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ABSTRACT
This study explores changing perceptions of dryland degradation (desertification) as revealed
through twentieth century intergovernmental policies. Between the 1930s and 1990s these
policies reflected markedly different ideas regarding the nature of the problem (e.g., global or
local), its causes (e.g., natural or anthropogenic), and its remedies (e.g., based on modem science
or indigenous knowledge). In the 1970s, for example, policies portrayed desertification as a
phenomenon of worldwide extent. They identified "irrational systems of productivity" as
primarily responsible for the problem and prescribed technological means for its amelioration. In
the 1990s policies emphasized the local variability of land degradation. They attributed
desertification to complex interactions involving ecological, political and economic factors, and
called for decentralized programs and public participation.
This thesis argues that the history of desertification as a policy issue does not conform to
traditional notions of progress whereby advances in science enable and underwrite advances
toward effective governance. In this case, varied framings of the problem, rather than emerging
from improved understandings of nature, arose from interactions linking the creation of scientific
knowledge with the formation of international environmental institutions. The study identifies
four discrete periods of international desertification politics: colonial, modernist, internationalist
and pluralist, and undertakes a comparison of expert advisory processes, quantification, and
visual representations across the periods. On the basis of this comparison the thesis presents an
alternative interpretation of policy change and identifies three processes by which science and
international governance were mutually constitutive and evolved in tandem: authorization,
inscription, and boundary work. Authorization is the process that determines whose knowledge
counts and what methods of knowledge production are valid. Inscription describes the means by
which institutional resources and priorities embed problem framings and causal narratives.
Boundary work concerns efforts to organize activities, delegate responsibility, and determine
rules of participation. In the desertification case, boundary work proved important in delineating
realms of science and non-science, lay-expert, natural-social, and local-global. Recognition of
these processes opens the way to redefining expertise and redesigning expert advisory processes
in current international environmental regimes.
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Prologue
In the mid-i 970s television news crews provided inhabitants of the industrialized world
with unforgettable glimpses of the struggles and human tragedies that so often plague
residents of arid regions. Pictures of parched landscapes and emaciated children in living
rooms across North America and Europe highlighted the human inequities that contribute
to catastrophic dryland crises in politically and economically troubled places.
Americans, while familiar with their own desert regions, could hardly feel a sense of
oneness with the starving African people. Yet, transmission of these desperate images
throughout the globe also reflected (and perhaps promoted) a growing sense that the
social and ecological burdens of dryland peoples had to be shouldered, in part, by a
worldwide community. Nowhere did these burdens seem greater than in Africa.
Dry climates are synonymous with human suffering. Soil fertility and water are
not sufficient to support the degree of agricultural productivity found in more temperate
areas. The adequacy of the food supply is, therefore, uncertain. In addition, dryland
areas experience extreme fluctuations in temperature and humidity. Long periods of low
rainfall can deplete the soil of moisture, leaving desiccated landscapes and withered
crops, incapable of yielding precious agricultural resources. When torrential rains
terminate dry spells, the land cannot easily absorb the water and it races across the
ground's surface. The water floods communities, erodes soil and vegetation in its path,
and is wasted for human purposes.
So-called arid and semi-arid lands stretch across northern Africa, border the
Mediterranean and occupy parts of central Asia, the western coast of South America and
southwest North America. Calamities of drought and famine, however, are not evenly
dispersed among these regions. Such disasters wreak the greatest devastation at sites of
social and natural instability and where inequitable distribution of global resources is
most sorely apparent. The southwestern United States and Australia contain deserts and
arid climates. During the 1930s severe drought and economic depression in the Great
Plains of the United States gave way to agricultural and social devastation often called
the Dust Bowl. Aside from such notable exceptions, however, developed countries have
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not experienced nearly the level of hardship that has accompanied climate anomalies in
other settings. In places like the Sahel, India and South America, for example, people
must contend with a multitude of threats to human well being. It is the combination of
these ecological, financial and political hardships, which give rise to disasters such as
famine. Preconditions for disaster are, perhaps, most apparent in African countries.
Rainfall is exceedingly variable and natural resources, to begin with, are deficient.
Frequent droughts contribute to depletion of precious water reserves, drying of soils and
withering of vegetation. Economies are not developed and people lack the fiscal and
technological means which can aid societies in withstanding vagaries of climate.
Political systems are often unstable. They frequently lack the ability or will to promote
sound natural resource use and to erect buffers to cushion people against unfavorable
ecological change. Oppressive regimes, civil wars and absence of coherent, dependable
policies all handicap individuals in their attempts to secure and maintain their personal
livelihoods.
One of the most publicized accounts of arid region calamities occurred in the
Sahel between 1968-74. During this period, rainfall in Mauritania and Niamey dropped
by nearly 50 percent. Decreases in production of crops and livestock were commensurate
and observers estimated drought-related human deaths at 100,000 persons. Other
manifestations took the form of human migration and increased dependency on foreign
aid (Copans, 1983). Similar problems surfaced during the 1975 drought in Belize,
where colonial style agricultural practices were still in use and undermined the ability of
farmers to cope with rainfall shortages. Inhabitants lost millions of dollars (Belize) in
livestock values. Grain production dropped by 50% and immense shortfalls in rice
production required replacements from commercial imports (Hall, 1983). Similar crises
have afflicted India, Pakistan, central Asia and the Soviet Union.
Through a number of complex and interconnected processes, crises in
disadvantaged arid regions have become, in a sense, globalized. The media, employing
ever more sophisticated information technology has managed to shrink the world and
make events happening thousands of miles away appear as though they are happening
next door. Decolonization by European countries followed by an increasingly prominent
role for international institutions has helped to match the plight of developing countries
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with the technical and financial resources of developed countries, particularly on
environmental problems. Within this context, international institutions and actors have
taken up the task of understanding and addressing difficulties associated with natural and
social systems in arid regions.
Multilateral policies on desertification (land degradation in arid regions) provide a
noteworthy example of such actions. This form of environmental deterioration, though
variously defined, has been closely linked to processes of drought and famine. Over the
past eighty years, a number of intergovernmental initiatives have sought to alleviate this
menace. Consistently, developed and developing countries supporting these programs
have taken the position that people can and should do something to end, or at least
ameliorate, desertification. Yet, they also agree that, despite substantial effort, little has
been accomplished toward realizing this goal. The following account of tried and failed
attempts at international environmental initiatives explores the difficulties associated with
finding coherent solutions to the problem of dryland degradation. Attempts at
desertification policymaking, for example, have not consistently built on one another.
They have, instead, reflected markedly different interpretations of what desertification is,
how it happens, and who or what is responsible for it. In order to understand this
complex, non-linear evolution and some of the reasons why dryland problems have
proved so resistant to policy remedies, it will be necessary to examine the linkages
between international governance systems and changing knowledge and perceptions of
arid regions. The following chapters take up this challenge.
I I
CHAPTER 1
Understanding Policy Change
1.1 Motivation and Research Goals
The past three decades have witnessed the "globalization" of environmental issues and a
marked growth in international environmental agreements.' In addressing the complexity
of problems such as ozone depletion, climate change, and biodiversity, policymakers have
increasingly looked to science for guidance in identifying global threats and their
consequences. Deference to scientific and other forms of expertise is evident in the
growth of global change research (Sand, 1991), and in the proliferation of expert advisory
bodies and other institutional mechanisms created to inform negotiation and
implementation of environmental accords.2 Nevertheless, our understanding of
relationships linking science and multilateral environmental policymaking lags far behind
the rate at which we sign new treaties, convene international expert committees, and fund
large-scale scientific assessments. Surprisingly little systematic analysis has been carried
out to investigate policy formulation at the international level and how it relates to the
production, interpretation, and dissemination of knowledge about the global environment.
Much of the research addressing questions of science and international
environmental policymaking asks how science influences policy. Scholarship in the
fields of international relations and policy studies suggests that science is important
primarily because it can prompt policymakers to redefine their interests. Many analyses,
for example, describe the discovery of the ozone hole as a turning point in the Montreal
Protocol negotiations. They suggest that as scientists verified the hole's existence and
made it visible to the public, industrialized countries revised their priorities and their
Between 1974 and 1990 over 67 environmental treaties were concluded comprising approximately 51
percent of the total number of treaties. Before the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment
(UNCHE) 1.23 treaties were signed annually. Since UNCHE this rate increased to 4.2 per year (Haas and
Sundgren, 1993).
2 Such bodies include the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the expert assessment panels
for ozone agreements, and the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice under
the Convention on Biological Diversity.
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expectations about what they could accomplish as parties to the agreement (Haas, 1992b;
Porter and Brown, 1991).
Other analyses suggest that science is mainly a political resource, and
policymakers selectively marshal knowledge claims to advance their pre-determined
political positions. In 1989 non-governmental organizations working on wildlife
conservation issues sponsored a study of the African elephant. The study concluded that
the Convention on Trade in Endangered Species should declare the African elephant
threatened with extinction and should ban most trade in this elephant. According to
Porter and Brown (1991), parties to the Convention rejected or accepted the reports'
findings depending on whether or not they supported policies for other reasons.3
While the above analyses may call attention to science as an important element of
international environmental policymaking, they also tend to black-box the concept of
knowledge. As with much research in international relations and policy studies, these
accounts focus on knowledge claims alone, without examining the tacit negotiations that
produce these claims nor the processes through which people come to view them (or not)
as authoritative and credible. These facets of knowledge production, dissemination and
use are considered unproblematic because science itself is assumed to be either
monolithic and shaped outside of institutional, cultural and historical contexts, or else
wholly subservient to politics. Hence, the ozone hole seems to possess autonomous
agency and independent explanatory power (Jasanoff, 1996a), while the African elephant
assessment seems to be little more than a political weapon. In either case, scientific
knowledge appears as something separate from politics and either acting on or acted upon
by politics, rather than as something integral to and evolving with political
decisionmaking.
Underlying many of these conventional views of science and international politics
is the assumption that scientific knowledge accumulates along a linear pathway toward an
3 Collinridge and Reeve (1986) argue that a policymaking environment is always either under-critical or
over-critical of scientific claims. In under-critical environments a policy position is firmly established and
science that supports this position is not highly scrutinized. In over-critical environments, participants in
the policy process are divided on which course of action to adopt. Each group marshals scientific claims in
support of its own position, while challenging the validity of information presented by the opposing side.
Such "analytical intractability" can persist endlessly until some external event changes dynamics within the
policy community (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993)
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ever truer and more certain understanding of environmental degradation. International
policies and policy debates tend to suggest that, over time, scientific knowledge naturally
converges around a narrowly-defined, widely-accepted perception of a problem. As
noted in Agenda 21, Chapter 35, "Science for Sustainable Development,"
... A first step towards improving the scientific basis for these strategies is
a better understanding of land, oceans, atmosphere and their interlocking
water, nutrient and biogeochemical cycles and energy flows which all form
part of the Earth system. This is essential if a more accurate estimate is to
be provided of the carrying capacity of the planet Earth and of its
resilience under the many stresses placed upon it by human activities. The
sciences can provide this understanding through increased research into
the underlying ecological processes and through the application of modem,
effective and efficient tools that are now available, such as remote-sensing
devices, robotic monitoring instruments and computing and modelling
capabilities. The sciences are playing an important role in linking the
fundamental significance of the Earth system as life support to appropriate
strategies for development which build on its continued functioning. The
sciences should continue to play an increasing role in providing for an
improvement in the efficiency of resource utilization and in finding new
development practices, resources, and alternatives... Thus, the sciences are
increasingly being understood as an essential component in the search for
feasible pathways towards sustainable development (Agenda 21, Chapter
12 (2)).
This excerpt from Agenda 21 reflects predominant views of science in international
environmental policymaking contexts: namely, it portrays science as an important basis
for policymaking and an unquestioned vehicle of progress. As suggested by Agenda 21's
reference to a "more accurate estimate" of carrying capacity, there is a "right" perception
of the problem amenable to discovery through scientific research. Agenda 21 further
implies that as science facilitates such convergence around understandings of
environmental phenomena, science can and should also inform the ways in which people
interact with and respond to these phenomena, as through development activities.
Overall, this "more-is-better" philosophy of science assumes that more research and
scientific information about the environment automatically translate into more efficient,
effective and robust policies.
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This more-is-better approach also pervades notions of capacity and capacity
building regarding international environmental politics. Both observers of and
participants in international environmental policymaking tend to assume that equality
across scientific and technical resources of regime members is an important prerequisite
for equitable participation by these members. Levy et al. (1993: 407), for example, argue
that governments possessing comparatively weak technical capacity are likely to adopt
vague negotiating positions in policy debates because their constituents (due largely to
lack of scientific information) have not developed sufficient concern for an environmental
problem. These authors also suggest that "technically ignorant" governments tend to
adopt vague policy positions because they are unsure of the ecological, financial and
political implications of various policy commitments. To remedy the apparent disparities
and reluctance arising from imbalances in scientific and technological resources, scholars
such as Levy et al. (1993) advocate regular scientific monitoring of the environment,
monitoring and publication of state environmental policies, and
widespread development of scientific knowledge concerning the various
causes of environmental damage, the various consequences of suspected
pollutants, thus providing more accurate agenda specification over time
(Levy, et al., 1993: 412).
Hence, these authors, like those of Agenda 21, emphasize science as a path to more
correct understandings of the environment and ultimately to more effective policy. They
call for "open-ended knowledge creation" so that scientific analysis and re-analysis of
problems can continuously inform policymaking.
In the present study, I depart from conventional views of science and
policymaking. My approach stands in contrast to perspectives that frame science and
politics as wholly separate activities and focus on the role of scientific information in
redefining interests or in serving as a political weapon. Instead, I take the position that
scientific knowledge and political order, as reflected in policies and governing bodies, are
co-produced (Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998).4 In other words, the stabilization of factual
4 Susskind and Elliott (1983) also used the term "co-production" in their volume on citizen action and
citizen participation in the decisionmaking of western European governments. However, their use of the
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findings and the creation of social relationships, identities, and institutions are
interdependent. Understandings of natural and social systems, and the ways we go about
developing these understandings, influence how we organize treaty regimes and
intergovernmental agencies and how we regulate human interactions with the
environment. Similarly, the structure, composition and resources of social institutions
influence what scientific questions get asked, who has the authority to answer them, and
what the answers look like and signify.
I also question notions of progress that tend to follow from conventional
conceptions of science as an autonomous provider of ever improving knowledge about
environmental phenomena. Perceptions of problems such as acid rain and ozone
depletion seem to have narrowed over time to a set of widely-held perceptions of what
constitutes causes of and appropriate responses to these forms of degradation. However,
science and policymaking for problems such as deforestation and desertification have not
followed the same trajectory. In these histories science did not provide a singular, linear
pathway to greater truth and certainty on the part of researchers and policymakers.
Rather, at different points in time, policies regarding these issues reflected markedly
different ideas about the source of the degradation, its manifestations and what should be
done about it. My aim in this analysis is to understand relationships linking science and
politics in a case where there has not been closure around a singular problem definition.
In particular, I ask: in what ways do experts, policymakers, and institutions participate in
simultaneous creation of scientific knowledge and political order? And how might
enhanced understanding of these processes inform the way we conceptualize, organize
and conduct science and international environmental policymaking? These questions
form the primary motivation for the research.
term differs markedly from that of scholars in the field of Science and Technology Studies, as described in
the text. Susskind and Elliot defined co-production as a "pattern of participation in which decisions are
made through face-to-face negotiation between decisionmakers and residents claiming a major stake in
particular decisions." In doing so, public officials and citizens accept each other's involvement in the
decisionmaking process and the possibility that both citizens and government might participate in the
production of management and development processes.
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1.2 Research Approach: Case Comparison
Between roughly 1920 and the present, desertification politics have passed through four
maj or changes or eras, which I term colonial, modernist, internationalist and pluralist.
Each era is characterized by a unique and prevailing set of ideas about the nature, causes
and remedies of dryland degradation. I seek to explain this evolution through a
comparative study in which each of the four eras constitutes a case.5 I look within and
across the cases to examine how varying perceptions of desertification took shape, gained
prominence, and (in some instances) lost credibility. My analysis is based primarily on
policy documents, negotiating texts, scientific literature, and interviews with agency
officials, government representatives, scientists, and expert advisors.
The following discussion, as summarized in Table 1, briefly describes the four
eras of desertification science and policy. As with any idealized scheme, this
periodization oversimplifies desertification's complex history. It is not meant to imply
that this history is linear or that it took place in four wholly distinct compartments. Yet
these labels provide a useful organizational structure that facilitates discussion about the
different types of desertification "paradigms" that have existed over the last eighty years.
What I term the colonial era begins in the early 1920s, when claims of an
advancing Sahara desert first appeared (e.g., Bovill, 1921), and extends until World War
II commenced and African forestry research slowed. The modernist period begins in the
early 1950s with the early stages of decolonization in Africa and development of the Arid
Zone Research Programme under the United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific
Organization (UNESCO). This era continues through the United Nations Conference on
Desertification (UNCOD) in 1977, and ends in the early 1980s as the first critiques of
UNCOD policies began to appear. The internationalist era picks up in the early 1980s as
these critiques emerge and continues until the early 1990s with the United Nations
Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, the Rio Conference). The
pluralist era begins with the Rio Conference and extends through the 1990s, with the
5 See Long (1997) and Long (1998) for early formulations of this approach.
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signing of the Convention to Combat Desertification6 (CCD, or the Convention) and the
early stages of its implementation. Each time period reflects a different dominant framing
of the desertification problem. Comparison and contrast of these varied framings over
time provides insight into the cultural, social and political contexts from which they
emerged. Below are brief vignettes of each period, highlighting some of its key features.
In-depth descriptions of these periods are presented in Chapter 2. As ideas about the
nature of degradation changed over time, so did the terminology used to described
degradation processes. Many of these terms and their definitions appear in Table 2.
Colonial
The colonists saw dryland degradation as a national problem, arising largely from the
ignorance of African natives and amenable to natural resource policies and African
adoption of European farming practices. In 1937 the French and British colonial
administrations in West Africa set up a joint Forestry Commission to investigate reports
of severe dryland degradation south of the Sahara. The commissioners refuted forester E.
P. Stebbing's claims of a southwardly advancing desert. They similarly dismissed
theories that the West African climate was becoming increasingly arid, thereby shrinking
water bodies and destroying vegetation. However, the Commission agreed with
Stebbing's research revealing extensive deforestation due to shifting cultivation, a
farming method apparently popular among the indigenous African peoples. According to
reports of the time, a shifting cultivator would fell and burn a track of forest and farm the
land with minimal maintenance effort. Once crop yield began to diminish, he moved on
to another track of forest to repeat the same process. In lieu of transnational projects
involving extensive forest belts, the panel recommended European-style agriculture,
increased forest reserves, and greater coordination among colonial natural resource
departments.
6 The full title of the treaty is the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa.
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Table 1: Policy Comparison
Framing/Eras Colonial Modernist Internationalist Pluralist
Time Period Early 1920s to Early 1950s to Late 1970s Early 1980s to Early 1990s 1992+
World War II
Policy Anglo-French Plan ofAction to Combat Agenda 21, Chapter 12 Convention to Combat
Statement Forestry Desertification Desertification
Commission
Domain West Africa Global problem framing Global problem framing The global nature of
" French Niger based largely on the still prominent, but desertification is subject to
Colony physical extent of eventually questioned. debate.
" Northern Nigeria degradation. Debates regarding regional o Links to climate change
" Commission versus international nature 9 Regional annexes
views degradation of the problem arise during * International partnerships
as a local issue. UNCED.
Definition Debates concern: From drought to Land degradation Land degradation
" Desiccation desertification.
" Encroaching Spread of desert-like
deserts conditions arising from
direct physical interactions
with the land.
Causation Natural factors "Irrational systems of "Climatic variations and "Complex interactions among
versus productivity:" overgrazing, human activities." physical, biological, political,
shifting cultivation. salinization, social, cultural and economic
overcultivation. factors."
Remedies Coordination among "Proximate solution" Basic research, increased Bottom-up approach:
natural resource * Top-down vegetation, poverty 9 Public participation
departments e Technological fixes eradication, popular * Local and traditional
I_ I Iparticipation. knowledge
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Table 2: Frequently Used Terms
Term General Meaning
Progressive desiccation A purported trend of increasing aridity in West Africa
during the 1920s and 1930s. Some colonial researchers
believed that this phenomenon resulted in shrunken
streams, lowered water tables, decreased vegetation, desert
encroachment and human migration. However, observers
disagreed as to which of these symptoms existed and what
causal mechanisms were responsible for degradation.
Desert encroachment The expansion of a desert outward from its center.
Shifting cultivation Process by which a farmer deforests an area of land,
cultivates crops on this land with minimal upkeep and then
moves to a new tract of land to repeat the process.
Land Refers generally to soil, vegetation and hydrology.
According to the Convention to Combat Desertification
land means:
"terrestrial bioproductive system that comprises soil,
vegetation, other biota, and the ecological and hydrological
processes that operate within the system (CCD, 1994,
Article (e): 7).
Land use Refers generally to activities that deplete or alter land
resources. They include grazing, irrigation, cropping and
deforestation.
Land degradation "...reduction or loss, in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid
areas of the biological or economic productivity and
complexity of rainfed cropland, irrigated cropland, or
range, pasture, forest and woodlands resulting from land
uses or from a process or combination of processes,
including processes arising from human activities and
habitation patterns..." (CCD, 1994, Article 1(f): 7).
Arid, semi-arid and dry "...areas, other than polar and sub-polar regions, in which
sub-humid areas the ratio of annual precipitation to potential
evapotranspiration falls within the range from 0.05 to 0.65"
(CCD, 1994, Article l(g): 8).
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Modernist
Policymakers in the 1970s viewed desertification as a problem of global extent, arising
from irrational land use practices, and amenable to scientific and technological solutions.
Between August 29 and September 9 1977, five hundred delegates from 94 countries
gathered in Nairobi, Kenya for the United Nations Conference on Desertification (the
Conference or UNCOD). The Conference followed two years of extensive research and
assessment activities. These efforts took place under the leadership of the Conference
Secretariat, housed in the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). At the
Conference, government representatives negotiated an international Plan ofAction to
Combat Desertification (the Plan or PACD). The Plan portrayed desertification as a
global problem arising from "irrational" land use practices and linked to the African
drought and famine crisis of 1968-1973. It also emphasized the effects of land
degradation on human welfare and the economic development of affected communities.
In the face of these problems, country representatives prescribed a "proximate solution"
for desertification (UNCOD, 1978: p. 8). This solution focused on improving various
livelihood systems through internationally-coordinated national policies, guided by
scientific expertise (mainly from developed countries) and facilitated by western-style
technologies.
Internationalist
The 1980s were a decade of evaluation and critique regarding desertification science and
policy. The 1980s also marked period in which competing national perspectives
influenced international cooperation on environmental issues. UNEP set about measuring
the global "status" and "rate" of desertification's "advance." When assessment results
suggested a worsening of the problem, UNEP expressed disappointment with the Plan's
implementation (Tolba, 1984; Dregne, 1984, Mabbutt, 1984; UNEP, 1984; Tolba 1987).
Outside UNEP, Swedish researchers used remote sensing studies to question the very
existence of desertification (Hellden, 1988). Others criticized the ways that
desertification had been conceptualized and addressed in the 1970s. They took issue with
the multiple meanings ascribed to the term (Glantz and Orlovsky, 1983; Verstraete,
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1986), heavy reliance on natural as opposed to social science expertise (Spooner and
Mann, 1982), methodologies used to characterize desertification (Caldwell, 1984; Warren
and Agnew, 1988), and causal narratives that portrayed victims of desertification as
obstacles to rather than resources for its remedy. By the early 1990s, even TNEP began
to re-examine the Plan's definition of desertification and its top-down solutions (UNEP,
1991). In the midst of preparations for the Rio Summit desertification once again became
the subject of an international policy statement. Chapter 12 of Agenda 21 identified
desertification as a problem of land degradation arising from "climatic variations and
human activities." Policy remedies included poverty eradication and popular
participation, as well as basic research and increased vegetation.
Pluralist
Policies in the 1990s portrayed a more complex vision of desertification processes and
emphasized local participation and the use of indigenous knowledge and practices along
with science in addressing the issue. On May 24, 1993, diplomats from developed and
developing countries revisited Nairobi as part of the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee for the Elaboration of an International Convention to Combat Desertification
(INCD). Unlike participants in the 1977 conference, these delegates did not identify a
single factor, such as land use, as responsible for desertification. Neither did they portray
scientific expertise as the primary means for defining desertification and devising its
solutions. As early as the first negotiating session, participants began painting a more
complex picture of desertification. They pointed to complex interactions among
ecological, social and political factors (CCD, 1994: Preamble) as responsible for
desertification. Rather than "top-down" policies based on more "rational" land use and
western technologies, developed and developing countries alike called for a "bottom-up"
approach involving local communities and greater participation by women and non-
governmental organizations. Instead of focusing exclusively on "science," the
Convention emphasized the broader category of "knowledge." This discursive shift
focused attention on both previously unrecognized forms of knowing, and modern
science as useful resources in understanding and ameliorating desertification.
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1.3 Theoretical Background
In this study I attempt to explain how changes in desertification policy came about and
what they can teach us about relationships between scientific knowledge and international
environmental policymaking. Knowledge is an important aspect of the desertification
story because throughout the twentieth century there have been significantly different
understandings of purportedly the same phenomenon - land degradation. Policies are
also a key feature of this history because they reflect prevailing ideas about both the
nature of the problem and how to ameliorate it via social regulation and environmental
management.
In attempting to understand the evolution of desertification as a transnational
policy issue, I turn to three theoretical frameworks that address questions of knowledge
and policymaking: regime theory, the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF), and
science and technology studies (S&TS). In the following sections I briefly describe and
critique these research approaches. The cognitivist school of regime theory and the ACF
tend to focus on how political actors use scientific knowledge and how new information
changes the behavior of these actors. While these research areas make valuable
contributions in recognizing cognitive factors as an important element of policymaking
and policy change, they rest on several assumptions that are at odds with the
desertification case. In particular, they tend to assume that knowledge accumulates in a
uni-directional fashion and largely in isolation of societal factors. In contrast, S&TS
scholarship provides a more useful set of tools for analyzing the history of desertification
policy. Researchers in this field examine the plurality and social constructedness of
knowledge. They acknowledge the existence of multiple methods of knowing a complex
environmental phenomenon and the non-linear pathways by which knowledge
development proceeds. They analyze the cultural and ideological factors embedded in
production, representations and perceptions of knowledge, and probe ways in which
understandings of natural and social systems intersect with efforts to govern and live
within these systems.
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1.3.1 Regime Theory
Regime theorists seek to explain the collective management of global and regional
interdependence (Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992).7 They investigate why states act
collectively on certain issues and how they develop practices, rules and arrangements
intended to guide behavior. In short, this line of scholarship furthers understanding about
the formation and evolution of regimes (Young, 1998: Haas, 1993). Regimes are defined
as:
... sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decisionmaking
procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of
international relations (Krasner, 1983: 2; also quoted in Haas, 1989:
381).'
By this definition, regimes are not simply policy agreements or treaties, but are, instead,
social institutions that embody patterns of behavior in compliance with a set of norms and
rules (Hurrell and Kingsbury, 1992).9
Krasner's (1983) classic edited volume depicted regimes as an intervening
variable between causes and policy outcomes. Debates among regime theorists focus on
whether material conditions, interests, or ideas are the primary driver of regime formation
and evolution (Haas, 1989; Haas, 1992a; Young, 1994; Young, 1998). 10 Realists and
7 Regime theory grew out of interdependence theory (Keohane and Nye, 1977), a reaction to state-centered
international relations scholarship. Interdependence theory suggested that transnational, societal factors,
not just relations among states, were important in shaping international politics. Contrary to some of the
assertions of interdependence theory, states have remained a central player in the face of economic
interdependence (List and Rittberger, 1992).
8 "Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are standards of behavior defined in terms
of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decisionmaking
procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice" (Krasner, 1983: 2; also
quoted in Haas, 1989: 381).
9 A regime, for example, is not a treaty. "Whereas a treaty is a legal instrument stipulating rights and
obligations, a regime is a social institution wherein stable patterns of behaviour result from compliance with
certain norms and rules, whether these are laid down in a legally binding instrument or not" (Hurrell and
Kingsbury, 1992: 90).
10 Krasner (1983a) summarized the determinants of regime development as: self interest, political power,
norms and principles, habits and customs, and knowledge. More recent work on regimes has consolidated
these factors into power, interests, and knowledge.
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neorealists maintain that actors who possess the greatest material power act as hegemons
during the process of regime formation and change. These actors dictate the norms and
rules of the regime and thereby determine relationships among parties to the regime and
their respective roles in managing environmental problems. Utilitarians rely on game
theoretic or microeconomic explanations. They believe that participants in the process of
regime formation act to maximize their own benefits.
Cognitivists, by contrast, believe that agreement about the causes and solutions of
a problem can motivate regime development." They look to consensual knowledge and
social learning for explanations about regime formation and change. They also maintain
that new information can enable actors to redefine their interests and thereby learn over
time (Haas, 1993; Young, 1994). 12 13 Cognitivists generally view knowledge as emerging
outside of political forums. They are interested in how this knowledge influences the
policy process and argue that scientific findings are important because they can alter
behavior. As regime participants acquire new knowledge they are assumed to refine their
understanding of a problem. This may cause them to support a new regime, or change the
course of an existing one.
Students of international environmental regimes tend to believe that cognitive
factors have their greatest impact on a regime during its early stages of development. In
other words, ideas and scientific knowledge are thought to be most important during
agenda formation and fact-finding (Porter and Brown, 1991).14 15 During this process,
" This relates to the Gramscian notion of a hegemonic worldview (Cox, 1983; Young, 1994).
12 Regime theory has been the subject of critiques since its emergence as part of the international relations
literature. In 1983, Susan Strange denounced regime theory as faddish, imprecise, value-biased, static in its
conceptualization of regimes, and narrow in its focus on state-centered paradigms. More recently, even key
proponents of this school of thought lament the tendency of some scholars to focus on a single factor such
as hegemonic stability and the role of expert coalitions in explaining regime formation and change
(Young, 1998). Despite these criticisms, however, regime theory has persisted well into the 1990s and has
proliferated especially among scholars interested in international environmental governance.
13 This school of thought constituted a major departure from traditional international relations theory and its
emphasis on interest, and economic-based explanations for international cooperation. As noted by Stephen
Krasner in 1983, regime theory was potentially liberating for structuralists because it emphasized the role of
"learning, cognitive ideas, and understanding" -- factors usually dismissed as causal explanations in
political science.
14 Students of international politics tend to conceive of the regime formation process as comprised of three
stages: agenda formation, negotiation, and operationalization or regime strengthening (Young, 1998; Porter
and Brown, 1991). During agenda formation, relevant actors in the international community identify a
problem, its causes and possible remedies. Throughout the negotiation phase, states engage in bargaining
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parties are said to develop authoritative statements about the problem, and interested
parties endorse the regime if they believe these problem statements are valid and
necessitate regime formation:' 6
Agenda formation calls for intellectual leadership to frame issues, to
present them in ways that capture the imagination of attentive publics, and
to bring the weight of the scientific community and other groups of experts
to bear in persuading policymakers of the importance of the issues at stake
(Young, 1998: 23).
According to regime theorists, ideas have less impact on later stages of regime
development, while interests and material power have more. By this time, it is assumed,
the problem has been defined and regime participants set out to forge and implement
regulations aimed at remedying the problem. During implementation, policymakers
engage in legislative and administrative politics as they negotiate the allocation of
resources required for implementation (Young, 1998: 24).
Epistemic Communities
One way in which scientific knowledge is thought to influence regime development is
through epistemic communities. Epistemic communities are coalitions of experts who
share research methodologies and normative convictions, unite in pursuit of a common
policy enterprise, develop and disseminate knowledge about a given policy problem, and
contribute significantly to regime formation around a given policy issue. Epistemic
community members share normative beliefs that provide a "value-based rationale" for
over what international action should take place. During implementation, or regime strengthening the initial
agreement is put into practice and states engage in further bargaining to forge new agreements, and/or
amend existing agreements. Porter and Brown (1991) add a fourth stage of fact-finding between agenda
setting and bargaining; this phase does not occur in all cases, and sometimes blends in with bargaining
activities. Fact-finding is a collective attempt by states to jointly discover more information about an issue
and to clarify disagreements about the cause, nature, and extent of the problem. Porter and Brown (1991)
suggest that when no joint fact-finding takes place, states who oppose regime formation can openly
challenge perceptions of the problem established during the issue definition stage.
5 Young (1998) suggests that interests are more important during the negotiation stage of regime formation,
while allocation of material resources and enforcement are key factors during the operationalization stage.
16 The international environmental institutions literature similarly portrays scientific knowledge as central to
agenda setting. Keohane et al. (1993: 8), for example, suggest that international institutions contribute to
"more appropriate agendas" by "reflecting the convergence of political and technical consensus about the
nature of environmental threats."
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taking social action (Haas, 1992a: 3). These members also subscribe to a set of
methodologies for knowledge validation that guide the analysis of problems impacting
society. Problem analysis leads to a shared understanding of problem causes. Insight into
causal relationships enables the community to develop shared ideas about what types of
policy should be put in place. According to cognitivists, as an epistemic community
champions a policy enterprise, the community helps to catalyze international cooperation
and policy formulation (Haas, 1992a: 3).
According to a well-known case study by Peter Haas, epistemic community
activity significantly influenced the negotiation of the Mediterranean Action Plan, a
regional treaty aimed at controlling marine pollution. Haas suggests that individual
scientists who shared common beliefs regarding ecological values, the causes and severity
of pollution, and appropriate policy responses, coordinated a lobbying effort. Their
coalition encouraged government cooperation and domestic intervention aimed at
protecting the Mediterranean environment (Haas, 1990). Other studies have analyzed the
role of epistemic communities in regimes for ozone depletion and whaling (Haas, 1992b,
Peterson, 1992).
Regimes and Learning
Although the role of knowledge is thought to decrease in later periods of regime
development, learning is believed to be a primary process through which cognitive factors
shape a regime's evolution. Cognitivists believe that regime change occurs when new
knowledge causes regime participants to redefine their interests. The regime, in other
words, is viewed as the dependent variable transformed by new information:
... a major independent variable is new information, a major intervening
variable is the mode of information-processing at the state level, and the
dependent variable is the regime pattern (Haas, 1993: 175).
Haas (1993) also suggests that new knowledge has the potential to transcend ideology,
especially when it is consensual.
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Ernst B. Haas, a noted political scientist, adopted a similar approach in his 1990
analysis of three international organizations. Addressing the role of knowledge, power
and learning in organization change, he sought to explain how, over time, a given
organization defines and redefines the problem it intends to solve. Haas claimed that
problem definitions change through one of two processes: adaptation and learning.
Adaptation refers to incremental change that occurs without a questioning of causal
theories, underlying values, or the organization's purpose. In contrast, learning is a
behavior change that can occur when epistemic communities present consensual
knowledge to decisionmakers within an organization. This knowledge causes actors to
question prior theories, values and the organization's overall purpose. As actors redefine
the organization's goals they also revise the means for achieving these goals.
... the knowledge available about the problem at issue influences the way
decision makers define the interest at stake in the solution to the problem;
political objectives and technical knowledge are combined to arrive at a
conception of what constitutes one's interest" (E. Haas, 1990: 9)... The
doing of actors can then be described by observers as an exercise of
defining and realizing interests informed by changing scientific knowledge
about man and nature (E. Haas, 1990: 11).
Both Peter and Ernst Haas note that scientific knowledge is integral to policymaking.
Ultimately, however, they seem to suggest that science acts autonomously on the political
process by changing interests and decisionmaking.
Limitations of Regime Theory
The cognitivist school of regime theory makes a valuable contribution by recognizing
knowledge as an important component of policymaking. However, this approach has
several limitations that diminish its usefulness in understanding relationships linking the
science and politics of desertification. As mentioned above, this view tends to portray
science as exogenous to policymaking, to black box knowledge and treat it as a singular
category, and to assume that knowledge accumulates in a linear fashion over time,
thereby progressively reducing uncertainty and enabling policymakers to make more
enlightened and more accurate choices.
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The regime theory perspective separates the cognitive elements of policymaking
from interests and material elements. This is apparent in the "either or" formulations
used to describe regime formation and in the notion that agenda setting is the primary site
for knowledge use. Regime change, for example, is said to result from influences that are
either realist or utilitarian or cognitive. According to Young (1994: 39) "most observers
believe that ideas matter in the sense that their impact on processes of regime formation is
independent of the exercise of power or the interplay of interests." Regime theorists
therefore imply that knowledge is somehow disconnected from these other factors. This
belief also pervades assumptions about the role of knowledge during different stages of
the policy process. The suggestion that knowledge is most important before political
negotiations get underway, implies that knowledge creation and policymaking happen in
sequential order. Knowledge is largely isolated from ideological influences, and acts
primarily to enlighten individuals and assist them in redefining their interests. 17
Similar ideas permeate the literature on epistemic communities. Epistemic
community research importantly reveals knowledge to be a basis for community building
and for the formation of social identity. Epistemic community theory, however, has been
criticized on several fronts for the questions it leaves unanswered and for its limited
usefulness in informing policymaking (Susskind, 1994). 18 In most cases, for example, it
is unclear whether epistemic communities can be legitimately treated as independent
variables. The approach also fails to examine the processes by which knowledge and
networks develop and knowledge claims achieve acceptance. It obscures critical
17 Yet, even some regime theorists suggest that there is something missing from this sort of approach. As
one researcher remarked, "...there is something disembodied about this line of thought; it seems to rely on
a spontaneous process that has no engine to drive it" (Young, 1994: 96).
18 Some critics of epistemic community theory question the political power ascribed to these networks and
the means by which they achieve cognitive authority (Jasanoff, 1996a). Porter and Brown note that
scientists may support and enable some environmental regimes, but "remain divided or even captured by
particular government or private interests in others" (Porter and Brown, 1991: 25). Oran Young suggests
that scientists can call attention to a problem, enhance understanding, present alternative solutions, and
provide means of implementing solutions. However, he questions the ability of a group of experts to
"manipulate" political decisionmaking. Young goes so far as to question whether epistemic communities are
actually a product of regime formation rather than its agents. (Young, 1994: 97; Young, 1993: 439).
Lawrence Susskind supports the idea that networks of experts might subscribe to an agreed problem
definition or causal model. However, Susskind is doubtful that experts, divorced from national interests,
would agree on policy responses or would compete effectively against national representatives who support
alternative response measures (Susskind, 1994: 75).
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questions of values and power, which are inevitably central to international
environmental negotiations (Jasanoff, 1996a; Litfin, 1994). This approach also tends to
bypass consideration of institutions and their role in creating, communicating and using
knowledge. Peter Haas, for example, notes the potential importance of organizational
structures in diffusing knowledge and determining its impacts, but admits that epistemic
community studies do not explore these factors (Haas, 1992a: 28). They tend to focus,
instead, on the fate of a knowledge claim once it appears as part of the political debate.
There is little consideration of why or how this knowledge emerged and how the
processes by which it was shaped may have influenced or been influenced by ideological,
institutional, and/or cultural factors.
The learning literature focuses on how development of new knowledge follows a
linear pathway carrying policymakers ever closer to understanding their true interests.
The desertification story, however, does not fit this simple scenario. Rather, scientific
research in this area has encountered stops and starts, sideways diversions, and even the
reenactment of old controversies. For example, debates about desert encroachment that
began in the 1920s were repeated virtually verbatim in the 1970s. Similarly,
understandings about the interactions of climate and desertification have followed a
pattern more closely resembling a circle than a straight line. The 1920s witnessed lively
debates about progressive desiccation. Some scientists argued that a trend of increasing
aridity was killing the vegetation and depleting water sources (Hubert, 1920). Others
contended that the climate had alternated between wet and dry intervals since the
Quaternary Period (Jones, 1938; Falconer, 1938). Similar discussions surfaced in the
1970s and 1990s as experts and policymakers debated the relative contributions of long-
term climate change, short-term climate variability, and human factors in prompting
desertification (Charney, 1975; Jackson and Idso, 1975; Hare, 1977; Hare, 1983;
Williams and Balling, 1996; Balling, 1993).
Even a cursory glance at the four eras of desertification policy identified above
suggests that there is more going on than simply the production of objective knowledge,
wholly dictated by nature and impersonally influencing decisionmaking. Knowledge and
policies regarding desertification have been negotiated simultaneously (rather than in
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sequence) for decades. Politics has evolved in tandem with the acceptance of different
forms of knowledge and means of knowledge production. Colonial visions of
desertification as a local rather than a transnational problem had much to do with methods
of dryland observation and with the organization of the French and British
administrations. Similarly, UNEP's position as a fledgling international agency coupled
with certain mapping techniques and North/South dynamics all contributed to
transforming West African drought and famine problems of the early 1970s into an
international desertification problem. Hence, scientific understandings of desertification
evolved in tandem with politics in an interactive rather than a linear cause-and-effect
process.
1.3.2 The Advocacy Coalition Framework
The Advocacy Coalition Framework is another line of scholarship concerned with
scientific knowledge, policy change, and coalitions (although not simply expert
coalitions). 19 Like regime theory, the ACF focuses on the effects of knowledge on
policymaking, the use of technical information as a tool of persuasion in political debate,
and the role of new knowledge in enabling policymakers to develop a more accurate
picture of the world and their priorities. Unlike regime theory, however, the ACF
acknowledges to some degree the social construction of knowledge. According to
Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), policy analysis is a process through which individuals
agree to the validity of claims involving facts and values. A knowledge claim is
analytically tractable (i.e., authoritative and credible) when it is based on recognized data,
methods and theories.
The ACF focuses on policy subsystems: groups of actors from all levels of
government, private organizations, and interest groups who focus on policy problems
such as water quality, mental health or air transportation (Sabatier, 1993). Within a
subsystem, actors who share common normative and causal beliefs 20 act collectively as
19 Although the ACF was developed based on case studies of domestic policymaking, Granville Sewell
(forthcoming) has applied the model to international climate change policymaking.
20 Belief systems provide the "glue" that binds a coalition together. These belief systems reflect ideas about
how the world operates. They include basic normative convictions, policy objectives that arise from these
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an advocacy coalition. Government programs and policies arise from interactions among
these competing coalitions and perturbations external to the subsystem. Relatively stable
parameters such as the nature of the problem, the distribution of natural resources, and the
legal structure of the political system impose similarly stable constraints on these
dynamics.
Here, as in regime theory, knowledge is believed to affect policy formulation
through a learning process by which scientific and technical analysis can alter beliefs
within a coalition or within the broader policy subsystem.2' Four principles govern the
role of technical information in policy learning and the policy change that can arise from
this learning: (1) analysis is usually stimulated by threats to core aspects of one's own
belief system or by the perception that another competing coalition has an opportunity to
realize its core values; (2) technical information is critical for alerting people to the
possibility that a policy issue affects their interests; (3) advocacy coalitions often use
technical information to justify and elaborate their policy positions; (4) such
substantiation is generally necessary if actors wish to translate their beliefs into policy.
Political power is not enough to ensure the dominance of a coalition within the
subsystem. This coalition must also provide the technical information necessary to
convince other actors that its positions regarding policy objectives and the means for
obtaining them are sound (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993: 45).
The ACF outlines favorable conditions for "productive analytical debate." Some
of these conditions concern the nature of expert forums.2 2 Because analysis is a social
convictions, and ideas about the means for realizing these policy objectives. Sabatier (1993) distinguishes
between three elements of a belief system: deep core beliefs, near (policy) core beliefs, and secondary
beliefs. Deep core beliefs are fundamental normative and ontological axioms that reflect an individual's
philosophical orientation. These apply to all policy areas and are very difficult to change. Sabatier likens
change in deep core beliefs to religious conversion. Near core, or policy core beliefs, are fundamental
policy positions. These positions concern strategies for translating normative convictions into policy.
Policy core beliefs relate to the specific policy area and are difficult, but possible, to change if conditions
are conducive to change. Secondary aspects focus on instrumental decisions and information searches
necessary to implement the policy core. These beliefs are moderately easy to change and constitute the
topic of most administrative and legislative policymaking (Sabatier, 1993: 30-1).
2 Technical information is also said to mobilize "latent actors," individuals who would become active in the
policy subsystem if they had access to the relevant information. Advocacy coalitions often activate latent
constituencies and increase their influence in the subsystem (Sabatier, 1993: 24).
22 Analytical intractability pertains to issues subject to a high degree of uncertainty. These issues are
complex, perceived causal mechanisms span several policy areas, and policy objectives regarding these
issues differ among groups (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier, 1993b: 51).
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process involving discussion of facts and values, the forum for this discussion plays an
important role in technical analysis. According to the ACF, an open forum invites the
expression of many diverse viewpoints but lacks the shared norms that underlie scientific
inquiry. Professional forums constitute a type of closed setting in which screening
assures that participants subscribe to common protocols for development and verification
of analytical claims. Professional forums limit the range of views expressed, as well as
the level of conflict among those views. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) suggest that
professional forums with diverse political membership are more apt to reach a consensus
over highly contentious issues than more open and democratic forums (Sabatier and
Jenkins-Smith, 1993).
The ACF departs in several important ways from regime theory. First, the ACF
recognizes that the data and methodologies used to produce knowledge influence the
authority and credibility of that knowledge. Second, the ACF acknowledges that the
actors who participate in knowledge creation (e.g., via an expert panel) can have
important effects on who ultimately accepts the knowledge as valid and persuasive.
Third, the ACF model recognizes the possibility of multiple knowledge positions based
on divergent policy interests of advocacy coalitions. These insights are important in
breaking down the black box that surrounds traditional conceptions of science as
independent of politics.
However, ACF adherents, like regime theorists, tend to focus on how knowledge
influences beliefs and serves as an instrument of political persuasion. There is little
consideration of how institutional contexts, cultures and interests could be embedded in
knowledge claims, and how scientific practices may affect not only an issue's analytical
tractability, but also the legitimation of certain institutional structures and problem
framings. In addition, the ACF stops short of probing how and what determinants of
credibility, sources of authority, modes of communication, social contexts and techniques
23 Munro (1993) compares Kuhn's The Structure ofScientific Revolutions, to the ACE. He suggests that
policy learning within a given policy paradigm is akin to normal science. Similarly, major policy failures
are like scientific revolutions in bringing about the revision of deep-seeded beliefs and normative
convictions. In this analogy, however, Munro seems to assume incorrectly that Kuhn's revolutions propel
science closer and closer to the truth.
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of validation make knowledge claims more or less open to deconstruction and more or
less stable over time. 24 As discussed in the next section, the field of science and
technology studies addresses many of these issues.
3.3 Science and Technology Studies
Researchers in the field of S&TS view science and technology to be an integral aspect of
social activity - worthy of deep intellectual analysis, in large part because science enjoys
a revered position as objective and free, or ideally free from values (Jasanoff, 1996b).
This position often obscures the social processes through which scientific knowledge is
constructed. S&TS aims to make these processes apparent to investigate their
implications for how science is integrated with other social activities. S&TS scholars do
not reject the idea that science seeks out truth (Jasanoff, 1996b). Rather they work to
understand what constitutes "truth" in different contexts and the means by which it is
discovered, accepted, communicated - and, as is important in policy settings,
deconstructed or reconstructed as an authoritative basis for action. Research in this field
explores knowledge production as a cultural, political and institutional activity. This
entails investigation of the socially relevant meanings and implications of scientific
claims and representations, as well as questioning of taken-for-granted categories,
classifications, and boundaries (Jasanoff, 1996b).
With his groundbreaking study in 1962, Thomas Kuhn challenged the idea that a
progressive accumulation of scientific knowledge carries us necessarily closer to a truer
vision of the world. Kuhn called attention to the possibility of multiple co-existing
perceptions of nature. He contended that personal and historical accidents can lead one of
many competing "paradigms" to comprise the worldview of a particular scientific
2I am not suggesting that coalitions have not been a factor in desertification's evolution. They have.
Coalition dynamics have also changed over time, with UNEP becoming less involved since its "reign" in the
1970s, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) becoming important participants in policy negotiations
of the 1990s (Corell, 1999). However, these factors by no means offer exhaustive explanations of why
governments sometimes viewed dryland degradation as a global problem, and at other times they did not.
Nor do these factors fully explain why policies in the 1970s cited human land use as the primary cause of
desertification (UNCOD, 1978), while in the 1990s policies identified "climatic variations and human
activities" (CCD, 1994: Article 1(a)) as responsible.
2 In drawing upon these ideas in my research, I am not suggesting that there are no knowable facts about
the world and how it works. I am simply interested in how people go about discovering, articulating,
trusting, and deconstructing such facts.
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community at a given point in time. Once this world view is established, scientists take
up the day-to-day tasks of "normal science" in confirming and augmenting their shared
beliefs, while also suppressing anomalies that challenge these beliefs. But these
anomalies, in Kuhn's account, inevitably resurface. When the accumulation of such
anomalies subverts the basis of the existing scientific enterprise, a scientific revolution
may take place. Through this revolution the community members reach a different set of
shared beliefs and commitments.
More recent scholarship has shown that interpretations of the natural world
depend on the social context from which they emerge, as well as on nature itself.
Ideology, culture, values and materiality are part of knowledge production in just the
same way that they are integral to any other social activities. Consequently, even when
using purportedly objective scientific methods, individuals can come to different
conclusions about the causes, impacts and implications of a given natural phenomenon.
People from different political positions are apt to view the world in ways that conform to
their expectations and personal interests (Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Nelkin, 1992).
Similarly, national-scale approaches to issues of science and technology tend to reflect
culturally embedded beliefs and priorities, as well as attitudes toward risk, uncertainty,
and regulation (Brickman et al., 1985; Jasanoff, 1986, 1987). Even ideas about what
constitutes "knowledge" may vary with social context. In some cases failure to recognize
lay knowledge, as reflected in the observations and interpretations of local people have
accompanied major failures on the part of more traditionally "scientific" projects (Wynne
1989; Fairhead and Leach, 1996; Leach and Mearns, 1996; Scott, 1998).
In developing these insights, S&TS scholars examine practices and artifacts
through which knowledge is constructed and represented. In the context of this thesis,
practices are the formal and informal techniques employed by scientists, policymakers,
institutions, and governments as they create knowledge and policy regarding the global
environment. While these techniques are not governed by any distinct sets of rules, they
comprise widely agreed upon and frequently used methodologies. "Practice" might refer
to routine methods of negotiation whereby diplomats debate and modify the elements of a
negotiating text until they reach consensus. Similarly, "practice" might describe
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established methods for conducting statistical analyses of desertification impacts.
Artifacts are embodiments, inscriptions or representations of knowledge and policy (e.g.,
Latour and Woolgar, 1979; Latour, 1990). They may be textual or material, but are firm
enough to be portable or to circulate beyond their original place of production. Generally,
these artifacts are produced through application of one or more practices. A treaty, for
example, might be an artifact generated through policy negotiations. The treaty embodies
elements of the negotiation process and reflects a convergence of relevant views. A
graph, chart, or map might be an artifact generated through statistical analysis of
desertification. These artifacts serve as vehicles for communicating and representing
information about desertification's impacts. As discussed below, the practices and
artifacts of knowledge production and policymaking are deeply intertwined.
S&TS research has brought to light many ways in which institutions engage in or
interact with the production, dissemination and use of scientific knowledge. Some
studies have revealed the practices and politics of the laboratory as paramount to
knowledge construction (Latour and Woolgar, 1979). Others have investigated expert
advisory panels and their role in delineating the boundaries between scientific and non-
scientific institutions (Jasanoff, 1990; Gieryn, 1995). At broader scales, we see that
science itself has been integral to the rise of liberal democratic states. Ezrahi (1990), for
example, has persuasively argued that democratic governments draw on science to
construct and maintain their authority, legitimacy, and accountability in the eyes of the
public. Others have demonstrated how particular notions of objectivity and quantification
practices are integral to certain social identities (Porter, 1995) and governing structures
(Jasanoff, 1986).
In building on contributions from S&TS and related fields, Jasanoff and Wynne
(1998) use the notion of "co-production," to usefully articulate the interdependence of
scientific knowledge and political order. According to this model, scientific knowledge
and social order evolve jointly. Knowledge is not self-contained in its own isolated
sphere, but is instead integral to many aspects of social activity. Furthermore, scientific
knowledge is contingent not only on the natural world, but also on historical events,
social practices, and institutions that contribute to its construction, dissemination and use.
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Policies depend on specific knowledge claims, but also on the ways in which science is
conducted, communicated and used. In addition, the social/institutional contexts in
which knowledge production happens significantly shape the practices and
representations of scientific knowledge, just as much as problem diagnoses and policy
prescriptions are shaped by scientific inquiry.
Co-production is a powerful conceptual resource. It facilitates identification and
analysis of important and complex relationships involving knowledge and
decisionmaking. Yet, to some extent these relationships have yet to be examined and
sorted out in detail through careful empirical research. Questions remain about the
identifying features of co-production, the roles of different actors and institutions in this
process, and how these factors vary across different contexts. Other questions concern
relationships linking co-production with social constructivist insights into knowledge
creation. In what ways, for example, are practices and artifacts integral to co-production
processes? And in what ways does co-production further the understanding of
phenomena such as quantification, standardization and visual representation? As
discussed in Section 1.4, the desertification case provides an auspicious site for
addressing these questions.
1.3.4 Summary of Theoretical Basis
Regime theorists and proponents of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) have
made important contributions to political science and policy analysis by calling attention
to science in the policymaking process, something largely overlooked in standard realist
accounts of international relations and much policy studies work. The regime theory and
ACF literatures highlight the role of ideas and the importance of problem framing in
policymaking. Research on epistemic communities links knowledge to social identity by
suggesting that expert groups share not only research methodologies and adherence to
certain causal explanations, but also values, normative beliefs, and commitments to social
action. The ACF literature similarly portrays technical knowledge as integral to the belief
systems of social collectives. This model acknowledges that data, analytical methods,
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and expert forums involved in knowledge production and technical debates can influence
the perceived validity and credibility of a given knowledge claim.
However, these approaches provide only limited insights into the desertification
story because they stop short of problematizing knowledge itself. They imply that
knowledge claims affect the. policy process only to the extent they are used to raise
general concern for a problem or influence decisionmaking. Regime theory, in particular,
assumes scientific knowledge to be apolitical and, in its ideal state, divorced from power
and ideology. Understandings of the world seem to emanate from objective observations
of nature and in isolation from historical, ideological, and cultural contexts. This suggests
that science is a monolithic process, governed by a universal and objective scientific
method, rather than comprised of multiple, negotiated, and locally constituted agreements
about analytical methods, standardization practices, modes of visual representation, and
rules for interpretation of findings. As pointed out by students of science and technology
studies, these latter aspects of knowledge production are not only socially and culturally
contingent (e.g., Brickman et al., 1985), but are also deeply intertwined with the creation
of political order.
In revealing the interdependence of scientific knowledge and political order,
science and technology studies provides many tools and insights useful in analyzing the
desertification case. S&TS demonstrates that knowledge is often pluralistic and takes
shape through social processes. These processes in turn may impart cultural, ideological
and institutional character to scientific understandings, just as the understandings
themselves embed and shape institutions, politics and policies.
The concept of co-production importantly points to the interdependence of
scientific knowledge and political order. Studies have demonstrated, for example, how
polities (Ezrahi, 1990), regulatory regimes and the courts (Jasanoff, 1995) depend upon
science for guidance and legitimacy, while at the same time participating in the
construction of that knowledge. Similar approaches have been applied in understanding
international environmental policy (e.g., Taylor, 1992; Zehr, 1994; Wynne, 1995;
Jasanoff and Wynne, 1998). Yet little, if any work, has explicitly defined ways in which
38
institutions for international environmental policymaking and management are involved
in co-production.
1.4 Thesis Argument
As noted above, science did not progress in a linear fashion carrying policymakers ever
closer to a true understanding of desertification. The twentieth century has not witnessed
closure and consensus around a singular meaning of desertification or a narrow set of
remedies. Rather, at different points in time institutional settings, individuals, methods,
and types of knowledge gave rise to disparate perceptions of the issue and its solutions.
Knowledge about desertification did not emerge in isolation from institutional and
political contexts. Rather, institutions and policies regarding desertification have evolved
in tandem with knowledge about it. Cultural, social and political features of the regime
are embedded in different framings of desertification, just as knowledge about this issue
has helped to validate (or invalidate) colonial views of the African people, assumptions
about successful development efforts, and the participation of various actor groups.
Hence, science and policy regarding desertification have not evolved according to
traditional notions of scientific enlightenment or progress. Each era of desertification's
history reflects both different understandings of dryland degradation and different forms
of political order aimed at ameliorating it. Decades of analysis and expert advice for
desertification did little to make its highly complex natural-social facets tractable in a
policy sense. The story suggests that when causal narratives are unclear and widely open
to debate (as in the desertification case), convergence around a narrow set of problem
framings and policy prescriptions (even after years of research and assessment) may be
unlikely. Under such circumstances, changes in prevailing perceptions, representations
and approaches regarding the problem will be highly dependent on changes in broader
governance systems and institutional contexts.
Despite marked variations in international policies, I argue that disparate ideas
about desertification arose by way of identifiable knowledge-policy interactions common
to each of the four eras. By comparing and contrasting science and policymaking across
the four eras I observe specific ways in which knowledge and policy were mutually
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constitutive. This analysis focuses on two types of observations. First, I identify key
ways in which institutions participated in the creation of desertification science and
policy. By institutions I mean the individuals, forums, rules, and practices that comprise
administrative bodies, organizations, and regimes. Through a broad historical analysis of
desertification science and policymaking, I demonstrate how the assumptions and
worldviews embedded in international institutions were translated into varying
perceptions of the desertification problem across four policy eras. Second, I analyze ways
in which practices and artifacts contribute to co-production. I explore the specific means
by which scientists, policymakers, and institutions developed, contested, and changed the
dominant framings of desertification. In particular, I show how expert advisory
processes, quantification, and visual representations of desertification varied with
diagnoses of and prescriptions for the desertification problem.
1.4.1 Authorization, Inscription and Boundary Work
Institutional settings affect the ways in which scientists, policymakers and others go about
understanding and managing human/environment interactions. 26 Institutions are highly
visible collectives and often have considerable resources. Consequently, institutions can
be particularly powerful in framing a policy problem, identifying its remedies, and
implementing these remedies. Institutions help to determine what knowledge and whose
knowledge counts; what questions are relevant and important; how questions should be
answered (i.e., what methodologies are valid); and how answers (knowledge claims)
should be represented, interpreted, and used. I identify three primary ways in which
institutions have shaped dominant framings of desertification and corresponding policies.
I refer to these functions as authorization, inscription and boundary work.
Authorization refers to the role of institutions in determining whose knowledge
counts and what methods of knowledge production are valid. International institutions
26 This is by no means a uni-directional cause-and-effect relationship. Institutions reflect certain
understandings of the world and assumptions about political order. Institutions are at once products and
sites of co-production as well as participants in co-production processes.
27 Haas et al. (1993) also identifies three institutional functions. They argue that effective institutions are
able to change levels of concern regarding an issue, provide contracting environments, and affect capacity.
However, this model does not provide tools for examining knowledge production.
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such as the World Health Organization, the climate change regime, and the United
Nations Environment Programme design research agendas and convene expert panels.
This work can have direct implications for policy, especially when the research or expert
advice is developed explicitly in support of policymaking activities. In the desertification
case, institutions such as the French and British colonial administrations in Africa, the
United Nations Environment Programme, the United Nations General Assembly, and the
Desertification Secretariat were instrumental in defining the meaning of "expert." By
selecting expert advisors and designing expert mandates, these organizations determined
whose visions of desertification were legitimate and what methods for developing such
visions were valid and useful. The colonial administrators relied on the analysis of
foresters, hydrologists, and botanists. UNEP (the 1977 Conference Secretariat) convened
natural and physical science experts from fields such as soil science, climatology, and
physical geography. In the early 1990s, the expert advisory group to the negotiating
committee Secretariat included social as well as natural scientists. This Secretariat also
encouraged non-governmental organizations to share their understandings of
desertification.
Institutions can also be instrumental in defining relationships linking experts to
policy negotiations. The Secretariat to the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on
Desertification decided the timing of expert meetings in relation to policy deliberations
and also determined what modes of communication connected experts and policymakers.
These decisions significantly shaped perceptions and expectations of science, as well as
overall deference to science on the part of policymakers and others. In the 1970s, for
example, the United Nations Environment Programme was central in determining that the
natural and physical sciences should provide the primary tools for understanding and
ameliorating desertification. In the 1990s, the Desertification Secretariat and Parties to
the Convention have been much more receptive to social science perspectives and to lay
and non-western forms of knowledge in addressing desertification.
Inscription, on the other hand, is the process by which institutional characteristics
get inscribed on the definition of the problem itself. Environmental problems are
generally defined according to their causes and impacts. These causal "narratives"
(Cronon, 1992; Leach and Mearns, 1996) indicate a set of remedies for ameliorating the
problem. The desertification case shows that causal narratives and policy prescriptions
often reflect and are aligned with the interests, resources, and jurisdictional domain of
prominent institutions and governing bodies.
Each era of desertification policy reflects different ideas about desertification's
causes, impacts and remedies. As demonstrated in the following chapters, these features
of desertification's definition reflect the capabilities and priorities of the institutions that
dominated the policymaking process. The colonial and modernist era policies pointed to
allegedly irrational land use practices on the part of Africans as the primary reason for
desertification. This problem framing was compatible with the imperial agenda, not only
in their disrespect for local methodologies, but also because solutions included improved
coordination among natural resource departments and the introduction of European-style,
permanent agriculture. In the 1970s, the United Nations Environment Programme
advocated desertification policies that supported the tenets of international development,
and promoted scientific and technological solutions. More recent policies reflect a
broader causal narrative that points to "climate variations and human activities" (CCD,
1994: Article 1(a)) as responsible for desertification. They prescribe community-based
projects and greater reliance on local forms of knowledge. These developments reflect
UNEP's fading role in the desertification debate combined with greater participation by
non-governmental organizations.
Boundary work refers to the ways in which institutions define and differentiate
categories and organize activities in addressing a particular policy problem. It is part of
almost any successful institutional function, and is integral, for example, to both
authorization and inscription processes. Institutions and other collectives draw
boundaries for many different purposes. Expert advisory panels, for example, engage in
boundary work when they distinguish realms of science from those of non-science
(Jasanoff, 1990). Of particular interest in the desertification case are the ways in which
institutions delineate boundaries between lay-expert, science-policy, and global-local.
Lay-expert and science-policy boundaries in the desertification case were
primarily determined through authorization processes. Institutions distinguished between
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experts and non-experts as they established research priorities, created research agendas,
and selected members of advisory committees. Institutions defined the realms of science
and policy respectively when they issued a certain mandate to experts and another to
policymakers, established rules of participation, and structured relationships linking
expert and policymaking bodies. The changing role of social scientists and non-
governmental organizations, for example, played a major role in shaping the way that
Parties to the regime collectively thought about desertification and its remedies. In the
1970s social scientists were largely excluded from expert deliberations and non-
governmental organizations were not generally viewed as bearers of expert knowledge.
Throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, however, the desertification regime made room
for these perspectives, in effect blurring the boundaries between lay and expert. A similar
blurring has occurred in regard to science/policy boundaries. Whereas scientists in the
1970s carried out their work in advance of policy negotiations, experts advising the
Desertification Secretariat during the 1990s engaged (although communicating through
the Secretariat) in an iterative interaction with policymakers. Some of the experts
actually drafted portions of the negotiating texts.
The four eras of desertification policy also reflect changing ideas about the local
and global character of desertification. The colonial administrations rejected
transnational framings of West African land degradation in favor of more local framings.
In contrast, modernist approaches to desertification in the 1950s and 1970s, emphasized
the global extent of degradation and the need to use similarly global, universal, scientific
methods to understand and remedy it. Desertification policies of the 1990s returned to a
largely localized view of desertification, while still retaining the global features necessary
to support an international treaty.
The processes by which desertification has been defined and redefined as local or
global are closely tied to processes of institutional inscription. The desertification case
suggests that institutions tend to construct problems in their own image. The causes and
solutions of a given policy problem framing often corresponded to the agenda, tools and
resources of the dominant institutions involved with interpreting and remedying the
problem. Hence, the colonial administrations saw dryland degradation as a local problem
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that should be managed by natural resource departments. The United Nations
Environment Programme, on the other hand, saw desertification as a global problem,
aligned with UNEP's international agenda, and amenable to technical solutions and the
transfer of resources from North to South.
1.4.2 Chapter Overview
Table 3 briefly sketches the contents of Chapters 2 through 5. The columns in Table 3,
like those of Table 1 represent four international approaches to desertification. The rows
of the table summarize, in a highly abbreviated fashion, the following four chapters.
These chapters address the historical context in which desertification policy took shape,
expert advisory processes, quantification methods and representations, and visual
representations of knowledge.
The second row of the table corresponds to Chapter 2, which provides an
historical overview of the desertification issue, and highlights dominant international
institutions and key features of the political dynamics of each era. During the 1920s and
30s, for example, French and British administrations in West Africa generally operated as
independent governance systems, relying heavily on the expertise of specialists in fields
such as geography and forestry. The native African peoples were, of course, ruled by and
subservient to colonists, who treated the Africans as uncivilized and inferior. A new
global order began to take hold after World War II and Africa began a long route to
independence. "Third World" development became an objective of the international
community writ large as they attempted to attain worldwide prosperity with the tools of
science and technology. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP, a
fledgling agency) was highly influential in championing scientifically and
technologically-grounded approaches to environmental issues included in its mandate.
The 1980s and the early 1990s marked a period of increasing interest in so-called global
environmental issues and movement away from attempts on the part of industrialized
countries to impose science and technology on developing countries in their efforts to
address environmental problems. Throughout the 1980s, UNEP continued to function as
the lead agency on desertification issues. However, during this period national
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Table 3: Institutions, Practices and Artifacts
Colonial Modernist Internationalist Pluralist
Dominant Colonial powers in UNEP UNEP Desertification Secretariat, INCD,
Institutions West Africa National governments COP
Expert Advisory Independent Linear model Policy Evaluation Iterative model
Processes researchers. * Two-year process e Ad hoc panels 9 Broader notion of expert
9 Hierarchy of expertise e Pluralistic forums
Foresters, * Natural scientists Independent critiques 9 Disciplinary, geographic and
geographers, dominate * Social science gender diversity
agriculturalists serving * Greater attention to local
in colonial * UNEP's credibility in
administrations. question
Quantification Relative measures Global statistics Measures and management 9 Development and use of global
* "Status and rate" statistics diminishes
e Global statistics 9 New indicators address gender
questioned and capacity-building issues
* Critiques call for new
methods of counting
Visual Photographs and Lamprey's analysis of an World Atlas New forms of visualization
Representations Maps of Africa advancing Sahara. * UNEP Consultants e Scientists and non-scientists
e Personal & colonial * Global, continental and 0 ISS
perspectives World Map case studies * Web photographs
* France/Britain e International agencies * Local input and e A CCD logo
" Natural/Human * Global observations e Documentaries
" Colonists/Africans e Simplification and e Complexity - extensive
aggregation textual component
e Standardized measures of * Pluralistic visions
physical parameters
* Land use
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governments (such as those who participated in the ozone negotiations of the mid 1980s
and the Rio Summit in 1992) acting independently or in coalitions, held sway over
political deliberations and the content of policy statements. The later 1990s has seen a
broadening of participation in environmental politics. While national governments
ultimately make international policy, there has been growing interest in public
participation as reflected in, for example, local Agenda 21 initiatives. In the
desertification context new institutional mechanisms such as a Conference of Parties and
a Secretariat have replaced UNEP in its leadership position on desertification issues and
have fostered a substantial role for non-govemmental organizations in the policymaking
process
Chapters 3 through 5 analyze practices and artifacts as both instruments and
embodiments of authorization, inscription and boundary work. Practices and artifacts that
have been important in desertification's history concern expert advisory processes,
quantification and visual representation. Reliance on expert advisory panels has been a
frequent practice in international environmental policymaking. In addition, experts on
these panels employed various modes of analysis and communication that also constitute
practices. While expert panels themselves are not portable artifacts they generate such
artifacts in the form of reports, charts, graphs and numerical estimates. The design and
operation of expert advisory processes have embedded dominant views of desertification.
For example, technocratic approaches to desertification coincided with elite panels of
natural scientists. More democratic forums for sharing of expert knowledge coincided
with views of desertification as complex and locally contingent. Global maps of
desertification reflected perceptions of desertification as a worldwide problem with
scientifically knowable characteristics. At the same time, such maps were instruments
used to establish desertification as a global (rather than local) problem and to legitimate
the role of international institutions in solving this problem. Similarly, expressions such
as "irrational land use practices" were useful in establishing and representing the
authority of western farming methods over non-western methods.
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Expert Advisory Processes
Chapter 3 explores authorization, inscription, and boundary work as they relate to expert
advice. By tracing the evolution of desertification policy and formalized forums for
expertise, this chapter illustrates the role of expert advisory processes as both sites for
inscription and instruments of inscription. In building expert advisory bodies, institutions
identify sources of authoritative knowledge and define relationships linking scientists and
policymakers. As extensions of dominant institutions, expert advisory processes inscribe
institutional capacities onto problem framings, and define the meaning and importance of
"local" and "global." Institutions select members of advisory bodies. Hence, expert
advisory processes involve individuals whom the supporting institutions deem to be
authoritative, trustworthy, and possessing of relevant knowledge. In addition, institutions
allocate responsibility to experts and wield considerable control over their role in the
policymaking process. Given the role of institutions in constructing expert advice, it is
not surprising that expert panels often interpret a problem and its remedies in a way that
conforms to the resources and priorities of the institution they serve. Institutions and
expert panels themselves also engage in boundary work. They draw boundaries when
including some types of experts and not others or when delegating some tasks to experts
and others to non-experts. Other boundaries emerge through problem framing when an
issue is interpreted as local or global, social or physical.
Many changes in desertification policy over time correspond to the changing roles
and relationships involving natural/physical scientists, social scientists, and non-
scientists. In the 1920s and 1930s colonial officials and academics tended to disagree
about the state of the West African environment and causes of degradation. Participants
in these debates included foresters, geographers, and agriculturalists, but did not include
social scientists such as anthropologists. Not surprisingly, the colonial administrations
viewed desertification primarily as a problem of natural resource management. In the
1970s there was a notable bias against social scientists on the part of dominant policy
institutions. UNEP, for example, called on natural scientists to conduct a large-scale,
two-year assessment prior to policy negotiations. The resulting agreement portrayed
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desertification as arising from direct human interaction with the land and emphasized the
use of science and technology in ameliorating it. During the 1980s expert advisory
processes under UNEP took the form of ad hoc panels. Outside of UNEP social scientists
and rural ecologists began to play a much bigger role in the desertification debate. This
shift in participation accompanied perceived failures in desertification policy and a
questioning of earlier approaches to the issue. The 1990s have witnessed a decreased
emphasis on natural science and a marked increase in attention to indigenous and
traditional forms of knowledge. Forums for "knowledge sharing" have involved non-
governmental organizations and policy practitioners, as well as academic scientists.
Likewise, desertification policies portray a much more complex picture of issue and
support social and community-based responses.
Quantification
Chapter 4 explores the varying nature of statistics and other numerical measures and their
role in legitimating different approaches to desertification and allocating power among
various agents. Quantification is a means by which knowledge is made universal, imbued
with objectivity, and standardized (Jasanoff, 1986; Porter 1995; Jasanoff and Wynne,
1998). The desertification case reveals that quantification served these purposes not only
by creating a universal science of desertification, but also by constructing a global policy
issue. Global statistics served (at least temporarily) to support a belief in the global
extent of desertification, and lent legitimacy to international science programs and an
international policy approach. New policies for desertification emerged in tandem with
new indicators to measure desertification. Hence, standards for identifying and
characterizing desertification provide insight into its changing dimensions and into
evolving social systems aimed at measuring and managing them. These various means
and modes of quantification also obscured and aggregated various dimensions of
desertification. For example, global statistics reflecting physical manifestations of
desertification tended to sideline its social aspects.
A comparison of quantification practices across this history reveals that they are
tightly coupled to the institutional and political context in which they emerged. In the
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1920s and 30s, colonial administrations were not interested in establishing standardized
measures of environmental phenomena that could be compared across national borders.
Hence colonial researchers relied more on relative, qualitative measures, rather than
quantitative measures of environmental change. In the 1970s, as UNEP sought to buttress
international cooperation on this presumably scientific issue, the agency supported
development of statistics that expressed the extent and manifestations of desertification in
numerical terms and at a global scale. Throughout the 1980s, UNEP assessed progress
under the Plan of Action, largely in terms of the "status and rate" of desertification. The
quantitative results of these assessments came under question on the basis of quantitative
methodologies and the utility of expressing aspects of desertification in terms of global
percentages. Under the recent treaty on desertification, references to quantitative
measures have diminished. New desertification indicators focus, not on measuring the
physical extent of degradation, but on assessing institutional capacity and gender issues.
Visual Representation
As discussed in Chapter 5, maps constitute one of the most important forms of visual
representation in the desertification case. Maps were a particularly powerful means for
creating, supporting and altering global images of desertification and varied ideas about
whose vision counts. Processes of map-making and maps themselves have evolved with
changing perceptions of desertification. Maps portray not only beliefs about the
geographical extent of desertification, but also assumptions about its causes, impacts and
remedies, and who has the authority to define and interpret them.
Visual representations provide snapshots of desertification at different points in
time, and therefore serve as excellent indicators for tracing and interpreting this
evolution. During the 1920s and 1930s photographs and maps of the colonial researchers
depicted colonial territories and often showed the personal perspectives of the researchers
as seen through the lens of a camera or illustrated in their routes through the countryside.
Pictures and cartographic representations of desert encroachment and other forms of
degradation reflected relationships between France and Britain, perceptions of human-
environment interactions and colonial attitudes toward the African peoples. During the
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1970s interest in advancing deserts resurfaced with concern about the West African
drought of 1968 and 1974. Although UNEP helped to sponsor a study of what was
believed to be a southwardly advancing Sahara in 1975, the agency never published this
analysis. It did not conform to the new vision of desertification emerging in preparations
for the 1977 Conference on Desertification. As part of these preparations, several
international agencies developed a World Map of Desertification. In contrast to maps of
Saharan encroachment in West Africa, the World Map emphasized the global extent of
desertification, the use of standardized measures in assessing it, and the role of land use
in causing degradation. This map played an important role in helping to legitimate
desertification as an international issue. In 1992 the World Atlas of Desertification,
created by a number of UNEP consultants, marked a more complex and pluralistic vision
of the desertification problem. Instead of a single world map, the 69-page Atlas
contained global, continental and case study maps, based, in part, on local observation
and the knowledge of local experts. The Atlas received little attention during negotiation
of the Convention. Other forms of visual representation seem to be replacing the role of
maps in policymaking contexts for desertification. Photographs appear on the
Secretariat's web page and documentary films about desertification and a new
desertification logo seem to reflect attempts on the part of the United Nations system to
popularize the desertification issue.
Implications
Chapter 6 reflects on some of the theoretical and practical implications of this analysis as
they relate to global environmental politics in general, as well as to ongoing activities in
the desertification regime. Following a review of authorization, inscription and boundary
work, the chapter reflects on how analysis of these processes might inform and enlighten
science and international environmental policymaking.
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CHAPTER 2
Desertification in Historical Context
Dryland degradation defies a singular definition. For better or worse, desertification's
plurality has become its hallmark. Nearly every article or book written about the issue
reminds us that the desertification concept has acquired more than 100 different meanings
over the past several decades. 28 However, despite a cacophony of perceptions regarding
desertification, its lifetime as a scientific and political concern has been punctuated by
moments of relative clarity. Intergovernmental agreements on desertification have
marked these moments, by forging some degree of consensus about what dryland
degradation is and what should be done about it. Still, each stabilization of the
desertification concept has proved fleeting. Every attempt to address desertification at
the international level has generated a new interpretation of what it is, how it happens,
and how people should respond to it.
As briefly described in Chapter 1, this study organizes desertification's recent
history into four eras: colonial, modernist, internationalist and pluralist. The present
chapter provides a more in-depth account of these changes, and situates them in a broader
historical context, introducing the major agreements, individuals and institutions that
comprise the story. As described below, each era reflects a different policy regime and
corresponding ideas about the nature of desertification, its causes and remedies. The
colonial period of the 1920s and 30s centers around the Anglo-French Forestry
Commission and its response to the claims of British forester E. P. Stebbing. The
modernist period commenced after World War II and continued throughout the 1970s,
ending with creation of the United Nations Conference on Desertification and the
resultant Plan ofAction to Combat Desertification (PACD or the Plan). The
internationalist period during the 1980s and early 1990s, encompassed both modernist
perspectives of the 1970s and new visions of desertification emerging in the 1990s.
28 Glantz and Orlovsky (1983) and Verstreate (1986) documented a number of meanings ascribed to
desertification in the scientific and policy literatures. These varied meanings are often the target of critics
contending that desertification is an ill-defined term and problematic as the subject of research and policy.
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Manifestations of this period include several UNEP desertification assessments and
"Managing Fragile Ecosystems: Combating Desertification and Drought," Chapter 12 of
Agenda 21. The pluralist era encompasses most of the 1990s. This study focuses on a
period beginning in the fall of 1992 and June 1994, when the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee on Desertification completed the Convention to Combat
Desertification (CCD or the Convention).
2.1 Environment and Empire: Dryland Degradation in Colonial West Africa
Many contemporary ideas about dryland degradation began to take shape in colonial
West Africa. As European powers settled the African frontier seeking to profit from the
land's natural resources, scientists and administrative officials examined the viability of
these resources and their supporting environment.
2.1.1 Historical Context
Understandings of dryland degradation in the early twentieth century reflected
paternalistic attitudes toward the African people and heavy reliance on scientists and
other specialists within colonial administrations. The imperial powers aimed to settle and
develop the African landscape and to derive profit from its varied and abundant natural
resources. They viewed this, in part, as an effort to "civilize" African peoples and
transfer European ways of life to the so-called dark continent. Geographers, botantists,
agriculturalists, and other specialists often served as explorers. They forayed into
uncharted territory to examine the countryside and assess its natural resource potential. It
was out of these explorations that concern for West African dryland degradation
emerged.
Colonial administrations of the early 1920s and 1930s originated in the late
1800s. The Berlin Conference of 1885 was the beginning of the end of decades of
European quarrels about African imperialism. In marking out their "spheres of interest"
the major powers of France, Britain, Germany, and smaller countries such as Italy,
Portugal, Belgium and Spain agreed to invade and overtake Africa without fighting each
other (Davidson, 1989). Much of West Africa was partitioned among Britain and France
in the late 1800s. By 1914, France occupied nearly the whole of West Africa in and
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around the Sahara. Britain held Nigeria, the Gold Coast, Sierra Leone and Gambia, with
Liberia remaining an independent country and a few smaller coastal countries belonging
to Germany and Portugal. France and Britain imposed markedly different forms of
governance. France adopted a centralized form of direct rule. Britain opted for a system
of indirect rule, allowing its governors far more autonomy than their French counterparts.
Their success in World War I strengthened the colonial powers and invigorated
their hold over the African colonies. As Europeans recovered from the War during the
1920s, they also completed their pacification objectives on African soil. When they were
satisfied they had subdued warring factions in Africa, the colonial powers began to
replace military governments with civilian administrations. West Africa had very few
European settlers, largely because the climate was thought to be unhealthy for Europeans.
Consequently, European rule in these regions took the form of a hierarchy in which
European officers assumed executive positions and African men served as their
underlings. French West Africa, for example, was divided into 118 districts, each
governed by a French district officer. In 1938, approximately 380 British officers
governed 40 million inhabitants of northern Nigeria. An additional 1200 or so British
officials worked in various civil service departments such as those for medicine and
agriculture (Davidson, 1989).
2.1.2 Debating Degradation: Progressive Desiccation, Advancing Deserts and
Shifting Cultivation
Major scientific debates in the early 1900s concerned the theory of progressive
desiccation. According to proponents of this theory, large-scale climatic changes were
increasing West Africa's aridity and contributing to a southward movement of the Sahara
desert. In 1937 and 1938 members of an Anglo-French Forestry Commission investigated
scientific studies claiming progressive desiccation was occurring in West Africa. As part
of their study, the Commission offered policy recommendations concerning dryland
management. In doing so, they spoke to several ongoing debates about the maintenance
and utilization of West Africa's environment. Unlike many progressive desiccationists
who saw West Africa as threatened by transnational forces of nature, largely out of
human control, the Commission dismissed progressive desiccation theory and interpreted
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West Africa's problems as local and anthropogenic. Commissioners rejected claims of
increasing aridity and focused instead on the role of shifting cultivation practices as
responsible for environmental damage. To remedy the problem the Commission
prescribed the introduction of European-style permanent agriculture and insisted that
well-coordinated offices of natural resource management oversee forest reserves.
Desiccation was a broad term with multiple meanings. As the forester, E. P.
Stebbing commented,
Many conflicting opinions exist upon this word desiccation; and some,
even those who have dwelt in contact with it, have frankly said they did
not understand what was meant or implied (Stebbing, 1937b: 15).
In general, however, "progressive desiccation" referred to a purported trend of increasing
aridity and environmental degradation in West Africa. Scientists used desiccation to
explain various phenomena observed throughout West Africa. These phenomena
included shrunken streams, lowered water tables, decreased vegetation, desert
encroachment, and human migrations. However, observers disagreed as to which of
these symptoms actually existed and what causal mechanisms were responsible for the
degradation. The following discussion highlights debates about West African
degradation and their culmination in a stand-off of sorts between forester, E. P. Stebbing,
and the Anglo-French Forestry Commission.
Proponents of progressive desiccation theory (Hubert, 1920) believed that
climatic changes in West Africa were causing the region to become increasingly arid. In
1904, for example, the French Government appointed a mission to continue previous
investigations into reports of increasing aridity and desiccation. As evidence of
continued deterioration, mission participants noted archeological remains of higher
cultures and old irrigation systems that had fallen out of use. They also spoke with
inhabitants of the area who recalled more prosperous periods and reported ongoing decay
in more recent years. 29 Henry Hubert, a French geologist, was widely cited for
desiccation research he performed in Senegal. This research, he claimed, supported the
theory of progressive desiccation and suggested that large-scale climate changes were
29 See Touchard (1907) and Bovill (1921) for accounts of these studies.
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primarily responsible for depletion of water and vegetation in West Africa. According to
Hubert (1920), the first twenty years of the twentieth century exhibited the most marked
decrease in humidity, prompting drying up of rivers and wells, increased salinity in river
waters, and the encroachment of the Sahara on the Sudan. 30
Three geologists named Gautier (1908), Chudeau (1909; 1916), and Falconer
(1911) challenged the desiccationists. J. D. Falconer, a government geologist, believed
that the distribution of iron ore, the existence of fixed sand dunes in the northern
provinces of Africa, and periodic rains indicated a return to more humid conditions.
Chudeau (1916) claimed that lake levels were on the increase in the early 1900s and
provided evidence that water was becoming more rather than less abundant. Gautier and
Chudeau also opposed the theory of a southwardly moving Sahara. Based on analysis of
eroded river beds, Gautier (1908) claimed that in the south of West Africa the steppe
followed the desert, turning desert areas to vegetated land. Drawing on studies of dead
dunes (dunes without vegetation), fossil dunes and drainage systems in the Sudan,
Chudeau (1909) similarly claimed that the Sudan was encroaching on the Sahara, rather
than the other way around.
Debates about the manifestations and causes of progressive desiccation continued
into the 1930s. At this time E. P. Stebbing published widely read accounts of
environmental degradation in West Africa. E.P. Stebbing was one of the most prolific and
well-known students of the West African environment. Stebbing, described as a
sportsman-naturalist (The Geographical Journal, 1935), was in the Indian Forest Reserve
before becoming Professor and Head of Forestry at the University of Edinburgh. He
sided with the desiccationists in forecasting increasing aridity and a southwardly
advancing Sahara. After a trip to Niger and northern Nigeria in March-April 1934, he
published numerous books and articles. He noted several signs of degradation and
desiccation including de-vegetation, deforestation, decreasing water levels (e.g., in Lake
Chad) and desert encroachment. The image of advancing deserts served as a title for
many of Stebbing's books and articles, such as "The Encroaching Sahara: The Threat to
30 Bovill (1921), Edwardes (1919), and Tilho (1914; 1920) reported similar findings.
31 Jones (1938) provides further discussion of these findings.
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the West African Colonies" (1935); "The Threat of the Sahara" (1937b), and "The Man-
Made Desert in Africa: Erosion and Drought" (1938).
Stebbing portrayed the Saharan encroachment issue as one that transcended
political boundaries by affecting two of the world's "big Powers" (Stebbing, 1935: 518).
He suggested that Britain and France sponsor research to explore desiccation and desert
encroachment. The Nigerian Government and the Administration of the French Niger
Colony established a Commission to investigate Stebbing's claims. As discussed in
Chapter 3, the commissioners rejected the notion that progressive desiccation threatened
West Africa. They similarly dismissed Stebbing's claim of an advancing Sahara. In
response to the Commission's report and other critiques, Stebbing retracted his claims of
advancing deserts and colonial administrations continued with their respective national
land use management schemes.
2.2 Global Problems and Global Knowledge: Science, Development and
Desertification
The lively forestry debates of the colonial era quieted during the 1940s as World War 1I
captured the attention of European powers and began to transform their colonial empires.
Not until the 1950s did widespread interest in African drylands revive. New research
into arid regions accompanied the initial stages of African decolonization, the first
inklings of global environmental consciousness, and increasing attention to worldwide
economic development. Activities of this period culminated in a major international
conference and policy agreement -- the 1977 United Nations Conference on
Desertification and its Plan ofAction to Combat Desertification. According to the Plan,
desertification was an urgent, and "spreading" threat to economic prosperity in dryland
regions. The Plan justified international cooperation on the issue based on
desertification's physical extent, monetary costs to the international community, and the
need for North-South transfers. Plan authors saw climate as an important factor in
desertification processes. However, they perceived desertification not as a natural
hazard, but as a problem arising primarily from irrational human land use practices.
Policy remedies focused on "proximate solutions" based largely on the application of
science and technology to "improve" land use and support development objectives.
56
2.2.1 Historical Context
Modernist approaches to desertification policy were deeply intertwined with post-World
War II transformations in international governance, development and environmental
policy. Activities in these areas reflected broadening relationships between North and
South, increasing reliance on science and technology as keys to the world's prosperity,
and a growing belief in global environmental stewardship as a focus of international
cooperation.
Decolonizing Drylands
The war ushered in a new global order when a depleted Europe could no longer maintain
its colonies. As Africa began a twenty-year road to independence beginning in the 1950s,
its welfare increasingly became the responsibility of the international community at large,
rather than the concern of specific colonial powers. Industrialized countries adopted
"third world" development as an international objective and regarded science and
technology as tools necessary for its attainment (Shinn et al., 1997). Themes of science
and development were similarly evident in international programs devoted to drylands
research. Projects involving basic scientific research were aimed at standardizing
analysis and universalizing understandings of dryland regions. Environmental protection,
after emerging on domestic agendas in many industrialized countries during the 1960s,
became the subject of a major international conference in 1972. These developments
provided a backdrop for the Desertification Conference and provided seeds for many of
the ideas at the heart of the 1977 Plan ofAction.
Desertification linked forestry investigations of the colonial era to international
science initiatives of later decades. A. Aubreville, a French forester, is widely credited
with coining the term desertification in a 1949 publication.3 2 Aubreville prepared cross
sections of latitudinal vegetation zones in West Africa and concluded that destruction of
forest and savanna zones was taking place (Aubreville, 1949; Mortimore, 1989).
According to Aubreville,
32 Those who credit Aubreville with inventing the term "desertification," include: Mortimore (1989),
Verstraete (1986), Odingo (1990) and Stiles (1995).
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ce sont des d6serts qui naissaent aujourd'hui, sous nos yeux, dans les pays
o il tombe cependant annuellement de 700 i plus de 1500 mm de pluies
(Aubreville, A. 1949 Climats, forets et desertification de l'Afrique
tropicales, Societd d'1'ditions Geographiques et Coloniales, Paris).
Aubreville claimed that new deserts were emerging in regions where the annual rainfall
ranged between 700 mm to 1,500 mm. He labeled the process of desert creation
"desertification" and linked it with certain rainfall conditions. Like the Anglo-French
Forestry Commission, Aubreville suggested that humans were primarily responsible for
the formation of new desert regions. He attributed these changes to burning, clearing and
erosion and likened them to a skin disease, or "leprosy" spreading over the face of Africa
(Aubreville, 1949, as translated in Mortimore, 1989: 14).
Aubreville's findings appeared just as major changes were remaking international
relations. The colonial powers were about to begin withdrawing from their colonies as
international institutions began to provide new contexts for North-South interactions.
Whereas development and aid programs for Africa formerly provided vehicles for
colonial expansion (e.g., The British Development and Aid Plan of 1929), "third world"
development after World War II generally fell to international organizations such as the
United Nations and the World Bank. These institutions sought to foster economic
security and prosperity in developing countries, often via the application of science and
technology. In 1965, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) evolved out
of United Nations Technical Assistance Programme of the late 1950s. Science and
technology continued to be an important piece of UNDP's agenda and central to
development efforts throughout the UN system (Rittberger, 1982).
Globalizing Drylands
Interest in Aubreville's ideas and in dryland environments persisted throughout this
shuffling of world order. In 1951 development, science and drylands came together as
the focus of a major international science initiative sponsored by the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The Arid Zone
3 Several papers by Chavelier in 1950 relayed the same doomsday message that adherents of progressive
desiccation relayed in the 1920s and 1930s (see Mortimore, 1989).
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Programme was one of only a handful of arid studies research programs at the time, and
its members included natural scientists from many regions of the world. The
Programme's general practice was to develop a state-of-the art report on a given subject
and follow it with an international symposium devoted to the same topic (Batisse, 1985).
Although furthering development goals was purportedly one of the Programme's
overarching objectives, its activities focused primarily on basic research. Research topics
included arid zone hydrology; plant ecology; human and animal ecology; climatology
and microclimatology; and plant-water relationships. As evidenced by these titles, the
link between scientific knowledge and practical application was often tenuous. Program
participants were content with advancing scientific understanding of drylands under the
assumption that such knowledge would ultimately be useful in addressing the practical
challenges of arid environments
The work of the Arid Zone Programme played a major role in depicting drylands
as a global phenomenon. Experts identified climatic and physical characteristics of
drylands, exploring their similarities and differences throughout the world. Researchers
also assessed the nature and extent of arid lands and produced widely-used and cited
maps of aridity and arid regions. By standardizing dryland characteristics and showing
worldwide commonalities of dryland soil, climate and vegetation, the Programme
emphasized the universality of drylands, largely erasing associations between local
dryland features and specific settings in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.
These endeavors coincided with a de-politicization of dryland research. Studies
through the 1930s were heavily tied to the advancement of colonial interests through
cultivation of profitable natural resources, "taming" of indigenous populations, and
settlement of colonial frontiers. In contrast, the Arid Zone Programme, under the UN
umbrella, framed dryland issues as primarily scientific, thereby de-emphasizing political
motivations that had so dominated earlier dryland analyses and interpretations. The
reference to Arid Zone, for example, forgoes mention of particular jurisdictions or
territories, implying that drylands constitute a politically neutral concept. Reference to
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"zone" in the singular (rather than "zones") further emphasized the framing of aridity as a
universal phenomenon.3 4
International Interest in the Biosphere
The Arid Zone Programme continued for thirteen years. But with burgeoning
environmental consciousness in many industrialized countries, the program's focus on
aridity soon seemed too narrow. 3 5 With a broader conceptualization of environment and
new initiatives aimed at development, not only in drylands, but in countries inhabiting all
climates, the Arid Zone Programme and a newer, parallel program regarding the humid
tropics merged with a new natural resource program in late 1964.36 This program, a
Natural Resources Research Advisory Committee, coincided with commencement of the
International Hydrological Decade, an event focused largely on water resource issues in
developing countries.
These changes occurred as a new environmentalism took hold in the 1960s. This
movement accompanied newly popularized concern for chemical pollution,
overexploitation of natural resources, and population growth. Rachel Carson's popular
and highly influential Silent Spring (1962), for example, revealed the dangers of pesticide
use and their harmful impacts on human health. Her work is widely credited with
inspiring high level investigations into environmental degradation within and outside of
the United States.
As a more holistic vision of humans and their natural surroundings emerged in
popular literature and politics, UNESCO's activities underwent similar transformations.
On the foundations of the Arid Zones Program UNESCO, in 1968, erected its Man and
1 The term "zone" referred to, not only the land of arid regions, but also the flora, fauna, and climate of
these regions.
3 Caldwell (1996) cites Canada, France, Japan, Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United
States as having active citizen groups lobbying for environmental protection and improved environmental
quality at this time.
36 According to Michele Batisse, the Arid Zone Programme marked the first attempt to focus international
scientific resources on a worldwide development problem. "At the same time, however, the experience
acquired under the Arid Zone Program had shown that most bottlenecks to development were not so much
linked to aridity per se as to the way scientific research was conducted and its results, applied or not
applied, and to the broader problem of evaluation, utilization and conservation of natural resources. It had
also become clear that the availability of water resources in adequate quantity and quality, which was, of
course, the central concern in all arid areas, was in fact a worldwide problem requiring a bold and
worldwide approach" (Batisse, 1985: 23).
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the Biosphere Programme. Unlike its predecessor, the Biosphere Programme addressed
all types of climates, ecosystems, and social systems, rather than only those confined to
arid regions. 37 This broadening focus of UNESCO's environment initiatives coincided
with growing concern for the planet's fragility. Studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s
warned that overpopulation and overexploitation threatened to deplete the earth's
resources. In The Population Bomb, Ehrlich (1968) examined population growth in the
context of disparate consumption patterns. He demonstrated that the consumption rate of
Americans, for example, far exceeded that of their counterparts in developing countries
and in many developed countries as well. In The Limits to Growth, Meadows et al.
(1972) argued that economic stagnation, population growth, the arms race, and
environmental degradation were heading the world's inhabitants toward a perilous future.
They asserted that industries would outstrip the earth's carrying capacity and that
extensive restructuring of developed country economies was necessary to circumvent
their demise.
Governments began to view environmental protection and natural resource use as
international, as well as domestic issues. Unfortunate events of the early 1970s seemed
to fulfill dire prophesies of the analysts, vividly illustrating environmental
interdependence across national borders. In the early 1970s, a world grain shortage
threatened food security. Drought and winter snowcover in the Soviet Union (USSR)
resulted in crop failures and prompted the USSR to buy large amounts of grain from the
world's markets, leading to a crisis in world grain trade. Weather-related problems in the
U.S., Canada and Australia decreased production of wheat, corn and soybeans just as
demand for surpluses in these crops was greatest (Rockefeller, 1976). Catastrophic
drought and famine in much of West Africa were particularly important to international
initiatives regarding desertification. This drama caught the attention of people
worldwide, as television reports carried pictures of emaciated children and parched
landscapes into living rooms throughout the world. Media coverage made West Africa's
3 An expert committee appointed by UNESCO originally considered an Indian proposal that UNESCO
establish an international institute focused on arid regions. The committee rejected this idea explaining that
conditions were not favorable for such an institute, but instead recommended creation of an international
arid zone research council, which led eventually to an Advisory Committee on Arid Zone Research, and
finally, in 1951, to the Arid Zone Research Programme. At its inception the Programme had a budget of
just $14,000. By 1960, this budget reached over $300,000 per year, not including staff expenses and
extrabudgetary funds (Batisse, 1985).
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problems highly visible and emphasized the international dimensions of devastation and
relief. Amidst these calamities, international environmental cooperation took the form of
a major United Nations initiative. The United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment (UNCHE) took place in Stockholm in 1972. This Stockholm Conference
drew 1200 delegates from 114 countries who set out to forge a global partnership to
improve the human environment, curtail the arms race and prevent a population
explosion (Elliott, 1998).
The Stockholm Conference established a non-binding declaration, an action plan,
and an institutional framework for addressing environmental issues. The Stockholm
Declaration contained 26 principles aimed at balancing development objectives with
environmental protection. The Action Plan consisted of 109 recommendations on topics
including human settlements, pollution, development, and social impacts of
environmental degradation. Like UNESCO's Arid Zone Programme the Stockholm Plan
prescribed an international, research-based approach to soil management issues. The
research agenda focused almost exclusively on standardization and analysis of physical
and climatic elements of soil degradation processes. Recommendation 20 called for the
"acquisition of knowledge and transfer of experience on soil capabilities, degradation,
conservation and restoration..." (UNCHE, 1972: Recommendation 20). In noting
preparations at FAO and UNESCO for a Soil Map of the World, Recommendation 20
called for creation of international criteria and methodologies for soil assessments.
Several references to information exchange stressed the need for data regarding physical
and climatic parameters such as vegetation, soil, and climate. The few references to
social aspects of land management focused narrowly on agricultural practices and
inadequate pricing of agricultural resources.
Stockholm also set in motion the process by which the UN General Assembly
established the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which later became the
leading international organization regarding desertification issues. This Programme
continues to serve as coordinator and catalyst,38 of a wide range of environmental
initiatives. By situating UNEP's headquarters in Nairobi, Kenya, UNEP's founders
38 According to Elliott (1998), UNEP was given a limited mandate because existing UN agencies were
jealous and developing countries were opposed to a powerful agency that might restrict their development.
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aimed to both symbolize concern for developing country environments, as well as
facilitate a greater role for these countries in environmental policymaking.
2.2.2 Desertification as an International Policy Issue
Pre-Stockholm deliberations contained the seeds of the United Nations Conference on
Desertification. As part of the Stockholm process, African countries raised the problem
of desert creation in international forums and ultimately inspired the 1977 Plan ofAction
to Combat Desertification. As discussed below, the Plan set forth new ideas about the
nature of desertification, and its global dimensions, causes and remedies. In many
respects the Plan's provisions were emblematic of prominent trends in international
environmental politics. According to the Plan, desertification posed a threat to
international development. It affected lands throughout the world, arose from irrational
land use practices, and was knowable and solvable through the use of scientific
methodologies. This interpretation of desertification as a universal problem arising from
a singular cause seemed ready-made for the international policy prescriptions set forth in
the Plan, namely improvements in land management aided by the transfer of modern
science and technology to affected areas.
From Advancing Deserts to Desertification
The Plan ofAction emphatically denied any connection between desert encroachment
and desertification. However, references to advancing and spreading deserts remained a
tenacious feature of early multilateral efforts to develop dryland policy. Such references,
for example, appeared in many international resolutions of the early 1970s. In August
1971, the first All-African Seminar on the Human Environment convened under the
auspices of the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA). Their task was to plan for the
upcoming Conference on the Human Environment. Much of the discussion concerned
the drought and the difficulties of getting financial support to address it. However, in
addition to resolutions on drought, the seminar recommended measures intended to
"combat the spread of deserts in Africa" (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 6). This caught the
attention of the ECA Conference of Ministers who noted the problems of desertification
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in resolution 264 (XII) and urged that the ECA collaborate with the international
community in seeking solutions (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 6).
As UN agencies and the UN General Assembly attended to problems of drought
and desertification, desert encroachment was frequently cited as an important issue. For
example, Governing Councils of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)
and the United Nations Environment Programme called for studies of drought and action
plans to "check the spread of desert conditions" (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 6). In June,
1973, and again the following March, UNEP's Governing Council issued several
decisions under the heading of "Land, water and desertification." In these decisions the
Governing Council requested UNEP to help countries control the loss of productive soil
caused by erosion, desertification and laterization and to offer help with land reclamation.
The Council asked that UNEP give special priority to "arresting the spread of deserts,"
and alloted 1 million dollars of its budget for the "land,water and desertification" issue
area (UNEP Governing Council Decision, June 22, 1973). During this period, UNGA
passed Resolution 3054 (XXVIII), "Consideration of the Economic and Social Situation
in the Sudano-Sahelian Region Stricken by Drought and Measures to be Taken for the
Benefit of that Region." In this resolution the UNGA requested the UNEP Governing
Council to "give priority to the search for a medium-term and long-term solution to the
problems of desert encroachment in the countries bordering on the Sahara and other areas
with similar geographical conditions."
By December of 1974 UNGA stepped up its efforts to formulate international
policy on drylands. At this time, however, UNGA referred to "desertification," rather
than "desert encroachment" in prescribing international activities. UNGA also focused
on desertification to the exclusion of drought. In its resolution 3337 (XXIX) of
December 12, 1974, the General Assembly initiated "International Co-operation to
Combat Desertification." This decision would later prove to be key in establishing
desertification as a global environmental problem requiring a multilateral policy
response. In particular, the resolution called for an intergovernmental conference on
desertification and a plan of action comprised of anti-desertification measures. In
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launching one of several international, post-Stockholm conferences, 39 the resolution
made no mention of the advance or spread of deserts.
As discussed in Chapter 3, the United Nations Environment Programme, in its
capacity as Conference Secretariat, organized an intensive two-year assessment process
in preparation for the Conference. This process generated several assessment reports and
maps aimed at characterizing the desertification problem and prescribing its remedies.
The Secretariat then prepared an initial Draft Plan ofAcction to Combat Desertification
(draft Plan) and circulated it among governments, UN agencies, researchers and others in
August 1976. In January 1977, the Secretariat completed a second draft Plan and
presented both the draft Plan and accompanying scientific studies at four regional
meetings.40 The Conference itself took place from August 29 to September 9, 1977. 41
Approximately 500 delegates from 94 countries convened in Nairobi Kenya to negotiate
the final Plan ofAction to Combat Desertification (UNCOD, 1978).
The Plan ofAction to Combat Desertification
The Plan consisted of twenty-eight detailed recommendations concerning a range of
topics including land management, strengthening of science and technology and
international cooperation.4 2 Like previous resolutions, the Plan ofAction portrayed
desertification as an urgent and global threat to land productivity and ultimately to
development. Its policies were aimed at maintaining and enhancing dryland productivity
by preventing desertification or by reclaiming land that had been desertified.
39 Several agreements on oceans, international trade in endangered species, and long-range transboundary
air pollution dealing with oceans were completed during this period. The UN also convened a number of
international conferences. These included, the World Food Conference (see Biswas and Biswas, 1975), a
United Nations Water Conference (see Biswas, 1977), and a World Population Conference (see Biswas and
Biswas, 1974).
40 The regional preparatory meeting for the Americas was held from February 23-25, 1977 in Santiago,
Chile. A regional meeting for the Mediterranean area took place in Algarve, Portugal from March 28 to
April 1, 1977. A regional meeting for Africa, South of the Sahara was held from April 12-16 in Nairobi,
Kenya. The regional meeting for Asia and the Pacific took place from April 19-22 in New Delhi, India
(A/CONF.74/33/Add. 1).
41 Despite references to impending disaster, the Nairobi negotiations in 1977 took place during a period of
abundant rainfall. Indeed for a few years, the drought appeared to be subsiding - so much that some
observers attributed the later failure of UNCOD financing and policy implementation to increased rainfall
levels.
42 The Plan was published in 1978 along with a "Round-up of the Conference" which provided a brief
history of Conference preparations along with background information on desertification processes.
Resolutions adopted by the Conference and a summary of associated activities also appeared in this
publication.
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The Plan distinguished desertification from advancing deserts and portrayed
desertification as a threat to economic development worldwide. Desertification, as
defined in the Plan, was:
... the diminution or destruction of the biological potential of land, and can
lead ultimately to desert-like conditions. It is an aspect of the widespread
deterioration of ecosystems, and has diminished or destroyed the
biological potential, i.e. plant and animal production, for multiple use
purposes at a time when increased productivity is needed to support
growing populations in quest of development (UNCOD, 1978: 7).
This definition stressed the economic valuation of land and a vision of desertification as
an obstacle to international development. The focus on dryland "productivity," and
"prosperity," reflected a view of the environment as first and foremost a resource,
necessary for economic growth.4 3 References to the profitability of anti-desertification
measures elsewhere in the Conference report (see UNCOD, 1978: 1) portrayed
desertification as cause for international cooperation largely because it thwarted a
singular, universal quest for prosperity. This portrayal implied that development was an
unproblematic goal, closely aligned with western, market-based notions of progress. The
Plan's vision of development as a monolithic and unquestioned good helped to situate
desertification as a universal bad, an enemy that the international community should
"combat.'
Regarding the process of desertification, however, the Plan diverged from
preceding policy resolutions. The Plan drew on the findings of pre-Conference scientific
assessments in differentiating desertification from advancing deserts. A 1977 case study
of Aghazer and Azawak in Niger, for example, stated that:
Desertification does not...mean a steady encroachment by the Sahara; it is
not a front whose advance can be calculated over the last 40 years.
Desertification happens at particular points; it is patchy, not linear
(A/CONF.74/14: 92; Walls, 1980: 137).
4 This view of desertification is reminiscent in Garrett Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons." In his piece
in Science (1968), Hardin drew an analogy between overexploitation of English commons and unrestricted
use of marine and atmospheric resources in the context of overpopulation. He argued that without
individual land tenure, commons users have an incentive to overuse the resource for personal gain. He
predicted that the commons would ultimately be enclosed, thereby indirectly resulting in enforced limits on
population growth.
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A similar interpretation of desertification made its way into the final Conference report.
A preface to the Plan ofAction, made a sharp distinction between desert encroachment
and desertification.
Deserts themselves are not the sources from which desertification springs.
Except for hot winds, the deserts themselves supply none of the essential
impetus for the processes described. Desertification breaks out, usually at
times of drought stress, in areas of naturally vulnerable land subject to
pressures of land use. These degraded patches, like a skin disease link up
to carry the process over extended areas. It is generally incorrect to
envision the process as an advance of the desert frontier engulfing usable
land on its perimeter: the advancing sand dune is in fact a very special and
localized case. Desertification, as a patchy destruction that may be far
removed from any nebulous front line, is a more subtle and insidious
process (UNCOD, 1978: 5).44
In distinguishing between desertification and desert expansion, this statement broadened
the geographical extent of desertification. Advancing deserts can presumably occur only
in the presence of true or natural deserts. Because such deserts exist in a very limited
number of places throughout the globe, instances of desert encroachment are similarly
limited. Desertification, as divorced from the concept of spreading deserts, however, was
relevant to a much larger and widely dispersed land area. Any land in arid, semi-arid and
dry sub-humid climates was considered susceptible.
The distinction between desertification and deserts was one of many ways in
which the Plan portrayed desertification as a global phenomenon. Other global
dimensions of desertification concerned its physical extent, costs to the international
community, and the North-South transfers necessary for its amelioration. For example,
statistics and maps prepared for the Conference highlighted the worldwide geographic
scope of desertification.
... problems of desertification are larger, more widely shared, and require
greater and longer term action than expected... desertification is not a
44 Mention of "growing populations" in this definition is reminiscent of the environment and population
studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s that warned against overexploitation and overpopulation. A
similar element of crisis seemed to pervade the Plan as its authors noted a "well-founded sense of danger"
(UNCOD, 1978: 1), and called for urgent implementation of policy measures.
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problem that concerns just a few countries. Based on climatic data, more
than a third of the earth's surface is desert or semi-desert and more than 15
per cent of the world's population live in these areas" (UNCOD, 1978: 1).
The Plan referred to the World Map of Desertification as illustrative of the distribution
and intensity of the problem (see Chapter 5). Statistics and cartography (see Chapters 4
and 5) were useful in portraying desertification as a universal problem and in
standardizing its analysis. Maps and measures of desertification, for example, suggested
that desertification could be diagnosed based on a small set of scientific criteria.
Consequently, desertification, as addressed in the UNCOD context, appeared as a
singular (rather than pluralistic) problem, common to many diverse areas of the world
and amenable to universally applicable solutions.
Linking desertification with development was also important in portraying
desertification as a global problem. The Plan emphasized costs that desertification posed
to the international community on the whole, called for international cooperation in
ameliorating degradation, and argued that anti-desertification efforts would benefit
nations worldwide. According to the Plan, the costs of rehabilitation were rising
exponentially and threatened irreversible damage to the world's land resources. To solve
the problem it called for the transfer of knowledge, technology, and financial resources
from developed countries to developing countries. Such transfers aligned with
development practices. The Plan referred to the interdependence of desertification and
anti-desertification activities, noting that "efforts to combat desertification must be part of
a broad programme for promoting social and economic progress" (UNCOD, 1978: 7).
All of these features of the Plan suggested that desertification was a problem of
worldwide proportions, requiring remedial measures based on international cooperation.
2.3 The Internationalist Era: Evaluation and Critique
The 1980s was a decade of evaluation and critique in the arena of international
desertification science-policy. Many international organizations and individual scientists
spoke out about the meaning of "desertification," prospects for its amelioration, and its
validity as a policy issue. When assessments indicated a desertification problem on the
68
rise, UNEP, the agency in charge of PACD implementation, 4 5 re-visited some of the
Plan's underlying principles. Outside of UNEP, remote sensing methodologies provided
new insights into land degradation and researchers in areas such as rangeland ecology
and cultural anthropology pioneered new approaches to drylands management. Some
criticized UN policy approaches, while others questioned the very existence of a
desertification problem. Much of this work seemed destined to wipe desertification (at
least as formerly conceived) from the international agenda. Yet, by the early 1990s the
issue was once again on the international negotiating table. Working within an emergent
"sustainable development" framework, participants in the United Nations Conference on
Environment and Development (UNCED) agreed to a new definition of the issue and a
slightly modified set of causal factors. However, in keeping with the Plan ofAction's
technocratic approach, UNCED participants emphasized the global dimensions of the
desertification problem and offered policy prescriptions reminiscent of those set forth at
the 1977 Conference.
2.3.1 Historical Context: UN Evaluations
Changes in desertification policy followed on several years of UN-sponsored studies.
The Plan ofAction specified 1984 as the year in which UNEP should conduct its first
evaluation of the Plan's implementation. At the request of UNEP's Governing Council,
a similar assessment was completed in 1991 and presented to the United Nations
Conference on Environment Development (UNEP, 1991). The intervening years saw
numerous, smaller scale studies performed by UNEP and other intergovernmental
organizations. They measured progress in the anti-desertification campaign in terms of
the worldwide land area affected by desertification and rates at which desertification was
overtaking new areas. Some assessments, such as the Provisional Methodologyfor
Assessment and Mapping of Desertification (FAO and UNEP, 1984) and Desertification
Revisited, Proceedings on an Ad hoc Consultative Meeting on the Assessment of
4UNEP was charged with coordinating and evaluating PACD implementation. To assist UNEP, the United
Nations established the Inter-Agency Working Group on Desertification (IAWGD), the Consultative Group
for Desertification Control (DESCON), and a special account for financing desertification. UNEP and
UNDP also undertook a joint venture under the United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office to assist the
Sudano-Sahelian region of Africa. Affected countries, however, had major responsibility for implementing
the PACD (UNEP, 1991: xiv).
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Desertification (Odingo, 1990a) aimed at developing new methodologies to facilitate
standardized measurement of desertification processes.
Virtually all of these studies contended that efforts to implement the 1977 Plan of
Action did not meet expectations. UNEP's General Assessment of Progress (1984)
argued that desertification was continuing to "spread and intensify" (UNEP, 1984: 5).46
In 1987 Mostafa Tolba remarked,
Where are we ten years after UNCOD? It grieves me to say it, but more
land and, tragically, more people are affected by desertification today than
in 1977 (Tolba, 1987: cover page)
In the face of failed anti-desertification efforts, UNEP set up expert panels and
assessment programs to investigate obstacles to the Plan's implementation and to
critically evaluate the ways in which the Plan defined and addressed the desertification
problem. On the whole, UNEP-sponsored analyses continued to portray desertification
as problem of global extent, arising from human land use, and amenable to scientific
measurement and technological remedies.
At the same time, however, many of the assessments began to evolve new
perspectives on desertification. In 1990, UNEP convened an expert panel to, among
other things, evaluate the definition of desertification (Odingo, 1990b). Based on studies
and discussions, this panel defined desertification as land degradation resulting from
adverse human impact. Land degradation was said to imply:
... reduction of resource potential by one or a combination of processes
acting on the land. These processes include water erosion, wind erosion
and sedimentation by those agents, long-term reduction in the amount or
diversity of natural vegetation, where relevant, and salinization and
sodication (Odingo, 1990b: 3).
This definition, unlike that presented in the Plan ofAction, did not link desertification to
advancing deserts or the spread of desert-like conditions. Neither did this definition refer
46 In 1984 several articles appeared in Environmental Conservation detailing the assessment's findings.
Their authors had served as science advisors to the 1977 Conference Secretariat and included Mabbutt
(1984) and Dregne (1984).
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to ignorance or irrationality on the part of affected populations. The reference to
"adverse human impact" was considerably more neutral.
During the following year, as part of the 1991 assessment, UNEP further revised
the meaning of desertification for submission to the UNCED process. This study defined
desertification as,
land degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas resulting
mainly from adverse human impact (UNEP, 1991: 2).
The word "mainly" suggested that other causal factors were at work. These factors
included climate fluctuations and soil resilience. In fact, participants involved in the
1991 assessment debated the merits of identifying both climate and human factors as
responsible for desertification. They decided to cite only human causes because these
were the mechanisms most amenable to policy intervention. They also decided that
reference to climate factors might distract attention from the implementation of concrete
anti-desertification measures (Interview with UNEP Advisor 3).
2.3.2 The United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
In the arena of international environmental policymaking, desertification re-emerged in
the context of "sustainable development." Vaguely-defined, yet widely used, this
concept marked a more integrated approach to environment-development policy.4 7
Previously, environment and development frequently appeared as two, mutually
exclusive goals at the center of a strong North-South polarization. While many
industrialized countries advocated environmental protection and conservation, most
developing countries viewed this as a threat to their development, and perhaps an indirect
strategy on the part of the North to perpetuate their own preeminence. In early 1983 the
UN General Assembly established the World Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED). The WCED, also named the Brundtland Commission after its
chairperson, Gro Harlem Brundtland, Prime Minister of Norway, included 23 participants
from 22 countries. More than half of these participants came from developing countries
47 While the sustainable development concept has been generally accepted in international environmental
politics, it continues to be the target of much criticism (see, for example, Elliott, 1998, pp. 183-191).
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(Elliott, 1998). With its call for sustainable development, the Commission's report, Our
Common Future (1987) emphasized complementarity rather than competition between
environmental and economic priorities. The report addressed problems of population,
food security, species and ecosystems, energy, industry and urbanization.48 As indicated
in the title of the Commission's report, it portrayed sustainable development as a shared
set of challenges and opportunities, leading North and South jointly toward convergent
rather than divergent futures. 49
In regard to desertification, perhaps the most important of the WCED's legacies
were plans for a second Stockholm-type meeting. The WCED report provided the basis
for the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED). This
international summit on sustainability issues took place in Rio de Janiero in 1992. After
three years of planning and preparation, the UNCED Conference produced Agenda 21, a
statement of objectives intended to guide governments in leading an equitable and
environmentally sound world into the twentieth century. Agenda 21 addressed social and
economic development; conservation and management of resources for development; the
role of major groups (e.g., women, youth, and indigenous peoples); and implementation.
Chapter 12 of Agenda 21 was "Managing Fragile Ecosystems: Combating
Desertification Drought." Chapter 12 was similar to the Plan ofAction in some respects,
but also reflected many new perspectives on desertification and its remedies. Both the
Plan ofAction and Agenda 21 portrayed desertification as a global problem. However,
while the Plan defined desertification as a process leading to desert-like conditions,
Agenda 21 equated desertification with the more general phenomenon of "land
degradation." Chapter 12 also departed from the Plan in identifying a broader set of
causal factors. This chapter cited climatic variations as well as human activities as two of
48 In the WCED report, desertification once again appeared as an advancing desert phenomenon. In noting
the low priority afforded to desertification, the Commission wrote: "The recent destruction of much of
Africa's dryland agricultural production was more severe than if an invading army had pursued a scorched-
earth policy. Yet most of the affected governments still spend far more to protect their people from the
invading armies than from the invading desert" (WCED, 1987: 7). In a section entitled "Advancing
Deserts," the Commission cited many of the statistics reported in UNEP's first General Assessment of
Progress (1984). Interestingly, the Commission identified the causes of desertification as "a complex mix
of human and climatic effects." It added that we have more control over human effects, implying that
policies are best directed at land use practices, adverse terms of trade and social strife (WCED, 1987: 127-
8).
49 For example, the three major sections of the report are titled, "Common Concerns," "Common
Challenges," and "Common Endeavors" (WCED, 1987).
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many factors responsible for desertification, marking a broadening view of desertification
processes.
Despite this new definition, however, several policy prescriptions in Chapter 12
were similar to those outlined in the 1977 Plan ofAction. Both agreements, for example,
emphasized scientific research and monitoring, changes in land use, and national action
plans as key to eradicating desertification. In addition, however, Chapter 12 highlighted
the importance of public participation and local knowledge. Overall, the Chapter
outlined six categories of corrective activities: strengthening of the knowledge base,
changes in land use activities, development and strengthening of integrated development
programs for poverty eradication and promotion of alternative livelihood systems, anti-
desertification programs integrated with national development plans and environmental
planning, drought preparedness and drought relief schemes, and encouragement of
popular participation and environmental education. Most importantly, Chapter 12 called
for a new international treaty on desertification to be completed in. 1994.
2.4 From the Bottom Up: Reinventing Problem and Process
As preparations and negotiations for the new treaty began there seemed to be an active
attempt on the part of participants in the policy arena to distance the anti-desertification
efforts of the 1990s from disappointing attempts of earlier decades. Drawing heavily on
the UNCED themes of sustainable development and public participation, an international
convention on desertification was completed in 1994. In several respects, the Convention
to Combat Desertification departed from previous desertification policies. Instead of
focusing solely on human land use, the treaty portrayed a more complex and holistic
picture of desertification and its interaction with broader social and ecological systems.
The Convention also suggested a new vision of desertification's global dimensions.
Whereas previous agreements portrayed desertification as a uniform problem, global
because of its geographic extent, the Convention's regional annexes reflected pluralistic
degradation processes, varying with climatic and human contexts. Remedies set forth in
the Convention similarly departed from earlier policies in their emphasis on traditional as
well as modern knowledge, in their strong support for local participation in nearly all
facets of policy formulation and implementation, and in their focus on integrated
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solutions addressing at once, physical, biological and socio-economic aspects of
desertification.
2.4.1 A Brief Summary of Convention Negotiations
The Convention to Combat Desertification followed close on the heels of the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development. 0 In October 1992, four months
after UNCED, the UN General Assembly's Second Committee referred negotiations
regarding UNCED and its follow-up to a working group chaired by Malaysian
Ambassador Razali Ismail. Based on a draft resolution by the African Group, the
working group agreed on a treaty objective and the format for the treaty negotiations. In
titling the treaty, the working group determined that this agreement would aim "to
combat desertification in those countries experiencing serious drought and/or
desertification, particularly in Africa." They also agreed that one organizational session
would take place in New York in early 1993, followed by five substantive sessions.
Based on the same African resolution, the working group invited non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) to contribute to the negotiating process (ENB:03:02; ENB:03:03),
and called on the UN Secretary General to establish a "multi-disciplinary panel of experts
to assist the ad hoc secretariat and, under its authority, to provide necessary expertise in
the scientific, technical, legal and other related fields..." (ENB:03:03).
A week-long organizational session in January 1993 commenced the convention
preparation process. At this meeting, delegations adopted rules of procedure and a
schedule of meetings, and elected officers and chairman, Ambassador Bo Kjell6n of
Sweden. Participants also established two working groups responsible for different parts
of the Convention. As determined later, Working Group I led negotiations regarding the
Convention's preamble, principles, objectives and commitments, including financial
arrangements and capacity building. Working Group II was in charge of institutional,
50 This was not simply a matter of timing. As he commenced treaty negotiations, Bo Kjelldn, Chair of the
INCD, described the task ahead of delegates as an opportunity to make the dreams of Rio, "a human-
centered reality" (ENB:04: 11).
5' As discussed in Chapter 3, the original African proposal called for a multi-disciplinary expert group to
assist the INCD. However, resistance from developed countries caused the working group to opt for a
more modest expert group (ENB:03:02).
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administrative, technological and scientific provisions; research, data collection and
information exchange; and procedural arrangements and other legal issues (ENB:04: 11).
Over the next 18 months the Negotiating Committee5 2 convened five times for
approximately two-weeks each.53 At their last session, in June 1994, the Committee
adopted the final Convention.54 The Chairman presided over the negotiating sessions and
guided their progress. 55 The CCD Secretariat carried out administrative tasks associated
with the negotiation process. The Executive Secretary, Hama Arba Diallo of Burkina
Faso, headed the Secretariat and appointed its members. 56 In accordance with UN
General Assembly resolutions of late 1992, an International Panel of Experts (IPED)
advised the Secretariat on technical issues. As discussed in Chapter 3, this panel of
nearly 20 members, included a multidisciplinary group of scientists from developed and
52 The negotiating committee was formally named the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for the
Elaboration of an International Convention to Combat Desertification in Those Countries Experiencing
Serious Drought and/or Desertification, Particularly in Africa.
5 As discussed in Chapter 3, the first week of the first negotiating session was devoted to an "Information
Sharing Segment." This session was the brainchild of the United Nations General Assembly and marked a
new innovation of sorts in the context of international environmental politics. At its organizational session
in January 1993, the INCD determined the seven topics that would be addressed. The Secretariat then
invited speakers from UN specialized agencies, other intergovernmental organizations, non-governmental
organizations and academia to give presentations pertinent to these topic areas. Representatives from
various countries also gave presentations. For a summary of the Information Segment see (ENB:04:1 1).
54 The Convention was opened for signature in Paris on October 14 1994. Pending the CCD's entry into
force, the INCD held six meetings between January 1995 and August 1997. Delegates heard progress
reports on the implementation of urgent action activities in Africa and interim measures in other regions.
Participants also made preparations for the first Conference of Parties (COP-1). Preparations concerned the
Secretariat's programme and budget, the Global Mechanism (the Convention's financial mechanism), the
location of the Permanent Secretariat and establishment of the Committee on Science and Technology
(ENB:04:116). The fiftieth instrument of ratification was submitted to the UN in September 1996. The
treaty entered into force the following December. Two Conference of Parties sessions took place in 1997,
1998 respectively. Most discussions and decisions at COP-1 focused on organizational issues. The
Convention's Committee on Science and Technology met for the first time and COP-1 selected Bonn,
Germany as the location of the Permanent Secretariat. In addition, COP-1 marked the first-ever plenary
meeting reserved specifically for dialogue with non-governmental organizations (ENB:04:116)
* Country delegates numbered 200 to 300 during initial meetings. Approximately 20 of these delegates
were elected to a Bureau charged with assisting the Chairman. This Bureau included a Chair, three Vice
Chairs, and a Rapporteur. Each of these five members represented one of the five UN groups. The
extended Bureau group included various officers and representatives from the two working groups. Non-
voting members (or observers) also constituted a large contingent at the negotiations. These included
members of UN agencies, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations. While
about 100 observers attended the first negotiating session, more than 300 observers attended the second
Conference of Parties (Corell, 1999).
56 The size of the Secretariat grew from two people at the start of negotiations, to thirty people in 1997 and
had a number of different titles throughout the various stages of negotiation (Corell, 1999). Titles changed
with the evolving status of the Secretariat from an ad hoc body to an interim body and ultimately to a
permanent body. For consistency, I refer to this body as the Desertification Secretariat or simply the
Secretariat.
75
developing countries. They commented on negotiating texts, provided input on various
negotiation activities, and prepared reports on subjects related to their various areas of
expertise (Interview with CCD Secretariat Consultant).
2.4.2 Treaty Elements
The Convention differed from past desertification policies in that it constituted a legally-
binding agreement. The treaty comprised both a framework convention and four
"operative instruments" or regional annexes (Kassas, 1995). The framework convention
portion of the treaty included general principles, obligations, and institutional
mechanisms. The principles highlighted the importance of popular and community
participation, and cooperation between local and national levels, and between
governmental and non-governmental organizations. The treaty urged for the integration
of desertification with development initiatives and a comprehensive approach to its
physical, biological, and socio-economic aspects. As discussed below, the Convention
outlined obligations for affected and developed country parties and aimed to foster
partnerships between North and South rather than more traditional, aid-based
relationships (Lean, 1995).
National Action Programmes (NAPs) were designed to serve as vehicles for treaty
implementation. NAPs, in conjunction with Regional and Sub-regional Action
Programmes suggested that local solutions and initiatives were essential, but must be
coordinated with strategies at broader scales. According to the Convention, NAPs should
indicate factors contributing to desertification; measures to combat desertification and
mitigate effects of drought; necessary resources; and roles of local communities,
governments and land users. More specific provisions for NAPs were contained in the
four regional annexes. The regional annexes focused on Africa, Asia, Latin America and
the Caribbean, and the North Mediterranean. All of the annexes specified guidelines for
combating desertification at national, sub-regional, and regional levels. Elements of
regional annexes included a list of conditions specific to the region, and a sketch of action
programmes, financial resources, and institutional mechanisms. Priority for Africa was
evident in the African Annex which was more extensive and detailed than the remaining
three annexes. The African annex included commitments for African and developed
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country Parties, and guidelines for preparation of action programmes, technical
assistance, and follow-up.
To oversee development and implementation of NAPs and the Convention on the
whole, the treaty established several institutions. The Conference of the Parties (COP)
was established as the "supreme body" of the Convention. The COP oversees and
regularly reviews implementation and the functioning of associated institutions. The
COP also has the power to put in place and direct subsidiary bodies. A Permanent
Secretariat handles administrative aspects of the Convention and facilitates assistance to
developing country Parties. As discussed below, the treaty regime also includes a
Committee on Science and Technology and a roster of independent experts. The
Committee provides advice on technical matters and surveys existing networks,
institutions, and agencies. The roster contains the names of individuals with relevant
expertise. The COP can draw on this roster in assembling ad hoc panels to provide it
with advice on specific topics when needed (Lean, 1995). The Convention did not
establish a new source of funding to support implementation. Instead, the treaty calls for
mobilization of resources through existing channels, and established a Global Mechanism
to facilitate and promote this mobilization effort (Lean, 1995).
2.4.3 A "Fresh Approach"
The new treaty ushered in a rhetoric of "newness" and "fresh starts." Following the Rio
Summit, UNEP assumed a much smaller role regarding desertification policy. However,
the agency did help to develop and publicize a new approach to the issue. In the face of
critics who continued to question desertification's legitimacy as the focus of international
policy issue (e.g., Hellden, 1988; Rhodes, 1991), one UNEP staff member wrote:
Various studies and publications since the mid-1980s question various
aspects of the concept and extent of dryland degradation, and these have
had significant consequences in political and policy-making circles,
particularly in the industricalized countries. One reason for the weak
support given to the proposal for a Desertification Convention by the
North is thought by some to be well publicized claims that the United
Nations (UN) has exaggerated the extent of the desertification problem,
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and that it has misrepresented the concept for political reasons (Stiles,
1995: 4).
According to Stiles, UNEP in the late 1980s and early 1990s, was revising its view of
desertification, reassessing long-standing policy approaches, and directing attention to
socio-economic issues.
Literature out of UNEP and the Desertification Secretariat stressed the need for a
new and "fresh" approach to the problem (Cardy, 1991). The treaty itself noted,
despite efforts in the past, progress in combating desertification and
mitigating the effects of drought has not met expectations... a new and
more effective approach is needed at all levels within the framework of
sustainable development (CCD, Preamble).
As discussed in Chapter 4, similar sentiments were voiced in public relations material
published by the Interim Secretariat. The subtitle to "Down to Earth," a simplified guide
to the Convention, read "...why (the Convention) is necessary and what is important and
different about it" (Lean, 1995). Various articles and public relations literature referred
to the Convention as an innovative solution, a "fresh approach" (Cardy, 1991) and a "new
hope" (Interim CCD Secretariat, 1995). All of this seemed to reflect a concerted effort
to separate the Convention from the widely publicized and lackluster performances of
earlier decades.
Additional changes concerned the meaning of desertification. The definition of
desertification as presented in the 1977 Plan ofAction and the 1994 Convention
contained subtle, yet important differences. These differences reflected important shifts
in thinking about environment, development, valuation of ecological resources, and
57 As references for these comments Stiles cited Thomas and Middleton (1994), Pearce (1994a; 1994b);
Hellddn (1991); Olssen (1983); and Warren and Agnew (1988). During the period over which the
Convention was negotiated, UNEP sponsored a five-day workshop entitled "Listening to the People: Social
Aspects of Dryland Management," held in Nairobi in December of 1993 (see Chapter 3). The aim of the
workshop was to develop a better understanding of community participation and bottom-up development
(ECONET, 1994a). Participants spoke on the social dimensions of desertification and dryland
management, participatory methods, indigenous knowledge, gender issues, and government policies.
UNEP compiled these papers in a collection entitled The Social Aspects of Dryland Management. Daniel
Stiles of UNEP edited this volume.
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human relationships to nature. The 1977 Conference on Desertification had grown out of
the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. In keeping with the
anthropogenic orientation of its precursor, UNCOD emphasized land as first and
foremost an economic resource, important primarily because of the ways in which
humans used it to further development goals and support their burgeoning populations.
Following on the sustainable development philosophy of the United Conference on
Environment and Development, the Convention to Combat Desertification aimed to put
environmental considerations on par with development objectives. The Convention
equated desertification with land degradation,5 8 which it defined as:
reduction or loss in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas, of the
biological or economic productivity and complexity of rainfed cropland,
irrigated cropland, or range, pasture, forest, and woodlands...(CCD, 1994:
1(f))
This definition was reminiscent of the 1977 definition in referring to land as an economic
resource developed through different forms of land use such as farming and pasturing.
However, in distinguishing between biological and economic productivity and
complexity, the 1994 definition implied that ecological viability of the land might be
important for reasons not readily valued in economic terms.
The Convention also framed desertification as a global issue. In particular, the
agreement described desertification as a global problem affecting all regions of the world.
However, "global" as reflected in the Convention departed from earlier notions of global.
The Plan ofAction emphasized the worldwide physical extent of desertification. The
Plan, for example, pointed to the World Map of Desertification as evidence of a universal
and uniform desertification phenomenon that was global because it affected such a large
percentage of the earth's surface area. The Plan did prescribe national action plans to
address specific national needs. However, the Plan implied that no matter where
desertification was occurring, it was amenable to a standard and universally applicable
set of remedies.
58 The first appearance of "land degradation" in an official definition of desertification, was in a UNEP
study (Odingo, 1990). Agenda 21, Chapter 12 also defined desertification as land degradation but did not
explicitly define the meaning of this latter term.
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The Convention, on the other hand, portrayed desertification as a process
affecting many disparate regions and ecosystems in many different ways. It noted that
Desertification and drought are problems of global dimension in that they
affect all regions of the world and that joint action of the international
community is needed to combat desertification and/or mitigate the effects
of drought (CCD, Preamble).
Hence, the Convention portrayed desertification's global dimensions as an important
basis for international cooperation. However, the treaty also emphasized desertification's
regional variability. This new vision of desertification was manifest in the Convention's
five regional annexes, each specifying the needs and challenges of particular locations.
They outlined socio-economic, geographic and climatic characteristics of different areas,
as well as regionally-focused policy provisions. As discussed in Chapter 5, a regional
conception of desertification was also evident in the 1992 World Atlas ofDesertification.
The Atlas acknowledged not only varied regional conditions and policy measures, but
also the existence of pluralistic interpretations of degradation. Regional and local maps
in the Atlas featured disparate manifestations of desertification processes, as well as a
variety of analytical and cartographic assessment methodologies.
2.5 Policy Change
The preceding historical sketch highlights key aspects of desertification policy5 9
throughout the twentieth century. The present section presents a summary comparison of
these policies. This comparison focuses on the four texts representative of each of the
four eras: papers from the Anglo-French Forestry Commission; the 1977 Plan ofAction;
Agenda 21, Chapter 12; and The Convention to Combat Desertification. These
statements on desertification differed in regard to definitions of dryland degradation,
global framings of the issue, notions of causation, and approaches to remedial and
preventative action.
In the 1930s, British and French colonial administrations in Africa dismissed
theories regarding progressive desiccation and desert encroachment. The Commission's
59 I use the term "policy" loosely in referring to findings of the Anglo-French Forestry Commission and to
international statements such as Agenda 21, Chapter 12.
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stand on this issue had implications for the presumed source of degradation and the scope
and nature of policy measures. Progressive desiccationists believed that West Africa was
becoming increasingly arid largely because of changes in climate (e.g., Hubert, 1920).
Sympathetic colleagues identified desert encroachment as a symptom of progressive
desiccation and attributed this phenomenon to a mix of natural and human-induced
processes. In the face of such seemingly regional threats, E. P. Stebbing proposed the
implementation of transnational policies requiring cooperation between France and
Britain. Colonial officials, however, provided a much different view of degradation.
According to their observations, the climate was not becoming increasingly arid and the
desert was not encroaching. The only form of degradation of concern to the officials
arose from shifting cultivation practices on the part of indigenous Africans. Based on
this diagnosis, the commission members supported independent colonial policies rather
than transnational schemes.
Between the early 1950s and late 1970s, the United Nations system took on
problems of drought and desertification. In planning an international conference and
developing a fledging environmental agency (UNEP), the UN targeted the latter of these
problems by way of a Plan ofAction. This Plan portrayed desertification as a problem of
global extent and with clearly identified causes and solutions. As defined in the Plan,
desertification was not the spread of deserts but the spread of desert-like conditions, and
it had the potential to cause degradation on every continent. By virtue of its sheer
physical extent and costs, desertification was said to warrant international attention. As
prescribed in the Plan, this attention should focus on a singular anthropogenic source of
degradation: irrational land use practices. By calling attention to these practices, the
Plan emphasized the physical processes by which activities such as overgrazing,
irrigation and continuous monoculture depleted the land's resources. To rectify these
problems, the Plan called for a "proximate solution," one based largely on the application
of modern science and technology through top-down, nationally-based programs.
The 1980s and early 1990s were a period of critique and questioning. UNEP
evaluated progress in implementing the Plan and reported disappointing results. In
addition, UNEP's methodologies and general approach to anti-desertification efforts
came under scrutiny. In the context of a sustainable development paradigm and the
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United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, desertification re-
emerged as the focus of international negotiations. As reflected in Chapter 12 of Agenda
21, new perceptions of desertification were emerging. This policy statement declared
desertification and land degradation to be synonymous, further distancing the
desertification concept from the notion of deserts or adv
ancing deserts. Agenda 21 also identified a broader set of causal mechanisms as
responsible for desertification. Human ignorance was no longer considered the sole
source of desertification. Instead, UNCED participants agreed that a much broader set of
"climatic variations and human activities" were at work. The statement continued to
emphasize the global extent of degradation, heavy reliance on basic scientific research
and increased vegetation. However, Agenda 21 also contained the beginnings of a more
pluralistic approach to knowledge and decentralized plans for policy implementation.
In 1994, the Convention to Combat Desertification departed even further from
earlier policies. Under this full-fledged treaty, desertification remained a process of land
degradation arising from climatic variations and human activities. However, ideas
regarding desertification's global character and remedies were largely and importantly
new. While previous agreements had stressed the singularity of desertification's causes
and manifestations, the Convention presented desertification as involving complex
interactions among ecological, social and economic factors. Consequently, the treaty
highlighted the need to tailor anti-desertification efforts to ecological, cultural, economic
and political factors inherent in each local context. As reflected in the regional annexes
and country obligations, the problem was global, not only because of the total area of
land it covered, but because its amelioration required "partnerships" linking developed
and developing countries and institutions at local, national, regional and international
levels. The policy prescriptions in the Convention did not recommend specific
technologies and practices, but instead emphasized the need for a process based on public
participation at the local level and reliant on indigenous knowledge and practices, in
combination with modern science and appropriate technology.
The remaining chapters focus on explaining how and why these policy changes
came about. The discussion centers on processes of authorization, inscription and
boundary work and examines their role in problem framing (e.g., how did the perception
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of desertification as a global problem gain legitimacy?); responsibility (e.g., in what ways
did changing causal narratives apportion blame and empower and disempower different
groups to act?); participation (e.g., how did different problem framings dictate rules of
participation?).
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CHAPTER 3
Constructing Expertise, Environment and Policy
Expert advice has been part of desertification policymaking throughout the century.
However, the definition of expert, the nature of expert institutions,60 and interactions
connecting experts with political decisionmakers have varied markedly during this period.
These changes emerged alongside continuous transformations in widely held perceptions
of dryland degradation and international attempts at its amelioration.
In the 1930s the Anglo-French Forestry Commission refuted claims of an
advancing desert and proposals for transnational forest belts. They interpreted
environmental degradation as a local phenomenon arising from "primitive" modes of
agriculture and lack of coordination among colonial natural resource departments. In the
1970s, the United Nations Environment Programme commissioned natural scientists,
primarily from developed countries, to participate in extensive assessment activities in
preparation for the United Nations Conference on Desertification. On the basis of these
assessments, UNEP portrayed desertification as a "coherent" global problem arising from
unsound land use practices and amenable to technological solutions.
In the 1980s, as UNEP convened various panels of natural scientists to assess
implementation of the Plan ofAction, the agency focused on measuring the physical
extent of land degradation and the rate of its "advance" at the global scale. However, new
voices outside United Nations circles also began to attract attention. While some
researchers severely questioned the very existence of desertification, others, voicing
social science and rural ecology perspectives, began to offer new insights into its local
dimensions. By the time of negotiations for a Convention to Combat Desertification
60 Expert advisory processes as defined in this chapter include panels, committees, and symposia,
commissioned by intergovernmental organizations to provide specialized knowledge on some aspect or
aspects of desertification and/or related issues for the purposes of policymaking or policy evaluation. Here,
the definition of intergovernmental organization is broad, including, for example, the United Nations
General Assembly, the United Nations Environment Programme, and the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee on Desertification.
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(CCD or the Convention) in early 1993, UNEP was fading as the leading international
institution on desertification and a new model of expert advice was in place. A relatively
small panel of natural and social scientists consulted for the Desertification Secretariat
throughout treaty negotiations. By most accounts, however, these experts did not play
key roles in framing the desertification issue. Just as modem science diminished as the
means for understanding desertification processes, modern science and technology
occupied a much less prominent place among desertification's solutions. Unlike the
technocratic, top-down approach under the Plan ofAction and UNEP, the new
Convention looked to alternative forms of knowledge and public participation as
implements of amelioration.
This chapter demonstrates how expert advisory processes for international
desertification policymaking were inextricably linked to the institutions that gave rise to
them. In the desertification context, as in many other international environmental
regimes, the design, activities and use of expert advisory processes encompassed a fairly
formalized set of practices. Practices involve, inter alia, the creation of mandates, explicit
or implicit guidelines for participation, and rules governing the timing and nature of
interactions between experts and policymakers. While the very cultures and interactions
comprising expert advisory processes had implications that reached beyond the confines
of the expert process itself, expert advisors often generated portable artifacts in the form
of texts, maps, and other forms of visual representation.
3.1 Analytical Framework
Desertification advisory panels and expert consultants enjoyed varying degrees of
autonomy in deciding what scientific questions to ask and how to answer them. For
example, while UNEP assigned specific research topics to its experts and monitored their
work fairly closely, experts consulting for the Desertification Secretariat in 1993 and
1994 had substantial latitude in shaping their personal contributions to the process.
Nevertheless, throughout desertification's history, dominant institutions such as colonial
empires, UNEP, and the Desertification Secretariat served as the ultimate determinants
regarding the structure and composition of expert bodies, their mandate, and their role in
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policymaking activities. The desertification case further suggests that, by controlling so
many aspects of expert activities, institutions colored not only the shape and look of
advisory processes, but also the knowledge claims and policy prescriptions they
generated. In particular, the processes and products of expert consultations tended to
reflect the objectives and capacities of their commissioning institutions. For example, the
Anglo-French Forestry Commission advocated a local framing of degradation amenable
to control by individual colonial administrations. By contrast, UNEP's advisors in the
1970s portrayed desertification as a global problem, knowable through natural science,
and manageable ultimately, via a centralized international agency.
The following sections explore four eras of desertification policymaking in terms
of three themes. The first theme concerns the design of expert processes, their mandate
and relationship to policymakers. Discussions regarding this theme examine the "model"
of expert advice. For example, does the expert process reflect a conception of science
and policymaking as sequential whereby scientific assessments take place prior to policy
negotiation and are expected to "feed into" these negotiations? Or does the expert
process reflect an interactive view of science and policymaking in which experts are
directly engaged with policy deliberations? Other aspects of design concern the mandate
and methodologies of experts. What questions, for example, are advisors expected to
answer and what modes of inquiry, representation and communication do they employ?6'
The second theme, composition, refers to the question of who counts as an expert? Who
is perceived as possessing the required authority to "witness" natural and social
phenomena in question? Is deference paid to natural scientists, social scientists, or non-
scientists? The third and final theme pertains to institutional capacity andproblem
framing. This theme concerns ways in which expert processes embody the priorities of
their respective commissioning institutions, and support problem framings which
conform to the resources and capacities of these institutions. Do expert assessments on
behalf of individual national governments, for example, tend to interpret issues as
inherently local and amenable to administrative control? Similarly, do advisory processes
61 While the present chapter addresses these questions in a general sense, Chapters 4 and 5 explore
quantification and visual representation in more detail.
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for international institutions tend to frame problems as fundamentally global and
necessitating multilateral cooperation?
Insights regarding these themes are relevant to literatures of science and
technology studies, policy studies and the history of science. While adhering to a much
different vision of science and politics than that presented in this study, authors such as
Majone (1989), Ozawa (1991), and Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993) have suggested
that participation and forums for technical debate often have consequences for outcomes
of such debates. Majone (1989) argued that adversarial interactions were the best means
for developing science policy. According to Majone (1989), "objective analysis,
unassisted by advocacy and persuasion is seldom sufficient to achieve major policy
innovation." In contrast, Ozawa (1991) advocated consensus-based methods involving
stakeholders, decisionmakers and experts as a means for handling technical policy
disputes. Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith (1993), on the other hand, suggested that
technocratic advisory processes, which are closed to public participation and which
involve experts with common professional norms are the most conducive to robust
policymaking. While these authors generally share a view of science and policy as
fundamentally separate enterprises, their contributions, nevertheless, further suggest that
questions of structure, process and participation in regard to expert advisory activities,
have a bearing on policy formulation.
Sheila Jasanoff in her study, The Fifth Branch (1990), revealed science advice to
be an integral component of regulatory decisionmaking. Based on studies regarding the
use of expert committees by federal agencies in the United States, her analysis revealed
how expert deliberations involve simultaneous negotiation of technical and political
controversies, with expert participants engaging in boundary work to delineate what
counts as science and what counts as policy. The study further demonstrated that the
ability of such negotiated boundaries to withstand public scrutiny depends in part on the
procedure, structure and composition of expert panels. Important process characteristics
include experts' ability to transcend disciplinary boundaries, committee membership,
participation by different publics, the role of agencies in defining the subject of study, and
procedures by which participants engage in deliberation. The analysis below explores
87
questions of participation and advisory committee design in the context of international
environmental politics. It also builds on Jasanoff's (1990) notion of boundary work as
involving not only the delineation of science-policy boundaries, but also the demarcation
of natural-social and lay-expert realms.
Research in science and technology studies and in history of science and politics
have demonstrated the interdependence of science and social order reflected in my
suggestion that advisory processes are, in part, instruments of institutional inscription.
Shapin and Schaffer (1985), through analysis of debates involving Hobbes and Boyle and
the rise of experimentalism showed that processes of knowledge production ultimately
hinged on politics, while political order similarly depended on solutions to problems of
knowledge. Ezrahi (1990) demonstrated how liberal democracies draw on science for
authority, legitimacy and accountability. Jasanoff (1995) in her analysis of science and
the American judicial system demonstrated the role of the courts in producing public
understandings of science and technology, while at the same time using science to resolve
disputes. The case of desertification similarly reveals an interdependence and
simultaneous construction of science and international policy. In particular, it vividly
highlights the role of institutional priorities and resources in constraining and shaping
problem framings.
Studies revealing the interdependence of scientific knowledge and social order
also emphasized the importance of systems for determining what knowledge and methods
were authoritative. Shapin and Shaffer (1985) examined multiple witnessing as a process
necessary for generating matters of fact. Jasanoff (1995) explored the role of the courts in
constructing and deconstructing expertise. She considered different cultures of expert
witnessing and the role of the judicial system in testing credibility of adversary processes
and in certifying witnesses and their testimony as admissible or not. Witnessing also
proves important in the desertification case. In designing the structure and membership
of expert panels, presiding institutions have often determined who constituted important
and credible witnesses for interpreting desertification phenomena. However, when
independent scientists and the press questioned the credibility of these very institutions,
new voices of authority began to emerge and were later incorporated into the new regime.
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The nature of expert forums, boundary work, and witnessing are all important in
understanding desertification politics and how these politics evolved with changing
institutions and problem framings.
3.2 Science Advice and Colonial West Africa
Debates about West African desiccation and an advancing Sahara during the 1930s
provide insight into the role of expert advice in French and British colonial West Africa
and into colonial priorities and resources inherent in then-current perceptions of
environmental degradation. The resoluteness with which the Commission seemed to
refute E. P. Stebbing's claims illustrates, in part, the deference that colonial
administrations and researchers paid to government-appointed experts. The credentials of
the various Commission members further reflected French and British reliance on
ecological specialists in devising and carrying out administrative policies. While
boundaries separating colonial scientists and natural resource managers were often
difficult to delineate, boundaries between natural and social scientists were not. Although
anthropologists, for example, worked on relevant issues in West Africa, governments and
natural scientists did not consult them on problems of desiccation. Natural science
communities, however, were not devoid of controversies concerning the nature of
desiccation and its remedies. The Stebbing-Commission debate, for example, highlights
two divergent views of the West African environment and its management. Whereas
Stebbing portrayed desiccation as a singular threat to the region, warranting transnational
forest belt schemes, the Commission perceived degradation as a local phenomenon, best
managed through improved administrative coordination. Acceptance of the
Commission's proposals over Stebbing's suggests that colonial objectives and attitudes
were inscribed in predominant visions of the West African environment.
3.2.1 West Africa's Fifth Branch: Science Advisors as Policymakers62
Colonial administrations relied heavily on scientists and other specialists in fields such as
forestry, agriculture, medicine, and economics. In doing so, colonial governments
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62 From title of Jasanoff (1990).
authorized the views of scientists who served as administrative officers, as well as outside
expert consultants. In the young colonies, geographical departments handled all aspects
of colonial governance. However, beginning in the late 1920s and continuing to
approximately 1945, administrations received support from a wider variety of specialists.
Full-time expert advisors and advisory committees provided input on decisionmaking
regarding farming geology and economics. Over time, full-fledged natural resource
departments formed and played an active role in policy development. A conservation
ideology began to take hold around this time and its adherents sought to maintain what
they saw as "Nature's balance." By preserving a stable equilibrium among natural
resource use in different sectors, colonists sought to ensure viability of valuable exports
(Hargreaves, 1996: 46).
West African exports included groundnuts, cotton, hides and skin (Jones, 1938),
and colonial leaders were interested in maintaining an environment that could support
their profitablility. Studies by individual researchers and natural resource mangers were
central to these efforts. Some investigations focused on climate and land management,
with droughts providing a popular topic for government-appointed commissions and
independent researchers. In 1904, for example, reports of desiccation prompted France to
commission an examination of dryland degradation. Several years of low rainfall from
1905 to 1920 prompted analysis concerning broader climatic trends and their possible
effects on the African landscape. In 1920 the French Comite d'Etudes for West Africa
commissioned a study of dess6chment progressif (Hubert, 1920)63 to determine whether
increasing aridity posed a threat to land, water and vegetation.
Colonial priorities and attitudes did more than motivate scientific inquiry. They
were integral to the processes and products of science. French scientists generally
focused their attention on French territories, while British scientists studied the British
colonies. References to British and French borders populated the writings of the
scientists, as did references to ignorant and violent native tribes.64 Support for the
settlement of Africa in Europe's image, was in many places unmistakable. In 1931, for
63 See also Mortimore (1989).
64 Examples abound throughout the scientific literature of the period. Examples, include Hubert (1920),
Schwarz (1923), Bovill (1921), Stebbing (1935), Jones (1938).
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example, an accomplished British agriculturalist described deserts and man as being at
war. Though he spoke of the Kalahari in east Africa, his fervor for colonial settlement is
emblematic of many writings of the time. In personifying the desert MacDonald wrote:
He is waging eternal war with us. He does not want men. He wants
desolation... Half-a-century has come and gone, and what have we done?
The white man has joined hands with the native vandal, and year after year
the work of ceaseless destruction goes on. Not a single tree is ever
planted... Is it possible, then, the reader may ask, to check the advance of
the desert, conquer the crop-blighting winds of aridity, and ameliorate the
climatic conditions of a vast country such as the Kalahari? Yes; but three
things are essential - Population, Conservation and Afforestation
(MacDonald, 1913: 3,4).
Growing populations alone were not the answer. To be successful, it was thought,
Africans needed to employ European methods of resource management, forestry, and
agriculture to support favorable ecological and economic conditions.
In Search of True Facts
Scientific research as a basis or potential basis for colonial policies was also apparent in
recommendations by Stebbing and the commissioners. They did not limit their analyses
to interpretation of natural phenomenon alone (e.g, in determining whether or not
progressive desiccation was occurring). They also translated their scientific findings into
specific policy recommendations. Some of Stebbing's recommendations illustrate the
role of expert advice as perceived in the colonial context. He recommended that a
government-appointed expert group confirm his findings before France and Britain take
joint policy action. As Stebbing concluded:
the true facts on the subject of the present advance southwards and threat
of the Sahara can be substantiated in one way only-by the appointment of
a small Commission of officers carefully selected for their knowledge of
the local conditions on both sides of the frontier. (Stebbing, 1937a: 232,
also quoted in Stamp, 1940: 297).
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Stebbing's reference to "true facts" suggests a belief in rational administrative
decisionmaking, based on objective scientific knowledge and balanced representation of
colonial governments. The equating of experts and colonial officers implicit in his
recommendation reveals the primary role of the government specialist in government as
responsible for assuring this objectivity. Stebbing's view of expert advice as the only
means for obtaining such facts underscores colonial dependence on science as a source of
authority and as a source of guidance regarding how to settle and manage the new
frontier. 65
The Nigerian Government and the Administration of the French Niger Colony
heeded Stebbing's recommendation. In 1936 they appointed ajoint commission to
examine his claims of desiccation and a southwardly advancing Sahara around northern
Nigeria. In the words of one Commissioner, Stebbing presented a "more gloomy view of
the future of West Africa than any of his predecessors in this field" (Jones, 1938: 401).
Stebbing's vision suggested to colonial administrators that farmland fertility and water
supplies in the northern Nigerian provinces were in jeopardy. As described by Jones
(1938), export trade in groundnuts, cotton, hides and skins made this a "rich agricultural
region" and "a most important factor in the economic life of the Protectorate." Stebbing's
predictions were particularly relevant to the 218,389 tons of groundnuts grown in the
most northerly districts. If Stebbing's accounts of an advancing Sahara were correct,
these crops would be in "immediate danger" and the colonial administrations could not
ignore his warning (Jones, 1938: 401).
In keeping with Stebbing's prescribed mandate, the Niger Colony and Britain
appointed a small group of seven officers from both colonies. The governments directed
them,
to inspect the country on both sides of the Anglo/French boundary and to
collect all available data from which conclusions can be drawn as to the
progress of desiccation...and the extent to which desert conditions are
being created, and what is causing these conditions (Falconer, 1938: 355).
65 The next section discusses colonial ideas about what counts as authoritative knowledge. Such ideas are
evident in Stebbing's references to experts who are government-appointed, representative of diverse
geographic regions, and knowledgeable about local conditions.
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This mandate was clearly aimed at generating an evaluation of Stebbing's claims. In
collecting "all available data" the Commission's purpose was to provide a scientifically-
grounded basis for government decisionmaking. The commissioners carried out this
mandate in 1936 and early 1937 (Falconer, 1938: 355),66 by traversing the route depicted
in Figure 4 (see Chapter 5). The commissioners commenced their journey near Sokoto
and moved eastward on the Nigerian border to Lake Chad through Katsina, Kano and
Geidam. On the return trip the group began in Nguigmi and traveled along the French
border to Niamey through Zinder, Maradi, with a northern detour to Agad'es. At each
town the Commission questioned chiefs and local councilors about water supply changes,
agricultural practices, sand movement, and vegetation changes. They authored a brief
report of their findings to the government (Stamp, 1940), but published extensive
accounts of their findings in scientific journals (e.g., Jones, 1938; Collier and Dundas,
1937).
Following their investigation, the Commission rejected the claim that the West
African climate was becoming progressively dry. On issues of humidity, surface and
subsurface water, population migration, and desert encroachment, the Commission
systematically refuted nearly all of Stebbing's observations and conclusions. The
Commissioners believed (along with earlier studies 67) that West Africa's rainfall was not
decreasing according to any secular trend. They argued instead that 1936 had been "an
exceptionally wet year" and that surface water was increasing. On the subject of
subsurface water, the Commission referred to the Geological Survey of Nigeria, which
maintained that the water-table was "to all intents and purposes stationary" (Jones, 1938:
417). As far as population migrations, the Commission attributed these to political and
economic factors, rather than to progressive desiccation (Jones, 1938). Furthermore, the
Commission claimed that Stebbing had mistaken an outcrop of sandstone near Maradi for
66 According to Jones (1938), the Commission carried out their fieldwork between December 1996 and
February 1997. Dundas, another Commission member, said the Commission visited the colony from
January to March 1937 (Dundas, 1938). Most of his paper presents a detailed description of the vegetation
types east of the River Niger and north of Dahomey and Nigeria. His classification scheme is based on
names given in an Imperial Forestry Institute Paper by Dr. J. Burtt Davy (1938), "The Classification of
Tropical Woody Vegetation-types."
67 Examples include Chudeau (1909), Falconer (1911) and Gautier (1935).
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a southwardly moving Sahara. They similarly reported that live dunes of the Sahara
existed over 150 miles from the Nigerian border. According to the Commission, the
potential encroachment of the Sahara on the Sudan was a remote possibility because sand
displacement was occurring at slow rates and dunes without vegetation were likely to
become anchored by vegetation quickly in the then-present climate conditions. The
officers concluded that climatic changes in West Africa were accompanied by gradual
expansions and contractions of the Sahara.
The Commission also disagreed with Stebbing on several points regarding
deforestation. According to the commissioners, Stebbing lacked evidence to support his
claim of deforestation in northern Nigeria. Commission members suggested that, in the
town of Geidam, Stebbing mistook fertile farmland (observed during the dry season) for a
desert-like area. They argued that drying and dead trees in Niger were not evidence of
desiccation, but were, instead, signs of tree asphyxiation following clay deposition at the
bottom of marsh depressions. In other areas, the Commission found soil erosion to be
responsible for tree deaths. The commission similarly rejected the notion that increased
aridity contributed to deforestation or lowering of the water table. They believed that
several climate fluctuations took place between the early Quaternary period and the
1930s. Evidence of such fluctuations included anchored dunes in Quaternary river
valleys and isolation and divergent evolution of crocodiles and North African elephants.
However, the Commission agreed with Stebbing that shifting cultivation presented a
major threat to the West African countryside.
Stebbing's Advancing Desert Retreats
In response to the Commission's report and other critiques, Stebbing modified his claims
of advancing deserts. Stebbing published his article and talk, "The Encroaching Sahara:
the Threat to the West African Colonies" in The Geographical Journal in December of
1937. In it he dramatically portrayed the desert's advance. By January 1938 he published
a book entitled The Man-Made Desert in Africa (Stebbing, 1938a) which begins with a
response to his critics. Stebbing conceded that his descriptions of the advancing desert
had been misleading. He had not meant to imply a wave-like, southward advance of the
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desert. In April 1938 Stebbing published a response to detractors such as Francis Rodd
(1938) and J.D. Falconer (1937, 1938) in The Geographical Journal (Stebbing, 1938b).
This time Stebbing's tone was more defensive:
I have already admitted an inadvertent mistake in using the latter term for
my address to the Royal Geographical Society in 1935. I had never
imagined that I should be credited with the idea that the Sahara was
advancing in great waves like the incoming tide of a sea. The main theme
of my paper and book is forest degradation which leads to erosion, and as
a late stage to barren land-sand, or sheet rock, or other form, depending
upon the locality and environment. Owing to the presence of a great desert
to the north the process is hastened by blown sand in the colonies on the
southern edge of the Sahara (Stebbing, 1938b: 357).
In later writings Stebbing adopted the term "erosion" in lieu of references to desert
advance, sand invasion, sand penetration, and sand displacement that had colored his
earlier publications. He also emphasized the presence human-induced (rather than
climate-induced) forms of erosion arising from practices such as shifting cultivation
(Stebbing, 1938b).
3.2.2 Colonial Authorities
The Commission was praised for its analysis. In expressing relief at the Sahara's
apparent stability, fellow scientists and administrative authors also commended the
Commission's investigation. J. D. Falconer referred to the study as based on a "very
complete reconnaissance of the area" (Falconer, 1938: 354). Dudley Stamp (1940), of
the London School of Economics, remarked how Commission member Brynmor Jones
refuted Stebbing's claims with "complete scientific thoroughness." Stamp cited the
Commission's knowledge of local conditions, as well as their reliance on many different
types of evidence and a wide array of literature (Stamp, 1940: 299). Other scientists such
as Jacks and Whyte (1939) simply referred to Stebbing's advancing desert concept as
incorrect, without giving specific credit to the Commission.68 Acceptance of the
68 Scientists writing in the last decade continue to refer to the authority with which the Commission
challenged Stebbing. As noted by Harold Dregne a prominent desertification expert since the 1950s, "The
most striking refutation of Stebbing's thesis about the advancing Sahara came from an Anglo-French
forestry commission study..." (Dregne and Tucker, 1987: 17). Jeremy Swift, who also served as a UN
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Commission's findings reflects, in part, their authority as perceived by fellow scientists
and administrators. The discussion below outlines the Commission's membership and
relates it to colonial ideas regarding natural and social science, and to the importance
placed on knowledge of local conditions.
The Commission was international and multidisciplinary. In addition, all
Commission members served in either the French or British administrations. The group
included two senior administrators, one from Britain and one from France, two British
Nigerian foresters and one geologist, and two Inspectors of Forests and Water Supply of
French West Africa (Stamp, 1940). Aubreville, a French forester, led the French
delegation. The governments' reliance on natural science in matters of environmental
degradation is clear in the Commission's membership. Their methodology and analyses
also reflect attention to and knowledge about the local environment. In keeping with
Stebbing's recommendations, it appears that colonial governments selected commission
members, in part "for their knowledge of the local conditions on both sides of the
frontier" (Stebbing, 1937a: 232). As discussed below, the colonists valued and, therefore,
authorized the views of individuals possessing both natural science expertise and
familiarity with local conditions.
A Challenge for the Natural Sciences
Scientists and colonial administrative officers considered environmental well-being as
dependent on natural as well as anthropogenic factors. Nature was considered inherently
balanced. Humans, however, in overexploiting nature's resources could disrupt this
balance. Yet, while scientists often referred to migrations, economic factors, and human
land use systems as manifestations and causes of degradation, they generally did not seek
deeper understanding of these phenomena. Despite the various social factors involved,
West African degradation remained a problem for natural science to understand and
address. According to Collier and Dundas (Commission members and Senior Assistant
Conservators of Forests in Nigeria), the Commission agreed with Stebbing that
expert on desertification in the 1980s, similarly remarked that "the Commission systematically refuted most
of Stebbing's assertions" (Swift, 1996: 76).
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uncontrolled development in the form of shifting cultivation, was leading to deforestation
along the international border, posing "good reason for anxiety." While further north, the
French Niger Colony faced a "completely different problem" of a reversed trade flow,
resulting from decrease in population (Collier and Dundas, 1937: 191-2). Collier and
Dundas mentioned development, trade, shifting cultivation and population. However, in
no place did they defer to anthropologists or economists or even mention their relevance.
Instead, they defined the colonies' problems in largely physical terms such as desiccation,
deforestation, and spreading deserts. These issues fell under the intellectual jurisdictions
of foresters, agriculture scientists, geologists and meteorologists. For the most part,
natural scientists took the social dimensions of degradation and dryland management for
granted. They did not seek deeper understanding of the political, economic, and cultural
processes at work.
Despite parallel developments in fields of ecology and anthropology, experts in
these two areas did not cross paths, at least not in relation to the progressive desiccation
debate. British cultural anthropology, in particular, was building a central and lasting
69foundation for the development of major theoretical perspectives in its field. Many
ideas generated through this process seemed to echo thinking in the world of geography
and forestry. In particular, anthropologists, like their natural science counterparts, were
developing a holistic view of environmental and social phenomena, while increasingly
focusing on local, micro-level dynamics and their relevance to global trends. 70 The
functionalist or structural-functionalist school in anthropology, in short, assumed that "all
of the contemporaneous cultural and social features of a stable society could be assumed
to form part of a coherent and interdependent system. The task of the interpreter was to
infer the connections" (Moore, 1993: 7). Functionalist scholars sought to understand
these interdependencies through the study of small communities from the inside.
69 British social anthropology between 1920 and 1960 was much more influential than French work in the
same area. Moore (1993) refers to the decades 1920-1960 as the "classic period of the growth of
anthropology."
70 A French anthropology pioneer in France was Maurice Delafosse who died in 1926. He was a French
colonial officer from West Africa who taught at Ecole Coloniale and the Institue d'Ethnologie where he
trained many colonial officers in ethnographic methods. Twenty years after his death the premier French
Africanist was Marcel Griaule who focused primarily on museum work and artifacts and later on the themes
of ritual, myth and symbol. But his work had only limited influence outside of France (Moore, 1993: 7-8).
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Concern for local insights and the dynamics of localized systems were similarly of
interest to British anthropology and to the British colonial administrations in general.
Because the British government sought to delegate authority to local entities the study of
local organizations and social institutions in Africa was of great interest to colonial
administrations. British colonial administrations operated under a system of "Indirect
Rule." The British believed that, where possible, local government should be carried out
through indigenous political institutions, which were assembled to exist in self-governing
"tribes." While the government occasionally used anthropologists to collect needed
information, it more frequently relied on local political officers (Moore, 1993).
Much like the movement reflected in Jacks and Whyte's (1939) World Survey of
Soil Erosion, anthropology, beginning in the late 1930s and continuing into the next two
decades, began to adopt a broader view of its research subjects. Instead of focusing on
isolated, local settings, studies of rural-urban relationships revealed that "the African
countryside was imbedded in a much larger set of political and economic relations"
(Moore, 1993: 14). In the late 1930s, for example, anthropologists began to seek out
universal laws to describe their findings. This approach emanated from A.R. Radcliffe-
Brown's work in 1937. Although he was not an Africanist, his teachings derived from
Durkheim's works on cultural comparisons and proposed "that anthropology was a
comparative sociology, which should be devoted to the discovery of social laws... Such
laws would be like the laws of natural science" (Moore, 1993: 11).
While anthropology and some areas of natural science were developing similar
ideas during the early 1900s, synergy and sharing of these ideas did not occur. Foresters
and other natural scientists continued their focus on the physical aspects of degradation
and anthropologists were frequently passed over for relevant government work in favor of
political officers (Moore, 1993).
Debates Among Natural Scientists
Although anthropologists did not participate in West African environmental studies of the
colonial period, there was no shortage of debates and competition across disciplinary
lines. Dating back to at least the beginning of the twentieth century, disciplinary identity
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has factored into scientific debates about dryland environments. The work of Stebbing
and the Commission surfaced amidst this climate and reflected many of its characteristics.
The complex African environment and phenomena such as land degradation,
aridity, advancing deserts, and migration have been accessible to a wide array of
observers. In a sense the colonies opened up a giant experiment for western scientists.
Foresters, geologists, climatologists and agriculturalists brought a multitude of
methodologies, languages and practices to bear on the Continent's puzzles. Often
scientists from a given specialty focused on just one of the many interconnected elements
of the ecosystem (e.g., rivers, forests, savannah cover, agriculture). In journal articles of
the time scientists revealed their disciplinary affiliations and were often critical of those
with different training. Ideas or theories on particular issues were usually ascribed to a
certain disciplinary perspective. Consequently, authors regularly referred to "the
geologists' view..." or the "foresters' view..." in summarizing the literature on a
particular point. For example, meteorologists and forestry experts often disagreed over
the relationships linking forests and rainfall patterns. "While the meteorologists have
denied such a relationship, they are modifying their views to be somewhat more
compatible with the uncompromising opinion held by forestry experts in many different
parts of the world" (Bovill, 1921: 259).71
In opposing the theory of progressive desiccation, Jones closely aligned himself
with the geologists, Gautier, Chudeau and Falconer and against Hubert. Gautier argued,
based on river bed erosion in the north and fixed dunes in the Sudan, that "in the north the
desert has followed the steppe, and in the south the steppe has followed the desert."
Chudeau observed dead ergs, fossil dunes and drainage systems in the Sudan and
concluded that the Sudan was encroaching on the Sahara. Based on rainfall records,
Chudeau found sounds of increasing humidity in the Sudan (see Bovill, 1921: 265).
Jacks and Whyte (1939: 250) alluded to the reputations of various scientific
disciplines when comparing engineering and chemistry approaches to soil management
with ecology-based approaches. They noted that engineers and chemists were successful
7 Similar generalizations were made in referring to the "French view" or "British view" of various natural
phenomena. The theory of progressive desiccation, for example, was often attributed to the French (e.g.,
Stamp, 1940).
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in altering vegetation in cool regions by changing the soil type. Tropical soils, however,
required the expertise of the ecologist who "does not command the respect as either of the
others" (Jacks and Whyte, 1939: 250).
Witnessing
In the eyes of fellow officers and scientists, much of the Commission's authority derived
from its members' first-hand familiarity with local conditions. Many participants in the
progressive desiccation debate viewed academic researchers as lacking intimate
understandings of local environments. Members of the geography community, for
example, faulted Stebbing for his apparent misperceptions of West African conditions.
The colonial officer, because of his long-term residence in Africa and familiarity with
local ecosystems, was a more credible witness in the eyes of his scientific colleagues and
the government. Accolades for the Commission's work, and critiques of Stebbing's
claims illustrate the authority of local witnesses.
Well before the Stebbing-Commission debate, Bovill (1921), a staunch believer in
advancing deserts, suggested that proponents of desert encroachment theory possessed a
local perspective and were, therefore, more knowledgeable about dryland phenomena. In
referring to the southward migration of people in the Sudan region he made the following
comments.
It is the conviction of those who are in intimate contact with the natives
that this dislocation of the population is entirely due to the encroachment
of the Sahara... The division of opinion is not altogether surprising. It is
probably due to the difference in point of view between the geologist and
the administrative official. The field geologist in so vast and imperfectly
known a country as the northern half of Africa is required to range over
great areas; he seldom has an opportunity of becoming intimately
acquainted with any single district, and the scarcely perceptible processes
of nature such as the gradual shrinkage of wells, lakes, and even rivers, are
not unlikely to escape his notice; nor is he called upon to solve the
problems arising out of the consequent dislocation of the population.
Moreover, in his training, and in the exercise of his profession, mere
decades, and perhaps centuries, are periods of time of no great
significance. The local official, on the other hand, is usually required to
serve for long periods in very limited areas, with which he becomes
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intimately acquainted, and with the inhabitants of which he is in constant
and intimate contact. Under his eye the slight processes of nature,
especially when connected with the vital question of water-supply are far
less likely to escape observation. It is chiefly from this source that springs
that ever growing mass of evidence of increasing aridity. Unfortunately
almost the whole of this evidence lies inaccessibly hid in the files of
provincial offices (Bovill, 1921: 265-6).
Bovill's statement provides insight into what types of knowledge were valued around the
time of the Commission's study. The membership of the Commission (as exclusively
colonial officers), reflects Bovill's ideas regarding who possesses the more useful and
authoritative knowledge.
Francis Rodd (1938) questioned Stebbing's conclusions regarding progressive
desiccation and desert encroachment. Rodd, who spent considerable time in West Africa,
asserted, contrary to Stebbing, that the Sahara had actually retreated rather than advanced.
In supporting this conclusion, he referred to his "own experience" and to "native
accounts." Rodd further suggested that Stebbing happened to visit West Africa during a
dry spell.
A traveler in one of the areas where no rain has fallen for several years
will inevitably be led to the conclusion that vegetation is declining. If that
traveler has not happened to cross another area where rain has fallen
consecutively for several years after a dry interval his judgment will be
biased. The local evidence of the European is also curiously unreliable in
many cases. The European, especially in the dry seasons, is always apt to
exaggerate desiccation and the advance of the desert (Rodd, 1938: 354-5).
According to Rodd, the only reliable observations of West Africa, are those conducted
over "longish periods." He recommended that visitors spend more than one rainy season
before coming to any definite conclusions (Rodd, 1938: 355-6).
As Jones, a member of the Dommission, remarked in his account of the
Commission's study: "There are, however, observers with considerable experience in
West Africa who are not in accord with many of Professor Stebbing's conclusions"
(Jones, 1938: 27). According to several workers (as opposed to visitors) in French and
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British West Africa, the theory of progressive desiccation was incompatible with the
evidence.
Jones demonstrated his own experience and intimate knowledge of local
conditions throughout his paper. One example concerns his explanation of pools of
water. Stebbing claimed these pools to be the remains of dried rivers. According to
Jones, however, these pools resulted from the flat topography and interruption of ancient
drainage systems. He also provided their Hausa name as tabki (pl. tabkuna) and a
detailed account of how pools form after the deposition of fine material at the base of the
depressions. Further illustrating his familiarity with not only the local landscape, but its
people as well, Jones described how local people increased the water holding capacity of
tabkuna by trampling them with their cattle. A similar disagreement between Stebbing
and Jones concerned tree deaths. Stebbing concluded that dead and dying trees in
Komadugu Yobe resulted from depleted water supplies. Jones argued that tree deaths
resulted from the tabkuna formation process. Clay at the tabkuna's surface accumulates
around tree roots, eventually forming an impervious layer, and leading to tree
asphyxiation. To illustrate the ability of sand to seal out moisture, and to further
demonstrate his local experience, Jones noted how some Africans stored corn in dry sand
below a clayey surface to prevent damage to the corn from flooding. In response to
Stebbing's suggestion that the harmattan was reducing soil fertility, Jones noted a native
tradition in which a good harmattan means a good harvest (Jones, 1938).
While both Stebbing and the Commission interviewed local officials about the
state of the environment and the environmental changes they had observed, Stebbing was
criticized for relying too heavily on second-hand accounts, rather than his own, first-hand
observations. Stebbing based many of his conclusions on discussions with local officials.
The Emir of Katsina won Stebbing over as a "very popular ruler and great sportsman,"
and asked for assistance in "stemming the invasion." He showed Stebbing plans "to
create belts of plantations across the countryside..." (Stebbing, 1935: 511). One of this
Emir's Councilors, a sort of land agent, accompanied Stebbing for part of his travels and
pointed out examples of "desiccation and deterioration" that had occurred in the previous
twenty to thirty years (Stebbing, 1935: 511).
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Stebbing's critics questioned his reliance on the first-hand observations of others.
For example, Stebbing and the Commission came to different conclusions about water
table levels and their implications for desiccation. Whereas Stebbing believed decreased
water levels indicated progressive desiccation, the Commission disagreed and faulted
Stebbing's lack of local experience. The Commission spoke with local councilors about
water supply changes and made their own observations of water levels in Lake Chad,
rivers and groundwater in the area (Falconer, 1938: 355). In reference to deepening wells
as indicators of progressive desiccation, Jones (1938) explained that the "primitive"
construction of wells can lead the "casual observer" to believe the wells have become
progressively deeper. Consequently, the Commission deferred to the Geological Survey
of Nigeria in concluding that the water level was stationary (Jones, 1938: 417).
Falconer, a supporter of the Commission's assessment, similarly faulted
Stebbing's unfamiliarity with local conditions. Falconer questioned Stebbing's
speculation about the water table levels by criticizing his reliance on villagers' accounts.
"Thus, if 'proof of the steady advance of the Sahara exists' (p. 47) on the southern side of
the Nigerian frontier-tangible proof, and not mere speculation -it is nowhere contained
in Professor Stebbing's book" (Falconer, 1937: 551). The Commission and its
supporters, many of them colonial officials in West Africa, valued deep understandings of
local conditions. The Commission commanded greater authority than Stebbing, in large
part because in the eyes of scientists and other officials they possessed a more credible
understanding of local phenomena. As discussed in the following section, their local
expertise also buttressed the Commission's recommendations for local, as opposed to
regional management schemes.
3.2.3 Policy Prescriptions: Transnational Cooperation versus National Resource
Management
Just as Stebbing and the Commission held different views of the degradation problem,
they also voiced different ideas about what should be done about it. Stebbing called for
bi-lateral cooperation between France and Britain and a transnational forest belt to stem
the desert. The Commission on the other hand, advocated introduction of permanent,
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European style agriculture and enhanced coordination among natural resource
departments.
According to Stebbing, the problems of desiccation transcended political
boundaries. "It may be pointed out that this erosion and desiccation matter in Africa is
not a parochial or even a one-Colony one. The existing political or administrative
divisions into Colonies, British or French, are purely fortuitous. Man's mis-use of the
soil and Nature's retaliation are alike indifferent to the man-made frontier or boundary"
(Stebbing, 1938c: 17). According to Stebbing, the problem required an international
response. He described desert encroachment as an "invasion," thereby characterizing the
problem as a military enemy against which "two of the big Powers of the world" can
unite. As Stebbing remarked:
... isolated efforts to stop the progress of the Sahara are unlikely to stem
the invasion. A much wider policy is required (Stebbing, 1935: 518).
In his book, The Forests of West Africa and the Sahara, he called for barriers against the
advancing desert (Stebbing, 1937a; also see Falconer, 1937: 550). Stebbing called on the
colonial administrations to reserve a "Northern International Forest Belt" to hold back the
desert. The belt would consist of degraded dry mixed deciduous forest and extend from
Haute Volta to Lake Chad. A second "Central Protective Belt" would consist of degraded
moist mixed deciduous forest and extend from Lake Chad, through Geidam and West to
Segu (Figure 2, see Chapter 5).
Stebbing's view of the West African environment emphasized systemic natural
forces (e.g., climate and desert encroachment) largely outside the direct influence of
human intervention. In contrast, the Commission depicted a problem that was more
amenable to government regulation. In many respects the very structure and disciplinary
composition of the Commission mirrored the problem diagnosis and prescriptions it
offered.
In response to Stebbing, the Commission denounced "danger from the outside"
such as progressive desiccation or large-scale climatic phenomena as a plausible
explanation for environmental problems in Africa. They, instead, emphasized the role of
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localized human land use - activities amenable to administrative policies. According to
two Commission members:
... degradation of vegetation-type in this region, widespread though it may
be, is entirely due to cultivation and confined to farmlands. It in no way
indicates increasing aridity, nor a danger from outside to be guarded
against, but is the sign of local soil impoverishment which, if continued,
must either in time put a limit to the increase of population or give rise in
some exceptional year to disastrous famine Collier and Dundas (1937:
191).
By framing degradation as local, the Commissioners made it more manageable. Their
interest in proactive management efforts is evident in their disdain for the passive
approach that Stebbing's systemic vision might have required.
It is no consolation to an administration, or to the members of a crowded
and starving community whose lands are no longer adequately productive,
to know that the soil will recover if left alone for fifty to a hundred years
(Collier and Dundas, 1937: 191).
The "wait and see" approach implicit in Stebbing's findings, would not have been
palatable to the Colonial administrations. A remedy based on the control of human
behavior and management of natural resources would fit much more easily with the
administrations' overall objectives.
By rejecting Stebbing's interpretation of the environment, the Commission was
also free to reject regional policy responses in favor of cheaper, national measures. The
Commission, for example, did not endorse Stebbing's recommendation for a forest belt to
hold back the desert. Jones (1938) said that sand displacement need not be addressed
with "expensive regional schemes" (Jones, 1938: 422). Similarly Collier and Dundas
(1937) asserted that a natural belt of vegetation already existed in northern Nigeria and
was superior to any that could be built by man. However, the Commission did
acknowledge that local displacement of sand by wind posed a problem for farmers.
Consequently, they recommended placement of shelter belts at right angles to localize
and control erosion in the north by protecting remaining patches of vegetation. They also
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advocated the maintenance of trees in farmland areas and the placement of hedges or tree
lines at field boundaries (Stamp, 1940; Falconer, 1938: 356). All of these responses
called for local regulation and management.
The Commission also interpreted some of the observed problems as inevitable
side-effects stemming from pursuit of colonial objectives. Although the Commission
agreed with Stebbing that shifting cultivation was causing widespread deforestation in the
region, they saw it as a byproduct of colonial expansion and pacification of the region.
Before the European occupation the people were compelled to live in
settlements or within easy reach of a town in which they could take refuge
during raids by neighbouring tribes. The pacification of the country has
safeguarded life and property, and consequently in the last twenty years
shifting cultivation has expanded to a remarkable extent. The present rate
of distribution of forest in Nigeria by shifting cultivation has been
estimated at 100 square miles a year (Jones, 1938: 413).
Colonial expansion was believed to have decreased civil strife in many areas. According
to this view, the African people felt more secure in establishing stable livelihoods and
many turned to agriculture based on shifting cultivation.
The Commission viewed the "European model" of agriculture (see Falconer,
1938: 356) (or fixed cultivation) as the best method for maintaining equilibrium between
human and natural systems. The group's observations at Kano reflect these ideas. As
two commissioners remarked: "There can be no spectacular creation of balanced
conditions such as have been evolved by the natives themselves around Kano City ... "
(Collier and Dundas, 1937: 193). The group observed that more "prosperous" farming
and "stable living conditions" accompanied permanent cultivation systems. "The
Commission is of opinion therefore that the standards of living and farming naturally
attained at Kano could be reached elsewhere by the organization of 'permanent
farmlands, properly demarcated, regularly manured, adequately timbered with trees of
economic value and with an assured supply of water" (quoted in Falconer, 1938: 356).
In recognizing shifting agriculture as the primary cause of deforestation, the
Commission advocated the European Model of agriculture as the most promising remedy.
Thus, the Commission's view of degradation lent itself to localized (rather than regional)
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forms of management and the imposition of European agricultural practices. Jones, for
example, advocated the regulation of shifting cultivation coupled with incentives for
fixed cultivation. He cited a discussion with the District Head of that area who described
the conversion of bush to farmland. "The replacement of bush by farmlands, where these
are. permanent, is surely a sign of progress. It is a process which has taken place in all
civilized countries" (Jones, 1938: 411). Similarly, the Commission recommended
conservation throughout the region and maintenance of farmland fertility through
permanent cropping (Collier and Dundas, 1937).
Ecological Balance and Department Coordination
The Commission and its vision of the northern Nigerian problems highlight disciplinary
tensions and an early notion of equilibrium that continued to color desertification debates
of the 1970s and beyond. Ultimately, Commission members viewed solutions as resting
in successful agency coordination and balance among different development objectives.
This vision reflects the multi-disciplinary, multi-departmental Commission membership.
It also suggests that institutional structures of government departments, advisory panels,
and scientific disciplines were central to early framings of dryland degradation.
Collier and Dundas' (1937: 193) prescribed measures for achieving the "balanced
conditions" observed at Kano City. Thus, the ideal situation was an equilibrium state
between people (colonial expansion/native agriculture) and their environment (natural
resources), whereby permanent cultivation was maintained in conjunction with ample
water and forest reserves. This notion of equilibrium was based on a more-or-less
holistic view of the world in which social systems interact with natural systems, and
different categories of nature (e.g., forests and water) interact with one another. Collier
and Dundas suggested that the bureaucracy in charge of managing these interdependent
natural resources was key to maintaining the desired equilibrium. However, the
institutional boundaries that separated these departments and disciplines often tend to
demarcate opposing sides of technical and policy controversies. Ultimately, such
institutional structures heavily influence overall problem framing and policy
prescriptions.
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Many of the Commission's recommendations focused on agency coordination.
They assigned specific tasks to the various departments. The group suggested that
geographical officers identify areas where deforestation could lead to uncontrolled run-off
or erosion and segregate lands not useful for permanent farmlands. The Veterinary
Department took responsibility for determining which lands were suitable for grazing and
which were best for providing fuel and forest produce for agricultural lands. In the words
of Collier and Dundas,
But whatever is done, the most important point of all is that there shall be
the closest co-ordination of the activities of all Technical Departments.
The Forestry Department must realize that deforestation in many places
connotes true progress and desirable development; the Agricultural
Department must realize that well-placed forests are essential to ensure
permanency of cultivation in a country, and the Geological Survey must
realize that the creation of water supplies has an effect upon population
movements which cannot be ignored by the Forestry and Agricultural
Departments in the farming and execution of their plans. Development
must be considered as a whole, with the principle in mind that the greatest
benefit to the individual is by no means invariably the greatest benefit to
the community (Collier and Dundas, 1937: 193).
So whereas Stebbing emphasized intergovernmental cooperation, the Commission
advocated departmental coordination. Just as their rejection of "outside dangers" enabled
the Commission to recommend localized management policies, so the notion of balance
between human and natural systems suggested that coordination among natural resource
departments could maintain this equilibrium.
3.2.4 Recap
In appointing the commissioners, the French and British colonial administrations
ultimately authorized a view of the West African environment based on the local
experience of natural resource managers, their training in the natural sciences and their
support for colonial priorities and perspectives. Not surprisingly, the Commission
interpreted dryland degradation in a way that conformed to the attitudes and goals of the
colonial administrations. The Commission's emphasis on shifting cultivation and the
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need for European-style agriculture reflected their assumptions regarding both the
ignorance of the African peoples and their faith in European style agriculture as the best
means for ameliorating degradation. In concluding that degradation was ultimately a
question of resource management, commissioners defined this issue as one requiring the
attention of local natural resource departments rather than bi-lateral cooperation.
Policy prescriptions offered by both Stebbing and the Commission further
illustrated the realms of science and policymaking as delineated by the colonial
administrations. In general, these were not wholly separate realms. On the contrary, they
were integral to one another. Many administrators were also scientists, and management
of natural resources in the colonies required scientific analysis of these resources and the
ecosystems in which they existed. Hence, throughout the expanding specialized
departments of West Africa, scientific inquiry was part of policymaking and
implementation. Many contributors to scientific journals had served in both academic
and administrative positions in the colonies. Stebbing and the Commission, for example,
did not confine their analyses to the scientific aspects of their investigations. Often their
ultimate objective was to relate their scientific findings to specific policy questions facing
their respective countries. They did so by offering specific policy recommendations. The
goals and information needs of the colonial empire also motivated scientific inquiry and
helped to shape research agendas of independent scientists. Stebbing and fellow
contributors to The Geographical Journal, for example, regularly took on issues and
research problems of direct interest to the colonial administrations as they sought to
preserve and profit from the natural resources of their empires.
3.3 From Science to Policy: Modernist Visions of Expert Advice and
Environmental Degradation
Dryland research activity quieted during World War II but revived again in the early
1950s with the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO). As described in Box 1 and Chapter 2, UNESCO's Arid Zone Program
played a major role in constructing drylands as a global phenomenon, amenable to
analysis by natural scientists. In 1972, the United Nations Conference on the Human
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Environment (UNCHE or the Stockholm Conference) set forth a highly technical and
research-oriented approach to soil management. Around this time, West African
countries approached the United Nations for help in addressing problems associated with
severe drought and famine. Desertification was among these issues and quickly became a
focus of international policy (see Chapter 2). The United Nations Conference on
Desertification (UNCOD) took place in Nairobi, Kenya from August 29 and September 9,
1977 and produced a Plan ofAction to Combat Desertification (PACD, or the Plan).
According to the PACD, desertification was a physical problem of global extent, resulting
from human disturbance of nature's equilibrium. Desertification's remedy was thought to
reside in "rational land use practices" facilitated by imported technologies and the
administration of national action plans.
The policy prescriptions contained in the PACD reflected extensive scientific
assessment processes that preceded its negotiation. Scientific preparations for UNCOD
took place over a two-year period under the direction of the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP). Deeply intertwined with UNEP's agenda, these preparations were
based on the assumption that the production and assessment of scientific knowledge
should take place prior to policymaking and should provide negotiators with an objective
and consensus-based view of desertification and its possible remedies. Consequently,
expert advisory activities for UNCOD involved carefully selected groups of scientists
who met in isolation from diplomatic forums to define the desertification and prescribe its
solutions. These natural scientists, mostly from developed countries, depicted
desertification as primarily an ecological problem that transcended international
boundaries and could be ameliorated via the tools of science and technology.
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Box 1:
UNESCO's Arid Zones Progamme and the Internationalization of Drylands
As African decolonization began in the 1950s, dryland concerns that had formerly
occupied European colonial powers, became the responsibility of the broader
international community. International stability was thought to hinge, in part, on the
health and prosperity of newly independent nations. The US and the rest of the
developed world took an active role in fostering third world modernization through
early development programs such as the United Nations Economic Committee for
Latin America. Modernization theory supported the notion that industrial
development and its grounding in science and technology were key to economic
growth. Accompanying these ideas were notions that a "universal pattern of
modernity" could emerge from disparate traditions, cultures and values. However,
most modernization theories lacked "attention to deeper socio-cultural structures
and the political adolescence of most countries in the South" (Shinn et. al, 1997: 9).
The North addressed drylands issues much in the same way it approached
the challenges of development. UNESCO's Arid Zone Program (founded in 1951)
defined drylands as an international science issue. Over the following decade, the
Programme came to encompass 200 desert research institutes which operated in 40
countries. Primarily the studies furthered basic science rather than applied science.
They focused on discovery of natural laws and assessment of ecosystem limitations.
The Programme generated a newsletter, conferences and symposia. It also
supported publication of a research review series and special reports on a wide
range of topics. Occasionally studies were directed at general audiences and
attempted to peak interest by reporting the accelerating loss of agriculturally
productive lands in arid regions. However, these reports, were unable to achieve
"theatrical success in capturing the public ear" (Walls, 1980: 5). In 1962 UNESCO
merged the Arid Zone Programme with the broader natural resource program.
Attempts to integrate social science into the Programme's research agenda
failed in the late 1950s. During its first six years, the Programme's experts
employed natural science and methodologies such as mapping and vegetation and
soil classification. When Harold Dregne, a soil scientist, and prominent Programme
participant remarked that the "research findings know no national boundaries,"
(Dregne, 1970: insert page), he illustrated the value attached to universal,
standardized knowledge claims. Around 1957 Programme administrators attempted
to broaden the natural science focus. They recognized that development projects
also required attention to social activity. Consequently, UNESCO attempted to
involve sociologists and anthropologists in integrated survey teams. However, the
results were disappointing. The social science component never reached field-level
analysis (Batisse, 1985). While the natural science work was believed to transcend
national and cultural boundaries, social/cultural studies would have reflected these
boundaries - something for which the Arid Zones Programme was not prepared.
The diversity of social/human situations defied the types of universal findings that
the Programme valued. Contributions from social scientists could not be readily
integrated with efforts of the natural scientists who had established the
Programme's core methodologies.
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3.3.1 A Linear Science-Policy Model
In the mid-i 970s, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) placed heavy emphasis
on science as the basis for policymaking and afforded UNEP a central role in creating
both knowledge and policy. The activities of these institutions reflected definite ideas
about science and its relationship to politics. After much debate between developing
countries that favored an international conference and developed countries who did not,
UNGA, on December 17, 1974, adopted Resolution 3337(XXIX) on "International Co-
operation to Combat Desertification." This resolution called for a United Nations
Conference on Desertification to take place in 1977. It also stipulated the utilization of
all available knowledge and noted what it called an "urgent need to prepare a world
integrated programme of development research and application of science and technology
to solve the special problems of desertification..." UNGA also called for:
. Preparation of a world map of areas affected and those likely to be affected by
desertification processes;
. The assessment of all available data and information on desertification and its
consequences for development process of affected countries; and
. Preparation of an anti-desertification action program "including the building-up of the
indigenous and autonomous science and technology capacity in areas concerned"
(UNEP, 1978: 124-5).
In the same resolution, UNGA called on the Executive Director of the United Nations
Environment Programme (Maurice Strong) to establish a small conference secretariat. It
also requested the UN Secretary-General and relevant UN bodies to convene an ad hoc
interagency task force to assist the Conference Secretariat in carrying out its work. These
tasks, as prescribed by UNGA, proved extremely important in shaping pre-Conference
scientific activity and its role in the Conference and in framing desertification policy.
UNEP's directors embraced this mandate. It provided a perfect, flexible vehicle
with which to establish their fledgling agency as a scientifically credible organization
with sympathies toward developing country issues. As Mostafa Tolba assumed UNEP's
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Executive Directorship in 1975, he and his deputy Ralph Townley set to work
constructing what Tolba believed to be a new field of knowledge. UNGA's call for
scientific and technological solutions to the desertification problem and Tolba's personal
commitments to science as a basis for both sound policy were central to the creation of
desertification as an international science policy issue.
Building a Scientific Foundation
Implicit in the UNGA mandate was a vision of science and policymaking and their
relationship to one another. According to this mandate, science should take place prior to
policy negotiation and should provide diplomats with a foundation of knowledge upon
which to base their decisions. Tolba's comments reflected this enlightenment-style
approach to policymaking when he addressed the first session of UNCOD.
It is the scientists and technicians who formulate the problems with
precision, describe their characteristics, specify their dimensions, and,
most important, tell us what should be done about them. It is those in
political life who tell us what can be done about them, and then, most
important, take action in terms of their sense of human, political and
economic possibilities. In this order of events, science dominates the
opening scenes of our quest: the climax is played out in the realm of
practical affairs (A/CONF.74/L. 1: 1).
The experts that Tolba commissioned were well aware of the stark divide that Tolba
envisioned between science and politics. Ten years after UNCOD, Harold Dregne a key
consultant to UNCOD remarked: "Mostafa Tolba, as chairman of the consultant
meetings, made it clear from the beginning that he was interested only in establishing a
sound scientific foundation for understanding and combating desertification. No
bombast, no politics" (Dregne, 1987: 11). Similarly, in referring to conferences such as
UNCOD, Walls (a member of the UNCOD Secretariat) remarked "...these are unique
occasions when scholars and scientists, those who know, are brought together with
political leaders, men who can act, in an effort to reach and carry through a course of
rational action. Together, they embody the world as will and idea..." (Walls, 1980: 9).
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The New Science of Desertification
Ralph Townley, the UNEP administrator in charge of putting this model of science and
policy into practice, echoed Tolba's remarks.
In conferences of this kind, the preparations are expected to provide solid,
scientific foundations for the recommendations that are contained in the
customary plan of action. The delegations, representing Governments, are
then asked to provide the political will that is required to implement the
recommendation. Although they serve as arenas in which science and
policy converge, the conferences are fundamentally political events"
(Townley, 1978: 69).
To fulfill UNGA's mandate, Tolba and Townley mobilized a Conference Secretariat and
oversaw an Inter-Agency Working Group and several expert consultants. The
Conference Secretariat included approximately 21 individuals, housed within UNEP, who
focused primarily on administrative issues. An Inter-agency Working Group included
representatives of various UN agencies that served as a sort of general oversight/advisory
body. In addition, the Secretariat hired a large number of individual scientific consultants
to carry out a host of advisory and assessment-related tasks.
Conference preparations commenced in early 1975 and involved a hierarchy of
scientific consultants. At the top of this hierarchy was what one participant described as
the "inner circle" (Interview with UNCOD Advisor 2). This group of natural scientists
met approximately every two months with Ralph Townley and Mostafa Tolba to frame
and guide scientific analyses. Below the "inner circle" was a group of 7 scientists
commissioned to write thematic reports on four aspects of desertification. These reports,
or Component Reviews, dealt with climatic, ecological, demographic and technological
aspects of the desertification problem. Other consultants and organizations were
commissioned to prepare case studies for analyzing desertification in specific
geographical and historical contexts. National governments prepared feasibility studies
of transnational projects for ameliorating and preventing desertification. Individuals and
intergovernmental organizations prepared maps of desertification (see Chapter 5).
Finally, the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) sponsored a
symposium that took place immediately prior to the Conference. The goal of this
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symposium was to develop physical, social and biological indicators of desertification.
The above-mentioned activities resulted in several forms of documentation:
* Four Component Review reports on climatological, ecological, demographic
and technological aspects of desertification, plus an Overview, synthesis
report (A/CONF.74/1; UNCOD Secretariat, 1977);72
* Case studies of desertification in six regions/countries (A/CONF.74/4);73
* Nine associated case studies supplied by governments (Biswas and Biswas,
1980);74
" Feasibility studies for transnational projects (e.g., A/CONF.74/25;
A/CONF.74: 29);
* Four maps of desertification hazard, the status of desertification in hot arid
regions, a climate aridity index, and an experimental world scheme of aridity
and drought probability (A/CONF.74/3 1); and
* A handbook of desertification indicators (Reining, 1978).
Along with these tangible products, assessment activities are credited with sparking
desertification research and greater awareness of the desertification issue.
Tolba believed that, through these many endeavors, the Conference Secretariat
contributed significantly to development of a new scientific field. As he explained at the
opening of UNCOD, the universal nature of desertification and the need for an
international response to it required a "structure and coherence" that the issue lacked
because of its "fragment(ation) among a great variety of disciplines." (A/CONF.74/L.1:
1-2). Consequently, UNCOD commissioned experts from several different fields to
provide "order and structure to the subject" (A/CONF.74/L.2: 2).
Contained in these documents are the results of the extensive surveys and
scientific investigations carried out by individual scientists and by
members of the Inter-Agency Task Force on Desertification and of the
72 Also see A/CONF.74/5; A/CONF.74/6; A/CONF.74/7; and A/CONF.74/8.
73 The document A/CONF.74/4 contains a synthesis of the six case studies. Individual case studies appear
in documents A/CONF.74/9; A/CONF.74/10; A/CONF.74/1 1; A/CONF.74/12; A/CONF.74/13; and
A/CONF.74/14.
74 Australia, Iran, Israel, Peoples Republic of China the U.S.S.R, and the United States submitted case
studies.
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Panel of Senior Advisors to the Conference Secretary-General. This huge
input of the Scientific Community led to a clear identification of the
principal points on which our scientific colleagues found themselves in
agreement, and which constitute the heart of the problem
(A/CONF.74/L.2: 3).
Tolba also emphasized the interdisciplinary nature of the consultants. Yet, while they did
represent different disciplines, virtually all of them were natural scientists. The following
section discusses participants in the UNCOD assessment process.
3.3.2 Administrators and Advisers
Just like the "top-down" approach prescribed in the Plan ofAction, scientific activities
preceding the conference reflected a hierarchical structure. At the top of the pyramid was
Mostafa Tolba, Executive Director of UNEP, and his assistant Ralph Townley. These
men worked closely with a small group of experts in conceptualizing the desertification
issue and the key components of policy. They oversaw the work of various other
consultants and advisors, including authors of the four above-mentioned Component
reviews. There are several characteristics of these individuals and their work that are
important to note. By an overwhelming majority, these participants were natural
scientists who supported a global framing of desertification. Their interest in this
problem focused largely on physical processes and manifestations of desertification.
Analysis of physical parameters, or at least quantifiable social parameters (such as
demographics) generated research results, often generalizable to global scales. Because
insights offered by experts in fields such as anthropology and sociology were not easily
generalized in this way, UNEP and its "inner circle" advisors tended to exclude such
experts from deliberations. By focusing on the physical, land use-related causes of
desertification, key advisors were also free to place considerable emphasis on the use of
science and technology as remedies for desertification. As discussed further below, the
expert culture surrounding conference preparations had important implications for policy.
The following sections focus on some of the personalities and processes that
featured prominently in UNCOD preparations. The discussion describes Tolba and
Townley, two personalities who played an important role in orchestrating assessment
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activities. It also examines the core group of expert advisors and the preparation of
expert reports.
Tolba the Scientist
Tolba's scientific background colored UNEP's role in UNCOD preparations and its
extensive use of expert consultants. Born in 1922 in Gharbia, Egypt, Tolba received his
B.S. in botany from Cairo University in 1943 and his PhD from the University of London
in 1949. After serving as a professor of microbiology at Cairo University and as
Professor of botany at Baghdad University, he became the assistant secretary general of
the National Science Council of Egypt. He later assumed positions in Egyptian
government including undersecretary of state in the Ministry of Education. Eventually, he
led the Egyptian delegation to the Stockholm Conference in 1972. Tolba proved very
useful in assisting Maurice Strong, Chair of the UNCHE negotiations in helping to rally
developing country support for various issues. In 1972, when Maurice Strong assumed
the helm of a brand new UNEP, Tolba became his Deputy Executive Director. (Who's
Who, 1998; Interview with UNEP Official 1)
Tolba took pride in his nationality and scientific training and was fond of
reminding his colleagues of these two characteristics. He would often preface his
statements with "I am an Egyptian..." On other occasions he'd begin with the phrase, "I
am a scientist..." (Interview with UNEP Official 1). These phrases reflect, not only
Tolba's identity, but also the identity he was trying to sculpt for UNEP. Science offered a
potential source of personal credibility and credibility for UNEP.
Tolba was a controversial figure in his role at UNEP during the 1970s and 1980s.
Some people were skeptical of his individual wisdom and creativity because he so often
relied on science advisors. Many of his detractors and supporters, however, agreed that
his intellectual acumen and diplomatic skills were unparalleled. A prominent member of
UNCOD's Secretariat described Tolba as a "distinguished microbiologist" (Walls,
1980). Another colleague remembered that when scientists were called to UNEP to serve
on expert advisory panels for various issues, they would oftentimes insist on meeting with
7 Interviews with UNCOD Advisor 1, UNEP Advisor 2, and UNEP Official 1.
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Tolba and would decline to attend if Tolba, the man who could understand their science,
was not available to meet with them in person (Interview with UN Official 1). Even one
of Tolba's harshest critics described his "extraordinary mind with command of everything
and amazing attention to detail" (Interview with UNCOD Advisor 1). In her account of
the UNCOD negotiations, Margaret Biswas speculated that, perhaps, the "stature of its
Secretary General" differentiated UNCOD from the host of post-Stockholm conferences
in the 1970s (Biswas, 1978: 261). According to her, Tolba was a primary explanation for
the "unusual harmony and cooperation" and "unusual degree of consensus on both causes
and solutions." "Governments recognized his command of the subject, and were
prepared to trust his recommendations as being the correct road to implement
demonstrated resolve" (Biswas, 1978: 261). Both Biswas and UNCOD Secretariat
member James Walls commented on Tolba's practicality. Walls believed that Tolba's
attention to cost issues exemplified this characteristic.
Townley, the Administrator
Ralph Townley, in directing the UNCOD Secretariat, was instrumental in designing the
processes by which desertification knowledge was produced. In doing so he played a
major role in shaping the very nature of that knowledge and its dissemination. Townley
recognized the Secretariat's role in creating a subject area that, up until that point, was
largely unknown to the general public and lacked a coherent, singular definition among
academicians. As Tolba's deputy, Townley's interpreted and implemented the UNGA
resolution calling for the "The assessment of all available data and information on
desertification and its consequences on the development process of the countries
affected...." (LNGA Resolution 3337 (XXIX)). According to Townley, everything
known about desertification was to be assembled or created (Walls, 1980). As Townley
remarked, this was:
A tall order by any standards, but an even taller one when we found that
the word was not in the dictionary and no library had it in its classification.
We might well have spent the entire period of preparation for the
conference searching for a definition. This we eschewed and we found
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ourselves willy-nilly creating a new scientific discipline (Townley, 1983:
4).76
Hence, Townley shared Tolba's view that UNEP, in preparing for the conference, had the
job of essentially piecing together a new scientific field.
Ralph Townley's stint at UNEP in the mid-i 970s was just one stop in a long
career as a civil servant. An Englishman, Townley earned Bachelor of Science and
Master of Science degrees in economics from the University of London and served in HM
Merchant Marine in the Second World War. He joined the UN soon after completing his
formal education. Although he took his first position in 1952 on the agreement that his
tenure last just one year, he remained with the United Nations until 1984 when he retired
as a director. During this period he held numerous positions including those of Special
Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for Economic and Social Affairs, Deputy
Secretary General of the World Population Conference and Program Chief in the UN
Development Programme. Between 1984 and 1994 he served as a senior consultant to
the Secretariat on East Africa, the Middle East and Central America and chaired a
General Assembly Committee on the Middle East. He published two books on
international affairs as well as several novels and plays. Townley became Deputy
Executive Director of the United Nations Environment Programme in the mid 1970s and
soon assumed the role of Secretariat Director for the United Nations Conference on
Desertification in 1975.
Townley's primary concern prior to UNCOD was smooth and efficient
management of its preparations. Townley was quite well known in UN circles for
running a "tight ship." His colleagues describe him as a great conversationalist and a
successful manager (Interviews with UNCOD Advisors 1, 2 and 3). He was a skilled
administrator and civil servant and prided himself on conducting his work efficiently and
on time. Many of his recollections of the UNCOD process focus on the prompt
completion of reports, their translation into UN languages and their distribution to
76 This was not to imply, however, that the phenomenon itself was a new development. As Townley
remarked, "the process itself, resulting in land degradation and lowered productivity, is at least as old as
settled agriculture" (Townley, 1978: 69).
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delegates. His concern for procedure is evident in the way he later described UNCOD
preparations. He saw this process as consisting of five steps:
1) Obtain agreement for the country that is going to host the conference;
2) Invite governments to attend;
3) Prepare the scientific base for political discussion;
4) Draft the plan of action (a declaration of intent about what is to be done of the
problem) and get agreement on it;
5) Send the declaration to UNGA for approval (Interview with Ralph Townley).
In another account Townley described:
Conference papers were prepared by the best minds available in the
scientific community. They were reviewed carefully in the United Nations
system and in regional meetings of government technicians and were
linked to a draft plan of action-rare for a conference of this kind-in half
a dozen languages well beforehand. The conference itself came to swift
political conclusions but was not politically diverted (Townley, 1983: 4).
This outline suggests that Townley did not see himself as a knowledge producer, but
rather as an administrator and facilitator of knowledge production and scientific
assessment.
Yet, Townley (in conjunction with Tolba) was much more than a manager. His
decisions were instrumental in interpreting UNEP's mandate, defining what knowledge
counted, who would produce it and how it would be produced. Though he was not a
scientist, Townley's work on item three of the agenda he outlined for himself proved
instrumental in shaping UNCOD and the desertification issue itself. As a preliminary
step in completing this task, Townley and his assistants reviewed relevant literature in
search of information that could address questions of import to the UNCOD: "why, in
the first place, had desertification occurred at all? How had the process manifested itself?
What lessons could be learned that would lead to specific recommendations in the Plan of
Action...?" (Walls, 1980: 16). Townley set about this task first by hiring a Vietnamese
consultant, Khoi Pham to review UNESCO's studies on arid lands. Townley instructed
Khoi Pham to search for information applicable to the development of an action plan on
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desertification. To Townley's dismay the consultant unearthed only one short paper that
Townley deemed useful, a short executive brief on land degradation (Interview with
Ralph Townley).
The "Inner Circle"
In addition to his literature surveys, Townley began to assemble a group of expert
advisors to assist him in navigating this new field and in preparing a draft Plan ofAction.
This select group of scientists was characterized by several of the more peripheral
participants as the "inner circle" and the "club" (Interviews with UNCOD Advisors 1
and 2). Early in the process they made several important decisions that ultimately shaped
the form and substance of the assessment endeavor. In addition, the "inner circle"
constituted a closed forum for knowledge production. Its very existence implied that
policy-relevant expert knowledge should not derive from open, democratic processes, but
from highly controlled deliberations among scientists.
Membership in this select club of the "inner circle" was not determined, via a
diplomatic method aimed at ensuring disciplinary and geographic diversity as in several
of the more recent expert advisory panels for climate change, biodiversity and
desertification. Rather, participation in the "inner circle" was highly dependent on
personal connections and collegial ties among those involved. Townley coordinated the
first group that met in the Aspen Institute, West Germany in mid-1975 and went on to
convene in other cities alternating among Geneva, New York and Nairobi about every
four months leading up to the Conference. The core group, which varied modestly each
time they met consisted of Professor Mohammad Kassas, Professor of Botany, University
of Cairo (Egypt); Harold Dregne, Professor of Plant and Soil Science, Texas Tech
University (United States); Jack Mabbutt, Professor of Geography, University of New
South Wales (Australia); and Boris Rozanov, Professor of Soil Science, Moscow
University (USSR). Tolba was present at these expert meetings and was heavily involved
and extremely interested in their content. Occasionally the group would call on other
specialists to join in the discussion on specific topics such as meteorology, economics and
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anthropology. But each of these specialists would join the group only one or two times to
provide special input (Interview with UNCOD Advisor 4).
Most of these core participants were from traditional natural science disciplines of
soil science and botany. The geographers in the group were similarly inclined to natural
science and quantitative analysis. They tended to apply a macro-scale view of the world
(Interview with UNCOD Advisor 2). The majority of these experts were also from the
West and even more were trained in the West. Tolba and Kassas were Egyptian, but both
had been educated in London. No Africans were represented in the inner circle, nor in
any of the major assessment work conducted for the Conference. As Ralph Townley
explained, it was very difficult to find anyone at all who had expertise on the near-non-
existent topic. So finding a scientist from Africa was even more difficult. Although the
group did bring in consulting scientists for one or two meetings, all sessions were held in
English with only occasional translation into French. According to one key participant,
the language barrier posed problems and was, on occasion awkward, when a visitor to the
group did not have a solid command of English and could not express his/her ideas
effectively (Interview with UNCOD Advisor 4).
Dregne explained that UNEP looked long and hard to find experts who could
participate. He said, however, that it was difficult to find people with whom they could
develop close personal relationships and trust. So in selecting members to participate its
seems that familiar faces were important - not necessarily to reward or recognize friends
but to build a group in which the members could trust one another (Interview with
UNCOD Advisor 4). Ten years later Dregne remarked "Participation in the planning for
UNCOD was a truly rewarding experience. Having the opportunity to benefit from the
valuable insights of Mohammed Kassas, Jack Mabbutt, Boris Rozanov, and Gilbert
White, in particular, was a distinct pleasure" (Dregne, 1987: 11). Dregne's comments
reflect the sense of community that built up among these individuals as they engaged in
the UNCOD preparations.
The presence of the inner circle implies that knowledge production is not a
democratic process. The belief that desertification was a global problem that conformed
to natural laws seemed to obliterate any need for geographic diversity among the experts.
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If knowledge about desertification was not contingent on local circumstance, than local
knowledge need not be represented in expert deliberations.
Component Reviews and an Expert Hierarchy in Action
While the inner circle worked as special advisors to the UNCOD Secretariat they did not
author any major scientific reports for the Conference. Instead, a more junior group of
scientists prepared the four Component Review papers. The relationship involving the
inner circle and the Component Review authors reflected a hierarchical structure for
science advice. In addition, the Component Reviews themselves were more than just
another set of technical reports. They represented an emphasis on natural science and the
physical or easily quantified aspects of the desertification problem.
In referring to the reviews, a Secretariat member remarked how the topic of
desertification "seemed to cleave naturally into four components" (Walls, 1980:11).
Tolba similarly commented how participants in the advisory process "saw the subject as
falling naturally into four components" (A/CONF.74/L. 1: 2). In fact, it was Townley who
developed this thematic organization. Townley's structuring of the Component Reviews
marked a new approach to science advice in UN environmental conferences. In similar
conferences during the post-Stockholm decade, diplomats generally received scientific
information via numerous disparate reports and papers. Townley decided that the
UNCOD Secretariat would oversee compilation of a more cohesive set of scientific
studies - ones that would later be said by Tolba to lend structure and coherence to many
fragmented bits of knowledge about desertification. Townley proposed that experts write
four reports, each on a different aspect of desertification. He suggested four themes to
Tolba and to the "inner circle" and they agreed (Interview with Ralph Townley). The
four thematic papers, called Component Reviews, addressed the climatological,
ecological, demographic and technological aspects of the desertification problem.
The inner circle then identified authors and Townley gave them their assignments.
They chose Kenneth Hare, a Canadian climatologist to write a report on climate and
desertification. This study discussed characteristics of the world's dry climates and their
varability, and various ways in which this variability interacts with desertification
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processes. A group of geographers from Clark University in Worcester, Massachusetts
(USA) authored a paper entitled "Population, Society and Desertification." They focused
on demographic aspects of desertification including migration trends and population
dynamics. They also examined various livelihood methods and their vulnerability to
desertification, and discussed social consequences arising from it. Andrew Warren and
Judith Maizels, geographers from the University of London, wrote on the ecological
aspects of desertification. They explored processes at work in dry ecosystems and effects
of exploitation in these ecosystems. Dregne suggested that his colleague, Manuel Anaya
Garduflo of Mexico prepare the report on technology and desertification. This study
examined the use of technology in combating desertification in rural, urban and industrial
contexts. While the report noted the role of technology in exacerbating desertification, it
focused primarily on how technology could be employed to ameliorate the problem. The
authors had substantial freedom and latitude to carry out the studies as they saw fit over
the period of approximately one year. They would report to the "inner circle" periodically
to present their studies and receive comments from Tolba and other Secretariat members.
The inner circle was also instrumental in defining the overall framing of
desertification and the PACD's policy measures. These experts, for example,
championed a focus on desertification as a problem of human land use (similar to the
colonists' focus on shifting cultivation). The early talks among this group tended to focus
on drought. But the scientists gradually realized that "drought wasn't the real problem."
In their discussions they began to see drought as a normal, natural event. Moreover,
drought was not something that could be directly ameliorated or controlled by people.
Desertification, on the other hand, could be remedied through more rational land use
practices (Interview UNCOD Advisor 4).
Once the inner circle made such decisions they were resistant to ideas that did not
support their vision of desertification and the policy recommendations they envisioned for
the PACD. This tended to frustrate the younger generation of Component Review
authors who often introduced unconventional ideas, only to have them swept under the
rug by the more senior scientists. The inner circle embraced ideas that supported their
focus on more rational land use practices. But, "there were other things the 'club' didn't
124
want to hear" (Interview with UNCOD Advisor 1). His colleague similarly recalled "The
core group did not listen. They were all senior people and each had positions to defend"
(Interview with UNCOD Advisor 3). For example, when Douglas Johnson suggested
that soil movement, in some situations, could be beneficial, he came into conflict with
Boris Rozanov, an "old school soil scientist." "Boris would never agree with this and it
was an argument that people didn't want to hear" (Interview with UNCOD Advisor 3).
Component Reviews on climatic, ecological, demographic and technological
aspects of desertification were prefaced by chapter entitled "Desertification: An
Overview." James Walls, a writer and editor, known for his skill in making technical
material accessible to lay readers authored this chapter77 (Walls, 1980: xi). The UNCOD
Secretariat intended the Overview as an Executive Summary for delegates (Interview with
UNEP Official 1). In writing the Overview, Walls drew upon the various case studies
and Component Reviews.
The Overview addressed the causes, consequences and remedies of
desertification. In keeping with the provisions of the PACD, the Overview emphasized
the global dimensions of the desertification problem and the role of human land use in
ameliorating it. The report opened with a vivid account of the drought and famine crisis
of 1968-73, thereby lending a sense of universality and urgency to the desertification
issue. 78 The section on "Processes of Desertification," depicted the problem as a physical
one. Degradation was not a question of broader social interactions, trade imbalances,
poverty or gender relations at the household level. Instead, it involved man's direct
interference with the climate, and land and vegetation balances in dry lands. The concept
of natural equilibrium and the role of human land use in disrupting this equilibrium was
central to the Overview's message. According to the Anglo-French Forestry
Commission, degradation resulted from human disturbance of nature's balance. In
similar fashion the UNCOD experts proposed:
7 Walls had worked with Ralph Townley as a writer and editor for the World Population Conference and
he saw such conferences as an opportunity to explore a problem that had puzzled him since his experience
with the Peach Corps in 1961: namely, "why there are so many poor people in a world so filled with riches"
(Walls, 1980).
78 As discussed below, the emergence of desertification policy from the drought and famine crisis marked an
important transformation.
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Under natural conditions and through appropriate strategies, the dry land
ecosystems maintain a balanced exchange of water and energy, but a
favourable equilibrium is readily disturbed when man makes use of the
land. (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 13).
"Failure in resilience usually arises from sudden and severe disturbance,
and such disturbances, in the present world, are almost always the work of
man...it (desertification) occurs when man penetrates such environments
and acts there-often out of his need for survival - without an
understanding of or proper regard for their sensitivities and limitations"
(UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 21).
This focus on human behavior also appears in the climate assessments. Just as the
colonial experts rejected the possibility of an "outside danger" or progressive desiccation,
the Overview and Hare's climate study dismissed the role of global climate change as a
cause of desertification. The Overview noted that uncertainty associated with the general
circulation "should not.. .be taken to imply that man is a victim of recently accelerated
desertification rather than its active agent" (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 19). In contrast,
the Overview gave credence to the notion that overexploitation of land through activities
such as overgrazing could inhibit rainfall in local areas.
The notion of equilibrium and a focus on human land use supported a technocratic
approach to desertfication's solution. Just as the colonists had denounced shifting
cultivation and supported a European Model of agriculture, the Overview called for an
end to nomadic forms of pastoralism, in favor of more rational land use practices and the
introduction of western technologies. The Overview and technological study for UNCOD
recommended the sedentarization of nomads, and several specific measures including
mapping of land use types, mechanized equipment, research into revegetation methods,
introduction of more climate-resistant crops, improved weather forecasts, and improved
irrigation schemes.
Outside the Circle: Social Scientists and UNCOD Assessments
As evidenced by the Anglo-French Forestry Commission and the Arid Zone Programme
(see Chapter 2 and Box 1), dryland degradation had long been defined as a problem for
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natural scientists to explain. UNCOD preparations similarly portrayed desertification as a
physical problem involving a narrowly circumscribed relationship between humans and
their direct impact on the land as a physical resource. This justified a "proximate"
solution based on more rational land use practices. The natural science focus of UNCOD
preparations reflected the compatibility of natural science and international environmental
policymaking. Both of these endeavors involve simplification and generalization.
Because science involves the discovery of parsimonious and universal natural laws, it
provided the perfect vehicle for constructing desertification as a global problem. As
illustrated in Chapters 4 and 5, respectively, quantification and mapping of
desertification's ecological manifestations were instrumental in constructing a global
vision of desertification. Although there was some interest on the part of UNCOD
administrators to involve social scientists such as sociologists and anthropologists in
conference preparations, attempts at integrating predominantly ecological and
climatological research with these social science perspectives were not successful.
In a conversation in the Century Club in New York City with his friend and
colleague, James Walls, Townley expressed his frustration at the lack of social science
research on desertification. He had recently immersed himself in papers submitted to the
UNESCO-UNEP Man and the Biosphere Conference (convened in Sfax, Tunisia in
1974) and was dismayed at their content. According to Townley the studies said little
about the people "and yet they had been telling us for years that the social aspects of
desertification are critical." According to Walls, the "they" Townley referenced were the
physical scientists, who had long urged for social science expertise in addressing
desertification-related problems (Walls, 1980: 16).
Despite this apparent interest in natural and social science collaboration, experts
in fields of anthropology, sociology and history were largely absent the UNCOD
preparations. Several years following UNCOD, Brian Spooner, an anthropologist from
the University of Pennsylvania and author of the Iranian case study, criticized the lack of
social science participation in UNCOD's expert forums. He described himself as the
"lone social scientist" involved with Conference preparations. Spooner's involvement
with UNCOD resulted from an accidental confluence of events including the Iranian
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government's newly-found interest in deserts and environment and Spooner's visit to
Iran's Department of the Environment. In 1976 UNEP commissioned Spooner to prepare
the Iranian case study for UNCOD. Consequently, he was the only consultant with
training in Middle Eastern studies and anthropology. According to Spooner, "Everyone
else was coming from another direction" (Interview with UNCOD Advisor 2).
Both natural science experts and Spooner himself recognized a resistance to the
micro-level perspectives that fields like anthropology offered. The UNCOD experts were
concerned with macro-level issues and assumed that one could solve the desertification
problem by imposing new agricultural practices and technologies on people without
regard to social and cultural factors (Interview with UNCOD Advisor 2). In the words of
physical geographer, Andrew Warren:
There was a positivist stamp on the science and an underlying assumption
that erosion is bad. The social and physical science camps were
completely separate and differentiated between social and physical realms
when the interaction between the two is what really matters (Interview
with UNCOD Advisor 1).
While Secretariat members understood that the problem was not purely a technical one,
they were unable to integrate social science contributions with the rest of the knowledge
they were collecting (Interview with UNCOD Advisor 4). In further reflecting on
disciplinary cultures in the desertification context, Spooner authored the following
statements.
The concept straddles -- two sectors of science-the "two cultures" of
Western society. Since desertification is diagnosed from natural
symptoms, the natural scientists extend their hegemony over the debate.
There is so far no social-science definition of desertification. In fact, it is
difficult to see how there could be, because it would seem to be a social
definition of natural process! ... The biggest problem in (human) ecological
studies generally today is that there is as yet no such integrative concept or
framework (Spooner and Mann, 1982: 40).
The material and the social aspects of desertification, the damage to
primary productivity and the harm to people, appear so obviously related:
yet they are difficult to describe satisfactorily because the natural is
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supposedly universal whereas the social is divisive... We do not yet know
how to relate human activity to either evolutionary or ecosystemic
processes. We tend to treat it as ecologically intrusive, because it does not
fit within the boundaries of physical or biological units (Spooner and
Mann, 1982: 42-3).
Spooner fought an "uphill battle" in an effort to get attention to his views. He tried to
relay his ideas through long hours of discussions in both formal meetings and informal
settings, but never felt as if he influenced the Secretariat's approach (Interview with
UNCOD Advisor 2).
Tolba played an integral role in these disciplinary dynamics, seeming at times
unwelcoming of social science perspectives. One of the Component Review authors
recalled a meeting with Tolba in a Boston hotel room. The expert likened the meeting to
a PhD defense in which Tolba critiqued each of the reports. In reference to one of the
studies, Tolba noted that he did not approve of the word "societal," in the reports, but was
perfectly happy with the use of "scientific terms" (Interview with UNCOD Advisor 1).
Another UNCOD expert noted: "Tolba... believed we knew how to deal with
desertification because we had the technical solutions." Tolba seemed to assume that the
role of social scientists was to "tell us how to get people to do what we want them to do"
(Interview with UNCOD Advisor 3). This led one advisor to conclude that few fellow
advisors never understood that "you can't just order people to behave in a certain way"
(Interview with UNCOD Advisor 2).
The inner circle did consult with social scientists. However, according to one
UNCOD administrator, these experts were "useless." They could not speak outside of the
compass of their own specific research focus. "The natural scientists, especially the
geographers, were much better at working in a transdisciplinary setting" (Interview with
UNEP Official 1). According to one UNCOD advisor, social scientists suffered because
they lacked the quantitative models and figures that enabled the natural scientists to make
observations and recommendations that were applicable at a global scale. This expert
also commented that there was a certain degree of bias on the part of many of those
closely involved with the expert advisory processes. Some believed that "hard" science
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was, in general, more useful in addressing a problem like desertification (Interview with
UNCOD Advisor 4).
Spooner believed that part of this situation stemmed from lack of interest among
social scientists and a reliance on geographers who were primarily concerned with macro-
level issues.
The problem here was that very few social scientists were interested in
ecological problems, or even in the effects of ecological problems on
human life. Even if the organisers of this ecological conference had set
out to involve social scientists, it is unlikely that they would have
produced anything interesting. Social science was not ready for the
problem (Spooner and Mann, 1982: 44).
Geographers, however, seemed to satisfy the Secretariat's interest in and obligation to
social science. As described by one of the UNCOD experts, geographers were ideal for
UNEP because on the surface they appeared to straddle the realms of natural and social
science. However, the experts involved with UNCOD tended to have a natural science
orientation rather than a social or cultural one (Interview with UNCOD Advisor 2). They
dealt with some of the human elements of desertification, but focused largely on macro-
level issues of population and broad dynamics of social change (e.g., see Kates et al.,
1977).
In keeping with the tradition of the colonists and UNESCO, social science was
largely absent from the desertification debates of the 1970s. Emphasis on natural science
was helpful in simplifying desertification and making it amenable to the scientific and
technological tools of development assistance. As discussed in the next section,
simplification and technological solutions were central aspects of the Plan ofAction.
3.3.3 The Plan of Action: Constructing a Beat-able Enemy
In many respects the Plan ofAction mirrored the UNCOD advisory process itself, as well
as the views of its participants. This is not surprising seeing as the UNEP Secretariat,
with the help of expert consultants and their reports, authored the draft Plan ofAction
submitted to conference delegates. During their two-week session together, delegates
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methodically stepped through this document, negotiating its contents. However, with just
a few exceptions, the draft Plan ofAction (A/CONF.74/3) and the final Plan ofAction
(A/CONF.74/36; UNCOD, 1978) were markedly similar.
In keeping with many of the Component Reviews and advisory panel discussions,
the PACD portrayed desertification as a global problem in extent and urgency but arising
primarily from direct interactions involving people and their environment. Although the
agreement identified climate factors as an important part of desertification processes, it
emphatically dismissed drought as a direct cause of the problem. At least initially, the
Plan also sidelined the social aspects of desertification. The draft version of the Plan
UNEP submitted to the Conference did not contain discussion of socio-economic facets
of desertification. Such a discussion was added only upon the urging of some conference
delegates. As far as remedies, Plan authors and negotiators agreed to a "proximate
solution" for desertification. This solution focused on improving so-called irrational land
use practices. In reflecting the hierarchical structure of UNCOD's advisory process, the
Plan called for technologically-based, top-down programs administered by national
governments.
Desertification as a Problem ofLand Management
By highlighting land use practices as a major cause of desertification, the Plan focused
attention on direct physical interaction between people and their environment.
Desertification was thought to arise from a "network of cause and effect," involving
poverty, lack of education, and inadequacy of resources in the face of population growth
(UNCOD, 1978: 7-8). The immediate focus of policy, however, was a "less than rational
system of productivity" (UNCOD, 1978: 55) based on overexploitation of resources via
activities such as overgrazing, excessive mechanization, clean fallowing, deforestation,
and faulty irrigation schemes (leading to salinization and alkalinization). In echoing
colonial ideas regarding nature's balance, the Plan further implied that certain types of
interaction could disrupt this balance.
To see precisely what happens when desertification occurs, attention
should be focused on that shallow meeting place between soil and
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atmosphere, where plants thrive and where a balance is maintained
between incoming and outgoing energy and between water received and
lost" (UNCOD, 1978: 3).
This narrow vision of desertification emanated from activities at the land surface had
considerable implications for policy. UNCOD's conception of desertification focused on
physical and climatic considerations such as degraded vegetation, depleted soil,
deforested areas, temperature and precipitation. These parameters were amenable to
standardized, scientific measurement that facilitated a global framing of desertification
(see Chapters 4 and 5).
The Plan did acknowledge the geographical variability of desertification
phenomena. It noted that different ecological characteristics and social contexts will lead
to different desertification causes and processes and require varied responses.
Nevertheless, the Plan identified natural resource management as the primary focus of
policy regardless of the broader ecological and social processes at work.
Each region may require a distinctive approach to desertification
problems. With natural resource management as its primary concern, this
Plan of Action recommends methods for setting priorities for action
against desertification, but leaves the actual determination of priorities to
national policies and plans (UNCOD, 1978: 8).
Despite socially, culturally, and environmentally variable aspects of desertification, the
Plan ofAction as an international policy agreement was expected to provide, at some
level, a universal statement in prescribing anti-desertification measures. This statement
derived from an understanding of desertification as first and foremost a land use problem.
From Drought to Desertification: Optingfor an Anthropogenic Problem
While the Plan highlighted climate as an integral aspect of arid environments, it de-
emphasized the possibility that climate variations might actually be responsible for
desertification. In Recommendation 24, the Plan notes, "it is evident that climate plays a
critical role in most desertification processes" (UNCOD, 1978: 32). A major pre-
Conference assessment left open the possibility that long-term climate change might
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contribute to desertification (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977; Hare, 1977). However, the Plan
and supporting documentation argued that relationships linking climate and
desertification should not divert attention from land use techniques as the key cause of
desertification and the primary focus of policy. 79
.... plans for land management should take into account the possibility of
an even less reliable climate in the future. This should not, however, be
taken to imply that man is the victim of recently accelerated desertification
rather than its active agent. Clearly the answer to the question has great
significance for strategies to combat desertification (UNCOD Secretariat,
1977: 19).
In other words, because climate was not subject to control or manipulation via policy
measures, the Plan downplayed its role in desertification processes. To ensure a focus on
land use practices, Conference participants omitted reference to climate as cause of
desertification. The draft Plan ofAction submitted to the Conference on August 29, 1977
defined desertification as "widespread deteriation (sic) of ecosystems under the combined
pressures of adverse and fluctuating climate and excessive exploitation" (A/CONF.74/3:
2). However, the negotiators and final Plan authors removed reference to these dual
causal factors, deciding, instead, to focus on the role of "overexploitation" as
desertification's primary cause (UNCOD, 1978: 7). By downplaying the role of climate,
UNCOD participants further emphasized that people caused desertification, and could
therefore ameliorate it. This also resulted in distinguishing between drought (viewed as a
natural phenomenon) and desertification (viewed as a human phenomenon). As Tolba
noted,
Although their onset cannot yet be predicted, droughts are recurrent and
inevitable, and they are characteristics of arid, semi-arid and sub-humid
climates. The culprit, therefore, cannot be found in the shifting play of
79 Drought and famine were perceived as natural phenomena largely beyond human control (see Garcia,
1981). In contrast, the Plan (as discussed below) defined desertification as a problem arising from human
land use. This made desertification appear considerably more amenable to policy interventions. Arguably,
relationships linking climate and desertification might support desertification's framing as a global issue.
Yet, for the UNCOD participants, a large role for climate change in exacerbating desertification would
largely invalidate international desertification policy.
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climate. Rather it is man himself who must be viewed as the agent of
desertification. It is man's action that degrades the land by misuse or
overuse as he seeks to wrest a living from fragile ecosystems under
unpredictable and often harsh climatic conditions, and under a variety of
social and economic pressures (A/CONF.74/L. 1: 3).
While the West African drought crisis ultimately put desertification on the international
agenda, the UNCOD process transformed drought and associated problems of desert
encroachment (see Chapter 2) into desertification, a beat-able enemy amenable to
scientific and technological intervention and aligned with UNEP's interests in science
and development issues.
In keeping with a focus on human-induced desertification, pre-Conference
assessments also suggested that people might be responsible for regional drought
episodes. The summary assessment for the Conference (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977) and a
report on Climate and Desertification by Kenneth Hare cited well-known modeling
experiments by MIT professor Jules Charney. In a 1975 journal article, Charney argued
that increased albedo due to overgrazing could alter the atmospheric energy balance and
increase subsidence in localized areas. In other words, just as people caused
desertification, they might also contribute to regional drought conditions. Interestingly,
neither Hare nor other expert contributors to UNCOD cited work challenging Charney's
hypothesis. Researchers such as Jackson and Idso (1975) contended that vegetation
removal in drylands could decrease soil moisture levels and radiant energy while
increasing surface and near-surface temperatures. Measurements of warming near ground
temperatures in several locations where vegetation was reduced suggested that
hydrological conditions, rather than albedo effects, dominate surface energy balances
associated vegetation removal from most drylands (Williams and Balling, 1996).0
80 Research in the 1980s showed greater support for Charney's findings, but concluded that soil moisture
was at least as important as albedo effects (see Williams and Balling, 1996).
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Sidelining Social Dimensions
As with climatic factors, the Plan acknowledged social aspects of desertification, but said
little about their role in desertification processes. The draft Plan, prepared by the
Conference Secretariat and submitted to Conference delegates, contained virtually no
discussion of social facets of desertification. After much urging on the part of developing
countries, a section entitled "Socio-economic Aspects" was added to the Plan's text.
Conference participants identified unequal access to resources, lack of education,
population growth, deficient health services, and unsound human settlement planning as
contributing factors to desertification. The role of women, land tenure, and indigenous
views of the land and its use received very little attention. As discussed below, socio-
economic aspects of desertification were interpreted as problems that could be fixed
through the introduction of modern (mainly western), capitalist values and through
education to encourage populations in affected areas to think along the lines of developed
country inhabitants. Hence, plans to introduce western ideas and values, paralleled
similar plans to introduce modern technologies and land use methods.
Proximate Solutions
By framing desertification as a problem of land use, Plan contributors also constructed
science and technology as logical solutions. While scientific research could provide a
deeper understanding of desertification processes, use of technology could alter the ways
in which people manipulated the land's resources. 82 PACD authors acknowledged other
81 The Plan implied anti-desertification activities would eventually have to address social facets of the
problem, the immediate solution concerned changes in land use practices (e.g., see UNCOD, 1978: 8).
8 Emphasis on science and technology throughout the Plan, aligned with the goals of the UN General
Assembly. In establishing the Conference, the UN General Assembly stated that its aim was to enable all
countries, especially developing countries "to benefit from the achievements of modern science and
technology for the acceleration of their economic and social progress" (UNEP, 1978: 124). Reliance on
science and technology fit with the military metaphor of "arresting," "attacking" and "combating"
desertification (UNCOD, 1978: 6). Following Stockholm, UNGA and other UN organizations used such
metaphors in referring to desertification and drought problems. They suggested that anti-desertification
efforts were best fueled and informed by scientific analysis. On May 1, 1974 UNGA issued resolution 3202
(S-VI) recommending that the international community "undertake concrete and speedy measures to arrest
desertification and assist the economic development of affected areas" (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 6).
Similarly, the Economic and Social Council's resolution 1878 (LVII) of July 16, 1974 asked that relevant
UN organizations take up a "broad attack on the drought problem."
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complexities of desertification, but did not attempt to comprehensively address them
through policy.
While solutions probably rest ultimately in education, social and economic
advancement and the adjustment of population growth to the development
of resources, the proximate solution centers on improved land use
(UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 8).
This "proximate solution" of improved land use called for the transfer of knowledge and
technology from developed to developing countries and recommended that indigenous
approaches to land management be enhanced through "strengthening of indigenous
capabilities" and adoption of modern land use techniques. The Plan emphasized that
solutions to desertification were known, but more research could increase efficacy.
Specific measures included mapping and assessment efforts to determine the extent and
severity of the desertification problem, and the role of both natural and social systems in
contributing to it. Provisions aimed at promoting more "rational" use of resources
included rational assessment of water needs and improved water supply; technical
improvements to rain-fed cropping systems; improved irrigation systems; schemes for
maintaining and protecting existing vegetation; "rational use of fertilizers;" and shelter
belts to confine desertified areas.
While suggestions for land use improvements constituted the majority of the
Plan's recommendations, the agreement did include a handful of recommendations
regarding socio-economic concerns. These recommendations were aimed at improving
education, human settlements, and demographic information systems and policies. Like
provisions for land use improvements, those regarding socio-economic issues generally
called for the introduction of modern/western perspectives and techniques in affected
areas. It was hoped that such a transfer would enhance presumably deficient methods of
land management. The Plan, for example, called for "incorporation of (affected) regions
in a more rational system of productivity." This included, "the introduction...of a new
education system.. .that will allow the population to become fully aware of the ecological
aspects of development and at the same time create a sense of solidarity with future
generations." To enable demographic policies necessary for improved land use, the Plan
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called for "as appropriate, maintenance of an adequate rural labor force, sedentarization
of nomads and resettlement of migrants from rural to urban settings" (UNCOD
Secretariat, 1977: 22-3). The Plan also recommended improved health services and
increased monitoring of the human condition in regard to desertification. Suggested
indicators included population, human and environmental health, food, education, and
"man as a land user." (UNCOD, 1978: 25).
To facilitate implementation of its policy recommendations, the Plan outlined
several institutional and potential financial measures. To a certain extent these
institutions further illustrate the centralized, top-down approach to policy embodied in the
Plan. The Plan described the characteristics of national machinery and the role of the
UN's Regional Commission in supporting implementation. The Plan also outlined tasks
for UNEP and requested the UN General Assembly to establish an inter-agency working
group on desertification to assist UNEP's Governing Council and UNEP's Environment
Co-ordination Board in orchestrating policy implementation at the international level. In
regard to financing, the Plan did not establish a new funding source or financial
mechanism. Instead it recommended consideration of several types of financing through
(1) subregional cooperation, (2) bilateral, multilateral, and multi-bilateral assistance, and
(3) consultative group/club or group type financing. A fourth category proposed a special
account funded, inter alia, through international taxation, donations, and international
financing institutions. Although the idea never came to fruition in the desertification
context, the Plan marked the first appearance of international taxation as a possible
financing mechanism for international environmental agreements.
3.3.4 Recap
The PACD approach to desertification reflected the institutions and processes that gave
rise to it. UNEP, a fledgling international agency led by a scientist, viewed desertification
as a global problem, knowable by scientific inquiry and amenable to top-down,
technological solutions. UNEP developed and legitimized this vision of desertification
largely through its extensive, pre-conference assessment activities. In designating natural
scientists as the "thinkers," UNEP afforded them considerable control over problem
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framing. Not surprisingly, as developed country experts in soil science and physical
geography, these noted researchers interpreted the desertification in a way that aligned
with their backgrounds and perspectives. They emphasized features of desertification
that were amenable to simplification and generalization. In doing so, they supported
UNEP's emphasis on "rationality" as a means for understanding and ameliorating
desertification. In focusing attention on the physical processes and manifestations of
desertification, scientific assessments also helped UNEP to portray desertification as a
universal phenomenon. With a singular set of causes (i.e., poor land use practices) and
clear physical manifestations, desertification appeared amenable to standardized, global
measurements (see Chapter 4) and a proximate solution based on centralized,
technological interventions.
With this framing of desertification UNEP delineated realms of local-global and
natural-social. This boundary work on the part of UNEP and its consultants had
important implications for issues of participation in desertification science and
policymaking. In emphasizing global and physical dimensions of desertification, UNEP
invited the participation of experts such as climatologists and soil scientists who were
conversant with tools of generalization and standardization. At the same time, UJNEP
tended to close the doors on anthropologists and sociologists who emphasized the
variability of desertification processes and their social dimensions. These perspectives on
desertification generally did not highlight universal truths about the issue or support
proximate, technocratic solutions. Also left out of the debate were the voices of people
affected by desertification. UNEP did not hire African consultants to study
desertification, nor did the agency consult extensively with local people in developing the
draft Plan.83 Their local experiences would also have been at odds with the agency's
standardized portrayal of desertification. Moreover, as part of "irrational systems of
83 Governments oversaw a handful of case studies, but these analyses focused mainly on "true deserts"
which did not, in the end, fit the Plan's definition of desertification (e.g., Biswas and Biswas, 1977). UNEP
also held regional meetings to review the draft Plan of Action in Santiago Chile (February 23-26, 1977),
Algarve Portugal (March 28-April 1, 1977), Nairobi, Kenya (April 12-16, 1977) and New Delhi, India
(April 19-22, 1977) (A/CONF.74/33). However, participants at these meetings were members of
international organizations and country delegates, rather than local people or community organizations.
Consequently, the sessions served primarily as preparatory meetings for the negotiations.
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productivity" affected populations appeared to be the cause of desertification, rather than
its solution.
3.4 The 1980s: Science Advisors as Policy Analysts
Throughout the 1980s UNEP continued in its position as the lead UN agency regarding
desertification issues. As such, UNEP oversaw implementation activities under the Plan
ofAcction.84 Most expert advisory activities during this period centered on the task of
policy evaluation. The agency conducted two assessments of progress, one in the early
1980s (completed in 1984), and another conducted in the late 1980s (completed in 1991).
The latter study served as UNEP's primary contribution to the United Nations Conference
on Environment and Development in 1992. As discussed in Chapters 4 and 5,
respectively, a major thrust of these assessments concerned numerical measurements of
desertification's physical extent and development of new desertification maps.
Assessments also analyzed the financial status of desertification initiatives and reviewed
programs and projects implemented under the Plan. These endeavors continued to reflect
the linear view of science-policy prevalent in the 1970s. They also reflected UNEP's
heavy reliance on natural scientists, this time to characterize desertification and evaluate
implementation measures.
In proceeding with its assessment efforts, UNEP found itself no longer the
predominant interpreter of desertification. Other voices, emphasizing the local and social
facets of desertification, entered the arena and commanded considerable authority in the
eyes of fellow scientists and the public. Disappointing results of PACD implementation
caused UNEP to begin to develop some new perspectives on the issue. Most notably,
UNEP and its assessors began to note the success of non-governmental organizations in
implementing desertification projects and the need for greater attention to the human
84 In accordance with the Plan, the agency established or convened several institutional bodies to carry out
implementation tasks. It put in place a Desertification Branch to serve as a focal point in implementing the
Plan, an Interagency Working Group on Desertification to facilitate cooperation among different UN
agencies, and a Consultative Group for Desertification Control (DESCON), aimed at securing funding for
desertification projects (Dregne, 1984). For financing the Plan, UNEP opened a special account. The
agency also founded the Desertification Control Bulletin, published twice a year, and intended to raise
awareness about desertification issues.
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dimensions of degradation processes. However, LTNEP's "attack" on desertification
remained largely dominated by a top-down science and technology-driven approach to the
issue. Critiques from outside the agency easily overshadowed UNEP's embryonic
departure from its long-standing paradigm. Scientists, including some former
desertification advisors, questioned the validity of some of UNEP's assessment
methodologies and called for UNEP to revamp its vision of desertification policy and
policy implementation.
In the aftermath of controversy and debate, UNEP (as primary assessment
provider to UNCED) emerged once again as an important contributor to policy
formulation. Alongside well organized and vocal African country delegates, UNEP's
(1991) report on the world status of desertification and the progress of PACD
implementation served as a primary source of information for UNCED delegates and its
features are evident in Agenda 21 Chapter 12. This policy statement reflected a
desertification issue in transition, bringing together some of the prominent interpretations
of the 1970s, while introducing new ideas that would develop more fully in the 1990s.
The chapter's extensive provisions for scientific monitoring and measurement of
desertification were reminiscent of modernist-style desertification policy. Yet, new ideas
about the issue were evident in increased attention to public participation in anti-
desertification activities and greater consideration for the appropriateness of introducing
modern technology in local contexts. Perhaps the most telling feature of Chapter 12,
however, was the provision establishing an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee for
a desertification treaty, the result of heavy African lobbying and an institution that would
ultimately usurp UNEP's leadership role on desertification issues.
3.4.1 Assessments and Ad Hoc Panels
During the 1980s scientists continued to play an important role in the desertification
policy arena. Their responsibilities, however, broadened as they took on tasks of policy
evaluators in addition to scientific advisors. In the 1970s Tolba described scientists as the
thinkers and politicians as doers - people of action. Scientists, according to Tolba,
provided a factual basis for policymaking in advance of political negotiations. As the
140
Plan's implementation process got underway, UNEP devised another role for scientists.
It convened natural scientists to evaluate implementation efforts. Just as reliance on
natural scientists had contributed to the PACD's top-down framing of desertification and
its remedies, so a large role for natural science in the PACD's evaluation encourage the
use of a certain metrics of success. These criteria, in turn, perpetuated a focus on physical
manifestations of desertification. Determination of success or failure depended largely on
desertification's global extent and the rate at which desertification was "spreading."
Throughout the 1980s UNEP convened a number of expert panels and sponsored
several assessment processes. The agency had several goals in initiating these studies.
Many focused on developing desertification mapping and assessment methodologies,
operationalizing desertification's definition (e.g., Odingo, 1990b), and examining
financial aspects of implementation (e.g., UNEP, 1984; UNEP, 1991). UNEP's General
Assessments of Progress published in 1984 and 1991 had the most bearing on
international policy. The 1984 study fueled considerable controversy regarding UNEP's
interpretation of the issue, its assessment methodologies and its approach to policy
implementation. The 1991 assessment provided a forum for UNEP to respond, in part, to
critics, while continuing to portray desertification as a global phenomenon amenable to
standardized measurements and singular solutions.
Directives for the 1984 and 1991 assessments ultimately came from the Plan of
Action and the UN General Assembly, respectively. However, UNEP had considerable
latitude in interpreting these directives. The Plan, for example, simply called for a
general assessment of progress seven years after the Plan's completion in 1977.
Similarly, the UN General Assembly in a Resolution from 1989 called for UNEP's input
to the Rio Summit. The General Assembly requested UNEP to:
contribute substantially to the discussion on desertification at the
Conference, inter alia, by undertaking a general evaluation, sufficiently in
advance of the conference, of the progress achieved in implementing the
Plan of Action (General Assembly Resolution 44/172, December 19,
1989; also quoted in UNEP, 1991: xv).
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Unlike its call for extensive scientific analysis prior to UNCOD, this resolution did not
stipulate the use of such analyses. Hence, UNEP had considerable flexibility in designing
these assessment processes. The agency opted to call on science advisors to carry out its
assessment tasks. Chapter 5 contains a more detailed discussion of the 1984 and 1991
assessments and their reliance on quantitative estimates of desertification. The discussion
immediately following highlights key features of these assessments as indicative of
relationships linking scientists and UN institutions during the 1980s.
The 1984 assessment served mainly as a public relations effort gone wrong.
Rather than demonstrating need for greater attention and resources for desertification, the
assessment nearly destroyed the credibility of both UNEP and the issue itself. The study
examined the "global status and trend" of desertification, a very broad summary of
activities implemented under the Plan, a review of institutional and financial
arrangements, obstacles to success and recommendations for action. The assessment's
centerpiece concerned its analysis of status and trends, which took the form of several
statistics regarding desertification's physical extent and the rate at which this extent was
increasing. As discussed in detail in Chapter 5, statistics were generated based on
response to a questionnaire sent to governments and international agencies. But
responses were small in number and revealed confusion on the part of respondents
regarding the meaning of desertification. The estimates relayed substantial rates of
increase for desertification, but scientists familiar with the survey methodology and poor
quality of responses severely questioned UNEP's dire predictions.
If UNEP had relayed its survey findings in qualitative, descriptive terms, perhaps
the criticisms would have been less harsh. Instead, UJNEP portrayed its assessment
process as grounded in sound scientific methods. They also portrayed key assessment
findings without reference to their large uncertainties, thereby leaving the numbers open
as an easy target of deconstruction. When members of relevant scientific and policy
communities discovered that these numbers were not reliable, they lost trust in UNEP and
its picture of desertification. As discussed in Chapter 5, critics accused UNEP of
misleading the public and exaggerating desertification's impacts. While some observers
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believed UNEP had damaged support for a worthy cause and important problem, others
simply dismissed desertification as a scam.
Other elements of the 1984 study were easily lost amidst debate surrounding
numerical estimates. UNEP, in keeping with the Plan's provisions, clearly emphasized a
national, top-down approach to desertification. According to the assessment, for
example:
National institutions and machineries to combat desertification,
particularly in developing countries, are generally in need of further
support and in many countries do not yet exist. Further attention needs to
be given to establishing institutions capable of a government-wide co-
ordinating role, through which assessment of desertification and the
planning and monitoring of desertification-control programmes can be
achieved (UNEP, 1984: 9).
Nevertheless, buried in over sixty pages of text were two short paragraphs on the role of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in PACD implementation. NGOs received
minimal attention despite the fact that "in some respects NGOs have been the most
effective agencies in the campaign against desertification" (UNEP, 1984: 36). UNEP
attributed some of their success to the local-scale focus of their work, their flexibility, and
capacity for learning from past experiences. However, the report's Executive Summary
suggested only that other organizations, wherever possible, take the successful actions of
NGOs into account. Hence, while the inklings of new approaches to desertification were
emerging from UNEP's work, they were dwarfed by large-scale scientific research
endeavors.
Problems regarding the 1984 assessment opened the door to widespread criticisms
and the emergence of new approaches to desertification. As discussed in the next section,
new voices emerged from outside of UNEP to offer and encourage a more localized
vision of desertification and its solutions. While UNEP incorporated some of these ideas
in its 1991 assessment (discussed below), the agency continued to emphasize the physical
and global scale dimensions of desertification. In focusing on the "world status" of
desertification, for example, key messages from the assessment centered on the
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geographic extent of land degradation as expressed in numerical terms. However, the
study also employed a new definition of desertification.85 While this definition identified
human activities as the main cause of desertification, it equated desertification with land
degradation, rather than the spread of desert-like conditions. Hence, images of
desertification as process were beginning to replace a focus on desertification's physical
manifestations.
In addition to setting forth a new definition of desertification, the 1991 assessment
also identified several factors believed to contribute to lack of progress on the issue.
These included low priority given to anti-desertification initiatives, as well as lack of
funding and technical assistance. UNEP also noted that technical solutions were often
applied to problems of a socio-political and/or socio-economic nature, and that local
populations were not fully involved in planning and implementing anti-desertification
programs (UNEP, 1991: xiv). UNEP's reflections to signal a broadening vision of
desertification. Whereas UNCOD participants saw desertification as primarily a physical
problem, assessors in 1991 focused more attention on its social dimensions and the
futility of applying technical adjustments to processes that are essentially social and
dynamic in nature. This marked a significant shift in thinking from the modernist
paradigm from the 1980s.
3.4.2 New Voices ofAuthority
During the 1980s, LNEP continued to rely on the expertise of natural scientists in
evaluating policy implementation. However, the agency's credibility suffered largely as a
result of its 1984 assessment. UNEP, so well established as a key producer of
desertification knowledge, began to waver in the eyes of members of the scientific
community and new voices entered the debate. Former UNEP consultants on
desertification pointed out the weaknesses of UNEP's approach, while others offered new
tools of inquiry and new interpretations of desertification. However, new authorities in
the realms of international environmental politics were not only scientists. The UNCED
85 An assessment in 1990 (Odingo, 1990) generated this new definition. One of the goals of that assessment
was to improve desertification's definition by making it more operational, in other words, more amenable to
scientific analysis and mapping.
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process saw an outpouring of activity on the part of non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) who lobbied for, inter alia, greater support for public participation and specific
attention to local conditions and peoples in developing countries. In addition, African
country representatives played an active role throughout the UNCED process, were
particularly instrumental in designing the provisions of Agenda 21, Chapter 12 and
managed to gain agreement on an international desertification treaty.
The official 1984 assessment report (UNEP/GC. 12/9) did not identify any of the
study's authors or contributors. These individuals comprised a small, international set of
science advisors working in conjunction with UNEP administrators. Panel members
included A. G. Abdel Sami of the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology
(Cairo, Egypt), G. Aubert, of Services Scientifiques (Bundy, France); R. A. Perry from
the Division of Land Resources at CSIRO (Australia); Jeremy Swift of the Institute for
Development Studies (Sussex, UK); and Jack Mabbutt (School of Geography, University
of New South Wales). UNEP participants included Mostafa Tolba, Executive Director
at UNEP, and Gafaar Karrar and Daniel Stiles, both of UNEP's desertification branch
(Interview with UNEP Advisor 2; Jeremy Swift's personal files, 1998).
Interestingly, UNEP published the findings of its assessment under the name of
prominent desertification specialists with ongoing ties to UNEP. Each author
summarized a different section of the assessment in the form of journal articles published
in Environmental Conservation. Mabbutt (1984) discussed the status and trends of
desertification as established through the assessment, and Dregne (1984) addressed
accomplishments, constraints, project expenditures, and reasons for limited success.
Karrar (1984) compared the Plan's provisions with projects achieved at international,
regional, and national levels. Tolba (1984) authored an editorial lamenting disappointing
policy results and urging increased support and funding for anti-desertification initiatives.
This method of publication provided for wider distribution of UNEP's findings. In
addition, the authorship choices may have lent greater authority to the assessment's
conclusions in the eyes of the journal's readers.
Nevertheless, scientists outside UNEP had misgivings about the agency's
characterization of and approach to desertification. Some of the most prominent
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spokespeople had served as UNEP advisors. As discussed above, Brian Spooner (1982),
an American anthropologist criticized what he saw as an overly ecological view of
desertification. Geographer Andrew Warren (science advisor to UNEP during UNCOD)
and his colleague Clive Agnew, criticized the ambiguity of the desertification concept,
claiming it precluded rigorous scientific analysis. 86 They argued that conflicting
interpretations of desertification (such as those collected through UNEP's survey) led to
misleading litanies of statistics. They also declared LNEP's approach to desertification
to be overly top-down and global in its focus. They urged for desertification analyses
aimed at providing information useful at the local level, and recommended that grassroots
changes in areas such as education and agriculture form a key component of anti-
desertification efforts (Warren and Agnew, 1988).
Ridley Nelson, economist at the World Bank, recommended fundamental changes
to UNEP's assessment and policy implementation activities. Nelson, like Warren,
expressed concern regarding the Plan's emphasis on top-down solutions and UNEP's
focus on anti-desertification efforts at international and national levels, rather than local
levels. Contrary to the globally uniform view of desertification presented in the Plan of
Action, Nelson suggested that desertification's local variability precluded imposition of
any standardized technocratic solution. He recommended a trial-and-error approach to
policy. According to Nelson,
... the complexity of the problem and the local variability and the need for
experimentation-much of which it is better to think of as "search" (for
technical and social solutions) rather than "research" (which carries the
connotation of formal academic studies)--suggests the need for
predominantly village-level initiatives developmed from small-scale local
experimentation rather than large multi-country regional programs
(Nelson, 1990: 23).
Nelson's suggestion stood in stark contrast to UNEP's linear vision of science first, action
second. LNEP's elaborate mapping and assessment activities (Chapters 5 and 6) clearly
reflected a division between scientific analysis and policy implementation. Global
86 Glantz and Orlovsky (1983) made a similar argument in their survey of numerous desertification
definitions.
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statistics and remote sensing studies could fill pages of progress reports for UNEP's
Governing Council, but had little relevance to on-the-ground desertification projects. In
light of this, Nelson suggested that knowledge production and policy implementation
comprise one in the same process.
Nelson further suggested a different approach to understanding desertification. In
particular, Nelson urged for reliance on biological and historical experts to uncover the
sources of desertification. He believed that local historians would be of most use in this
regard because they could use their knowledge of local cultures, practices, and
environments to help construct a more dynamic picture of desertification processes. He
also believed that historians, in providing insight to the past, could also assist
policymakers in anticipating and planning for the future.
In the mid-to-late eighties, scientists with the local understandings Nelson talked
about were just beginning to skirt the desertification debate. Anthropologists, rural
economists, rural sociologists and other social scientists such as Ian Scoones, Camilla
Toulmin, and Richard Behnke spoke out, not from UNEP's expert committees, but from
platforms such as the Commonwealth Secretariat and the International Institute for
Environment and Development (IIED). These experts helped to focus the development
community on alternative models of agriculture and range ecology. Local case studies
revealed that small projects were meeting success through bilateral assistance, simple
technology and participation. The key lay in project design and management (Interview
with IPED Member 1). Ultimately, these social scientists challenged several basic
assumptions underlying the PACD and its top-down approach. Theories of disequilibrium
challenged long-standing ideas about nature's balance and carrying capacity. Similarly,
studies such as Farmer First (Chambers et al., 1989) and Beyond Farmer First (Scoones
and Thompson, 1994) showed that technology transfer and the imposition of western
practices were often inferior to programs based on local practices and community
participation.
Attention to alternative solutions and local participation, as reflected in the 1991
assessment, dovetailed with research emerging from fields such as geography, rural
sociology, and development studies. This research questioned orthodox, (i.e., western)
147
interpretations of environmental change in the developing world (Blaikie, 1985; Blaikie
and Brookfield, 1987; Thompson et al., 1986). Instead of viewing such change as a result
of ignorance, crisis, and/or physical processes knowable by science alone, researchers
began to suggest that environmental change reflected complex interactions of socio-
economic and environmental processes (Batterbury et al. 1997). Multi-site erosion
research projects acknowledged the high variability of social and ecological settings.
Projects such as OSTROM in West Africa recognized the site-specific nature of resource
management in Africa, where environmental conditions and politics were said to present
unique obstacles and opportunities. In the Guesselodi Forest in Niger,87 an initiative
aimed at developing flexible dryland management systems employed a new type of
research. Instead of researching a problem by investigating its dynamics in the abstract,
project participants in Niger researched problems by testing different solutions8 8
(Stocking, 1992).
Along with these changes, cultural ecologists and anthropologists highlighted the
importance of indigenous forms of knowledge. Some argued that assumptions deeply
rooted in cultures of industrialized countries, obscured other possible and important
views of environmental change, including those held by people residing in affected areas.
New accounts of dryland degradation claimed that the use of conventional research
methods often led to misleading accounts of environmental degradation. These accounts
frequently translated into remedial actions that were harmful to affected populations.
Alternative research approaches encouraged greater attention to the knowledge and
practices of indigenous populations and their understandings of environmental processes
(Roe, 1991; Hobart, 1993).
Advancing Desert Theory Under Attack
Perhaps the most serious challenges to the desertification issue came from researchers at
Lund University in Sweden. Based on remote sensing studies of the Sahel, Ulf Hellden
and his colleagues took issue with advancing desert interpretations of desertification. In
87 See Fries (1990) as cited in Stocking (1992).
88 This project won the "Innovations for Development Association Award" (IDEA), one million Kroner
($180,000), given by Sweden for innovative projects in rural development.
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doing so they questioned the very existence of desertification. As discussed in Chapter 5,
the Lund group claimed to debunk a 1974 UNEP-sponsored study by Hugh Lamprey,
asserting the Sahara was moving southward by 5.5 kilometers per year. In widely
publicized articles, the researchers and the popular press portrayed the Lund findings as
an ominous challenge to desertification and associated policy enterprises. Scientists and
journalists alike questioned the validity of the desertification issue. Headlines asked: "Is
Desertification a Myth?" (Binns, 1990),90 and proclaimed: "The sun is setting on creeping
desert theory" (Hawkes, 1992).91 Some scientists, such as S. L. Rhodes (1991) called for
a "rethinking" of the desertification problem. He called for more accurate assessments of
land degradation's location and severity, based largely on the use of remote sensing
technology.
The power of the Lund research in jeopardizing the credibility of UNEP and the
desertification issue itself, derived, in part, from mixed messages contained in the Plan of
Action and emanating from UNEP. On the one hand, the Plan and UNEP distanced
desertification and advancing deserts. On the other hand, they employed rhetoric and
imagery that often implied these terms were synonymous. Parts of the 1977 Conference
report emphatically denied a link between desertification and spreading deserts. A pre-
Conference case study of Aghazer and Azawak in Niger, for example, stated that,
Desertification does not...mean a steady encroachment by the Sahara; it is
not a front whose advance can be calculated over the last 40 years.
Desertification happens at particular points; it is patchy, not linear
(A/CONF.74/14: 92; Walls, 1980: 137).
UNCOD agreed with this interpretation. A preface to the Plan ofAction, made a sharp
distinction between desert encroachment and desertification.
Deserts themselves are not the sources from which desertification springs.
Except for hot winds, the deserts themselves supply none of the essential
89 Later writings by geographers and development experts included Thomas and Middleton (1994) and
Swift (1996).
90 At the time of his article, published in the journal Geography, Dr. J. A. Binns was a lecturer in
Geography in the School of African and Asian studies, University of Sussex.
91 Nigel Hawkes reported on the Lund University findings in the London Times.
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impetus for the processes described. Desertification breaks out, usually at
times of drought stress, in areas of naturally vulnerable land subject to
pressures of land use. These degraded patches, like a skin disease link up
to carry the process over extended areas. It is generally incorrect to
envision the process as an advance of the desert frontier engulfing usable
land on its perimeter: the advancing sand dune is in fact a very special and
localized case. Desertification, as a patchy destruction that may be far
removed from any nebulous front line, is a more subtle and insidious
process (UNCOD, 1978: 5).92
Despite attempts to distance desertification from desert encroachment, references
throughout the 1977 policy suggested that these two processes were the same.93 The Plan
itself made reference to the "advance" and "spread," of desertification, thereby
capitalizing on dramatic advancing desert imagery, while maintaining that desertification
constituted a more universal problem. The Plan's objective, for example, was "to prevent
and arrest the advance of desertification and where possible, to reclaim desertified land
for productive use" (UNCOD, 1978: 7, emphasis added). The Plan also proposed
remedial measures intended to thwart advancing desert fronts. Greenbelts (areas of
vegetation near desert edges) were suggested as the basis for transnational projects to halt
the dune advance (p. 20). Recommendations for smaller scale shelter belts and the
vegetation of desert uplands similarly suggested a spreading desert phenomenon. This
portrayal of desertification reflected many years of UNESCO research, and a number of
pre-UNCOD studies (e.g., Rapp et al. (1976) and Lamprey (1975)). These analyses
defined desertification as an advancing desert phenomenon.
Even UNEP literature seemed to conflate desertification with advancing deserts.
In expressing the growing problem of desertification, as estimated by UNEP, Mostafa
Tolba remarked:
In many ways the term "desertification" is misleading. The popular image
of sand dune encroachment is only a minor part of the problem.
92 Mention of "growing populations" in this definition is reminiscent of the environment and population
studies of the late 1960s and early 1970s that warned against overexploitation and overpopulation. A
similar element of crisis seemed to pervade the Plan as its authors noted a "well-founded sense of danger"
(UNCOD, 1978: 1), and called for urgent implementation of policy measures.
93 In addition, most of the case studies prepared for the Conference focused on so-called true, or natural
deserts, rather than sites of land degradation. See for example, Biswas and Biswas (1977).
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Yet, three years later, Tolba invoked the same advancing desert imagery he had cautioned
against.
In spite of hundreds of millions of dollars devoted to controlling the spread
of deserts over the past ten years, they continue to roll forward... Our goal
is to roll back the desert (Tolba, 1987: cover page).
Remote sensing appeared to shake the foundations of international desertification science
and policy. However, UNEP revised its view of desertification in time for the next
tabling of desertification in multilateral negotiations. In helping to modify the UN's
definition of desertification and its approach to desertification policy, UNEP played an
important role in setting desertification's course toward an international treaty.
Changing of the Guard at UNEP
In the early 1990s, UNEP began to take account of its critics and incorporate their
perspectives into an evolving vision of the desertification problem. In 1990 and 1991,
UNEP continued to select natural scientists to serve on expert panels. Based on their
work, UNEP continued to portray desertification as a global problem in need of
standardized, basic scientific measurement and analysis. However, a broader policy
evaluation followed by a change in leadership in UNEP's desertification offices
eventually infused the agency's desertification unit with a new set of priorities.
Mostafa Tolba was still Executive Director at UNEP for the pre-UNCED
assessments, and he called on primarily natural scientists to participate in expert panels
and assessment activities. In 1990, for example, the agency convened an Ad Hoc
Consultation on Assessment of Global Desertification: Status and Methodologies
(February 15-17, 1990). Nearly all participants in this consultation were geographers and
soil scientists. Professor Richard Samson Odingo, Professor of Geography at the
University of Nairobi, edited the collection of papers presented at the meeting. He also
authored an extensive survey piece examining the programmatic consequences of
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desertification's definition. In this study he responded to critiques calling for a more
operational definition of desertification (e.g., Warren and Agnew, 1988; Nelson, 1990).
Based on Odingo's survey of past definitions, he advised the consultation meeting on
what he saw as possible improvements to conventional interpretations of desertification.
In particular, he characterized desertification as a more subtle process of land
degradation. He also recommended increased attention to socio-economic and political
facets of the problem and greater attention to activities at all levels, especially at national
and local levels.
Tolba also secured the assistance of Boris Rozanov, Professor of Pedology at
Moscow State University. Rozanov had worked at UNEP from 1976 to 1980 as principal
officer and senior program officer in the desertification unit. In September 1990,
Rozanov rejoined UNEP as special advisor to Tolba (Desertification Control Bulletin,
1991).94 A few months before returning to UNEP Rozanov provided a major
contribution to the agency's 1990 desertification assessment. His paper, "An Assessment
of Global Desertification: Status and Methodologies," served as a discussion piece at the
Ad-Hoc Consultation Meeting of the same name, held in Nairobi from February 15-17,
1990. UNEP's Desertification Control Programme Activity Center had asked Rozanov to
examine the "global magnitude" of desertification and various methodologies available
for its assessment. The study provided brief, qualitative descriptions of desertification in
several regions throughout the world. Based on this survey Rozanov concluded that
desertification was "still active and progressing" and UNEP was "fully justified in its
struggle against desertification as a first priority environmental issue" (Rozanov, 1990:
70). In addition, however, he addressed "doubts and arguments concerning the
assessment of desertification." In recounting a large number of desertification definitions
and associated assessment methodologies, he concluded, in agreement with many of the
issue's detractors:
94 In 1963, Rozanov obtained his DrSc in pedology at Moscow State University where he later worked as a
lecturer and researcher. Rozanov also worked in Rangoon, Burma where he set up the Land-Use Bureau
and trained its staff. He was a visiting professor at Alexandria University in Cairo, Egypt; served as expert
advisor to UNESCO; and consulted on government projects (Desertification Control Bulletin, 1991).
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Thus, due to a certain diversity in desertification definitions and
corresponding methodologies for its assessment, the global picture has
become rather vague and much disputed (Rozanov, 1990: 72).
Yet, Rozanov did not waver from the conviction that global, quantitative measurements
of desertification were important in addressing it. He urged for a more precise definition
and standardized global assessment methods. While Rozanov did not propose his own
methodology, his study provided participants in the consultation meeting with a review of
previous techniques.
The early 1990s also saw a changing of the guard at UNEP. Franklin Cardy
(formerly of the World Bank) became Assistant Executive Director of Environment
Management and Institutional support at UNEP. He also assumed the directorship of
UNEP's Desertification Control Programme Activity Center and was largely responsible
for supporting new perspectives on the issue (Interview with UNEP Advisor 1). Cardy
emphasized socio-economic aspects of desertification processes, as well as their
biological and climatic features. With his "fresh approach" to desertification Cardy (in
keeping with UNEP tradition) portrayed the problem as a global one. Yet, his definition
of "global" departed from that of his UNEP predecessors.
The world is becoming interdependent; stability, security, humanitarian
and economic concerns are all contributing to the recognition of the Earth
as a "global village" or, more specifically, a global ecosystem made up of
interdependent states (Cardy, 1991).
Cardy viewed desertification as part of interdependent, social, economic and
environmental processes. These processes involved migration and urbanization,
biological diversity and world food markets and required responses attentive to social
issues and the need for local participation.
3.4.3 Policy in Transition: Agenda 21
Assessment processes prior to the Rio Summit adhered to the same linear model of
science and policy whereby expert deliberations and political deliberations occur in
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sequence, with reports, maps and other forms of communication and representations
traveling from assessors to negotiators in time for policy negotiation. In this process,
UNEP served as the Conference's science advisor on desertification issues. Within this
traditional/familiar framework, UNEP revised its approach to desertification and UNCED
participants incorporated many of UNEP's new ideas into policy. The 1991 study and
Agenda 21, Chapter 12 shared several characteristics. Both emphasized the global
dimensions of desertification and the need for large-scale scientific analysis of
desertification worldwide. They also suggested a broader definition of desertification and
noted that technology was not a universally applicable panacea.
UNEP, however, was by no means the sole source of ideas for UNCED. African
countries played a major role in tabling desertification and drought issues and in shaping
UNCED's approach to them. The United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office (UNSO)
organized two regional meetings to facilitate development of a common approach to
subregional concerns. 95 One meeting took place in Ouagodougou in February 1991. The
other convened in Cairo in the following July. UNSO prepared an assessment of
desertification and drought in the Sudano-Sahelian region: 1985-1991, as well as a report
entitled "Alternative and Sustainable Systems of Production and Livelihood in Marginal
Lands." This study presented examples of alternative methods of income generation
worldwide (Desertification Control Bulletin, 1993). As discussed in Section 3.5, African
countries played a more active role in the UNCED process than they had in the UNCOD
preparations. African countries lobbied heavily for attention to desertification. They also
collectively prepared and proposed draft text for inclusion in the policy statement, and
were strong proponents of an international treaty on desertification.
The Advancing Desert Retreats
In response to a number of criticisms, UNEP revisited the PACD's definition of
desertification. A new definition, developed through expert panels in 1990 and 1991,
departed from the UNCOD vision of desertification in three major ways. UNEP's (1991)
95 The UNSO meetings produced "the Sudano-Sahelian Platform for Action on UNCED negotiations and
beyond," which contributed to the African Common Position for Africa (Desertification Control Bulletin,
1993).
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assessment did not mention deserts, thereby distancing the desertification concept from
advancing desert phenomena. It determined desertification and land degradation to be
synonymous, thereby broadening the perceived scope of desertification processes. The
report also provided new views regarding desertification's causes. Whereas the 1977
policy identified irrational land use methods as the primary reason for desertification,
UNEP moved away from the paternalistic implications of "irrationality," for example,
and began to portray desertification as arising from a number of factors, some
anthropogenic and some not.
UNEP developed new definitions of desertification in assessment processes
during 1990 and 1991. Based, in part, on Odingo's (1990a; 1990b) analysis and
recommendations, the Ad Hoc Consultation Meeting in 1990 defined desertification as
land degradation resulting from adverse human impact. Land degradation was said to
imply:
... reduction of resource potential by one or a combination of processes
acting on the land. These processes include water erosion, wind erosion
and sedimentation by those agents, long-term reduction in the amount or
diversity of natural vegetation, where relevant, and salinization and
sodication (Odingo, 1990a: 3).
This definition, unlike that presented in the Plan ofAction, did not link desertification to
advancing deserts or the spread of desert-like conditions. Neither did this definition refer
to ignorance or irrationality on the part of affected populations. The reference to "adverse
human impact" was considerably more neutral than references to irrational land use
practices in the 1977 agreement.
During the following year, as part of the 1991 assessment, UNEP further revised
the meaning of desertification for submission to the UNCED process. This study defined
desertification as:
land degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas resulting
mainly from adverse human impact (UNEP, 1991: 2).
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The word "mainly" suggested that other causal factors were at work. These factors
included climate fluctuations and soil resilience. In fact, participants involved in the
1991 assessment debated the merits of identifying both climate and human factors as
responsible for desertification. They decided to cite human causes only because these
were the mechanisms most amenable to policy intervention. They also decided that
reference to climate factors might distract attention from the implementation of concrete
anti-desertification measures (Interview with UNEP Advisor 3).
UNCED negotiators disagreed as to the definition of desertification. While some
agreed with UNEP's sole emphasis on human factors, others urged for inclusion of both
natural as well as human factors. Amidst growing interest in climate change and a new
climate change treaty, delegates finally opted to augment UNEP's definition by
identifying both climate and human factors as important in desertification processes
(PrepCom III, 1991). They defined desertification as "land degradation in arid, semi-arid
and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various factors including climatic variations and
human activities" (Agenda 21, Chapter 12: 12.2). Reference to "human activities"
marked a departure from the derogatory tone of "irrational" land use and "adverse human
impact" of earlier definitions. Reference to "climatic variations" put anthropogenic and
natural causes on par with each other, signaling a shift in thinking about who and what
was responsible for desertification. This attribution had several implications. In one
sense, it suggested that people were, in part, victims rather than agents of
desertification.96 It also implied that developed countries might contribute to
desertification through global warming. In commenting on plans for an international
desertification convention based on this definition, B. Mokgothu, Botswana's assistant
minister for local government, lands and housing noted:
96 With equal emphasis on anthropogenic and climatic causal factors in bringing about desertification,
Chapter 12 suggested that drought planning and relief constitute a core aspect of desertification policy.
Drought preparedness and relief schemes centered on strategies for food deficiencies, storage and transport,
contingency crop planning, weather forecasts, agricultural extension services, training in early warning
methods. As far as addressing drought and ameliorating its effects, Agenda 21 called for several
preventative measures. These included development and use of drought resistant, and fast growing plant
species, as long as they are appropriate for a given ecosystem. Agenda 21 also recommended seasonal
weather forecasting for contingency planning, research to reduce water loss, and increase water absorption
and water harvesting. Other measures included risk mapping, remote sensing and crop forecasting.
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... the main function of such a convention will be to establish the causal
relationship between global warming, drought, and floods, and between
drought poverty; techniques for rehabilitation of areas subject to
desertification; and, most important, financial and institutional
mechanisms for redressing the problem (Shepherd, 1992: 47, paraphrasing
Mokgothu).
Regardless of the climate-desertification interactions at stake, Mokgothu's comment
vividly illustrates the complexity of desertification as portrayed in Agenda 21. According
to this interpretation, desertification was not amenable to singular causal explanations or
proximate solutions.
Just as desertification's causes were identified as climatic as well as
anthropogenic (see Chapter 2), Chapter 12's objectives included combating both
desertification and drought.97 To facilitate attainment of these goals, Chapter 12 outlined
six program areas concerned with: research and monitoring; soil conservation and
increased vegetation; strengthening development programs; national action plans that
integrate development and environmental planning; drought preparedness and relief
schemes; and popular participation activities associated with anti-desertification and
drought management efforts. Several of these areas are discussed below.
Basic Research
In building on UNEP's new definition of desertification, Agenda 21 also adopted many of
UNEP's ideas regarding the need to monitor and assess desertification at global scales,
with greater attention to socio-economic factors. Whereas, the 1977 policy proclaimed
that solutions to the desertification problem were known, Agenda 21 contended that
UNEP studies in 1991, 1984, and 1977, "revealed insufficient basic knowledge of
desertification processes." In light of this conclusion, negotiators adopted a largely
UNEP-esque approach to producing desertficiation knowledge. In particular, they
emphasized the need for worldwide observation and monitoring systems for analysis of
drought and desertification. Assessment criteria, however, indicated a more holistic
97 The title of Agenda 21 implies that it is possible to combat drought directly by encouraging rainfall, or
otherwise altering precipitation patterns. The text of Chapter 12, however, focuses, not on manipulating the
weather, but on drought preparedness, relief and coping schemes.
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vision of desertification processes than that prominent in the 1970s. At the urging of
delegates, these critieria included ecological, economic, and social factors
(A/CONF.151/PC/WG.1/L.29). To facilitate monitoring, they further recommended the
use of a wide range of indicators to track items such as natural resources, housing,
employment, education and local participation. .These suggestions stood in stark contrast
to the Plan's schemes calling for improved climatological, meterological, and
hydrological stations for surveying desertification indicators such as the state of
vegetative cover, dust transport, migration of wildlife, and changes in irrigated lands
(UNCOD, 1978: 2).
Increased Vegetation
While the context of desertification policy implementation was beginning to broaden to
encompass new forms of knowledge and wider set of environmental processes, the
specifics of land management policy remained a narrow question of maintaining a natural
balance and ensuring sufficient vegetative cover. As explained above, policymakers were
beginning to view desertification processes in a more complex and holistic light in
identifying human as well as climatic factors as responsible factors. However, remedies
for degradation associated with these processes remained mechanistic and focused on
direct, physical interactions with the land. They similarly implied that indigenous land
use techniques were inherently deficient in sustaining livelihoods
... traditional livelihood systems based on agropastoral systems are often
inadequate and unsustainable, particularly in view of the effects of drought
and increasing demographic pressure. (Agenda 21, Chapter 12, paragraph
12.26).
As reflected in the global statistics cited in Agenda 21, Chapter 12 (see above), Chapter
12 negotiators associated desertification with specific types of land use such as pasturing,
rainfed cropping and irrigated cropping. Consequently, these negotiators prescribed land
use improvements through soil conservation, afforestation and reforestation, green belts,
increased vegetation cover and stabilization of the hydrological balance. These measures
were aimed at increasing the land's carrying capacity and helping to maintain biotic
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resources. This program area prescribed more sustainable land use policies and practices,
and improved management of water and soil resources. However, Agenda 21 did not
stipulate what might be deficient about existing systems. Similarly, the chapter said little
about how to improve these systems except to make them more "sustainable." So,
whereas, the 1977 policy set forth some specific guidance on how to make land use
systems more "rational," Agenda 21 did not specify where improvements should be made
or how they should be carried out.
Alternative Authorities
While Agenda 21 clearly recommended the use of modem science techniques and
practices for furthering its objectives, the agreement also promoted local-scale anti-
desertification activities and integration of modern and traditional ways of knowing.
But African countries, in particular, argued that anti-desertification efforts must
ultimately take place at local levels, and with the use of technologies acceptable to local
populations (A/CONF. 15 1/PC/WG. 1/L.29; Shephard, 1992). UNEP mentioned
traditional forms of knowledge in its 1991 assessment, but only briefly. Although the
concept of "traditional knowledge" was never clearly defined in the policy text,
recognition of a type of knowledge other than scientific knowledge was an important
development. Reference to the category of "knowledge" itself marked the beginning of
an important transformation in desertification politics. Though the full extent of these
changes did not take hold until later in the decade, the notion that different knowledges
existed and could fruitfully contribute to anti-desertification efforts was beginning to gain
greater support in the midst of the Rio Summit.98 As one of six Program Areas, Agenda
21 called for development of land use models based on local practices. It was thought
that such practices could enhance understanding of the various natural and human factors
contributing to desertification. Chapter 12 also recommended that indigenous knowledge
98 In a very few places the Plan of Action also noted a role for traditional knowledge. It recommended, that
"particular attention be given to the utilization of local experience, knowledge, and expertise..." (UNCOD,
1978: 16) and referred to utilization of untapped skills and experience at the local level (UNCOD, 1978:
27). Yet, the vast majority of the Plan focused on modem science and technology as the key desertification
tools. Furthermore, most references to non-scientific understandings of desertification recommended that
they be strengthened and improved.
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be integrated with modern science and technology. Other provisions called for research
on traditional approaches to land use management and environmental conservation and
protection; integrating indigenous knowledge on forests, rangelands and other natural
systems; and integrating knowledge in these areas with research efforts concerning
desertification and drought.
Decentralization
In regard to development efforts, the Plan differed from previous policies in calling for
decentralized initiatives coupled with local empowerment. Agenda 21 included
provisions to enhance development efforts directed toward poverty alleviation and
promotion of alternative livelihood systems. In response to these problems, Agenda 21
(unlike the 1977 Plan) prescribed natural resource management based on innovative
indigenous technologies. It also called for the building of capacity in village communities
to enable inhabitants of these communities to take charge of developing and managing
natural resources. Agenda 21 further recommended rural credit and savings through
banks in rural areas, development of market infrastructure in local areas, investmentment
in dryland development, and public participation in design as well as implementation of
policy efforts.
Plans for a New Treaty
While UNEP's evolving approach to desertification aligned closely with Chapter 12, this
chapter's most important provision set in motion a process that would ultimately sidestep
UNEP as the main international agency on desertification issues. At the fourth
Preparatory Committee for UNCED, intense debate divided North and South on the
question of whether to establish an intergovernmental negotiating committee for
developing a desertification treaty. In a bit of horse-trading, African countries agreed to
commit to a Framework Convention on Climate Change, in exchange for a desertification
treaty. The treaty was slated for completion by June 1994 and UN General Assembly
working groups commenced preparations in the following months.
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3.4.4 Recap
In the context of the Rio Summit, UNEP was no longer the institution overseeing
development of desertification policy. Hence, Chapter 12 of Agenda 21 reflected the
capacities and goals of UNCED delegates more than the resources and priorities of
UNEP. Provisions for basic research and increased vegetation seemed reminiscent of
UNCOD and of UTNEP's approach to desertification throughout the 1980s. Throughout
this period, the agency continued to view natural science as providing the tools necessary
to understand desertification and evaluate desertification policies. UNEP was beginning
to acknowledge the regional diversity of desertification and the importance of socio-
economic factors. However, Chapter 12's references to different forms of knowledge and
decentralization of anti-desertification activities were more reflective of the African
countries who lobbied hard for attention to desertification alongside climate change and
biodiversity. This policy statement, in ushering in a new treaty, signaled the emergence
of new institutions, new authorities and authorization processes, and a redrawing of
boundaries. Over the next year, an intergovernmental negotiating committee and its
Secretariat replaced UNEP in its leadership role. They recognized non-scientific forms of
authority and redirected attention to the local and social contingencies of desertification
processes.
3.5 The INCD: New Visions of Knowledge and Policy
Preparations to convene an Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Desertification
(INCD) commenced toward the end of 1992. UNEP was no longer the primary
institution overseeing desertification activities. 99 The United Nations General Assembly
developed a framework for INCD negotiations. To put this framework into operation,
UNGA established a new Desertification Secretariat, wholly independent from UNEP.'00
99 UNEP's presence at INCD meetings diminished gradually over the first several sessions. At INCD-1,
UNEP representatives were among the first speakers of the negotiation portion of the meeting (the second
week). Elizabeth Dowdeswell spoke via a video taped message, while Franklin Cardy, UNEP's new highest
ranking desertification administrator delivered a strong endorsement for incorporation of indigenous
knowledge in planning, greater attention to the human dimensions of desertification, standardization of
assessment practices, and strengthening of research institutes (ENB:04: 11).
'00 Changes were occurring within UNEP as well. Elizabeth Dowdeswell, of Canada, replaced Mostafa
Tolba as Executive Director. With Dowdeswell at the helm, the organization assumed the role of a
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Under the leadership of this small but growing Secretariat,' 0' the negotiations, and the
role of experts therein differed markedly from desertification policymaking of previous
decades. The INCD process reflected a new vision of science and politics manifest in a
decreasing role for modern science in designing desertification policy, an iterative model
of expert-policy maker interactions, and a more pluralistic approach to understanding and
addressing desertification.
3.5.1 Designing Expert Forums
Expert forums for the INCD were unlike those for previous desertification negotiations.
While the mandate for expert advice originated once again in the United Nations General
Assembly, the Desertification Secretariat played an important role in interpreting,
implementing and augmenting this mandate. Processes for more traditional forms of
expert advice (e.g., from scientists and UN agencies) were more inclusive than their
predecessors. In particular, advisory bodies encompassed a greater range of scientific
disciplines, and their activities reflected an iterative rather than linear model of science
and policymaking. There were two formalized forums expressly for expert knowledge
production and dissemination -- an Information Sharing Segment and an International
Panel of Experts (IPED).
In addition, the Secretariat and other organizations sponsored conferences outside
of INCD negotiating sessions. For the most part, these conferences were aimed at the
supporting, rather than leading institution on desertification issues. UNEP's presence at INCD meetings
diminished gradually over the first several negotiating sessions. At the first meeting of the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Desertification (INCD- 1), UNEP representatives were among
the first speakers of the negotiation portion of the meeting (the second week). Elizabeth Dowdeswell spoke
via a video taped message, while Franklin Cardy, UNEP's new highest ranking desertification
administrator, delivered a strong endorsement for incorporation of indigenous knowledge in planning
activities, greater attention to the human dimensions of desertification, standardization of assessment
practices, and strengthening of research institutes (ENB:04:03; ENB:04:08). As the sessions continued,
however, UNEP assumed a lower profile. Much of the agency's work took place behind the scenes. As
Dowdeswell noted in her speech to the INCD in 1994, UNEP actively supported the Desertification
Secretariat via financial resources for the preparation of case studies, support for the Organization of Africa
Unity and Asian and Latin American countries. UNEP also enabled NGO representatives to participate in
INCD and other meetings and continued in its Joint Venture with the United Nations Development
Programme (UNDP) to provide financial support to the United Nations Sudano-Sahelian Office (ECONET,
1994a). As Dowdeswell noted, "The $1.5 million per year we have provided is matched by UNDP and has
been used by UNSO to generate almost $300 million of funding for desertification control work in 22
countries of the Sudano-Sahelian region" (ECONET, 1994a).
0 Corell (1999) noted that at start of negotiations, the Secretariat had just two members, but grew to a size
of approximately thirty by the late 1990s.
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participation of non-governmental organizations, providing them an opportunity to share
information and coalesce around common policy positions. In her detailed and important
case study of the INCD negotiations, Elisabeth Corell (1999) argued that non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) constituted an alternative source of expertise for
INCD delegates. She concluded that NGOs were more influential in their knowledge
provider role than members of the International Panel of Experts (IPED). One might
object to labeling NGOs as experts, arguing instead that they are interest groups
communicating particular pieces of analysis or information that support their political
views (e.g., in the mode of Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith, 1993). Nevertheless, these
groups saw themselves as providing specialized information to the delegates.
Furthermore, the Secretariat provided NGOs with funding support and gave them
opportunities to share information and develop policy recommendations in conference-
like settings. In doing so, the Secretariat authorized the views of these groups, thereby
facilitating dissemination of these views in the INCD process.
UNGA Mandates
As with the UNCOD preparations, the UNGA and the Committee Secretariat played a
considerable role in establishing advisory processes and defining their rules and
mandates. Decisions regarding the INCD process, however, reflected a much different
view of science and policy. The UNCOD model of expert advice was a linear one in
which an elite and largely insulated group of natural scientists carried out assessments
and made policy recommendations. Policymakers could modify the proposals, but
ultimately mobilized action on the issues. In contrast, designers of the INCD model did
not look to science for a unified vision of desertification, but, rather, established an
iterative process between negotiators and experts. The Information Sharing Segment
enabled "sharing" of different types of knowledge in an open, democratic forum where
the audience could directly engage with speakers. In regard to the IPED, iteration took
place through the Secretariat and, for the most part, did not involve direct interaction
between IPED members and delegates. Nevertheless, experts were engaged throughout
negotiations as the Secretariat solicited their comments on treaty drafts.
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The design of these various expert mechanisms began to take shape during
UNCED follow-up activities in late 1992. UNEP, the agency that had designed and
conducted desertification policy assessments for nearly twenty years, played no direct role
in these deliberations. UNGA's Second Committee, which handled social and economic
issues, decided that negotiations regarding follow-up work for UNCED would take place
in an open-ended working group chaired by Malaysian Ambassador Razali Ismail (who
had chaired the UNCED institutions working group). Desertification and drought were
among the topics this group addressed (ENB:03:02). In doing so, they set forth a general
framework for INCD institutions and their general responsibilities. These deliberations
often split along North-South lines. Through compromise, however, country
representatives developed an outline for the INCD process including provisions for an
expert panel and Information Sharing Segment. The new Desertification Secretariat10 2
was then in charge of putting the INCD in action.
The African Group played an active role in designing the INCD process. In early
October, this coalition began preparing a draft resolution presented by Algeria,
Mauritania and Tunisia. By October 28 the African Group of economic experts, under
the chairmanship of Benin, agreed on a draft resolution. On October 30, the African
group agreed to the resolution on the ambassadorial level and forwarded it to the Group
of 77 as a "non-paper." The draft resolution called for an international convention "to
combat desertification in those countries experiencing serious drought and/or
desertification, particularly in Africa" by 1994. In line with the suggestion of Burkina
Faso during UNCED, the resolution proposed an organizational session to be held in New
York in February 1993, followed by five substantive sessions. The draft resolution also
invited relevant NGOs to contribute to the negotiating process and called on the
Secretary-General of UNGA to establish a multi-disciplinary expert group to assist the
INCD (ENB:03:02).
Designing institutional mechanisms for science advice and knowledge
dissemination was also an important part of Working Group deliberations. In general,
102 As Corell (1999) notes, the official title and status of the Secretariat changed several times throughout
the negotiation process. For present purposes, I will simply refer to this institution as the Desertification
Secretariat, while acknowledging that at various points in time it went by names such as ad hoc Secretariat,
interim Secretariat and later on, Permanent Secretariat.
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developing countries called for larger more extensive scientific advisory panels on the
assumption that such panels would lend stature and legitimacy to the desertification issue.
However, developed countries, as the major donor countries, resisted large-scale panels
and processes because of the resources they would require. The arguments of developed
countries diverged from provisions of Agenda 21, Chapter 12, noting insufficient basic
knowledge of desertification. These countries argued that fifty years of scientific
assessment on desertification had already generated a knowledge base that could
adequately support treaty negotiations (ENB:03:02). So, unlike previous decades, when
UNGA and UNEP embraced large-scale advisory enterprises with relative ease, the 1990s
saw North-South debates surface over these issues.
The Information Sharing Segment
North-South compromises gave rise to expert advisory innovations. On December 22,
1992, the UNGA passed Resolution 47/188. This decision called for an Information
Sharing Segment (ISS) at the start of negotiations. The US was a strong proponent of the
ISS idea. It argued that such a forum would enable negotiators to develop a common
understanding of desertification (Interview CCD Secretariat Consultant 1). Of course
another benefit was the relative low cost of such an endeavor. This innovation, however,
also reflected new perspectives on science advice and its relationship to policy
negotiations. While the UNCOD process relied on a formalized set of scientific panels
and assessments to generate and relay knowledge to negotiators, the INCD process
encouraged the "sharing" of information. In the seminar-like setting a wide array of both
scientists and practitioners presented papers, while delegates and other observers listened
to the presentations and had opportunities to engage in dialogue with speakers.
The Information Sharing Segment occupied the first four days of the first INCD
negotiating meeting.'03 During this process, individual scientists and representatives
from international and intergovernmental organizations presented papers on various
aspects of the desertification issue. The Information Sharing Segment signaled a
103 As discussed in Chapter 2, there was one organizational session of the INCD and a total of five
negotiating sessions prior to completion of the Convention to Combat Desertification. INCD-5 was
followed by six interim session and two meetings of the Conference of Parties.
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changing perspective on science advice. It embodied a broader view of desertification,
encompassing not just land use causes and physical manifestations of degradation, but
also problems of drought, socio-economic factors, and challenges of bi-lateral assistance.
This contrasted with the UNCOD approach to expertise. In 1977, UNEP sought to
provide "coherence" to the subject of desertification, by integrating knowledge across
many fragmented disciplines and perspectives. The agency, for example, identified four
subjects for expert inquiry (climate and desertification, technology and desertification;
ecological aspects of the problem; and population and social facets).
The ISS, however, reflected a more democratic approach to assessment design and
knowledge dissemination. In January 1993, the INCD itself determined the agenda for
the Information Sharing Segment. This decision took place at the INCD's first meeting
(an organizational session) after the INCD Chair, Bo Kjellen, proposed an agenda for the
ISS.104 Delegates agreed to allow four days of presentations according to the following
outline of topics: "(1) desertification, drought and the global environment, (2) causes,
general extent and consequences of land degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid
areas, (3) social and economic dimensions, (4) patterns of bilateral and multilateral
assistance programmes, (5) experience with international, regional, sub-regional and
national programmes to combat desertification and mitigate drought in developing
countries, (6) experiences of developed countries, and (7) some possible elements of a
new strategy to promote sustainable development in countries experiencing drought and
desertification" (IPED, 1993). This agenda portrayed a somewhat broader vision of
desertification than that reflected in earlier policies. Causes, extent and consequences
which were central themes in the UNCOD process, were just one of many considerations
comprising the ISS agenda. Explicit mention of social and economic dimensions at the
outset of the negotiation process marked additional departures from the UNCOD
approach.
104 The organizational session took place in New York from January 26-29, 1993. In addition to outlining
the Information Sharing Segment, the INCD elected officers, adopted rules of procedure, approved a
preliminary calendar of meetings, and formed two working groups (IPED, 1993).
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IPED
Resolution 47/188 also established a second forum for production and dissemination of
expert knowledge. In particular, UNGA called for:
... a multi-disciplinary panel of experts to assist the ad hoc secretariat and,
under its authority, to provide the necessary expertise in the scientific,
technical, legal and other related fields, making full use of the resources
and expertise within and available to Governments and/or organizations of
the United Nations system dealing with drought and desertification
(UNGA, 1992).
The decision to have a multidisciplinary expert body represented a compromise between
developing countries that wanted an extensive IPCC advisory group and developed
countries that believed this would be too expensive (Interview CCD Secretariat
Consultant 1). Many developing countries argued that without an IPCC-like
organization, the desertification convention would have a much lesser stature than climate
change. They viewed an extensive advisory body as imbuing the issue with greater clout
and believed that without such a panel, members of the international community and the
public at large would perceive a desertification treaty as having less legitimacy than the
other Rio conventions. With their substantial hold over the necessary purse strings,
however, developed countries successfully resisted pressure for a large advisory process
and North and South compromised on the small multidisciplinary panel (ENB:03:03).
Provisions for the INCD panel differed markedly from UNGA's resolution of
1974 calling for the assessment of all available data and information on desertification
and its consequences. In 1992, UNGA did not make a general request for the generation
or assessment of desertification knowledge. UNGA defined a much more narrow set of
responsibilities for the panel. Their main goal was to act as consultants to the Secretariat.
Rather than generally furthering or synthesizing knowledge about desertification, the
panel was to respond to the specific questions and support needs of the Secretariat. The
1992 resolution also departed from the 1974 decisions by specifying that the panel be
multidisciplinary. This detail seemed to reflect the suggestion from individual scientists
(e.g., Spooner and Mann, 1982; Warren and Agnew, 1988) and more recently from UNEP
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itself, that efforts to address desertification required attention to a wide range of factors
including ecological, social and economic considerations.
In implementing UNGA's mandate, the Desertification Secretariat established a
17-member International Panel of Experts (IPED). The aim of this Panel was to "review
the program of work and contribute to elements of the convention under negotiation"
(Berstein et al., 1993a). The Panel carried out these tasks through the Secretariat.
Essentially, the IPED members served as consultants to the Secretariat. Their role was
loosely defined. However, the majority of the panel's work involved revising of treaty
texts, providing input on case study design, and preparing individual and co-authored
scientific reports on various topics regarding desertification (e.g., IPED and WMO, 1996;
IPED, 1995).105
IPED met in February 1993 and convened six more times, approximately six
weeks prior to each of the first six INCD sessions (Interview with CCD Secretariat
Consultant 1). On average, 13 of the 17 members attended each IPED meeting (Corell,
1999). Along with Panel members themselves, Secretariat staff members and
representatives from a number of UN agencies and intergovernmental organizations also
attended IPED meetings. Each IPED meeting followed a standard agenda. The
Executive Secretary would deliver opening remarks. The group would then approve a
report of the previous meeting, listen to updates of the 1NCD negotiations, case studies,
NGO activities, and various workshops and meetings. At its early meetings the group
provided input on case studies. On occasion they would review individual papers by
IPED members and provide feedback to the authors. (Interview with CCD Consultant 1).
The IPED's overall role was much less defined than that of the UNCOD experts.
The UNCOD Secretariat had a broad mandate to assemble and collect all available
knowledge about desertification. UNEP translated this mandate into specific, well-
defined tasks for its experts. The IPED's tasks were much less clear. In fact, at one of
105 Robert Balling, Jr., a climatologist on the IPED co-authored a book, Interactions of Desertification and
Climate with Martin A. Williams (an environmental studies professor at the University of Adelaide in
Australia (Williams and Balling, 1996). IPED, however, did not commission this study. The World
Meteorological Organization and UNEP commissioned the work after negotiators at UNCED in 1992
defined desertification as resulting from "various factors including climatic variations and human activities"
(Williams and Balling, 1996: foreward).
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the first IPED meetings Robert Ryan asked the panelists to submit a proposal outlining
what they intended to contribute as IPED members. He asked the panelists to prepare an
outline of the sorts of work they would be doing (IPED Report 1, 1993). Yet later in the
process, some of the panelists were still unsure of their role and they asked Robert Ryan
how he intended to use them (Interview with IPED Member 1). So whereas, the UNCOD
experts operated under a hierarchical structure and a "top-down" process of assessment,
the INCD experts group operated in a much less defined framework.
Most IPED members had little or no contact with negotiators. Two exceptions
were Robert Balling and Anothony M. A. Imevbore who presented papers at the
Information Sharing Segment. Other exceptions were two IPED members who also
served on their country delegations. The Secretariat justified their dual roles as expert
and negotiator by explaining that it was difficult to find experts to represent their
geographical regions (Interview with CCD Secretariat Consultant 1). Some IPED
members, however, found that fellow panelists who were also delegates, tended to
emphasize the interests of their home governments during discussions (Interview with
IPED member 1).
Non-State Forums
The Secretariat also played an important role in facilitating NGO participation in the
INCD process. The Secretariat, for example, organized workshops and meetings for
NGOs between INCD sessions to assist in NGO coordination activities. With the
agreement of delegates, the Secretariat provided financial and other forms of support to
developing country NGOs. This support enabled NGOs to hold meetings prior to
negotiating sessions and to attend INCD sessions (Corell, 1999).
New approaches to NGO participation in the INCD context led to innovations in
knowledge sharing and knowledge exchange. In addition to the ISS, the Desertification
Secretariat sponsored conference-like activities expressly for NGOs. The Secretariat, for
example, held a five-day conference in Bamako, Mali in August 1993. The conference
format involved a plenary session for presentation of papers followed by working group
sessions in which participants developed their own proposals for what they believed
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should be included in the treaty. Approximately one hundred people came from Africa,
Asia, Australia, Europe, Latin America and North America to participate in the
conference. They represented NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, regional
organizations and the INCD Secretariat. The Chair of the INCD, Ambassador Bo Kjellen
of Sweden, also delivered an address to conference attendees. His presence and show of
support for the endeavor underscored the legitimacy and authority ascribed to non-state
actors in the new regime. The final report of the conference was made available to INCD
participants. This report addressed a number of subjects pertinent to the Convention.
They included proposals on national and regional action programs; research, technology
and energy; and the role of women in anti-desertification efforts (ECONET, 1993b).
Unlike the IPED reports which reached delegates late in the INCD process (see below),
the timing of the Bamako meeting enabled its participants to present their positions to
delegates just as negotiations were getting underway.
UNEP also sponsored a similar four-day conference in December of 1993. As
evidence of UNEP's changing approach to desertification, this workshop was titled
"Listening to the People: Social Aspects of Dryland Management." This initiative
reflected UNEP's significantly altered views of desertification as, in essence, a complex
social problem.
Desertification control is a complex multi-sectoral issue. We have to
confront this complexity if our programmes are to succeed in maintaining
a sustainable environment at local levels. As the Honourable Minister of
Agriculture for Uganda said in her introduction to the Uganda Case Study
prepared for your Committee, "Desertification is a social problem". This
is an aspect which has been inadequately recognized (ECONET, 1994a).
The UNEP of the 1990s also shared the Desertification Secretariat's enthusiasm for NGO
involvement in policymaking and implementation activities. In referring to the
Secretariat's support of NGOs, Dowdeswell further noted, "Your openness to their
participation has already shown benefits in the substance of their contributions"
(Dowdeswell, 1994).106
106 The INCD, along with the Spanish government and UNEP also sponsored the Almira Symposium on
Desertification and Migration. Among other things, participants at this conference stressed the right of
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The "Listening to the People" workshop involved nearly one hundred social
scientists, government officials, non-governmental representatives and UN staff
members. The conference organizers aimed to develop ways to implement Agenda 21
provisions regarding social aspects of dryland management and provide guidance to
relevant institutions, including UNEP and the INCD. This conference, like the Bamako
workshop, involved a mix of plenary and workshop sessions. Discussions focused on
traditional and western approaches to land management, gender issues in dryland
management, government policies and environmental refugees. Near the close of the
meeting, participants debated and reached consensus on several anti-desertification
strategies. Consensus statements focused on the need for changes in power relationships
among actors at international; national and local levels; more effective communication
channels for people at local levels; government support for bottom-up programs; land
reform based on existing systems of ownership; and respect and utilization of indigenous
knowledge (ECONET, 1993c).
3.5.2 New Authorities
During the 1970s and 1980s UNEP looked to science as a primary voice of authority on
desertification issues. The emergent desertification regime of the 1990s, however, had a
different attitude toward science and how science advice could contribute to
policymaking. However, among scientists, familiar disciplinary differences appeared to
resurface.
Once UNGA put the ISS and IPED frameworks in place, it was up to the INCD
Secretariat to put them into practice. This time, no one in the Secretariat shared Tolba's
professed reverence for science. Robert Ryan, a US Ambassador to the UN chaired the
IPED. He earned a Master's degree in economics from MIT, but had no training in the
natural sciences. He worked as a diplomat for many years and led the US delegation to
UNCED in 1992. In contrast to dominant views during the 1970s, Ryan believed in the
notion of "demand driven science." With this philosophy, Ryan did not believe in force-
people who wish to remain at home to do so. They called for the maintenance of sustainable and enabling
environments in which people can persevere despite hardships and difficult conditions (e.g., see
Dowdeswell, 1994).
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feeding scientific knowledge to delegates, but saw the IPED as engaging in an interactive
process by consulting with the Secretariat in areas where they needed the specialized
skills of the scientists. Under Ryan's direction experts interacted with delegates
indirectly through the Secretariat, primarily by reviewing and commenting on treaty texts.
The IPED also authored thematic reports on issues such as pastoralism, water issues, and
biodiversity. However, most of these were completed too late in the process to be of use
to delegates as they negotiated the Convention. Ryan assumed his chairmanship of IPED
with considerable enthusiasm. Throughout most of the eighteen months leading up to the
treaty's completion, Ryan believed that the IPED would actually remain the key source of
science advice during treaty implementation, or at least during the interim session
(Interview with CCD Consultant 1).
Some members of the Secretariat, however, were less enthusiastic about the IPED
and its role in desertification's future. Unlike Tolba, who integrated his own scientific
interests and pride into the heart of UNEP's desertification activities, the Secretariat's
Executive Director, Hama Arba Diallo, brought a different emphasis to the
administration. Diallo, for example, was originally from a pastoralist community in
Burkina Faso and brought a respect for traditional practices of indigenous peoples to the
new regime. In expressing support for the preservation and use of traditional land use
methods, as well as his own connection to these methods, Diallo noted: "If they know that
I am saying here that they also have to change their traditional production methods, I
don't have a home any more!" (ECO, 1993e). Along with this new perspective, some
Secretariat members were simply indifferent about science advice and its potential for
making substantial contributions to negotiations. The Secretariat dissolved the Panel in
December 1994 reportedly because of pressure from delegates who did not want the panel
to continue during the interim session when negotiations might be in a limbo state and
when they preferred to have scarce resources directed toward anti-desertification
activities in Africa (Corell, 1999).
Some INCD delegates, IPED members, and Secretariat staff suggested that the
Secretariat intentionally marginalized the IPED's role in negotiations. They believed that
the Secretariat used the panel as a symbol of legitimacy, but minimized the panel's
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activities so that scientific debates would not interfere with the negotiations (Corell,
1999). Some delegates and observers viewed the IPED's low profile and general lack of
scientific assessment activities as a shortcoming of the negotiations. Mohammad Kassas,
an extremely active UNEP advisor throughout the 1970s and much of the 1980s
lamented:
It was evident that the committee did not have the support of a large body
of scientists, as had the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. That
panel provided the negotiators for the Framework Convention on Climate
Change.. .with massive and progressively updated information on issues
relevant to climate change. This lack of scientific and technical support
left the negotiators, predominantly diplomats, seriously handicapped
(Kassas, 1995: 177).
The Earth Negotiations Bulletin reported similar sentiments from delegates who
expressed disappointment that "the immense body of technical and scientific expertise on
desertification did not fully infuse the Convention as much as had been hoped. These
delegates were disappointed that the treaty text did not include more details regarding the
causes and consequences of desertification" (ENB: 04:55).
Interviews with Secretariat staff in early 1997 revealed an ambivalent view toward
scientific expertise and its relevance to the treaty regime. While few of these staff
members had been actively involved in the treaty negotiations of 1993-4, their views
seemed to echo the attitudes of some of their predecessors. None of the staff members
questioned viewed desertification science as a central focus of the Secretariat or a key
aspect of treaty implementation. They stressed, for example, the need to build linkages
between regimes for climate change, biological diversity and desertification (Interview
with CCD Secretariat Staff Member 1), and the role of NGOS in linking local and
national and local activities (Interview with CCD Secretariat Staff Member 2).
Information Sharers
In preparing for the Information Sharing Segment, the Secretariat invited (and thereby
authorized) many individual experts, UN agencies and governments to prepare
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background papers and presentations for this session. As discussed below, only two of
the speakers were also IPED members (Interview with CCD Secretariat Consultant 1).
ISS presentations contained many disparate visions of desertification from diverse
disciplinary perspectives. Speakers diverged on any number of points including the
definition of desertification, and its causes and consequences. As an example, this
section describes views of some speakers regarding causes of desertification. Papers by
the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), International Fund for Agricultural
Development (IFAD), and individual scientists indicated a departure from UNCOD's
focus on human land use. They also portrayed a new vision of desertification as a
problem that is locally contingent and open to many different interpretations (Long,
1996).
Representatives from FAO listed several human activities contributing to dryland
degradation. They noted, "loss of topsoil through water erosion is the most common type
of human-induced soil degradation" (Sombroed and Sene, 1993: 4). Their list also
included cultivation of fragile soils, overgrazing, uncontrolled fire use, and unsuitable
agricultural machinery. According to FAO, "all of these activities derive from two root
causes: from poverty and underdevelopment, or from 'modern' development which
disregards the impact of the technologies" (Sombroed and Sene, 1993: 3). They also
highlighted typical factors associated with poverty and underdevelopment: malnutrition,
lack of credit access, limited access to education, migration, and lack of technical advice
(Sombroed and Sene, 1993).
A resource economist from IFAD spoke about economic, social and cultural
causes and consequences of drought and desertification. According to IFAD,
The causes of desertification are rooted in socio-economic factors. . .the
relative importance of socio-economic causes of drought is debatable.
Significantly, both the causes and consequences of drought and
desertification are mediated by the socio-economic context in which they
occur (Ahmed, 1993: 1).
IFAD stated that desertification results from "cumulative outcome of unsustainable land
use practices" (Ahmed, 1993: 2). These practices include several broad categories:
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expansion of rainfed cultivation onto unsuitable lands, shallow mining, overgrazing,
groundwater mining, and uncontrolled biomass harvesting. IFAD characterized these
activities as a "rational response to incentives and constraints" (Ahmed, 1993: 3).
Constraints and incentives prompt a divergence between private and social accounting.
These can be outlined as international and national policy processes, institutional issues
(tenurial ambiguities, technology systems, social services), marginalization of important
groups (gender and ethnic biases), population growth, migration, drought and natural
disasters, civil strife, and political conflicts (Ahmed, 1993).
Professor Imevbore from the University of Nigeria discussed relationships
between desertification and biodiversity. Imevbore related dryland degradation processes
to four principal factors: ecosystem fragility, population pressures leading to land
exploitation, economic considerations that hinder appropriate long-term land use on a
long-term basis, and political unrest. Professor Imevbore presented estimates of
desertification according to percentage of land affected. His list of causes include land
clearing, salinization, overstocking, urbanization, overgrazing, and fuelwood collection.
The information session papers revealed a multitude of causal relationships
related to desertification. In similar fashion, other ISS speakers presented diverse views
of the issue, emphasizing different key issues and desertification processes. Whereas the
UNCOD Secretariat may have likely viewed the Info Session and its multiple messages as
a failure, the INCD Secretariat pronounced it a success and made the ISS papers
accessible to the general public. In the words of one Secretariat member, "the impact of
the Information Sharing Segment was immense" (Interview with CCD Secretariat
Consultant 1). One IPED member noted the ISS' role in highlighting socio-economic
factors and in communicating the importance of public participation in desertification
projects (Interview with IPED Member 1). Following the ISS, delegates generally agreed
that the session had effectively communicated the nature and extent of the desertification
problem. Their discussions following the ISS focused on local participation; economic
incentives, an integral role for women in anti-desertification initiatives, technology
exchange, and information collection and exchange (ENB:04: 11).
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Creating the Panel
The Desertification Secretariat had wide latitude (within its budget constraints, that is) in
assembling and managing the multidisciplinary panel as they saw fit. While the
Secretariat originally planned to select a group of just twelve experts, the number
expanded as the Secretariat sought to include a gender balanced group with a broad range
of geographic and disciplinary backgrounds (ENB:04:02). The Panel was intended to
include only independent experts working in their own capacities. Early in the
negotiation process some countries voiced interest in making nominations to the panel.
The Executive Director of the Secretariat, Ambassador Diallo, explained, however, that
members were not serving on the Panel as government representatives. They were
appointed "privately," with input from UN agencies (ENB:04:0 1).
The Secretariat selected IPED members during the first week of February 1993.
During the speedy selection process they consulted with organizations such as FAO, the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), UNEP and the World Meteorological
Organization (WMO) (Interview with CCD Secretariat Consultant 1). Robert Ryan,
special advisor to the INCD Secretariat and IPED Chairman, outlined five criteria he and
the Secretariat employed in selecting IPED members (Interview with CCD Secretariat
Consultant 1). They were:
Language. IPED candidates were reasonably fluent in English or French because there
were no funds for hiring translators for other languages. However, while some Panel
members claimed fluency in either French or English, their proficiency during the
meetings was not adequate to enable them to fully participate. Hence, not all Panel
members engaged fully in IPED discussions.
Disciplinary representation. The Secretariat tried to strike a balance between physical
and social scientists. Ryan explained that this disciplinary diversity was particularly
important for addressing the broad and complex area of sustainable development.
Geographical distribution. This diversity would enable representation from Africa, as
well as from Asia, Latin America, Europe and the United States. Such diversity was seen
as important in providing a balance of views within the Panel and assuring its legitimacy
in the eyes of delegates.
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Gender balance. The Secretariat ran into difficulties in obtaining nominations for
women who worked outside UN agencies. Robert Ryan explained that these difficulties
resulted in the inclusion of just three women Panel members.
Access to resources and influence in scientific circles. The Secretariat sought to recruit
IPED members who could convene groups of colleagues outside of IPED to carry out
extra-curricular studies.
Because the IPED was meant to function as an independent, non-governmental body, the
Secretariat also searched outside of governments for most of its experts.
Based on its selection process, IPED assembled a panel consisting of a total of 17
members. Five members were African, four were Asian, six were European, one was
Latin American, and one was North American. Nine of these 17 panelists were from
developing countries. As reported by the Secretariat, the Panel included experts in fields
of agro-forestry, alternative energy systems, biology, climatology, dryland ecology,
geographical information systems, historical geography, land economics, soil science, and
water conservation and resource management (Corell, 1999).
The IPED's composition marked a significant shift from the expert processes for
UNCOD. In 1975, UNEP, chose expert advisors largely on the basis of established,
collegial connections. Tolba and Kassas, for example, were long time friends. Kassas
and Dregne had worked together on UNESCO's Arid Zone Program. Dregne
recommended Gardufio to author the report on desertification and technology. Hence,
UNEP built its assessment processes around people who were already part of a network.
As far as disciplinary affiliation, the core experts were natural scientists and (as discussed
above) preferred to work with other natural scientists throughout the process. However,
consideration of gender, geography and language played little role in the expert selection
process. UNEP was not under pressure from governments to assemble a diverse,
representative expert group. There seemed to be a sentiment both inside and outside of
UNEP, that knowledge necessary for combating desertification would necessarily come
from developed countries. "Rationality" was an important theme in the Plan ofAction
and throughout UNCOD preparations. Because science was assumed to be a rational,
objective pursuit, perhaps UNCOD participants did not view scientific knowledge as
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culturally or politically contingent, and therefore did not see a need for diversity in expert
institutions.
In contrast, the INCD Secretariat did not view expert knowledge as universal.
They viewed knowledge as contingent on the various criteria employed in creating the
IPED. In order to address the many facets of desertification comprehensively and in
order to have legitimacy in the eyes of negotiators, the panel would have to reflect (to a
certain extent) their varied perspectives and priorities. Evaluations of the 1977 Plan of
Action suggested that certain views and sources of knowledge were underrepresented in
implementation activities and their low profile was believed to have contributed to the
disappointing results of policy implementation. More importantly, perhaps, policymakers
no longer viewed science and technology as a panacea for challenges facing developing
countries. Projects inside and outside of the desertification realm proved this approach to
be overly simplistic and not sufficiently accommodating of the various perspectives,
forms of knowledge, and cultural contexts where technocratic policy interventions were
attempted. In this new climate, the Secretariat had little choice but to make its panel as
diverse as possible.
IPED Activities
The IPED worked closely with the ad hoc Secretariat in reviewing negotiating texts, and
preparing papers on desertification-related issues. The IPED also provided the Secretariat
with advice regarding several case studies. These studies were intended to inform the
creation of National Action Plans, but were completed too late in the process to receive
much attention (Interview with CCD Secretariat Staff Member 2; Interview with CCD
Secretariat Consultant 1; Corell, 1999). For some tasks, the IPED broke into working
groups organized around topics and disciplines: interactions of desertification and
climate; biodiversity and desertification; economic causes and social consequences;
alternative energy systems; and water resources. In these groups IPED members carried
out individual studies and worked on various aspects of treaty development (Interview
with CCD Secretariat Consultant 1).
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Occasionally, when the IPED did not have the time or expertise to address a
specific issue, panel members worked with groups of outside scientists (Interview with
CCD Secretariat Consultant 1). IPED members Stein Bie and Anthony Imevbore
compiled a set of regional studies of desertification and its relationship to biodiversity.
The authors engaged colleagues from a number of institutions around the world to
contribute to the volume. The study reinforced a pluralistic approach to desertification as
reflected in the INCD process on the whole. For example, the editors and authors focused
on the peculiarities of desertification in various parts of the world, including China,
southern Europe, Sahelian and northern Africa, and Latin America. However, the study
was not published until 1995 and, consequently, was not available to negotiators while
they crafted the Convention's text. In 1996, the Secretariat published a study prepared by
the IPED and the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) on problems and
challenges of water resource management and desertification (IPED and WMO, 1996).
This analysis differed from many of UNEP's desertification assessments in its focus on
socio-economic facets of desertification and water issues.
Whatever the nature of intervention, size of installation and techniques
used, the main obstacles to the adoption of sensible and sustainable water-
resource development and management methods are socio-economic in
essence (IPED, 1996: 3).
Unlike the Gardufno study of 1977, the report by IPED and WMO stressed the importance
of adapting techniques and technologies to the specific societal contexts. The analysis
also presented a general survey of water management issues across nine regions
worldwide, thereby emphasizing the variability of water resource concerns. According to
a Secretariat member, these papers "were not terribly critical to the negotiations. The
negotiations didn't turn much on the papers and they had a greater impact outside of
delegates... in terms of raising awareness" (Interview with CCD Secretariat Consultant
1).
In retrospect, Robert Ryan commented that the IPED's most important role was
drafting pre-treaty texts and later drafting, commenting on, and reviewing negotiating
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texts. According to Ryan, the IPED was a sounding board on the treaty text" (Interview
with CCD Secretariat Consultant 1). The Panel assisted the Secretariat in compiling
government submissions. They also provided input on definitions used in the treaty and
prepared papers on various topics. Often, however, the group would help to word the
text. At its first meeting, for example, the Secretariat requested the IPED's input on
elements of the Convention - what they should contain, their format and specificity. In
particular, Robert Ryan requested input on the Convention's objectives and obligations,
suggesting that the IPED probably had little to contribute to the preamble. The IPED
spent a lot of time trying to articulate the objective of the Convention. According to
Ryan, fifty to sixty percent of the treaty's objective was developed by the IPED (Interview
with CCD Secretariat Consultant 1).
IPED members differed, however, in their views of the Panel and its role in
negotiations. One member of the IPED remarked that his IPED experience was the
highlight of his career. S/he felt that s/he made several concrete contributions to the
INCD process by producing text that was incorporated into the final Convention
(Interview with IPED Member 3). Other members had a dimmer outlook on their IPED
experience. One went so far as to describe it as "painful" because s/he did not have a
clear vision of the policymaking process and how they fit into it. To this expert, the
INCD process was a "black box." According to this expert:
We would meet and review a new version of the convention 6 weeks
before the next INCD. We'd find some things erased and other things
introduced... I felt used... Decisions were made outside of what we would
say in IPED meetings. IPED members were not given a clear view of the
process (Interview with IPED Member 2).
Another IPED member expressed dismay that the timing of IPED meetings prevented the
group from making more of an impact on negotiating texts that were sometimes already
on their way to delegates. This expert remarked that in UN processes, "this may just be
how things are done.. .I came into the process cold. If I came into the process again I
would know and understand the limits of the process" (Interview with IPED Member 1).
Another expert drafted a page of the Convention, only to find that it was "eaten up"
somewhere in the process.
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Symbolically, the IPED highlights several important features of the INCD and its
departure from early approaches to science and policy. In particular, the IPED's small
size and small role indicate that, during the INCD negotiations, the UN system, diplomats
and other relevant organizations, did not perceive desertification as a "scientific" issue
per se.10 7 It ceased to be a problem stemming from interference with nature's balance and
became a problem of social organization and the employment of local expertise. As
discussed below, non-governmental organizations played a much more active role in
disseminating information to delegates, raising general awareness of the desertification
problem, and pioneering new ways to address it.
Non-governmental Organizations
NGOs played an active role in INCD negotiations. NGOs, at the INCD negotiations
represented a number of regions worldwide. Of the 30 NGOs most active in the INCD
negotiations, over 36% of them were based in Africa. These groups worked as a well-
coordinated and cohesive unit, making unified interventions on the negotiating floor,
holding workshops, training new NGOs and lobbying delegates. These efforts led some
delegates and Secretariat members to conclude that NGOs contributed significantly to
shaping the Convention text (Corell, 1999).1"8
The NGO newsletter ECO served as an important vehicle for communicating
NGO views on a variety of themes. Generally NGOs generated daily issues of ECO
throughout each two-week negotiating session. The format of each issue varied, but
typical publications included editorial commentary on ongoing debates within the INCD,
analysis of the evolving policy texts and their implications for NGO interests, news
107 However, the CCD's Committee on Science and Technology and its Roster of Independent Experts,
suggest that a new version of desertification "science" is re-emerging as part of the fledgling regime.
Debates about these expert bodies are highly reflective of North/South debates over knowledge and control
of expert resources.
108 According to Corell (1999), NGOs owe their success to a number of factors. These included:
widespread support for a bottom-up approach which called for greater NGO participation; homogeneity and
cohesiveness among the NGO groups participating; absence of NGOs from the North; the absence of
business NGOs; and a negotiating environment that welcomed NGO participation (supported, inpart by the
Secretariat and the foundation laid at UNCED).
181
regarding desertification issues or relevant publications,' 09 and statements reflecting NGO
positions on a variety of issues relevant to the treaty. ECO writers expressed a number of
views that ultimately appeared in the final Convention document. Many of these views,
whether emanating from delegates, NGOs or elsewhere, distinguished the Convention
from earlier policy agreements on desertification. As illustrated below, NGO positions,
as reflected in ECO statements, called for greater appreciation for desertification's
variability and complexity; a decentralized approach to desertification policy; a human
centered vision of the problem; land tenure reform that respected local perspectives on
land ownership; and a greater role for NGOs in institutions governing the treaty's
implementation. NGOs saw themselves as not simply a voice for certain desertification
solutions. They viewed themselves as integral to and embodying many of these solutions.
In portraying desertification as a process involving interactions of social, political,
economic, cultural and ecological factors, NGOs emphasized the issue's complexity.
They similarly called attention to desertification's variability across regions and even
across different communities existing in proximity to one another. Hence, in the view of
NGOs, different forms of desertification were not simply a product of differing ecological
conditions such as those measured by aridity indices. Instead, variability in
desertification process could also arise from differences in social systems. Consequently,
NGOs called for programs tailored to the special ecological and social conditions existing
throughout affected areas.
Since countries are made up of communities with diverse cultures,
different climatic factors, and soil types, it would not be enough to just
have national action programmes but local action programmes as well. To
get to specific problems faced by the people, governments should consider
local action programmes which will give special attention to problems
faced by different communities. For example, in the event of
desertification, the problems faced by pastoralists are very different from
those faced by agrarian communities. Hence, different interventions,
taking into account the social, cultural, political and economic aspects, are
109 When noted researchers Mary Tiffen, Mike Mortimore and F. Gichuki authored a book (Tiffen et al.,
1994) challenging conventional wisdom regarding population and dryland erosion, ECO publicized their
findings (ECO, 1994c).
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required when combating desertification in these communities (ECONET,
1993d).
In response to this complexity, NGOs advocated a systemic approach to the issue focused
on increased education and training, access to land, rural banking systems and transfer of
appropriate technology. They also stressed the role of women in these various aspects of
anti-desertification initiatives (e.g., ECONET, 1993d).
NGOs also urged that policy implementation efforts take account of the local
practices and perspectives.
At the local level, the convention should put into place mechanisms to
ensure that peoples' culture, indigenous knowledge, economic activities,
coping mechanisms and their participation are taken into consideration
when designing projects to combat desertification. This can be done by
involving the local people in policy and decision making processes,
identification, implementation and evaluation of projects aimed at
combating desertification (ECONET, 1993d).
ECO contributors voiced support for the transfer of technology appropriate for local
situations, taking into account social and cultural factors as well as economic
considerations. They warned against reliance on bi-lateral aid as a mechanism for
technology transfer, noting that this form of aid "tends to result in the introduction of
supply-driven technology which does not take into account the complexities of
agricultural systems and the conditions of smallholders in drylands." Furthermore, NGOs
argued that, in failing to support use of indigenous technologies, the Convention would
increase the South's dependence on the North (ECO, 1994b)
A dencentralized approach to desertification policy was similarly high on the
NGO agenda. They viewed popular participation as an important means for ensuring
such an approach. As noted by ECO, "NGOs call for a shift from the institutional centred
development to a human centred one, where the overall well-being of people and their
full participation is the basis for all decision making" (ECO, 1993a). Greater attention to
people on the part of NGOs and other INCD participants marked a shift in emphasis away
from top-down changes to the mechanics of land use such as overgrazing and
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salinization, and toward a systemic, societal view of desertification. NGOs viewed
themselves as a means for achieving a more decentralized, human-centered approach to
desertification. They lobbied for a role, under the Convention, in helping to educate
people about their rights and about the ways in which they could address desertification
and raise awareness by disseminating information about desertification to local
communities, and by helping to "decentralize information centers and decision making
processes" (ECO, 1993a)
NGOs lobbied hard for land tenure reform, but urged for recognition of diverse
land tenure systems (ECO, 1993c).
NGOs want the convention to acknowledge the fact that many traditional
societies have a system of land tenure quite different from the Western
notion of title deeds. Without such a realization, traditional land holding
systems are very vulnerable to predation. For example, land used by
nomadic pastoralists is usually used on a periodic or episodic basis. This
land is not under-utilized as most people not familiar with such a system
may.think (ECO, 1993a)
NGOs called for improvements in land use practices and management schemes that were
leading to degradation. However, they argued that non-western land management
schemes were not inherently problematic, but rather, required understanding and respect
on the part of policymakers. According to NGOs, "The convention should stress on the
fact that project designs should be changed to suit the peoples' culture and not people to
change their way of life to suit project designs" (ECO, 1993a). So while colonial and
modernist style policies called for the introduction of European and western modes of
land use into affected areas on the assumption that these were the only "rational choices,"
participants in the INCD process called for the recognition of indigenous practices and
the importance of adapting new land use techniques to individual cultural contexts.
NGOs aimed to serve, not simply as instruments of implementation in local
contexts, but as an integral part the desertification regime at the international level.
The Convention should not limit itself to considering NGOs as executing
agencies for programmes designed elsewhere, but as specific actors and
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real partners of governments, scientists and local communities in the fight
against desertification (ECO, 1993b).
NGOs called for a role in policy formulation, program design and evaluation and
monitoring of desertification projects. They also viewed themselves as contributing
specialized knowledge to the policymaking process.
With respect to the scientific community, NGOs expect to contribute to
the definition of national research programmes. Their participation will
ensure enhanced recognition of traditional knowledge and perception of
local community skills and needs. They will facilitate contact between
academic and community-based researchers (ECO, 1993b).
Hence, NGOs offered to serve as a bridge between providers of modern scientific forms
of knowledge and other types of knowledge, although neither the NGOs nor other INCD
participants clearly defined the nature of alternative forms of knowledge. This theme of
mediator carried into a range of NGO proposals as they emphasized their ability to
facilitate dialogue among the various actors engaged in anti-desertification activities
(ECO, 1993b). NGOs also lobbied for national, as well as international NGO
accreditation for the Conference of Parties, arguing that national NGOs possess important
experience from working on anti-desertification projects at the ground level (ECO,
1994a).
ECO articles regarding the design of expert advisory institutions under the CCD
similarly reflected NGO's self-perceptions as knowledge providers. During negotiation,
the INCD agreed to establish advisory bodies that would provide input to the Conference
of Parties (the group of countries implementing the treaty) on topics that required
specialized knowledge or assessments. As INCD delegates debated the name, size,
membership and duties of these advisory bodies, NGOs expressed some of their opinions
through ECO. NGOs, for example, were opposed to labeling advisors to the Conference
of the Parties as science advisors. They believed that the reference to "science" would
mean the exclusion of non-scientific forms of knowledge from expert deliberations, and
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urged for adoption of the term "expert advisor" instead. NGOs similarly supported
experts representing a wide range of disciplinary and geographic backgrounds.
Given the extremely complex interactions that characterise the problem of
desertification and especially its social and economic dimensions, it is
clear that a purely technical approach to desertification is not adequate.
We need to re-orient the conventional approach to research and extension
towards a more people-centred and participatory one (ECO, 1994d).
They called for a new definition of expert inclusive of individuals possessing indigenous
knowledge about how to cope with local conditions and the variability of arid
environments. "Given the failure over the past two decades of strategies to combat
desertification, which have relied heavily on the western scientific theory, a new approach
to expert advice is long overdue" (ECO, 1994d).
3.5.3 New Knowledge, New Policy
The INCD process reflected a more pluralistic vision of desertification processes and a
broadening view of knowledge. Similarly, the treaty provided a more complex portrayal
of desertification phenomena. Rather than adhering to a singular cause and "proximate"
solution the Convention presented desertification as a variable, complex process requiring
locally tailored and locally supported projects.
Complex Interactions
Both the INCD debates about desertification and the final definition that delegates
adopted reflected a more pluralistic (and perhaps, intitally more confused) perception of
the meaning of desertification. The delegates engaged in a somewhat lengthy debate on
the meaning of desertification, but ultimately adopted the definition presented in Agenda
21. However, they further elaborated on this definition by emphasizing the complexity of
desertification processes.
Early in the negotiations, the definition of desertification became a sticking point
for delegates." 0 Presentations during the information session revealed that, despite the
'" Countries such as Egypt, Canada, Mali, Ghana, and Tunisia supported it.
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definition set forth in Agenda 21, many disparate interpretations of desertification existed
in research and policy initiatives worldwide. While some presenters referred to the
Agenda 21 definition, others highlighted an array of definitions, and still others did not
commit to any particular definition.m' Similarly divergent opinions surfaced during
policy debate. The Secretariat, IPED, and several INCD delegations supported use of
the Agenda 21 desertification definition. However, many other delegates viewed the
Agenda 21 definition only as a departure point. In general, some developing countries
argued that the definition should reference socio-economic aspects of desertification and
should refer to desertification's global dimensions and its links to climate change. Many
developed countries, however, opposed such changes, wanting instead to limit the scope
and scale of the problem (ENB:04:22; ENB:04:34; ENB:04:44).
In the end, delegates adopted the Agenda 21 definition of desertification, with
some additions. As in Agenda 21, the Convention described desertification as "land
degradation" arising from "various factors including climatic variations and human
activities" (CCD, 1994: 7). 11 As discussed above in the context of Agenda 21,
attributing desertification to "various factors including climatic variations and human
activities" signaled important changes regarding attitudes toward affected populations and
perceptions of natural-social interactions and their role in desertification processes.
Unlike Agenda 21, the Convention further elaborated on the causes of "land degradation"
in noting that this phenomenon resulted from:
" Some speakers stated explicitly that their presentations reflected the Agenda 21 definition for
desertification, while others did not indicate a particular definition. For example, Nessim Ahmed, a
Resources Economist for the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) advocated use of the
Agenda 21 definition in his discussion about the socio-economic causes of desertification. Speakers from
OECD and UNSO spoke about planning and assistance programs, but made no reference to a specific
desertification definition. In describing the hydrological impacts of desertification, Habib Zebidi, Director
of UNESCO's Hydrology Division, reviewed several definitions of desertification. He mentioned
UNCOD's definition as "the diminution or destruction of the biological potential of the land, (which) can
lead to desert-like conditions" (Zebidi, 1993: 1). Zebidi also mentioned definitions that focus on the role of
humans in degrading ecosystems which have already weakened due to natural climate conditions such as
drought. Giving further insight into the meaning behind these definitions, Zebidi cited five elements of the
desertification process: increasing aridity, irregular runoff, accelerated wind and water erosion, soil
desiccation and salinization, and decline in vegetation (Zebidi, 1993).
112 Countries such as Egypt, Canada, Mali, Ghana, and Tunisia supported using the Agenda 21 definition.
"3 The starting point for the "land degradation" definition was set forth in two assessments by UNEP.
Odingo (1990a; 1990b) and UNEP (1991) presented similar definitions.
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... land uses or from a process or combination of processes, including
processes arising from human activities and habitation patterns such as:
(i) soil erosion caused by wind and/or water;
(ii) deterioration of the physical, chemical and biological or
economic properties of the soil;
(iii) long-term loss of natural vegetation (CCD, 1994: 1(f)).
Here, land use appeared as just one of many factors contributing to degradation. Rather
than focusing on one cause such as irrational land use methods, this definition
emphasized that multiple processes are at work. The terms "erosion,". "deterioration,"
and "long-term loss," for example, could result from anthropogenic factors, climatic
factors or a mix of such factors. As mentioned above, this view of desertification
processes as pluralistic, shifted focus away from the individual farmer and toward the role
of social collectives in contributing to and ameliorating desertification.
Just as the Convention portrayed land use as one of many possible contributors to
desertification, it also presented desertification and drought, not as isolated problems, but
as multifaceted issues impinging on a number of social challenges.
... desertification and drought affect sustainable development through their
interrelationships with important social problems such as poverty, poor
health and nutrition, lack of food security, and those arising from
migration, displacement of persons and demographic dynamics (CCD,
1994: 4).
Because desertification and drought were part and parcel of the social and ecological
settings in which they emerged, they required policy remedies that were tailored to
specific local conditions and effective in addressing the entirety of social, economic and
political processes at work.
The Convention also went beyond the Agenda 21 definition in portraying an even
more involved causal narrative. According to the Convention:
... desertification is caused by complex interactions among physical,
biological, political, social, cultural and economic factors (CCD, 1994: 4).
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Reference to "complex interactions" reflected the diverse views of desertification
presented during the Information Sharing Segment. It also suggested a picture of
desertification processes that was more dynamic and holistic than those presented in
earlier agreements. Convention negotiators believed this vision of desertification as
''complex interactions" required a systemic rather than mechanistic policy response.
Instead of a focus on land use per se, policymakers advocated a so-called "bottom-up"
approach to "sustainable management of land and water resources, leading to improved
living conditions, in particular at the community level" (CCD, 1994: 8). This approach
recognized the variability of desertification's sources and manifestations throughout the
globe. Instead of prescribing specific changes to land use methods or technologies, the
Convention focused on the general sorts of social arrangements that were intended to
foster desertification's amelioration. A key aspect of these arrangements concerned an
increased role for women and non-governmental organizations in sustainable
development activities, and greater attention to the protection and utilization of
indigenous knowledge and technologies in environmental planning and protection.
The Bottom-up Approach
Like the causes identified in the treaty, desertification remedies targeted not just land use,
but broader social processes and interactions. These remedies emphasized a broader
concept of knowledge, participatory and community-based anti-desertification initiatives,
and a learning-based approach to policy implementation. Like the Plan ofAction, the
Convention called for National Action Programs and new institutional mechanisms to
foster policy implementation at various levels. Also in keeping with the Plan, the
Convention did not establish new sources of financing for addressing desertification.
With these provisions, treaty authors aimed to encourage a shift from "aid to partnership."
Past desertification policies were thought to reflect the one-sided process in which
developed countries provided assistance to affected countries and often dictated the
design of and priority given to specific projects. Similarly, central governments often
imposed policy solutions on particular communities without consulting with them as part
of the process. With the partnership paradigm, contributors to the Convention aimed to
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insure that projects would be developed jointly rather than "imposed by one group on
another" (Lean, 1995: 14).
With easy consensus among developed and developing countries, modem science
and technology continued to occupy an important place in desertification policy. For
example, the treaty stated that:
strategies to combat desertification and mitigate the effects of drought will
be most effective if they are based on sound systemic observation and
rigorous scientific knowledge and if they are continuously re-evaluated
(CCD, Preamble).
The Convention also stressed the need for a global network of research institutions,
standardized systems of measurement and analysis, and the use of modern technology for
data collection, assessment and dissemination of information. The treaty established a
Committee on Science and Technology (CST) to provide information and advice on
scientific and technological matters (CCD, 1994: Article 24(1)). This committee was
designed to be multidisciplinary, open to participation by all parties, and comprised of
government representatives. The Convention specified that the CST should develop a
roster of experts based on nomination from Parties. The Conference of Parties, the
governing treaty body, could then appoint ad hoc panels composed of experts from the
roster to advise policymakers on specific issues and questions. However, despite these
institutional mechanisms focused on science, modern scientific knowledge was no longer
the sole, or even the most important resource behind desertification policy.
Like Agenda 21, the Convention reflected a new approach to desertification-
relevant knowledge, but it also further elaborated on Agenda 21's suggestion that
alternatives to modern science could provide valuable tools in anti-desertification efforts.
The Convention, referred to broader categories of knowing. Instead of science alone as a
key antidote for desertification, the Convention stressed the importance of "knowledge"
in general. This included modern scientific research into climate and desertification
processes, as well as understandings of local ecosystems and farming practices developed
and passed from generation to generation in more localized areas. Unlike the Plan of
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Action, which emphasized the natural and physical sciences, the Convention called for
knowledge development through multidisciplinary and participatory research, and urged
for special attention to socio-economic data and their integration with physical and
biological information (CCD, 1994: Article 4(2a) and Article 16(e)). The scientist was
no longer seen as the only authoritative source of knowledge. Expertise was also
believed to reside in intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, as well as in
local populations (CCD 1994, Article 16(d), 17 and 18).
Traditional and local knowledge were not defined or distinguished in the treaty,
but they appeared as equally, if not more valuable than modern science in the fight
against desertification. Earlier agreements acknowledged traditional knowledge and
techniques, but generally called for their improvement. This implied that modem
perspectives and practices were inherently better than their indigenous counterparts and
that developed countries should use their insights and technologies to enhance inferior,
indigenous forms of knowledge. In contrast, the Convention called for protection and
application of traditional knowledge and know-how. In doing so, the treaty portrayed
traditional knowledge as useful and important, rather than inferior." 4 The treaty, for
example, called for the creation of inventories of "(traditional and local) technology,
knowledge, know-how and practices and their potential uses" (CCD, 1994: Article
18(2a)). Dissemination of such inventories, with appropriate legal protections it was
hoped would enhance the ability of populations to cope with desertification-related
challenges. The treaty also called for the integration of traditional practices and modem
technology, suggesting that the complementarities in these methods could provide
powerful tools in the process of policy implementation. 115
Perhaps most central to reconstructivist remedies was an emphasis on "bottom-
up" solutions to desertification. Nowhere does the term "bottom-up" appear in the treaty.
114 The treaty never explicitly defined local and traditional knowledge. However, it did contrast such
knowledge with modem science, suggesting that local and traditional knowledge constitute ways of
knowing not derived from or akin to the scientific method. It also urged that the use of local and traditional
knowledge and its integration with other forms of knowledge be carried out only in conditions that were
"appropriate." Yet, the Convention never defined what constitutes appropriate circumstances.
"5 This broader definition of knowledge coincided with a broader definition of expertise. The treaty, for
example, referred to the expertise found in intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, as well
as in local populations. This marked an important departure from the modernist era when expertise
virtually always meant scientific expertise.
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However, negotiators, the Secretariat and observers used this term liberally throughout
and following the negotiation process. Many of the opening speeches at the first
negotiating session (from developed and developing countries alike) encouraged the
negotiators to adopt a bottom-up approach to desertification (ENB:04:0 1). In general,
this phrase, "bottom-up," served to distance desertification initiatives under the
Convention, from the so-called "top-down" policies of the 1970s which sought to impose
technologies and practices from developed countries onto people in affected areas. As
described by The Centre for Our Common Future in conjunction with the Interim
Secretariat for the Convention to Combat Desertification,
The Convention breaks new ground by enshrining a bottom-up approach in
international law. It repeatedly emphasizes the importance of full
participation, and specifically underlines "the important role played by
women." It also stresses "the special role of non-governmental
organisations" and gives them an important role in ensuring
implementation (Lean, 1995 :15).
The bottom-up approach referred to participation of local populations not just in the
implementation of desertification policies, but in all aspects of their conception and
implementation. Bottom-up features of the Convention also called for greater attention to
women and youth, and a greater role for non-governmental organizations in Convention-
related activities. The treaty called for participatory approaches in several policy areas
including national action programmes; information collection, analysis, and exchange;
research and development; and education.
This philosophy seemed to have unanimous support from the very beginning of
negotiations. As he opened the first week of negotiations, Chairman Bo Kjellen noted the
central role that public participation should play in the negotiations, and described a need
to listen to people in villages. Country delegations made similar remarks in their opening
speeches. The European Community, Sweden and Brazil, for example, called for action
and attention at the local level. Chad, Ghana, and Jordan mentioned the importance of
local communities and local knowledge, and several other countries called for a primary
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role for women in anti-desertification efforts (ENB:04:1 1).116 With continued lobbying
on the part of NGOs during negotiations, this support translated into several treaty
provisions calling for participation by local communities, women, and non-governmental
organizations in creation and application of relevant knowledge, development and
implementation of anti-desertification programs, and in evaluation and refinement of such
programs.
The bottom-up approach coincided with a more flexible, learning-oriented view of
policy implementation. In stark contrast to policies of the 1970s, the Convention implied
that desertification solutions were still under development and that flexible approaches to
policy implementation could provide opportunities to learn more about desertification.
The Plan ofAction asserted that solutions to desertification were known and could be
applied via a "top-down" process. According the Plan, there were well-known "right"
ways of remedying desertification that could be imposed on affected populations by
international and national organizations. The Convention, on the other hand, suggested
that there was much left to learn about desertification. While some of this learning
should take place through large scale monitoring and scientific research, other lessons
were expected to emerge from on-the-ground trial and error. The Convention, for
example, prescribed a "flexible" approach to project design, which allowed for
experiment and iteration. This experimental approach to policy further reflected the
bottom-up philosophy because it accepted and encouraged development and use of
knowledge about desertification in more localized settings.
3.5.4 Reflections
The INCD process reflected new perceptions of science, policymaking and authoritative
knowledge. While the Desertification Secretariat seemed to sideline science, they also
promoted a more democratic vision of knowledge. The Information Sharing Segment and
activities of the International Panel of Experts blurred institutional boundaries that
traditionally separate science and policymaking. In authorizing NGOs as legitimate and
valuable contributors to policy creation, the Secretariat ignored boundaries normally
116 These countries included The Netherlands, Canada, Finland, Australia, Sweden and Madagascar (ENB:
04:11).
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separating interest groups and treaty administrations, and widened borders that often
circumscribe the realm of expertise. These institutional changes corresponded to a new
vision of environmental degradation. Democratic processes, knowledge production, and
dissemination gave rise to a more pluralistic view of desertification.
The Secretariat authorized a broader array of technical experts, and enabled them
to interact both directly and indirectly with policymakers. In contrast to the UNCOD
experts, ISS participants and IPED members were much more diverse in regard to their
disciplinary and geographic backgrounds. In addition, both these groups engaged with
delegates, albeit in different ways. The participants in the ISS spoke directly to delegates
and were available to answer questions and engage in dialogue. The IPED, though never
in direct contact with negotiators, commented on treaty texts as delegates were
developing them. Both these models of science advice differed markedly from the linear
science-to-policy-model at the core of the UNCOD process. Participants and observers in
the INCD negotiations seem to agree that the IPED's work had little bearing on policy
debates. However, the model under which they operated suggests a potentially greater
role for scientists in the actual process of policy formulation. It further indicates that such
a role for scientific experts, if carried out through a body like the Secretariat, would not
compromise the perceived legitimacy of the experts or the policy enterprise.
NGOs acquired a voice in INCD deliberations through channels and interactions,
which allowed these non-state actors to communicate directly with negotiators and
attempt to inscribe their views on the negotiation process and resultant policy. The
Desertification Secretariat was instrumental in authorizing non-governmental
organizations and enabling these organizations to participate in the INCD process. The
Secretariat also established forums in which NGO groups could come together, share
information and develop coherent policy positions. In a sense, NGOs as a group appear
to have served as an inscription device for the Secretariat. This administrative body was
interested in promoting the bottom-up approach to desertification while distancing the
new regime from past desertification failures and their dependence on the tools and
insights of modern science.
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Yet, it is clear from various NGO statements that this community was highly
interested in becoming part and parcel of the emergent desertification regime. In
particular, they lobbied for formal recognition as knowledge providers, and to a certain
extent they were successful. Through interactions with the Secretariat, NGOs became
part of the institutional framework from which the Convention emerged. Though not
voting members like delegates, the NGOs participated in negotiation activities in a
number of ways. Not only did they help to incorporate many of their views and ideas into
the treaty text, they were also recognized as part of the emerging regime. As evidenced
by Article 16 of the Convention, delegates recognized NGOs as possessing expertise of
use in treaty implementation.
In constructing new forms of social order, the INCD process also generated new
visions of natural order. Just as the INCD process sidelined scientists, but increased the
overall diversity of voices among scientists and non-scientists, the resulting treaty
emphasized complexity and diversity in desertification processes. The Convention's
bottom-up approach was markedly different from the technocratic focus on irrational land
use and proximate solutions in the PACD. Furthermore, provisions throughout the
Convention highlighted many complex elements of desertification processes. The treaty
also acknowledged desertification as locally variably in regard to perceptions of the
problem, as well as its sources and manifestations.
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CHAPTER 4
Dimensions of Degradation:
Quantification in Policymaking and Policy Evaluation
Throughout desertification's history, quantification has served to varying degrees as a
vehicle for analysis, a mode of communication, a symbol of objectivity and, somewhat
more surprisingly, a target of deconstruction. Initially, non-quantitative modes of
analysis coincided with notions of dryland degradation as a local process amenable to
colonial administrative policies. As UN agencies took on problems of dryland
degradation, quantitative methodologies became more popular. Increasing reliance on
numerical measures to standardize phenomena such as "aridity" were key in
universalizing drylands and justifying international scientific inquiry aimed at their
analysis. Global statistics expressing the magnitude, rate and extent of desertification
impacts worldwide similarly focused attention on the physical and ecological
manifestations of desertification rather than on desertification processes. During the
1970s these numbers buttressed the authority of international institutions in dealing with
desertification, and helped to justify top-down policies. In the 1980s, however, global
statistics became a focus of controversy as critics doubted their basis and accuracy, and
called into question both desertification's validity and UNEP's integrity. Ultimately,
these years of contention ushered in a new, less quantifiable interpretation of
desertification. In the 1990s, what counted and how it was counted changed markedly as
numerical representations of desertification again took a back seat to visions of
desertification as primarily a local phenomenon. Policies, though still emanating from
international forums, did not address a standardized, universal enemy, but rather a
pluralistic, socially contingent process.
4.1 Analytical Framework
The production and employment of numerical measures in the desertification context
reveal quantification to be an integral component of international environmental politics.
To a large extent, the desertification story further verifies what scholarly analysis of other
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public arenas has demonstrated about the role of quantification and mathematical
reasoning in creating social institutions and political order. Numbers, for example,
comprise a universal language distanced from the particularities of local and personal
experiences and central to the practices of modern science. As the basis for "rational"
decisionmaking in liberal democracies, quantitative assessment criteria serve as tools of
transparency and objectivity (Porter, 1995). Quantification also enables simplification
and aggregation of complex processes and diverse populations. In centralized
bureaucracies such streamlined views of the world are generally considered essential for
the formulation of environmental management and social policy (Scott, 1998).
In realms of science and public decisionmaking, quantitative methods are
associated with objectivity, exactness and universality. The rule-bound nature of these
methods seems to isolate quantitative analysis from the influences of personal opinion
and detach the counting and the counted from local identities and experiences. In
technocratic approaches to environmental management, quantification provides for
rationality and managerial efficiency, and possesses an appeal deriving from its
"sometimes spurious, but undeniable, aura of respectability and credibility" (O'Riordan,
1976: 16). A cost-benefit analysis, for example, might indicate the viability of a given
project, while a human health risk assessment might be used to determine the safety of a
hazard waste site. Because such numerical analyses generate definitive answers,
decisions based on their results appear as transparent, forgone conclusions, detached from
the individuals in charge of the decision. As Ted Porter remarks: "Quantification is a
way of making decisions without seeming to decide" (Porter, 1995: 8). Heavy reliance
on quantitative methods in the United States government, for example, reflects, in part,
demands for openness and transparency in that governance system.
Jasanoff examined the use of quantitative regulatory methods in the United States.
She noted the tenacity of American quantitative risk analysis even in the face of
criticisms regarding false precision, questionable methodologies, and the blurring of facts
and values in numbers that essentially hide the subjective judgments of the
decisionmaker. Quantitative risk analysis in the US, for example, has been an important
regulatory tool for balancing risk benefits, setting standards, and determining which risks
warrant regulation and which do not. In the face of unacceptable uncertainties,
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quantitative methods have also been used in efforts to estimate subjectivity in expert
decisions or to represent uncertainty more precisely in numerical terms, as through
probability distributions (Jasanoff, 1986, 1991).
Jasanoff also compared quantitative risk analysis techniques for lead regulation in
the United States and Britain. She found that disparities in political and administrative
cultures explained divergent approaches to risk communication (i.e., in numeric and non-
numeric terms), assessment of subjectivity in expert decisions, and uncertainty in risk
estimates. Cultural variations concerned the more insulated environment of civil servants
and advisory committees in the UK compared to dependence on political appointments in
regulatory agencies and greater public scrutiny of government decisionmaking in the US.
The apparent objectivity of numerical measures allows government officials to appear
unbiased in their decisionmaking. Quantitative methods also seem more transparent and
open to public control. Yet, costs associated with quantitative methods and their
tendency to open up new areas of conflict and protracted technical controversy cast a
shadow over their potential benefits. Hence, use of quantification to "bring an
unattainable level of technical rationality to decisions that are fundamentally subjective
and political may weaken trust in government" (Jasanoff, 1991: 45).
Consistency across diverse individuals and settings enables numbers, statistical
analyses, and mathematical formulae to serve as modes of communication among diverse
groups (Porter, 1995) and as sources of credibility, authority and control over physical,
biological and social processes (O'Riordan, 1976). Standardization via quantitative
methods is often used as a tool of simplification and control in centralized bureaucracies.
Through processes of standardization, the entity being counted or measured is generally
objectified and represented in aggregate terms.
According to Benedict Anderson (1991), census-taking in peninsular Malaysia
prior to and during British colonial rule illustrated standardization and quantification both
as instruments of control and organization, and factors in the shaping of national identity.
Enumeration schemes of pre-colonial leaders reflected an interest in tax revenue and
military strength. Consequently, their census categories ignored women and children, but
kept careful count of tax payers and men eligible for conscription. Over time, colonial
census classifications increasingly emphasized ethno-racial hierarchies and de-
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emphasized religious classifications, with each individual fitting into one and only one
category. Demographics generated via the census served as a basis for the state policy.
Ethnic-racial classifications, for example, dictated the organization of numerous social
institutions, including schools, courts, police stations, and immigration offices.
The above authors provide a theoretical basis for exploring quantification in the
context of desertification science and policymaking. The nature and use of quantitative
methods and numerical estimates of desertification have varied with each new
institutional context, and with the priorities, values and resources it brought to the
problem. To highlight changes in quantification through the four eras of desertification
politics, the sections below are organized chronologically. Each section addresses three
basic questions: Who was counting? What was counted (and what was not counted) and
how? And what implications did quantification have for desertification policymaking?
The colonists, UNEP, and the CCD regimes had their own distinct approaches to
quantification, which reflected their respective institutional capacities and goals. They
differed with regard to the emphasis they placed on quantification, the aspects of
desertification they chose to quantify and the indicators and criteria they employed.
UNEP, for example, relied heavily on aggregate, numerical measures of
desertfication's physical extent. Based on the work of scientific advisors, the agency
used global statistics in legitimating desertification as a global problem and in evaluating
policy implementation. In contrast, the current desertification regime has not emphasized
numerical measures of desertification as a means to assess the problem or monitor policy
implementation. The Committee on Science and Technology, a body of country
representatives is, instead, developing indicators of desertification, which are intended to
provide information on topics such as gender issues and capacities of local institutions.
Analysis of these varying uses and methods of quantification further illuminates the
processes of authorization, inscription and boundary work in policymaking. The
employment of certain quantitative methods in desertification assessment was akin to the
use of particular languages: desertification discourses included some individuals, while
excluding others. In helping to frame and define desertification, quantitative methods
and estimates provided instruments with which institutions constructed the desertification
problem in ways that aligned with their resources and interests, whether these were
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scientific or non-scientific, global or local.
4.2 Qualitative Colonists
During the 1920s and 30s, colonial researchers and specialists in local management
positions served as primary interpreters of the African landscape. Neither they nor the
colonial administrations relied heavily on quantitative analysis or standardized
measurements of environmental phenomena in these regions. Colonial governments had
little need for aggregate measures of land degradation and vegetation changes aside from
economic estimates regarding the productivity and profitability of agricultural and natural
resources. Until the end of the 1930s, publications of colonial foresters, geographers and
botanists engaged in the progressive desiccation debate were nearly devoid of numbers.
These studies brimmed with personalized accounts of the African landscape, often
relaying a strong sense of the researcher's identity and political leanings. Many of
Stebbing's books and articles, for example, read like travelogues, tracing his encounters
and impressions like a diary. He regularly presented his accounts in first person, with
frequent excerpts from his field notebook. Apparent in many articles of the period was a
clear alignment between the beliefs of the researcher and the priorities of the colonial
empires. As noted by Jones:
The replacement of bush by farmlands, where these are permanent, is
surely a sign of progress. It is a process, which has taken place in all
civilized countries (Jones, 1938: 411).
Such explicit endorsement of colonial objectives was a common feature of scientific
publications of the period. Nearly all researchers supported colonial settlement of the
"frontier" and the introduction of the European-style permanent agriculture throughout
Africa (e.g., Stebbing, 1935, 1937; Jones, 1938; Falconer, 1938; Stamp, 1940).
4.2.1 Relative Measures
The colonial investigations reflected heavy reliance on direct observation by the
researcher and interviews with local inhabitants. As researchers attempted to ascertain
changes in vegetation, the movement of sand dunes and fluctuations in water levels,
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universal systems of standardization seemed largely irrelevant, and perhaps simply
impractical. Standard measures of rainfall were nevertheless important as researchers
compared climatic trends over long time spans. But for the botanist or forester on an
expedition through the Sahel region, relative measures and the recollections of local
chiefs were often of greater value than an aggregated set of rainfall data. Furthermore,
such rainfall data were not even available until the turn of the century. As Collier and
Dundas reported in 1937, "data on rainfall are deficient, as records have not been kept in
Nigeria or Niger Colony for a sufficiently long period to be of any value" (Collier and
Dunas, 1937: 187).
Analyses were standardized to the extent that researchers interested in progressive
desiccation tended to evaluate similar parameters. In his analysis, for example, Jones
systematically presented assessments of the following indicators: sand encroachment,
retrogression of vegetation, reduction of rainfall, lowering of the water table, shrinkage of
streams and lakes, and population migration. Not all researchers examined exactly the
same indicators, but aimed to determine how this general set of criteria changed over
time. In most cases they conducted evaluations based on temporal variations at specific
locales. In characterizing periodicity in fluctuations of Lake Chad, Collier and Dundas
(1937) simply described lake levels as "high" in some years and "low" in others, instead
of referring to numerical values." 7 In noting migration patterns, these authors
characterized movement in British territories of northern Nigeria between 1902 and 1904
as "proceeding on a considerable scale" (Collier and Dundas, 1937: 189). In referring to
vegetation trends, Jones described how "several areas in the Niger Colony are much
better wooded to-day than they used to be" (Jones, 1938: 411). Similarly, Stebbing
remarked:
There are considerable tracts of a dry degraded mixed deciduous forest of
varying quality, subject to firing in the dry season by natives, either for
shooting or grazing" (Stebbing, 1935: 508-9).
As illustrated, the colonial researchers often employed terms such as high, low,
m1 Collier and Dundas (1937) based their description on the findings of Chudeau without reference to any
particular publication.
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considerable and varying in lieu of specific quantitative figures. While they may not
have possessed the technology and resources to ascertain such information, it also
appears that scientists and officials alike did not view such measurements as necessary
for evaluating possible signs of progressive desiccation. While proponents of this theory
believed desiccation processes affected a large portion of West Africa, the theory's
validity hinged on changes over time in the local environment and not on comparison of
measurements across large spatial areas. Hence, portable, standardized quantitative
figures were, for the most part, not a high priority.
This is not to say that numbers were wholly absent from colonial studies.
Stebbing (1935), for example, often provided estimates of miles and acres to
communicate his location to readers as he progressed in his narrative and traversed the
countryside. He also used numerical estimates to describe the size of some forests tracts
or areas of degraded land. Jones's (1938) account of the Commission's work opened
with details regarding the northern provinces of Nigeria. In perusing the demographics
and economic statistics for the region, Jones noted the population as 11.5 million with an
average density of 40.58 per square mile. He also enumerated groundnut exports in terms
of their tonnage and cash value. Other numerical measures concerned analysis of grain
size, pH, and chemistry for harmattan dust. The Commission determined that (contrary
to Stebbing's assertion) material deposited by the harmattan improved rather than harmed
soil quality. For the most part, however, the colonists described changes and variations
in the environment and in population patterns in qualitative terms.
Stebbing offered one important exception. He argued that the Sahara north of
Tahoua was advancing southward at a rate of one kilometer per year and had done so for
three centuries. He credited Monsieur A. de Loppinot, an administrative officer in the
Niger Colony, with providing this estimate. Based on this rate, Stebbing predicted that
the desert would overtake the village of Kano within fifty years or less (Stebbing, 1935).
In indicating the reliability of the one-kilometer-per-year estimate, Stebbing referred to
the experience of Lippinot noting that he had based his estimate on personal observation
and inquiries and had "long service in the Niger and French Sudan colonies" (Stebbing,
1935: 515). Stebbing also noted that Lipponet's conclusion confirmed his own
observations.
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Collier and Dundas (1937) challenged Stebbing by describing and mapping the
countryside. They noted the location of live dunes at the same location as described by
Clapperton and Barth in 1921. They also described a belt of forest extending from the
Niger Colony between the desert and more southern regions where rain is sufficient to
support permanent agriculture. Similarly, Jones (1938) identified the position of live
dunes as 150 miles north of the Nigerian frontier, and described that same tract of forest
noted by Collier and Dundas (1937). Jones (1938) further noted that the forested region
contained an area of dunes, often assumed by observers to constitute a potentially mobile
desert edge. He explained, however, that grass firmly anchored the dunes and rather than
constituting a desert edge, they were surrounded by forest on all sides. Neither Jones nor
Collier and Dundas made any special attempts to demonstrate why their observations
were any more accurate than those of Stebbing. As evidenced by letters to The
Geographical Journal, the journal's readership readily accepted the Commission's
findings as the more authoritative (e.g., Falconer, 1938; Stamp, 1940).
Despite refutation of Stebbing's assertions, it is interesting to consider the role
that quantification played in the power of Stebbing's message, the attention it received,
and the activity and debate it generated. As noted in other chapters, Stebbing's
descriptions of the Sahara's advance were vivid and alarming. In estimating a specific
rate of advance, Stebbing suggested that the desert's movement constituted long-term,
quantifiable change. This assertion seemed to lend even further import to his message.
In some respects Stebbing's dramatic estimate did help to mobilize action in the form of
the Anglo-French Forestry Commission. However, the rate of advance he reported
ultimately made his analysis more vulnerable to attack. He soon became an easy target of
skeptics who supported preservation of national rather than initiation of transnational
cooperation. In the face of the Commission's descriptive accounts of the landscape, The
geography community considered Stebbing's numerical findings invalid. His number did
not infuse his assertions with objectivity or persuasive power. While his rate estimate,
being such a conveniently portable artifact, continued to appear in later articles and
books, it was often disparaged as an almost humorous reminder of Stebbing's presumably
outlandish claims (e.g., Jacks and Whyte, 1939; Stamp, 1940; Swift, 1996)
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4.2.2 Environmental Policy Analysis and Imperialism
As reflected in the progressive desiccation debate, colonial governing institutions and the
scientists they hired did not requires sophisticated quantitative methods, standardization
or the appearance of rational decisionmaking in dealing with environmental problems.
As reflected in the Commission's interpretation of degradation, the colonial
administrations were primarily concerned with the state of natural resources in their
respective jurisdictions. They did not need to know how the vegetation in northern
Nigeria compared with that in French Niger, and therefore, did not develop
standardization procedures for making such comparisons. When Stebbing did use a
numerical estimate of desert advance to describe a supposedly transnational phenomenon,
he succeeded in getting the attention of the colonial administrations and spurring a
significant bilateral study.
On the whole, however, scientists and administrators concerned with
environmental degradation did not require many quantitative methods in their day-to-day
activities. Colonial subjects were not in a position to scrutinize the actions of their
superiors, demand greater transparency in policymaking or call for objective
decisionmaking. Hence, colonial administrators, while they did have to answer to the
officials back in Britain, did not have the public pressure that motivates so much
quantitatively based policymaking in liberal democracies with a penchant for open
policymaking, like the United States.
Later, as soil erosion became recognized as a global phenomenon, calls for
standardized approaches to its amelioration began to surface among members of the
scientific community. In Rape of the Earth: A World Survey of Soil Erosion, Jacks and
Whyte (1939) noted that the problem of erosion in Africa was much more difficult to
control than that in America because of the diverse peoples, climates, agricultural
methods, and land policies. These authors noted that land management successes in the
United States were largely a result of the country's single, unified soil conservation
system. Jacks and Whyte believed a similar uniform system was needed to stem
worldwide economic casualties of soil erosion.
This world-wide problem must be tackled as a whole, otherwise soil
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conservers would be placed at an immediate economic disadvantage in
relation to soil exploiters... .the problem is crudely but effectively solving
itself through the growth of economic nationalism (Jacks and Whyte,
1939: 222).
Hence, these authors proposed not just an African-wide systems of standardization, but a
global system. However, with World War II around the corner, such recommendations
could not garner sufficient resources and soon fell by the wayside.
4.3 Numbers of Internationalization
Quantification became much more prominent in dryland research after World War II. In
place of the local observations and personal accounts of colonial foresters, international
scientific programs utilized techniques of aggregation and standardization. Increasing
reliance on numerical measures coincided with interpretations of dryland degradation as a
global problem arising from physical rather than social phenomena. UNESCO's Arid
Zone Program, for example, standardized the concept of aridity and used maps (as
discussed in Chapter 5) to illustrate arid regions worldwide. UNEP, in preparation for the
United Nations Conference on Desertification, assembled estimates of desertification's
global extent and statistics regarding the risks, causes and impacts of desertification.
These estimates signaled that desertification was not confined to drought-stricken West
Africa, but instead affected every continent. Quantitative measures further indicated that
the mathematically grounded natural sciences offered appropriate means to assess and
remedy desertification problems.
4.3.1 Constructing an Arid Zone
A worldwide aridity classification scheme was one direct result of UNESCO's efforts to
establish an Arid Zone Research Program in the early 1950s. As suggested by the use of
the singular term "zone" rather than "zones" in its title, participants in this program were
interested in standardizing analysis of arid regions worldwide. Hence, after the
program's initiation, UNESCO found itself in "immediate need" of someone to delineate
the arid zone and devise a classification scheme for comparing climatic differences
within it. To carry out this task the agency's Department of Natural Sciences
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commissioned Perveil Meigs to compile homoclimatic maps of the continents in time for
the fall meeting of the Advisory Committee on Arid Zone Research in early 1951. In
taking on this task Meigs set out to "...use criteria that would be significant, of world-
wide application, and suitable for clear mapping (Meigs, 1953: 203).
Meigs classified drylands according to a ratio involving precipitation and
temperature. While Meigs considered precipitation the essential determinant of aridity,
he selected temperature as an indicator because it is the climatic factor most strongly
affecting evaporation, and was the most widely monitored and widely available piece of
climatic data. Meigs' maps indicated moisture, seasonal temperatures, and season of
precipitation. Based on a formula developed by Thornthwaite (1948), which estimated
the adequacy of precipitation in relation to the need of plants, Meigs classified dry
climates as either semi-arid or arid. Based on rainfall records, Meigs further designated
some regions as extremely arid. These areas, often referred to as "true deserts," had
experienced at least twelve consecutive months without rainfall or exhibited no seasonal
rhythm in terms of rainfall patterns. Meigs' classification scheme portrayed aridity as a
worldwide phenomenon, thereby erasing or aggregating local climatic features. As
Meigs commented:
Maps on the scale used here, while useful for general world-wide
comparisons, cannot show the numerous local variations of climate,
particularly in mountainous areas where climate differs greatly in short
distances (Meigs, 1953: 208).
The depiction of a worldwide aridity scheme was important in legitimizing UNESCO's
international science program. By way of his classification scheme, Meigs depicted (and
thereby constructed) the singular arid zone at the heart of the program's focus. The
erasing of local features similarly corresponded to the international scientific focus of the
initiative. Without inclusion of local level features and jurisdictional boundaries, the
maps (like the program) appeared politically neutral and grounded in objective science.
Meigs' classification schemes and cartographic endeavors were widely used by
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climatologists, hydrologists and other scientists interested in dryland issues. "8 They also
stimulated development of similar indices by other specialists in fields of climatology and
hydrology In the 1970s Meigs' work served as an important resource for scientists and
policymakers involved with the United Nations Conference on Desertification. As
Kenneth Hare remarked in his pre-Conference report, "Climate and Desertification,"
"The best known and most widely accepted classification of the dry climates is that of
Meigs (1961)" (Hare, 1977: 71). Because desertification was, by definition, a problem
plaguing dryland regions (UNCOD, 1978: 4), Meigs' classification scheme provided a
basis for estimating the physical extent of desertification and the number of people
affected or potentially affected. Using Meigs' classification scheme, for example, the
Conference Secretariat prepared a table showing estimates of dryland populations
according to livelihood categories (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977; UNCOD, 1978).
Similar indices appeared in UNCOD assessments by Kenneth Hare and FAO and
UNESCO. Hare's analysis of the world's dry climates adopted an index developed by
Budyko (1958). This radiational index of drying (or dryness ratio, as named by Lettau in
1969) was expressed as the ratio of the mean annual net radiation (i.e., the radiation
balance) to the product of mean annual precipitation and latent heat of vaporization for
water. In 1958 and 1974, Budyko used this ratio to categorize land areas in terms of
vegetational response. Based on dryness ratio values he designated regions of the world
as desert, semi-desert, and steppe or savanna. In preparing The World Map of
Desertification, FAO and UNESCO (in cooperation with WMO and UNEP, as discussed
in Chapter 5) used bioclimatic maps as a basis for the World Map. Zones of aridity were
calculated using a ratio of precipitation to evapotranspiration. Evaporation was
calculated based on a formula developed by Howard Penman (see Penman, 1963) and
requiring data regarding atmospheric humidity, wind speed, and solar radiation
(A/CONF.74/2).
Meigs' classification scheme and its derivatives were important in enabling
UNEP consultants in the 1970s to standardize analysis of desertification at a global scale.
Aridity classification schemes were originally developed to locate and characterize a
18 Meig's presented a revised version of his maps in 1960 as Distribution ofArid Homoclimates. Eastern
Hemisphere. Western Hemisphere. United Nations Maps No. 392 and No. 393, Revision 1, UNESCO,
Paris, 1953. Reproductions of these maps appeared in Stamp (1961) and Dregne (1970).
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worldwide arid zone based on climate conditions in various regions. UNEP similarly
relied on these schemes to indicate desertification worldwide based on climatic and
physical parameters. In particular, UNEP consultants used aridity measures to
extrapolate information on the state of soil and vegetation. These activities had several
implications for UNEP's framing of the desertification problem. In particular, they
portrayed desertification as a global and essentially physical phenomenon.
Desertification was global in the way that the arid zone was thought to be global. The
zone exhibited common physical characteristics at different locations throughout the
world. Desertification appeared to be more dependent on the state of climate, soil and
vegetation than on the cultural, political and economic contexts in which it arose. Aridity
schemes as a basis for desertification analysis also provided standardized, quantitative
measures of desertification. These measures were consistent with UNEP's emphasis on
natural science expertise as the key resource for understanding and remedying
desertification. The standardized, uniform nature of these measures also enabled a
simplification of desertification. For example, they supported the notion in the PACD
that desertification arose from the singular cause of land use practices and was amenable
to proximate solutions.
4.3.2 Counting on UNCOD
While desertification analyses would continue to depend on the work of Meigs. For
many years to come, reliance on his formulas and classification schemes was just a
starting point for a host of standardization and quantification exercises associated with
Conference preparations and follow-up. The use of quantitative methods in expert
studies preceeding the Conference generally supported a framing of desertification as a
global problem. As part of its two-year, pre-Conference assessment, the UNEP-based
Conference Secretariat, with the help of UN agencies and expert advisors, developed a
number of statistics reflecting desertification's global dimensions. Arid regions,
desertified or vulnerable land areas, and affected populations were among the most
popular categories for enumeration. Expressed as percentages of world totals, statistics
for these categories became a ubiquitous feature of desertification rhetoric beginning in
the 1970s. UNEP presented some of these statistics in the form of global maps of
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desertification (see Chapter 5). Other estimates appeared in tabular form or in the midst
of textual descriptions of desertification. Global statistics regarding desertification's
geographic extent, demographic analyses, and estimates of costs and benefits helped to
justify international cooperation on the issue while further highlighting the Plan of
Action's uniform approach to problem diagnosis and policy prescription.
Spatial Extent
Estimates of the earth's surface area experiencing or prone to desertification appeared in
conjunction with references to desertification as a global problem, amenable to scientific
analysis. As noted in the published UNCOD report:
What has emerged from all this expert work... is that desertification is not
a problem that concerns just a few countries. Based on climatic data,
more than a third of the earth's surface is desert or semi-desert and more
than 15 per cent of the world's population live in these areas. If we go by
data on the nature of soil and vegetation, the total area is some 43 per cent
of the earth's land surface.. .Further, some 30 million square kilometres
(19 per cent of the earth's land surface) are threatened with desertification,
and this threatened area is distributed among more than two-thirds of the
world's 150 countries (UNCOD, 1978: 1).
This quote, brimming with numbers, reflects several key features of quantification and its
role in framing the desertification concept and desertification policy. Reference to "all
this expert work" and to desertification's relevance to "more than just a few countries,"
for example, reflected UNEP's reliance on science advice and global statistics as a source
of legitimacy and justification for international cooperation on desertification. As noted
in Chapter 4, UNEP framed desertification as an issue grounded in scientific analysis.
Numbers, being the hallmark of scientific inquiry and its universal language, imbued the
Secretariat's portrayal of desertification with an aura of objectivity and certainty. While
UNEP referred to the numbers as estimates, no measures of uncertainty accompanied its
tables and statistics.
To estimate the extent of desert and semi-desert regions, the Secretariat referred
to a map of the Budyko-Lettau dryness ratio (Henning, 1970) presented in Hare's (1977)
study of climate and desertification. Hare defined areas subject to desertification as
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drylands under pastoral and rainfed agricultural use. According to Hare, these regions
generally occupied areas with a dryness ratio of between 2 and 7. Although, Hare did not
specify the spatial extent of these regions, the Secretariat (as indicated in the above
quote) reported the figure as greater than thirty percent of the earth's land surface. The
Secretariat estimated areas subject to desertification based on a World Map of
Desertification prepared for the Conference by FAO, UNESCO, and the World
Meteorological Organization. Using the classification scheme developed by Penman (the
ratio of precipitation to evapotranspiration), the agencies identified four climatic regions
as hyperarid, arid, semi-arid, and subhumid. Then, based on climate, terrain, soil
characteristics and vegetation, they calculated the land's vulnerability to desertification,
or desertification hazard. In referencing the World Map, the Secretariat determined that
high or very high risk areas occupied most of the arid and semi-arid regions, and
extended into adjacent sub-humid regions. They further determined that potentially
productive but threatened drylands covered 45 million square kilometers or.30 percent of
the world's land surface (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 7).
These occur so widely that two-thirds of the 150 nations of the world are
affected. Through its sheer extent, therefore, desertification is a global
problem (LNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 7).
The Secretariat emphasized that effects of desertification reached beyond lands
immediately affected. Dust storms, for example, could transfer soil large distances while
denuded trees and vegetation could lead to increased flooding downstream of desertified
areas.
Statistics expressed in terms of percentage of world totals, helped to communicate
the purportedly vast extent of the desertification problem. In addition, these statistics
implied that desertification was the responsibility of all people whether they resided in
dryland regions of not. If such a big portion of our earth was threatened or currently
degraded, it could be argued that everyone had reason to worry about it. These aggregate
measures also contributed to a simplified picture of desertification as a phenomenon with
a standard set of characteristics that were easily identified and measured. These numbers
could reflect variations in climate, vegetation and soil at more local levels.
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Population
Demographics offered another widely used means for expressing desertification in
numeric terms. Just as land-based aspects of desertification were represented in global
statistics, the purportedly social or human elements of desertification were portrayed
primarily by way of aggregated, global population figures. UNEP noted, for example,
that "The dry lands under threat must be seen for what they are, the home of one-sixth of
the world's population" (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 8). Similarly, the Plan ofAction
reported that desertification,
... threatens the future of 628 million people, or that 14 per cent of the
world's population who live in the drylands; of this number, between 50
and 78 million people are affected directly by decreases in productivity
associated with current desertification processes (UNCOD, 1978: 6).' 9
Like references to global land area, these estimates portrayed desertification as a global
and scientifically measurable problem. As discussed below, enumeration of people in
terms of standardized livelihood system categories further emphasized the physical
aspects of desertification and its uniformity across national and cultural boundaries.
The majority of population statistics that UNEP and UNCOD cited came from a
pre-Conference study commissioned from a group of researchers at Clark University's
Graduate School of Geography. This study by Robert Kates, Douglas Johnson, and
Kristen Johnson Haring (1977) was titled "Population, Society and Desertification." It
examined population and livelihoods at risk, social causes and consequences of
desertification, and responses to desertification, by focusing primarily on changes in
demographic structure and spatial location as both causes and consequences
desertification. The most widely quoted pieces of the analysis derived from two
numerical tables. The first of these tables (see Table 4) portrayed estimates of dryland
populations by region and livelihood group. In creating it, Kates et al. used a method
similar to those employed in creating the global land area statistics. They used Meigs'
119 Kates et al. (1977) determined that 50 million people were exposed to desertification and between 50
and 78 million were vulnerable to desertification.
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(1953) aridity classification scheme to define what constituted dry lands and applied
population estimates (from an undisclosed source) for these areas.12 0 They categorized
population, on the one hand, according to regional groups comprising UNEP Governing
Council Meetings (i.e., Mediterranean basin, sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and the Pacific,
and the Americas), and on the other hand, according to livelihood system (i.e., urban-
based, agriculture-based and animal-based). They assumed that the world population in
1974 totaled 3.86 billion, and thereby that approximately 14 percent of the world
population resided in dryland regions. The study noted, however, that these figures
"should be read with caution," because of the doubtful accuracy of population estimates
for many countries and problems in enumerating livelihood populations.
The second table by Kates et al. (1977) (see Table 5) was reproduced in the
Conference report (UNCOD, 1978). This table presented estimates of populations and
livelihoods resident in areas recently undergoing severe desertification. For this table,
Harold Dregne estimated areas undergoing severe and very severe desertification, based
on the state of soil and vegetation in areas in question.m Once again, Kates et al. (1977)
organized the table according to the same regions and livelihood types mentioned above.
This analysis gave rise to the statistic that 78 million people were threatened by
desertification, with
120 Kates et al. (1977) also determined that, of the 628 million people residing in dry lands, 72 percent lived
in semi-arid zones, 27 percent lived in the arid zone and 1 percent lived in the extremely arid zone.
12' Dregne developed three criteria for identifying severely desertified land: (1) Undesirable forbs and
shrubs that have replaced grasses or have spread to such an extent that they dominate the flora; (2) Sheet
wind and water erosion have largely denuded the land of vegetation, or large gullies are present, or (3)
Salinity controllable by drainage and leaching has reduced crop yields to more than fifty percent." Very
severe desertification criteria were as follows: "(1) Large shifting barren sand dunes have formed, or (2)
Large, deep, and numerous gullies are present, or (3) Salt crusts have developed on nearly impermeable
irrigated soils." These were the same criteria Dregne used in creating his map of the "Status of
Desertification in Hot and Arid Regions" (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977; A/CONF.74: 31).
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POPULATION, SOCIETY AND DESERTIFICATION
T ABLE 1. stimates of drylanda populations by regionb and
livelihood group (in thousands)
Livelihood populations in dry lands
Dry lands Urban Agriculture Animal
Region Total populationc based based based
Mediterranean Basin 106,800 42,000 60,000 4,200
(39%) (57%) (4%)
Sub-Saharan Africa 75,500 11,700 46,800 17,000
(15%) (62%) (23%)
Asia and the Pacific 378,000 106,800 260,400 10,300
(28%) (69%) (3%)
Americas 68,100 33,700 29,300 5,100
(50%) (43%) (7%)
628,400 194,200 397,100 37,100
(31%) (63%) (6%)
aMeigs's classification (1953) including extremely arid, arid, and semi-arid areas.
bGroupings as designated by UNEP Governing Council for regional meetings.
CTotal world population was estimated to be 3.86 billion in -1974.
TB 2. 'mates of populations and livelihoods resident in areas recently
undergoing severe desertificationa (in thousands)
Total Urban Agriculture Animal
Region population based based based Area (km2)
Mediterranean Basin 9,820 2,995 5,900 925 1,320,000
(31%) (60%) (9%)
Sub-Saharan Africa 16,165 3,072 6,014 7,079 6,850,000
(19%) (37%) (44%)
Asia and the Pacific 28,482 7,740 14,311 6,431 4,361,000
(27%) (54%) (19%)
Americas 24,079 7,683 13,417 2,979 17,545,000
(32%) (56%) (12%)
78,546 21,490 39,642 17,414 30,076,000
(27%) (51%) (22%)
aAs estimated by H. Dregne (includes both severe and very severe categories).
72th Ass 4L ancf 5 2i4 ? 6b s / a I. (/e 77)
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50 million immediately menaced through the destruction of their
livelihoods and who are faced by the grim prospect of uprooting
themselves from everything familiar and migrating to other areas
frequently ill-equipped to receive them (UNCOD, 1978: 2).
Population statistics proved dramatic when presented in conference documentation.
However, no disclaimer regarding uncertainties in the data accompanied publication of
the second table in the UNCOD (1978) report.
Furthermore, Kates et al.'s (1977) demographic analyses implied a commonality
among desertification processes in suggesting that they affected and interacted with
populations in uniform ways. The global statistics also focused attention on livelihood
systems and particular types of land use as responsible for desertification. Kates et al.
(1977: 271) explained, for example, that "two basics types of agricultural livelihood
exist," dry farming and irrigated farming. In regard to animal-based livelihoods, the
researchers highlighted what they considered to be the most significant features. These
features included mobility, flexibility, and diversification. Regarding urban-based
livelihood they identified intrinsic and indirect interactions. Intrinsic interactions were
said to arise from urban population densities and consumption patterns. Indirect
interactions originated in areas located outside of the city. These statistics were
important in suggesting that land use practices could be categorized into types that were
uniform worldwide. They similarly implied that a proximate solution based on improved
land use was viable.
The pre-UNCOD population study also exemplified the way in which UNEP
conceived of the social dimensions of desertification. In particular, the agency and its
consultants addressed social factors in much the same manner that it analyzed
desertification's physical dimensions -- through quantitative methodologies that lent
themselves to generalizations. The Kates et al. (1977) report was the only Component
Review to directly address human aspects of desertification. Measures used in this
analysis focused on demographic structure and the spatial location of populations. By
enumerating all people living in dryland areas, the study created a category of "dryland
population" similar to the category of "arid zone" developed under the auspices of
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UNESCO and employed liberally in the UNCOD assessments. This category and the
aggregate measures comprising it helped to legitimize desertification as a global problem
by implying that it affected uniform categories of people (defined by where they lived,
their land use practices and the climate) in uniform ways (expressed as a degree of
severity). In employing aggregate measures of these population categories, it was
impossible for researchers to capture locally contingent aspects of degradation processes,
such as culturally embedded views of the land, land use and trade policies that have a
bearing on how people interact with the land, and issues of poverty and education. While
some of these issues received brief discussion in the Kates et al. (1977) report, the
quantified estimates proved much more portable and were easily incorporated into
speeches, policy documents and UN, scientific and popular literature. As they circulated,
they relayed a simplified vision of the desertification problem as amenable to a
standardized set of solutions.
Costs and Benefits
Quantification also served as an important tool in estimating the costs and benefits of
anti-desertification measures. In advance of the Conference, the Secretariat arranged a
set of meetings specifically intended to bring together economists and financial experts
with earth science specialists. The product of this interaction was a table showing the
costs of desertification and the benefits of anti-desertification efforts. The tale fwas
prepared for the Conference and then revised for inclusion in the published conference
report (UNCOD, 1978) (see Table 6). For three types of land (categorized as irrigated,
range, or rainfed crop land), the table presented the annual rate of land degradation (in
hectares), its estimated value if salvaged and if not salvaged, the cost of salvage, and the
total net benefits expected for land salvaged (all in American dollars). While net benefits
in 1977 were reported as $632.5 million, the 1978 table reported total net benefits as
$895 million. Text accompanying the 1977 version of the table emphasized the
preliminary nature of the table entries, noting that the numbers represented "educated
estimates" and should be considered as a "rough order of magnitude of the elements
under consideration" (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 9). The 1978 version of the table,
published
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REVISION OF TABLE PREPARED FOR THE CONFERENCE, BASING LAND VALUES ON
CAPITALIZED VALUES AND ADJUSTING UNIT SALVAGE COSTS TO MORE REALISTIC LEVELS
Initial estimates of orders of magnitude of costs and benefits of corrective measures
(1)
Type of land'
Irrigated
Range
Rain-ted
Crop
(2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Annual rate Estrnated value Gan
of land if not if (4) - (3) (21-(5)
degradation salvaged salvaged per heclare Total
(000 hectares)l (S per hectare)3 rnihon
S S
Estenated
cost of
salvage'
per hectare
S
1255 200 2.000 1.800 225 850
(250-2.000)
3.200 2 20 18 58 10
(1-50)
2,500 50 450 400 1.000 100
(50-150)
TOTAL 5.825
'And and sorni-and lands only
ZAnnual rate of land degradation is based on annual rate of change of
classes of land to more degraded concitions. The degree of degradaion
from higher to lower classes of land has been converted to more imited
areas assumed to be delenorating from land yielding highest not return (if
salvaged) to land at the point of going out of production (if not salvaged).
fin view of difficulties in quantifying social values, these estimates are
rough conservative approximations of orders of magnitude of capitaized
values Values are calculated using an assurned not income at half of
gross income divided by an assumed opporiunity cost of 10 per cent. with a
1.283
Total Not
(2-7) gain
million per hectare
(5)-(7)
S S
Total net
benefits
(2).19)
millon
S
106 950 119
32 8 26
250 300 750
388 895
sight adjustment for rangelands to reflect lower opporunity costs If social
factors are included the values would be substantially higher
'Figures within parentheses give ranges of salvage costs ft follows from
footnote 2 that cost of salvage is the maximum. equivalent to the cost of
reclamation or restoration of practicaly completefy desertihed land Be-
cause desertification is a continuous process. the more prudent course of
action would be to begin corrective investment as soon as practicable andinitially to lands which oler the highest returns to ensure continued
mainmum production
s0ue to waterlogging. sainization and. to a lesser extent. alkabnization.
/~lqly)
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as part of UNCOD's report, portrayed the numbers on the whole as revised and "more
realistic," but did note, in a footnote, the roughness of the capitalized value estimates.
Because of difficulties in quantifying social values for the 1978 table, estimates of land
values were based on estimates of capitalized values (UNCOD, 1978: 2).
The use of cost-benefit analysis on the part of the Secretariat further exemplified
the emphasis on rationality and scientific objectivity in the context of desertification
policymaking. As noted by O'Riordan in 1976, "resource allocation techniques such as
cost-benefit, systems dynamics, and programme budgeting were created and are popular
precisely because they are supposed to be 'value free' and 'rational' (page 15)." By
demonstrating the costs and benefits of anti-desertification activities, UNEP aimed to
provide: quantifiable reasons why countries should support desertification policy.
Because social valuations of land and costs were not easily quantifiable they were
excluded from consideration. As discussed below, this one table seemed to serve as a
starting point for more extensive use of monetary metrics of desertification in later years.
Rate
UNEP's estimates of area of land per year lost to desertification relayed a sense of
urgency, and like global statistics, became a mainstay of desertification assessments for
years to come. The Conference report estimated that the world was likely to lose nearly
one third of its arable land by the turn of the century (UNCOD, Secretariat, 1977: 9;
UNCOD, 1978: 2-3). Similarly, Mostafa Tolba remarked:
It is estimated that between 30,000 and 70,000 square kilometers of useful
land are going out of production every year, and the most important cause
of this appalling loss is desertification (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977:
A/CONF.74/L.1: 3).
However, UNEP provided little information regarding the data and methodologies used
in producing these statistics. Rate estimates, for example, were calculated as part of a
cost and benefit analysis for the Conference. A footnote to the cost-benefit table
explained that the rate of land degradation was determined based on the rate at which
various categories of land exhibit more degraded conditions. The categories reflected
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causes of degradation, in terms of waterlogging, salinization, range deterioration, and
dryland deterioration. Yet, UNEP provided no information about the scheme for
classifying different levels of degradation or how changes in these levels were
determined (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 9; UNCOD, 1978: 2).
Similarly, UNEP concluded that, if desertification were allowed to proceed further.on the
geographical scale suggested by the World Map, 700 million people would be said to face
eventual risk. The source of these various estimates was unclear, as they were not
attributed to any specific pre-Conference assessments or to other studies or data sources.
UNEP, nevertheless, cited rates and projections of desertification's progress worldwide
as justification for immediate action. The Secretariat noted that rising food requirements
at least matched the rate of population growth, and projected that such changes would
require an increase in food by at least one third before the end of the century in order to
maintain then-current dietary standards (UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 9). Largely because
of desertification rates, the Conference argued that "preventive measures, embodied in
proper land management, should be developed on a massive scale and without delay"
(UNCOD Secretariat, 1977: 9). UNEP further argued that because desertification is a
continuous process, investment directed at lands promising the highest returns should
commence as soon as practicable (UNCOD, 1978).m2
4.3.3 Looking Ahead: Desertification Indicators
Standardized measurements of desertification phenomena were not only a product of
UNCOD preparations. UNEP also considered such measurements an important feature
of the implementation and evaluation activities under the Plan ofAction. The Plan, for
example, noted that defining the magnitude and impact of desertification constituted the
first stage in a several stage process for ameliorating desertification. The first
recommendation in the Plan called for assessment and evaluation of desertification using
comparable indices and the standardization of monitoring facilities and methods. In
keeping with pre-Conference modes of analysis, the Plan called for observations
122 Rates estimating the "advance" of desertification also tended to suggest a desert encroachment image of
desertification and contributed to confusion regarding the relationship of these phenomena. As discussed in
Chapter 3, rates became the focus of controversy in later years as critics questioned the notion of advancing
deserts, despite the PACD's disclaimer that advancing deserts were not the focus of the agreement.
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covering atmospheric processes, vegetation, dust transport, soil cover, wildlife, and crops.
The Plan similarly called for maps to represent the results of monitoring. Mostafa Tolba,
in recognizing the substantial amount of groundwork to be completed before any such
monitoring could start, remarked on the newness of desertification as a focus of
international cooperation. He noted: "precise standards are yet to be formulated for
measuring desertification and gauging its advance." He referred to the development of
physical, biological and social indicators of desertification, which he said, promised to
help "assess more accurately the state of the process of desertification" (A/CONF.74/L. 1:
2).
Tolba's comments alluded, in part, to the Science Associations' Seminar on
Desertification, which took place in Nairobi during the week preceding UNCOD (August
21-25, 1977). This meeting, organized by Priscilla Reining of the American Association
for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) and chaired by Harold Dregne, focused on the
development of desertification indicators.12 3 Approximately thirty scientists from almost
twenty countries attended the meeting along with observers from UN agencies,
universities, government ministries and various organizations. The scientists came from
areas of soil science, climatology, plant and animal ecology, agricultural economics,
range and wildlife management, anthropology, sociology, geography, and agronomy.
They aimed to develop comparable indices for monitoring desertification. Planning and
development agencies worldwide were expected to use these indices in implementing the
Plan.
123 Through its Office of International Science the AAAS became involved with United Nations
conferences on Population, Woman, and Human Settlements. In preparation for UNCOD, AAAS
established an ad hoc Advisory Committee on Desertification (headed by Harold Dregne) which was
significantly larger than its permanent Committee on Arid Lands. The AAAS recognized desertification as
a "complex systemic process." The project's aim was to focus scientific attention on a specific objective to
enable an "effective contribution" from the scientific community. In June of 1977 AAAS sponsored a
workshop at Cremona Farm in Maryland to prepare for the Nairobi Seminar. This workshop produced a
"Working Paper on Indicators" that served as an agenda item and background paper for the Nairobi
seminar participants. Twelve scientists attended the Cremona Workshop accompanied by Priscilla Reining
and four other AAAS officers and associates.
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Only a highly focused objective can enable a small number of scientists to
make an effective contribution. A considerable need existed to create
consensus for precisely what processes of desertification should be
measured, how, and where they should be monitored. Such measurement
and assessment are called for in the first recommendation of the Plan of
Action to Combat Desertification (Reining, 1977: xiii).
The set of indicators was first developed by a working party over a several month period
prior to the seminar. These indicators included physical, biological/agricultural, and
social. Many of the proposed indicators focused on physical and biological
manifestations of desertification such as soil depth, soil organic matter, ground water
depth and quality, and animal populations. Other indicators identified changes in
settlement patterns, migration, health and conflict as categories of social indicators.
These indicators were primarily intended to provide a means for creating more
maps and statistics regarding the geographic extent, location and rate of desertification.
They also buttressed the notion that desertification processes could and should be
standardized and thought about in terms of their international scale and scope. As
discussed below, these objectives occupied UNEP throughout the next decade as the
agency used various indicators to further refine the global picture of desertification it
introduced in 1977.
4.4 Measures and Management
As the lead agency in charge of overseeing the Plan's implementation, UNEP relied
heavily on quantitative methods in continuing to study the desertification problem and
assess the efficacy of anti-desertification efforts. One of UNEP's tasks was to conduct
General Assessments of Progress regarding the Plan's implementation. The way that
UNEP interpreted this task was important. In particular, the agency channeled
considerable time and resources toward measuring the "rate and extent" of desertification
on a global scale. Hence, UNEP operated largely under the assumption that good
management depended on good measurement. The agency continued to focus on
assessing physical manifestations of desertification, instead of analyzing processes
contributing to desertification. With a numerical metric of success, global statistics, such
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as those introduced during the 1970s, proliferated. Statistical categories continued to
emphasize land use as the primary cause of desertification and to focus attention on
demography as the best means for representing desertification's social dimensions.
However, while global statistics during the 1970s seemed to legitimate
desertification's global framing and justify international attention to the problem, similar
statistics developed in the 1980s did not meet the same degree of acceptance. Rather than
imbuing the issue with an aura of objectivity and universality (e.g., O'Riordan, 1976),
UNEP's methods of quantification became a target of critics who questioned the
credibility of both the issue itself and UNEP as its staunchest proponent. Some scientists
suggested that UNEP's quantitative estimates of desertification in the 1970s exaggerated
its extent and severity. Several individuals were also highly skeptical of the
methodologies UNEP applied in preparing its 1984 General Assessment of Progress.
They criticized UNEP's attempt to gather information for its assessment via a
questionnaire, and argued that UNEP's assessment results were at best inaccurate and at
worst, fabricated. Nevertheless, global statistics continued to appear again and again in
various pieces of UN literature, articles, and even in subsequent international agreements.
Furthermore, UNEP continued to develop and rely on assessments of desertification's
rate and extent throughout the 1980s.
4.4.1 Policy Implementation and Quantification
In overseeing the Plan's follow-up, UNEP sponsored a number of assessment activities
during the 1980s and early 1990s. The most extensive of these studies were the General
Assessments of Progress, conducted at seven-year intervals following the Plan's
completion in 1977 (UNEP, 1984; UNEP, 1991). UNEP also carried out a number of
additional studies, often in conjunction with other agencies, or through ad hoc expert
panels. As such, these studies addressed mapping and assessment methodologies (FAO,
1981; FAO and UNEP, 1984; UNEP and ISRIC, 1989; Odingo, 1990a; Odingo, 1990b;
Rozanov, 1990), progress in implementing the Plan ofAction, and various definitions of
desertification and their implications for policy implementation (Odingo, 1989, 1990).
Through many of these studies, UNEP relied largely on quantitative measures to
characterized desertification, and highlighted an important role for such measures in
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policy implementation. At times during the 1980s, for example, members of UNEP's
administrative staff reminded expert consultants that policymakers could not base their
work on the cautionary hedgings of "scientists who say they can't know anything for
sure" (Interview with UNEP Advisor 2). Quantitative estimates provided at least an
appearance of certainty.
Many of UNEP's assessment activities focused on measurement and mapping of
desertification. An accurate assessment of desertification's physical manifestations
worldwide was considered necessary for successful implementation of policy measures.
The Plan ofAction called for efforts to define the magnitude of desertification and FAO
and UNEP echoed similar ideas in their 1983 analysis of assessment and mapping
methodologies.
This project was initiated with the aim of obtaining precise figures on rate
and risk of desertification to assist future planning, to guide anti-
desertification activities at national and regional levels as a basis for
international action to combat desertification (FAO and UNEP, 1984: 1).
With this perspective, UNEP and the consultants it hired placed considerable emphasis
on identifying and measuring quantifiable desertification indicators. When UNEP
convened an expert meeting in May 1979 to discuss assessment and mapping methods,
participants determined that "indicators should, ideally, be quantitative, sensitive to small
changes in the fact being measured, easy to measure and few in number." At a second
Expert Consultation in July 1981, participants approved a provisional methodology for
field testing. Parameters selected for evaluation focused on physical manifestations of
desertification, including degradation of vegetative cover, water erosion, wind erosion,
and salinization. For assessment and mapping purposes, FAO and UNEP deemed it
necessary to "describe, quantify and codify" these parameters, and then determine their
status, rate and "inherent risk" (FAO and UNEP, 1983: 11-12).
An emphasis on evaluating the status and rate of desertification continued to color
UNEP assessments throughout the 1980s. As discussed further below, UNEP's General
Assessment of Progress in 1984 used data obtained from a questionnaire to estimate
changes in desertification's physical extent and severity since 1977 and to project
desertification rates to the year 2000. In 1990, UNEP commissioned Professor Boris
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Rozanov, Chair of General Pedology at Moscow University, to consider issues regarding
the status and global assessment of desertification. In reviewing FAO and LNEP's work
in the mid-i 980s, Rozanov found the proposed indicators to be impractical for
measurements conducted at regional and national levels because of costs associated with
collection of such detailed information. He instead called for a "simpler, more refined
methodology" (Rozanov, 1990: 75).
Rozanov was an enthusiastic proponent of quantitative desertification analyses
according to internationally standardized criteria and methodologies. He lamented the
lack of an easily quantifiable, and therefore, "operational" definition of desertification.
... for the practical purposes of desertification assessment, mapping,
monitoring and countermeasures, particularly at the local level, none of
these definitions appear to be sufficiently operative, they lack the
quantitative aspect, on the one hand, and, on the other, an unequivocal
indication of what is to be assessed, mapped, monitored and fought. This
lack of operability has led to differences in the methodologies used by
different scientists and national and international institutions concerned
with desertification in different parts of the world, as well as at different
times (Rozanov, 1990: 71).
In keeping with ideas reflected by the Plan, Rozanov viewed quantitative assessment of
desertification as an integral part of anti-desertification policy implementation. In
keeping with his militaristic reference to fighting desertification, Rozanov's "know your
enemy" strategy required a united front on the part of national and international
institutions. Such unity, he believed, was possible only through precise characterization
of desertification and international standardization in the modes and methods of scientific
inquiry. In particular, he called for some "definite international methodology that would
be adopted and strictly followed throughout the world" (Rozanov, 1990: 73).
To serve these purposes, Rozanov believed that quantitative information
regarding desertification was essential, and he had little use for other desertification
indicators. In reflecting on the availability of descriptive data from affected areas, he
commented:
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There is an enormous amount of information concerning desertification in
Africa, South Asia and Latin America. However, this vast fund of data,
which appears in various reports and publications, does not cast any new
light on the problem because it is largely qualitative and, in some cases,
more emotional than factual. With some reservations this information can
be used for creating a general picture, but it is hardly sufficient to prove
the case beyond all reasonable doubt (Rozanov, 1990: 53).
In referring to the "emotional" aspects of qualitative data, Rozanov suggested that such
observations were not obtained via the scientific method and were therefore not objective
or useful in developing understandings of desertification.
UNEP's continued emphasis on desertification highlighted its interest in a
simplified interpretation of desertification that facilitated generalizations about it.
Quantitative measures focused attention not on processes of desertification, but on their
manifestations as expressed through measurements of geographic extent and changes in
this extent over time. Quantitative measures of status, rate and risk similarly obscured a
view of the various social, ecological, political and economic factors associated with
desertification processes. Consideration of these factors would have prevented
generalization and a uniform framing of desertification.
General Assessment of Progress, 1984
Perhaps the most widely publicized and most controversial of UNEP's assessments was
the 1984 General Assessment of Progress. The Plan ofAction called for an evaluation to
take place seven years after the Plan's completion. The Plan provided few specifics
regarding the methodologies and content of the assessment. Hence, UNEP had
considerable leeway in designing the study, and many of its decisions echoed the
approach to desertification reflected in the Plan ofAction. In particular, UNEP again
choose to assess the desertification largely in quantitative terms. In doing so, the agency
focused on ascertaining desertification's physical extent at a global scale, and the rate at
which this physical extent was changing. UNEP then looked to differences in 1984 and
1977 statistics as an indication of overall "progress" in ameliorating desertification.
While other aspects of the assessment presented qualitative descriptions of anti-
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desertification activities,1 24 institutional and financial arrangements, obstacles to
implementation, and recommendations for the next 15 years, the most dramatic and
widely cited results of the assessment were those expressed in numerical terms.
Although descriptive accounts of desertification's status and trends in several geographic
regions also appeared in the report, they were relegated to an annex and left.out of the
"Executive Summary."
UNEP began preparing of the assessment in 1982. The agency determined that
the study would include four elements12 5 and appointed an advisory panel to oversee its
compilation.126 A key feature of the assessment process was a questionnaire sent to 12
donor countries and 91 countries determined to be affected by desertification. The
questionnaire posed questions regarding changes in population, land use and crop and
livestock production since 1977; status and trend of desertification under primary land
use categories (irrigated lands, rainfed croplands and rangelands); and activities
implemented under the Plan's recommendations. Sixty-two affected countries responded
to the questionnaire, along with four donor countries.12 7 In addition to the questionnaire,
UNEP commissioned updates for several of the UNCOD case studies, Hare's (1977)
"Climate and Desertification" piece (Hare, 1983), and a new study on demographic
changes since 1977 (Caldwell, 1984). To review activities across the whole UN system,
UNEP obtained records of such activities from the appropriate agencies (UNEP, 1984).
The UNEP assessment used numerical representations much in the way that the
124 Assessors also enumerated donor and agency projects implemented under the PACD. A table of donor
projects appears on page 120 of Dregne (1984). A chart showing projects categorized according to
activities highlighted int the PACD (e.g., assessment, land use planning, range improvement, and
vegetation improvement) appears on page 31 of (UNEP, 1984).
125 Science advisors heavily involved with desertification policymaking in the 1970s summarized various
parts of the assessment in papers published in Environmental Conservation (Dregne, 1984; Karrar, 1984;
Mabbutt, 1984; Tolba, 1984).
126 Panel members included A. G. Abdel Sami of the Academy of Scientific Research and Technology
(Cairo, Egypt) G. Aubert, of Services Scientifiques (Bundy, France); R. A. Perry from the Division of
Land Resources at CSIRO (Australia); and Jeremy Swift of the Institute for Development Studies (Sussex,
UK). Others who attended the handful of meetings included Mostafa Tolba, Executive Director of UNEP;
James Mabbutt, consultant to UNEP; and Gafaar Karrar and Daniel Stiles, both of UNEP's desertification
branch (Interview with UNEP Science Advisor 2; Jeremy Swift's documents 1998).
127 In his paper entitled, "Desertification: Demographic evidence, 1973-1983," John Caldwell remarked
that UNEP's questionnaire was answered by only thirty countries: fifteen in Africa, nine in Asia, five in
South America, and one in North America. The discrepancy between UNEP's and Caldwell's response
figures may be due to the fact that Caldwell counted only those countries who responded to population
questions, while UNEP totaled all responses, whether or not they contained answers to population and
demographic questions.
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UNCOD experts had done - to express the physical extent and costs of desertification.
Categories for quantification included the extent of desertification, populations affected,
global trends, and projections to the year 2000. The UJNEP study, however, provided
estimates for a much larger set of regions than those included in the UNCOD studies.m
Desertification indicators used in.the assessment included growth and encroachment of
mobile sand dunes and aolian sand sheets, rangeland deterioration, degradation of rain-
fed croplands, waterlogging and salinization of irrigated lands, deforestation and
destruction of woody vegetation, and declining availability of groundwater and surface
water. Social and economic indicators, however, were not used in the assessment.
Although it is recognized that human and social indicators may lie close to
the heart of the problem, the evidence upon which to base them is not
systematically available, and in many other respects they have proved
difficult to monitor. Accordingly, they have not been used as primary
indicators in this assessment (UNEP, 1984: 13).
The report also noted that, in general, data regarding the status and trends of
desertification in various parts of the world were lacking and were found through the
assessment process to be inadequate and an impediment to the Plan's implementation.
This assessment shows that quantitative data about the status and trend of
desertification are inadequate... Data are particularly lacking on the
economic and social costs of desertification in terms of production lost
and social welfare impaired (UNEP, 1984: 7).
Nevertheless, UNEP presented its results as certain and definitive, without mention of
uncertainties relating to specific statistics. Based on the physical indicators, assessors
characterized various land use types as none or slight, moderate, severe or very severe.
These classifications depended on the extent and degree of degradation, losses in
128 Regions addressed in the study were as follows: Sudano-Sahelian region; Africa South of the Sundano-
Sahelian region; Mediterranean Africa; Western Asia; South Asia; USSR in Asia; China and Mongolia;
Australia; Mediterranean Europe; South America and Mexico; and North America.
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productivity, and required improvements.
The assessment presented a grim picture of desertification. It found that
desertification was continuing to spread and intensify with six million hectares of land
per year lost irretrievably to desertification or degraded to desert-like conditions. In
reflecting on these results, UNEP noted:
Desertification is shown by this assessment to be a world problem calling
for an appropriate global response, not merely by virtue of its scale and
urgency, but also through the universality of its impacts and causes, which
extend far beyond the drylands most directly affected (UNEP, 1984: 18).
The assessment, like the UNCOD studies, reported statistics according to categories of
land use and severity of desertification. For example, areas experiencing at least a
moderate level of desertification included 3100 million hectares of rangeland, 335 million
hectares of rainfed croplands and 40 million hectares of irrigated land, translating to 75
per cent of all productive lands in drylands. UNEP found that rural populations
experiencing severe desertification escalated from 57 million in 1977 to 135 million in
1984. They estimated the direct cost of desertification at $26 billion dollars annually
(excluding social costs) and attributed the majority of these costs to declines in
productivity. The assessment further reported that production losses arising from
desertification were equivalent to five times the cost of halting desertification. However,
no explicit cost-benefit calculations or tables were presented in the report.
Population figures showed substantial increases over the 1977 estimates.
Whereas the 1977 studies estimated the number of people vulnerable to desertification at
650 million, the 1984 assessment reported 850 million for the year 1984. UNEP cited
three reasons for the increase: population growth; inclusion of more subhumid land areas
in the category considered affected by desertification, and an increase in the extent and
severity of desertification. The population numbers showed rainfed agricultural land to be
the most extensively affected with over 60% of people in rainfed agricultural areas
experiencing at least moderate desertification.
To assess global trends in desertification, UNEP examined forest and woodland
cover and groundwater resources in regions corresponding to the three land-use
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categories. Assessors determined that desertification was accelerating in four regions:
the Sudano-Sahelian region, Africa south of the Sudano-Sahelian region, South Asia and
South America. Most discussion of desertification trends was expressed in qualitative,
descriptive terms. The report concluded that desertification had continued unchanged in
most land use sectors since 1977. The study also provided projections to the year 2000,
estimating that dryland populations would increase to 1.2 billion, with the rural
component increasing from 500 million to 600 million.
UNEP's (1984) statistics on desertification were widely quoted in UN reports and
in other articles. James Mabbutt's (1984) article in Environmental Conservation
presented a nearly verbatim account of the "status and rate" portion of the assessment, as
did a ten-year retrospective on desertification policy, published by UNEP's
Desertification Control Programme Activity Center (1987). In a 1984 issue of UNEP's
publication Uniterra and in a guest editorial for Environmental Conservation, Tolba
referred to the 1984 estimates in lamenting lack of progress in the fight against
desertification. Even Our Common Future quoted the UNEP figures in a section entitled
"Advancing Deserts."
4.4.2 Data Deficiencies
UNEP's assessment work in 1983 and 1984 marked the "moment when it all went
wrong." These comments by an advisor to UNEP's 1984 assessment process summed up
the sentiments of many observers, both inside and outside of UNEP during the early
1980s. Much doubt focused on the overall paucity of data necessary for calculating rate
and status statistics and on uncertainties surrounding responses to UNEP's questionnaire.
One advisor remarked that responses to the questionnaire "garbage." Even the United
States was unable to fill out the survey and environment ministries in many other
countries "didn't have a clue about how to answer the questionnaire." This advisor was
also distressed by the methodologies and lack of transparency regarding the calculations.
He described how data obtained were "thrown into computers." According to him,
several of the experts involved with the assessment voiced their concerns to UNEP
regarding availability and validity of the data (Interview with UNEP Advisor 2).
Correspondence between expert consultants and UNEP reflected similar
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impressions of the UNEP study. A draft manuscript entitled "Regional Assessment for
North America," for example, noted that "Desertification is a much-used but little
understood word in the US" and that "In North America there is little agreement about
the status and trend of desertification" (unpublished manuscript, "Regional Assessment
for North America"). Similar comments regarding ambiguity in desertification's
meaning in North America, however, did not appear in the North American Annex
presented in the final assessment report. In a June 25, 1983 memo, Brian Spooner, an
anthropologist from the University of Pennsylvania, reported to Dr. K. F. Jalal on his
analysis of desertification in Asia and the Pacific Region. Spooner relayed the problems
he encountered in shifting through various research materials: "I am afraid the further I
got into it the less 'hard' the data became" (Spooner memo, June 25, 1983, Jeremy
Swift's files). In referencing country reports and three responses to UNEP
questionnaires, Spooner continued:
The country papers in most cases when you look closely, simply hedge
rather than giving the required information, and most of the figures on the
questionnaires are either too divorced from context or have other problems
to have any obvious acceptable meaning (memo from Spooner to Jalal,
June 25, 1983, Jeremy Swift's files).
Spooner found Australia's responses to the questionnaire lacking as well, suggesting they
were based on data collected prior to 1977. To Spooner, the situation illustrated the need
for more information in statistical and map form.
It seems to me now even more than before that lack of information, both
in terms of statistics and maps - especially now that progress has been
made on the institutional front - is perhaps one of the most serious aspects
of the whole problem (memo from Spooner to Jalal, June 25, 1983,
Jeremy Swift's files).
Spooner suggested that UNEP had "shied away from" greater data collection efforts in
previous years because of the significant investments required. He recommended,
however, that the agency make information a key priority in subsequent years of the
Plan's implementation.
John C. Caldwell, a demographer at Australian National University, similarly
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found problems with UNEP's assessment data. Caldwell prepared a study for UNEP
examining the demographics of desertification between 1973 and 1983. Originally,
Caldwell intended to use the results of UNEP's questionnaire as the basis of his analysis.
However, he judged that responses to the questionnaire were inadequate on several
counts. According to Caldwell, the total number of respondents was low and questions
posed were not clear and not well understood by respondents. He also found that the
questionnaire presented information about desertification that was frequently "absurd or
at variance with published sources" (Caldwell, 1984: 21). Although hesitant to draw any
generalizations from the information collected, Caldwell did conclude that population
growth in most "Third World" arid lands was no slower than that in humid lands. For a
handful of countries he reported statistics that he considered to be accurate, but he
deemed migration results overall as "all wrong," and allowed only for the conclusion that
people tended to migrate from drier to wetter locations and from rural to urban areas
(Caldwell, 1983: 23).
Despite the concerns of its consultants, however, UNEP went forward with
publication of its assessment in time to meet its 1984 deadline. The document itself gave
no indication of who contributed to or authored the study. It is most often attributed to
Jack Mabbutt who played a major role in overseeing the process and published results on
desertification's status and trends in a 1984 issue of Environmental Conservation (e.g.,
see Nelson, 1990; Warren and Agnew, 1988).
4.4.3 Critics Recommend New Ways of Counting
UNEP's findings and methodologies continued to attract criticism throughout the
1980s.129 In 1988 Andrew Warren (former expert consultant to the 1977 Conference) and
Clive Agnew, both of University College London, published papers critical of the way in
which desertification had been conceptualized and addressed (Warren and Agnew, 1988a
and 1988b). Desertification assessment criteria and statistics were among the things they
129 Critiques of UNEP's desertification assessments appeared in the 1990s as well. Examples include Swift
(1996) and Thomas and Middleton (1994). In 1995 Daniel Stiles of UNEP responded to the various
critiques by pointing out weaknesses in critics' analyses. On the topic of UNEP's 1984 assessment,
however, Stiles conceded the report "did not contain accurate statistics. The data simply do not exist"
(Stiles, 1995: 14). Nevertheless, he contended that UNEP did not exaggerate the scale of the problem and
went on to question the claims of Warren and Agnew (1988) and Thomas and Middleton (1994).
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discussed. According to these two researchers, the "litany of statistics" was inadequate,
often misleading and based on conflicting definitions of desertification. For example, in
response to UNEP's claim that desertification threatened 35 percent of the earth's
surface, Warren and Agnew argued that at least half of this area was very arid already
and unable to support agriculture now or at any time in the future (Warren and Agnew,
1988a: 5). These authors placed most of the blame on what they called inappropriate
criteria. Inappropriateness stemmed from lack of standards or baselines in
measurements, inadequate attention to recoverability and resilience of degraded land,
lack of attention to natural fluctuations in climate and vegetation, scarcity of data, and
irrelevance of data to local land use systems (Warren and Agnew, 1988).
Warren and Agnew claimed that the measurements and assessments UNEP
considered so important as a basis for policy were actually of little relevance to "life on
the ground." The level of aggregation in UNEP's world maps and land classification
schemes made them largely meaningless to local populations. 30 Furthermore, the design
of large-scale analyses derives more from institutional priorities and available resources,
than from a concern for the needs of local populations.
The scale at which land degradation has usually been viewed has been
determined more by the availability, to the authorities concerned, or data
and manpower, than by its appropriateness to the inhabitants of semi-arid
areas (Warren and Agnew, 1988: 7).
They added that measurement of UNEP-identified parameters would be virtually
impossible at local levels because of technical and resource challenges they would pose
to provincial governments. Yet, despite their skepticism regarding past analyses of
desertification, they stated emphatically that they did not deny the problen's existence,
but simply called for improved evaluation techniques.
A couple of years later, as the World Bank was considering its funding priorities
in regard to dryland management, Ridley Nelson, an environmental specialist and
economist at the Bank, undertook an analysis of desertification and came to conclusions
similar to those of Warren and Agnew (1988). According to Nelson, several aspects of
130 The authors cited similar problems regarding erosion maps by the United States Soil Conservation
Service and surveys of land degradation in Australia.
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desertification had been exaggerated. These included the certainty with which the extent
and solutions to desertification were known; the degree of consensus among scientists
and practitioners regarding the extent, causes and solutions of desertification; and the
total area of irreversibly desertified land. As an example, Nelson pointed to UNEP's
claim that the number of people who inhabited lands undergoing desertification increased
by 35% between 1977 and 1984. To a general reader, this statement might indicate that
the number of people affected by desertification increased by 35% between 1977 and
1988. Yet, a lot of this change was due to a change in the study sample. UNEP added a
large portion of sub-humid areas to its analysis in 1984, thereby increasing estimates of
the affected population. While the original UNEP report mentioned the inclusion of
subhumid regions as a reason for the large increase in the population figure, reproduction
of the study's statistical findings in other publications did not always include this
important qualification (e.g., UNEP/DCPAC, 1987: 6).
Nelson identified UNEP's 1984 questionnaire study as the source of several
inaccurate and misleading statistics. He further criticized the assessment's ambiguous
criteria, invisible methodologies, and failure to consider how severe African drought
during the period of the study might have affected its results. However, in a somewhat
more understanding tone, Nelson acknowledged the highly political context from which
such estimates emerge.
The point is not to be critical of the questionnaire or the study: given the
lack of measurements in the field and the public and political demands for
some quantification what else can be done? The point is to emphasize that
the results, which are by far the most widely quoted evidence on the extent
of desertification, have an extraordinarily shaky basis and have clearly
been enormously influenced in Africa, by being completed after a long
and exceptionally dry period (Nelson, 1990: 5).
Like Warren and Agnew (1988a, 1988b) Nelson believed that desertification, was,
indeed, a serious problem and he recommended a number of strategies for improving
efforts to characterize and ameliorate it. His suggestions called for more measurement
of desertification's extent and enhanced analysis of its causes, the design of appropriate
technologies, greater participation by local populations, and legislation aimed at
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improved land management.
Nelson recommended better quantification and mapping supported by remote
sensing studies and standardized monitoring systems such as rangeland monitoring
systems based on Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometry or systems developed by
the International Livestock Center for Africa. In a similar vein to Warren and Agnew,
however, Nelson noted that "the need is not simply for better quantification of the
aggregate seriousness of desertification, it is for better mapping to show the location"
(Nelson, 1990: 20). Nelson further emphasized the complexity and local variability of
desertification as proof that "there are no global or regional technical solutions" (Nelson,
1990: 22). In light of the local and complex nature of the problem, Nelson suggested
ordinary photography as a lower-cost means for documenting local changes. He also
recommended greater reliance on biological and social historical analysis to aid
understanding of local conditions and their change over time. Overall, Nelson
encouraged the use of qualitative, as well as quantitative methods in identifying and
understanding desertification phenomena.
Criticism regarding the 1984 assessment damaged UNEP's credibility on the
desertification issue. Even more recent authors (e.g., Thomas and Middleton, 1994;
Swift, 1996) continue to point to the study as an example of bad science and inaccurate
reporting of results. The episode raises a number of questions: why did UNEP make the
decisions it did? What made the agency's work so open to deconstruction? And, what
implications did the assessment and its aftermath have to desertification science and
policymaking in general? While there are no simple answers to the first question, Ridley
Nelson, in noting the "public and political demands" (Nelson, 1990: 5) on UNEP
highlights an important point. The UN system and others interested in the desertification
issue probably had expectations regarding the way in which UNEP would evaluate
progress in the PACD's implementation. Ultimately, however, such expectations derived
largely from the way in which UNEP had framed the issue and the agency's role in the
first place. UNEP defined desertification as a scientific and quantifiable issue. The
agency also suggested that progress in implementing the PACD should and could be
measured via objective methodologies and expressed in quantitative terms. Within this
framework, people inside and outside of UNEP (e.g., Rozanov) expected a certain type of
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analysis based on quantifiable criteria and scientific modes of inquiry. If desertification
had been framed differently, a questionnaire and a qualitative interpretation of its results
might have been much more acceptable.
UNEP's statistics came under attack largely because they implied a sound
scientific methodology and circulated widely. When available technologies and
resources made it difficult for UNEP to realize its goals for a scientifically credible and
quantitative assessment, the agency relied on methodologies that many scientists found
questionable. Nevertheless, UNEP persisted in presenting its findings quantitatively and
in a way that implied they were precise and accurate. These results, though eventually
questioned, were highly portable and initially appeared in UN documents, scientific
articles and in the popular press.
4.4.4 UNEP's Response
In UNEP's next large-scale assessment in 1991, the agency continued to emphasize
quantitative analysis as a key assessment practice. However, the ways in which the
agency carried out the study and presented results marked a significant change from its
methods in 1984. The new analysis introduced a revised definition of the desertification
problem, employed datasets that proved credible to scientists and policymakers 3 1 and
afforded greater attention to socio-economic aspects of desertification.
In December 1989, General Assembly Resolution 44/172 requested UNEP's
Governing Council to evaluate progress in implementing the Plan ofAction. This
assessment was intended to contribute to discussions regarding desertification at the
United Nations Conference on Environment and Development. Preparatory studies and
consultations were conducted in the next year (e.g., Odingo, 1990; Ad Hoc Consultative
131 Agenda 21, Chapter 12, for example, quoted several statistics from UNEP's (1991) assessment.
"Desertification is land degradation in arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas resulting from various
factors, including climatic variations and human activities. Desertification affects about one sixth of the
world's population, 70/per/cent of all drylands, amounting to 3.6/billion hectares, and one quarter of the
total land area of the world. The most obvious impact of desertification, in addition to widespread poverty,
is the degradation of 3.3/billion hectares of the total area of rangeland, constituting 73/per/cent of the
rangeland with a low potential for human and animal carrying capacity; decline in soil fertility and soil
structure on about 47/per/cent of the dryland areas constituting marginal rainfed cropland; and the
degradation of irrigated cropland, amounting to 30/per/cent of the dryland areas with a high population
density and agricultural potential" (UNCED, Agenda 21, paragraph 12.2 - Econet version).
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Meeting in 1990), followed by a final assessment published in 1991: Status of
Desertification and Implementation of the United Nations Plan ofAction to Combat
Desertification. Presenting a global picture of desertification remained a priority for
UNEP (e.g., see Odingo, 1990: 3), as did the use of quantitative statistics to relay the
extent of desertification. The title of Chapter 1, "World Status of Desertification" was
similar to aggregate, quantitative analysis of 1984. As in previous years, UNEP
presented estimates of arid land area in various regions, as well as estimates of degraded
land classified according to severity of degradation, land use category, and region. Its
Executive Summary provided a familiar list of global statistics noting that desertification
manifests itself through degradation in 73 percent of all rangelands in dryland areas, loss
of soil fertility in 47 percent of all drylands used for rainfed cropping, and 30 percent of
all irrigated croplands located in dryland regions.13 2
However, the 1991 assessment also differed from previous assessments in several
respects. Expert consultations had resulted in a new definition of desertification. While
UNEP continued to identify human land use as the primary cause of desertification, they
equated desertification with land degradation. Degradation was said to imply:
... reduction of resource potential by one or a combination of processes
acting on the land. These processes include water erosion, wind erosion
and sedimentation by those agents, long term reduction in the amount or
diversity of natural vegetation, where relevant, and salinization and
sodication (LNEP, 1991: 1).
Based on this new definition and climate datasets (for years 1951-1980), provided by the
University of East Anglia, UNEP's GEMS/GRID Programme Activity Center created a
new world map of drylands. For this purpose, Mike Hulme of the University of East
Anglia developed a revised scheme for aridity classifications. Instead of the Penman
formula applied in the 1977 World Map, Hulme used Thornthwaite's method, but applied
an empirical adjustment factor to address the lack of uniform climatological data for the
132 In regard to financing for the Plan, UNEP presented several estimates of desertification costs according
to land use and regional categories. Figures covered cost of damage, as well as costs of prevention,
correction and rehabilitation.
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period 1951-1980 (Interview with UNEP Advisor 3; UNEP, 1990). New definitions and
formulas precluded estimates of global trends in desertification and aridity over time.
UNEP used two new global datasets in its analysis. The first showed various
forms of land degradation in drylands produced by the International Center for Arid and
Semi-Arid Land Studies of Texas Tech University. The second dataset provided
information on soil degradation in drylands, based on the World Map of the Status of
Human Induced Soil Degradation (Global Assessment of Soil Degradation, or
GLASOD), prepared by the International Soil Reference and Information center (ISRIC)
and UNEP in 1990. During expert consultations, debate ensued over whether the
assessment report should include the figure for rangeland degradation (2,576 million
hectares) as part of the total area of degraded drylands. Most scientists in the group
argued that this form of rangeland degradation should not be included in the total figure
because rangeland degradation was often a short-term phenomenon, while soil
degradation was often of longer duration and.of greater importance. Head officials at
UNEP, however, argued strongly that the rangeland vegetation figures be included
(Interview with UNEP Advisor 3). The final report included figures for rangeland
degradation totaling 50% of the total degraded land, presumably because these figures
increased the estimated extent of desertification worldwide.
In evaluating the global status of desertification, UNEP included a largely
qualitative account of desertification's socio-economic aspects. In contrast to previous
analyses and policy statements regarding desertification, the UNEP study remarked on
the complexity of desertification processes at various levels.
Recent developments have further underlined the fact that desertification
results from complex interactions among physical, chemical, biological,
socio-economic and political problems, local, national and global in nature
(UNEP, 1991: 12).
Consequently, the study provided a summary account of problems associated with
migration patterns, population growth, demands for production, and agricultural
expansions. The assessment further noted economic aspects of desertification,
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specifically citing economic and development policies, trade barriers, poverty, and lack
of credit available to women in rural areas (UNEP, 1991).
4.5 Quantification and the Convention to Combat Desertification
The process that gave rise to the Convention to Combat Desertification reflected a
markedly different approach to quantification than seen in earlier eras. UNEP, which had
served as the primary generator of desertification statistics throughout the 1970s and
1980s, no longer had a mandate to lead on the issue. In addition, Elisabeth Dowdeswell
replaced Mostafa Tolba as UNEP's Executive Director and Dowdeswell appeared to be
steering the agency away from additional commitments to large-scale treaty regimes.
Consequently, UNEP took a back seat to the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee
and the Desertification Secretariat. In this new institutional context, the use of global
estimates to characterize desertification decreased considerably. While participants in the
negotiation process continued to emphasize the need for desertification monitoring at
various scales and standardization of observation criteria, methodologies and indicators
prescribed for desertification assessment called for local participation and greater
attention to complex social processes.
The Desertification Secretariat probably makes the most use of statistics in the
new regime. Public relations literature out of the Desertification Secretariat expressed
the global extent of desertification in quantitative terms. The most widely-cited statistic
referenced the estimated 250 million people affected by desertification, rather than its
physical extent. However, various "Fact Sheets," intended to explain desertification to a
general audience, quoted the figures presented in UNEP's 1991 study and quoted in
Agenda 21, Chapter 12. Examples include the following:
Over 250 million people are directly affected by desertification, and some
one thousand million (or one billion) are at risk (CCD, 1995a)
Seventy percent of the world's drylands (excluding hyper-arid deserts), or
some 3,600 million hectares, are degraded. While drought is often
associated with land degradation, it is a natural phenomenon that occurs
when rainfall is significantly below normal recorded levels for a long time
(CCD, 1995b).
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At the global level, it is estimated that the annual income foregone in the
areas immediately affected by desertification amounts to approximately
US$ 42 billion each year (CCD, 1995c).
Similarly, the Convention's Web Page notes:
The UN also estimates that some 70 per cent of the 5.2 billion hectares of
drylands used for agriculture around the world are already degraded.
Urgent action is needed, particularly in Africa. However, desertification is
not just a problem for developing countries: the continent with the highest
proportion of severely or moderately desertified drylands is North
America. Five European countries also suffer from it, as do several
members of the former Soviet Union.
Hence, numbers continue to serve as a powerful means of communication, offering a
shorthand to those charged with portraying serious problems associated with
desertification to the public at large. However, the numbers quoted are already nearly ten
years old and the fate of such statistics remains to be seen. As discussed below, the
Convention itself and ongoing work under the COP have focused little (if any) attention
on developing quantitative measures of desertification.
Unlike previous policy agreements or statements, the Convention did not quote
global statistics regarding desertification. Just a couple of years before, Agenda 21,
Chapter 12 recited a litany of statistics expressing the quantified status of desertification.
In contrast, the Convention expressed the global extent of desertification in qualitative
terms. The treaty's Preamble noted:
... arid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid areas together account for a
significant proportion of the Earth's land area and are the habitat and
source of livelihood for a large segment of its population (CCD, 1994:
Preamble: 4).
This change signaled a movement away from quantitative, scientific analysis as the
primary tool for interpreting and addressing the desertification problem. It further
suggested that numerical characterizations of degradation phenomena did not adequately
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reflect the complexity of desertification or the emergent view of desertification as a
process rather than a physical manifestation.
The objectives of desertification assessment activities and the role of
quantification therein changed as well. Unlike UNEP's focus on measuring the status
and rate of desertification, the Convention prescribed a compilation of data aimed at
understanding not only the effects of desertification, but desertification processes as well.
The treaty called for
collection, analysis and exchange of relevant short term and long term data
and information to ensure systematic observation of land degradation in
affected areas and to understand better and assess the processes and effects
of drought and desertification (CCD, 1994: Article 16: 17).
The agreement also recommended the use of compatible standards and systems, as well
as physical, biological, social and economic indicators. However, it urged that collection
and use of information address the needs of local communities and decisionmakers, "with
a view to resolving specific problems." The treaty also stipulated that local communities
be involved in collection, analysis and exchange of data. Hence, the Convention
negotiators seemed to heed the pleas of people such as Andrew Warren and Clive Agnew
who in the 1980s called for less attention to global measurements and more attention to
assessment activities of direct benefit and relevance to local populations.
Reasons for this shift away from quantitative measures are numerous. Clearly a
change in institutional leadership and context played an important role. As noted in
Chapter 4, the Desertification Secretariat and the Intergovernmental Committee on
Desertification essentially replaced UNEP and embraced a holistic vision of
desertification as a complex social and ecological processes. In addition, new
perceptions of "expertise" suggested that non-scientists and qualitative methods of social
science could make important contributions to anti-desertification efforts. These
changing attitudes were evident during the negotiation process. During the Information
Sharing Segment, for example, there was relatively little focus on the status and rate of
desertification. The agenda for this session included seven topic headings as listed in
Chapter 3. Only one of these topics referenced the physical dimensions of
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desertification: "The causes, general extent and physical consequences of land
degradation in arid, semi-arid, and dry sub-humid regions." Papers presented on this
theme contained very few references to quantitative measures (e.g., Sombroed and Hadji,
1993; Eigen and Alabaster, 1993). Professor Imevbore an ecologist from Obaferni
Awolowo University in Nigeria, and member of the International Panel of Experts,
discussed the ways in which desertification affects the conservation and utilization of
biodiversity. His paper was one of the most quantitative. He quoted estimates of global
degradation rates, affected populations, and quantified the role of various causal
mechanisms in contributing to desertification. However, his quantitative estimates of
desertification constituted the exception, rather than the rule (Imevbore, 1993).
It is clear from ongoing work in the Conference of Parties that the present
generation of desertification policymakers has a new approach to processes of monitoring
and assessment. Recent efforts to define new desertification indicators provide the most
vivid examples of this transformation. The Committee on Science and Technology is
devising a methodology for developing and utilizing standardized desertification
indicators. While participants in the process, in accordance with the treaty, aim to
develop a standardized and systematic assessment method, many of the indicators they
recently identified were dramatically different from the focus on status and rate found in
the UNEP studies. As of the last Conference of Parties meeting in Fall 1998, an ad hoc
expert panel suggested that assessment methods include indicators which reflect
economic and social benefits to affected populations where desertification and drought
were successfully addressed gender issues; impacts of future environmental and natural
changes (e.g, drought early warning); and capacity building. The only social indicator
common to both the UNEP and CCD processes was cost. The ad hoc panel
recommended indicators to provide information on the costs associated with
desertification and the effects of drought (ICCD/COP(2)/CST/3/Add. 1).
It is too early in the Convention's implementation process to get a full picture of
what role, if any, quantification will play. Activities to date suggest that global
desertification statistics continue to appear in general publications about the issue. They
appear as easily portable mainstays of desertification rhetoric and evoke dramatic global
images of desertification and its relevance to affected populations. However, processes
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currently underway within the desertification regime do not aim at producing quantitative
measurements of desertification. Unlike, Mostafa Tolba who called for standardized
measures to gauge desertification, the CCD focuses on understanding processes involving
many complex factors not amenable to simple numeric representations. It is unclear how
fruitful recent efforts under the treaty will be. Nevertheless, a new approach to indicators
will potentially symbolize and facilitate different ways of comprehending and addressing
desertification-related problems.
4.6 Problem Framing, Participation and Policymaking
The desertification story offers new insights into quantification and international
environmental policymaking. Various forms of quantification, for example, were
instrumental in authorizing particular interpreters and interpretations of desertification,
framing the issue in a way that conformed to the resources and interests of dominant
institutions, and defining desertification as an inherently local or global process.
Statistics about the extent, effects and rate of desertification were essential to
desertification's framing as a universal phenomenon, knowable through science, and
deserving of attention from international institutions. Quantitative methods have played
an important role in helping to simplify desertification and represent it as something
amenable to management activities coordinated by an international agency. Numbers
have also provided an international language for communicating dramatic evidence
regarding the magnitude of desertification worldwide. Yet, in addition to "building up"
the desertification issue, quantitative methods and numerical evidence also provoked
much disbelief and controversy because of questionable methodologies, lack of
transparency, and concerns regarding the usefulness of global measures. In contrast to
American regulators who have opted for more quantitative analysis in the face of
controversy and skepticism regarding carcinogenic risk analysis, participants in the
desertification regime turned away from mathematical analysis and from easily
quantifiable indicators of desertification when critics found them to be lacking. In the
desertification case, quantification served as an instrument of problem framing and
institution building, as well as a catalyst for institutional and policy change.
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Understandings of land degradation as a local phenomenon in colonial Africa
coincided with limited interest in quantitative, standardized means of characterizing land
and vegetation changes. France and Britain preferred autonomous rather than bilateral
schemes for natural resource management. These governments authorized the views of
local officials trained in botany, forestry and geography to interpret and respond to
evidence of land degradation. The use of relative (e.g., descriptions of groundwater
levels as "high" or "low"), rather than quantitative, standardized means for characterizing
land changes was important in boundary work carried out by the Anglo-French Forestry
Commission. By employing non-quantitative methods for assessing Stebbing's claims,
the Commission portrayed climatic and terrestrial changes (or lack thereof) as inherently
local, rather than transnational. The Commission thereby inscribed the priorities and
institutional features of the colonial administrations into its interpretation of the West
African landscape. In de-emphasizing quantitative methods that might highlight
similarities in the Nigerian and French Niger environments, the Commission members
reinforced the authority of local officials, local natural resource departments, and the
colonial administrations to which they belonged.
During the modernist era, efforts to quantify and standardize aridity helped to
portray desertification as a uniform phenomenon, arising from physical processes and
global in its extent. This view of desertification and of aridity in general coincided with
the authority of natural scientists and international institutions. Natural scientists
universalized the meaning of drylands using quantitative measures of rainfall and
temperature. They extended desertification beyond the borders and particular
environmental conditions of West Africa. They sought to develop general truths and
classification schemes for land change under arid conditions, and numbers were an
important part of these endeavors. Whereas colonial foresters defined land degradation
as a local problem, scientists in the 1950s, 60s, and 70s carried out a different type of
boundary work. Their calculations and maps redefined land degradation as a global
process. Institutional organizations and scientists inscribed in their framings of
desertification the belief that the issue warranted international cooperation. In doing so,
they reinforced the legitimacy of international organizations as leaders in addressing land
degradation. Also inherent in these quantitative, global visions of desertification was the
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notion that science and technology should form the core of desertification assessment and
policymaking. UNEP's authority, its reliance on statistics and its centralized, uniform
approach to desertification during the 1970s further exemplified the importance of
quantification during this period. Quantification was important to UNEP's simplified
vision of desertification. This vision emphasized desertification's global extent, its
physical manifestations, and a singular set of causes and remedies.
During the 1980s numbers continued to be important in portraying desertification
as a universal phenomenon. Quantification, however, also became a target of criticism
and a tool for measuring the effectiveness of international desertification policy. In the
1970s statistics reinforced the authority of LNEP. In the 1980s these statistics threatened
to undermine (in a sense to de-authorize) the agency. Observers began to point out, not
only the questionable scientific basis of UNEP's 1984 report, but also the facets of
desertification obscured or left out of conventional calculations. Warren and Agnew
(1988) and Nelson (1990), for example, noted the need for attention to local variability
and affected populations, not captured by global statistics and world maps. The boundary
work that, in earlier decades, demarcated desertification as global, was now in question.
Individuals outside of UNEP emphasized local variability in contrast to global
uniformity. The utility of natural science and international institutions were similarly
uncertain as the only signs of success in addressing desertification appeared in
conjunction with local initiatives spearheaded by non-governmental organizations. As
reliance on global statistics weakened, a clear authority and course of action were no
longer inscribed in a widely-held vision of desertification.
During the 1990s, a decreasing emphasis on quantitative measures of
desertification has accompanied the rise of new authorities in the desertification regime.
While the Conference of Parties constitutes the main international body in charge of
desertification policy, efforts are much more decentralized than in past years and non-
governmental organizations and local people are regarded as key to solving problems of
land degradation. A de-emphasis on standardized measures and uniform classification
schemes supports the view that desertification is locally contingent and the result of
numerous physical, social, economic, and ecological interactions. The CCD process did
not involve boundary work to demarcate desertification as either fundamentally local or
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global. Regime participants address challenges of both local action and international
coordination. Scientists and policymakers in the 1970s inscribed scientific and
technological anti-desertification strategies in their quantitative characterizations of
desertification. In contrast, the latest regime presents qualitative characterizations of the
issue and promotes a bottom-up approach grounded in the notion that successful response
to desertification ultimately depends on social dynamics. The transformation that
occurred between the 1970s and 1990s suggests that quantitative analyses, depending on
how they are conducted and used, may actually hinder efforts to focus on the locally
contingent aspects of a problem, and the experiences of people living in affected
locations.
In employing certain ways of counting, desertification institutions have authorized
certain counters and not others. They also determined which people and phenomena get
counted and which do not. During the 1970s and 80s UNEP relied heavily on
quantitative techniques and looked to natural scientists for advice. Their work tended to
emphasize the physical dimensions of the problem, largely overlooking social processes
presumably at work. A widening of participation in the desertification arena has
coincided with a decreased emphasis on numerical measures. This trend suggests that
international policymaking for complex and regionally diverse issues such as
desertification do not require quantitative analysis for purposes of trust or transparency.
In fact, in some cases such analysis leaves some participants out of the debate and can
undermine trust in institutions.
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CHAPTER 5
Seeing is Believing:
Visual Representations and the (Re) making of a Global Issue
Throughout the construction and reconstruction of international desertification policy,
changes in the methods and nature of visual representations coincided with changing
perceptions of whether desertification was a local or global problem, what features of
desertification were important, and whose understanding of the issue was valid. While
photography served a the preferred means for visualization among colonial researchers,
increasing reliance on maps in the 1950s marked important changes in "visual culture" as
expressed through dryland science. The immutability of a given representation and its
mobility across linguistic, cultural and disciplinary boundaries meant that visual
representations were accessible to diverse participants engaged in desertification science
and international policymaking.133 Visual images served as powerful framing objects.
They reflected dominant perceptions of the issue while also helping to shape, legitimize
and alter these perceptions. Photographs and varied types of climate and desertification
maps over time embedded different worldviews, changing ideas about what it means to
see and what there is to see (see Alpers, 1983; Latour, 1990). As an expression of "visual
culture" (Latour, 1990), photographs and maps also reflected varying choices about
whose vision mattered, what should be rendered visible and what should be made
invisible. For example, while photographs made apparent the personal perspective of the
individual research and the local people and environment, global maps in the 1970s
erased a sense of the individual viewer and represented aggregate measures of aridity and
population.
5.1 Analytical Framework
Themes of visibility, invisibility and mapping are evident in the evolution of cartography
projections over the past several hundred years. Map projection methods used
133 See Latour (1990) on "immutable mobiles."
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throughout history reveal the power of the mapmakers in integrating their worldviews
into the visual images they create. The most influential map projections emanated from
Europe and reflected a European perspective. Many of these maps were designed in a
way that aided the sailor in navigating ocean waters in the mid-latitudes. Moreover, the
Mercator projections of 1569 magnified land areas in temperate zones, while minimizing
the size of countries in the tropical regions. These projections emphasized the imperial
world of Portugal and Spain and, unlike medieval Christian maps, did not center on
Jerusalem. Europe appeared at the top and center of these maps, while the southern
hemisphere was allotted less than half of the total map size. The popular Van der Grinten
method of 1898 derived from the Mercator system. This projection style exaggerated the
size of Greenland, Alaska, Canada and the USSR in global maps of the world. The
National Geographical Society is credited with the wide use of these maps in the United
States between 1922 and 1988, because National Geographic was a key distributor of
educational materials in the United States. These maps were most notable for embedding
a western perspective on the Cold War. In depicting a large, menacing USSR dwarfing
Europe and Asia, they reflected western attitudes toward the USSR and suggested that
fears of that country and the communist ideology were justified (Black, 1997).
Just as the Mercator projections reflected and influenced geopolitics throughout
history, dryland maps shaped and were shaped by the evolving arena of international
desertification policymaking. Hence, while maps served as instruments of inscription,
they were also embodiments of inscription. Participants in science and policymaking
activities employed the tools and products of visualization to emphasize the local or
global nature of desertification, its natural and social dimensions, and varying perceptions
of desertification processes. Maps also reflected the views of scientists and
policymakers in regard to what knowledge and whose perspectives were authoritative, the
utility of singular versus pluralistic interpretations of desertification, and the benefits of
centralized or decentralized policy measures.
This chapter examines visual representations of desertification as indicators and
agents of change. Changes in the nature, production and use of visual images provide
insight into how and why transformations in international desertification policymaking
took place. The discussion below traces visualization through all four eras of
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desertification policymaking. The analysis in each period focuses on three questions:134
Whose vision did the image represent and who was the intended audience? What
techniques of visualization did the image maker employ? And, what problem framings
did the image embed? Answers to these questions are helpful in understanding how maps
as both practices and artifacts of knowledge production contributed to processes of
authorization, inscription and boundary work. In commissioning global climate maps, for
example, governing bodies authorized certain visions and viewers of the desertification
problem. In reflecting different categories of land use, maps served as a medium in
which to inscribe causal narratives. Maps also provided a vehicle for persuading
policymakers of a given causal interpretation. In regard to boundary work, visual
representations served as means for both erecting and reflecting boundaries. In creating
photographs and maps, participants in the desertification arena delineated what to render
visible and what to make invisible. In doing so, they demarcated the realms of who
should be included in knowledge production and policymaking processes and who should
be excluded.
5.2 Envisioning an Empire
Visual representations featured fairly frequently in scientific publications concerned with
the question of progressive desiccation (Hubert, 1920), a theory that Africa's climate was
becoming increasingly drier (see Chapters 2 and 3). Early in the century researchers
tended to believe that this phenomenon was largely natural, stemming from changes in
the general circulation and leading to the drying of rivers, vegetation degradation and
movement of desert sands outward from the desert center. In later years, many foresters
and geographers believed that certain human activities such as nomadism and civil unrest
exacerbated the effects of progressive desiccation. Regardless of its source, progressive
desiccation and associated environmental changes potentially posed serious threats to
African natural resources so valued by France and Britain. Colonial commissions, as
well as independent scientists, traveled from Europe to Africa to study these phenomena.
They also served as explorers, providing interpretations of the colonial frontier and its
134 The discussion does not contain an exhaustive account of all maps that have featured in desertification's
history. Rather, the analysis highlights maps which played notably strong or notably weak roles in policy
formulation.
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inhabitants. Both photographs and maps were widely used means for relaying
information about African colonies. Photographs testified to the first-hand observations
of researchers and colonial officers, thereby enhancing their credibility. Maps, on the
other hand, erased the personal perspective evident in photographs. However, they
provided a more effective means for showing spatial relationships between environmental
phenomena and colonial jurisdictions. They also enabled researchers to schematically
depict environmental changes over time.
The discussion below focuses on visual representations in studies by William
MacDonald, E. P. Stebbing and members of the Anglo-French Forestry Commission
(AFFC). Their work represented an increasing reliance on maps by participants in the
progressive desiccation debate. These maps portrayed desertification as an African,
rather than a global problem and showed the shared interest of researchers in ensuring
that Britain could protect and profit from Africa's natural resources. The maps also
reflected the various causal narratives and policy prescriptions supported by the
researchers. The desert boundary, for example, represented a struggle between humans
and nature, as well as the attitudes of some colonists toward indigenous Africans. The
portrayal of an international border in maps by Stebbing and the AFFC, respectively,
revealed their differing opinions about whether degradation warranted a transnational
policy approach or independent policy initiatives on the part of French and British
colonial administrations.
5.2.1 Through the Eyes of Environmental Explorers
Visionaries of land degradation during the colonial era included scientists and
administrative officials working in Africa. Many were trained in fields such as botany,
agriculture and forestry and applied their environmental expertise to ensuring the
protection and profitability of Africa's natural resources. Some also served as explorers
of sorts, studying uncharted territories and delineating lands ripe for settlement. William
MacDonald, E. P. Stebbing, and members of the AFFC were scientists with experience in
various colonial administrations. The writings of each of these individuals reveal their
strong allegiance with colonial objectives aimed at imperial expansion and the
construction of colonial Africa in Europe's image.
248
MacDonald was an avid proponent of colonial settlement of African drylands and
an expert on dryland agriculture. He held a number of advanced degrees,135 was Fellow
of the Royal Society of Edinburgh and the Geological Society of London, editor of the
Agricultural Journal, member of the Union Department of Agricultural South Africa,
Secretary of the South African.Dry-Farming Congress, and Corresponding Secretary for
the International Dry-Farming Congress. Based on his extensive experience as an
agriculturalist, MacDonald had a personal interest and faith in opportunities afforded by
agricultural techniques and technologies.
MacDonald and others such as Bovill (1921) believed that the absence of human
settlement near deserts invited the desert to "creep in and swallow" fertile oases (Bovill,
1921). In his book, Conquest of the Desert, MacDonald touted the merits of land
settlement, "the most urgent question before the people of South Africa, as well as one of
the grandest problems of the age" (MacDonald, 1913: viii). He appealed to "our own
people - the British race -- to come to South Africa" (MacDonald, 1913: 196).
MacDonald similarly promoted development of the "empty land."
Whether we traverse the great karroo, the wind-swept plains of the Free
State, the bush veld or the low country, it is all the same-we see a vast
empty land, rich beyond the dreams of fancy, waiting only for the sturdy
colonist to build his home, to subdue the earth, and to make the wilderness
and the solitary place rejoice (MacDonald, 1913: 191).
He believed that man should exert his dominion over nature. More specifically,
MacDonald believed that colonists should control the lands of their empire and reap the
financial benefits of its natural resources. His view of the "Free State," not surprisingly,
seemed unconcerned with the perspective of indigenous African peoples whose lands the
Europeans were called to occupy. In addition to subduing the land, the colonists took
credit for pacifying the "natives" (e.g., Jones, 1938).
Over twenty years after MacDonald's accounts, E. P. Stebbing suggested that
desert encroachment was not simply a matter of a ruthless nature, but also a product of
indigenous African agricultural practices. He differed from earlier authors like
135His book, The Conquest of the Desert, lists MacDonald as holding a Master's of Science in Agriculture
in addition to "Sc.D, Ph.D., D.Sc." degrees (MacDonald, 1913: title page).
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MacDonald, in believing that shifting agricultural practices, on the part of native
Africans, were contributing to progressive desiccation and to desert encroachment at the
southern edge of the Sahara.
Until comparatively recently the Sahara has been regarded as something
beyond man's scope and power to deal with. The geologist, the
geographer, and the historian all appear to have accepted the great desert
as a component part of the globe, in existence for a very long time, its
origin mainly due to unknown catyclysms and changing climate-in other
words, a desert area for which Man could have had little or no
responsibility (Stebbing, 1937b: 3).
Stebbing's interpretation provided even more reason for the introduction of European
cultivation techniques. They were needed, not only to stem desert invasion, but also to
stop widespread degradation caused by colonial subjects. Hence, Stebbing too, called for
the colonists to take up arms against the desert invasion and hold back the forces of
nature.
The initial stage and chief damage is done by the method of farming and
annual burning of the forests, and when the farming ceases and is replaced
by stock the forest has still to supply the food, and has still to bear the
brunt of the annual firing. If we reflect that this treatment has been going
on unchecked down through the centuries can it be seriously contended
that sections of country would not gradually go out of cultivation and
gradually become desert (Stebbing, 1937b: 34).
Stebbing argued for the introduction of European farming methods in West Africa, as a
means to simultaneously replace unsound cultivation activities of the native peoples and
subdue nature by restoring its balance (see Chapter 3).
Brynmor Jones, F.S. Collier and J. Dundas were members of the Anglo-French
Forestry Commission. Jones was the sole geologist appointed to the Commission in
1936. He began his response to Stebbing's desert encroachment and progressive
desiccation findings with a brief discussion of Nigeria's importance as a profitable British
colony. In particular, he mentioned the cash value of key crops grown in the region by
way of justification for an investigation into Stebbing's claims. As discussed in Chapter
3, Jones (1938) possessed an impressive familiarity with both the environment of West
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Africa and the local customs of its people. Collier and Dundas (1937) worked in Nigeria
as Senior Assistant Conservators of Forests (see Chapter 3). In analyzing progressive
desiccation they sought lessons for natural resource management. Based on their study
they urged greater coordination among administrative departments.
5.2.2 Colonial Techniques and Representations
Between 1900 and 1940 many of the research studies of dryland environments did not
contain many visual representations. In the articles and books that did include
illustrations, photographs were the most common, with maps appearing with much less
frequency. Because researchers often served as their own photographers, their pictures
reflected their own personal perspectives much in the same way that their interpretations
of the African environment reflected their personal allegiance to British objectives of
colonial expansion. Some studies included simple maps showing areas open to
settlement or the route taken by researchers. In debates over progressive desiccation and
desert encroachment in the mid-1930s, however, maps also served to indicate the
movement (or not) of the Sahara.
Africa in Pictures
Early research on dryland degradation tended to focus on Africa, especially the regions
surrounding the Sahara and Kalahari deserts. Pictures often provided a sort of photo
essay, documenting the researcher's journey through the African landscape. They often
depicted various types of vegetation, soil conditions, desert landscapes, and vehicles and
equipment used by researchers. 13 6 These photographs reflected several themes important
to dryland environments and politics in the early part of the century. The photos and the
first-person narratives that often accompanied them, for example, emphasized the
individual scientific perspectives of individual researchers, as well as their support for
colonial exploration and conquest.
The Geographical Journal, a publication of the Royal Geographical Society, was
a primary forum for the desiccation and desert encroachment debates between 1900 and
1940. Advertisements for camping equipment and safari jackets occupied the opening
136 MacDonald (1913) provides many examples.
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pages of its issues. These ads, like the journal's articles and illustrations, reflected
research methodologies of the journal's readers and contributing authors. Foresters and
geographers who were not serving as colonial administrators on the continent carried out
their studies while on brief visits. With detailed descriptions of their travels, the weather
and individuals met along the way, these articles and books read more like the diaries of
explorers than contemporary scientific papers. Accompanying illustrations were
similarly personal in nature, with photographs of desert vistas, vegetation and "natives"
outnumbering maps as the favored pictorial form. For example, the cover of
MacDonald's, The Conquest of the Desert (1913) boasts "fifty illustrations." Yet only
two of these pictures are maps, while the rest are photographs. Maps, if included in
studies such as this, generally showed the route taken by the researcher or the
jurisdictional boundaries of the empire. Maps in this context were seldom used to depict
scientific observations.
As the travelogue nature of these pictures.revealed, this knowledge was generally
derived, not by the Africans themselves, or even long-term residents, but by short-term
visitors to the continent. The "outsiders-looking-in" character to early studies of dryland
degradation paralleled the continent's occupation by imperial powers. As discussed in
Chapter 3, academic researchers and long-term residents of Africa disagreed as to which
group generated the more accurate observations. Stebbing, being a visitor himself,
believed that he possessed a truer and more insightful vision of Africa. Stebbing argued
that deforestation was at least partly responsible for apparent depletion of water in Africa.
In response to officers who did not agree with him Stebbing wrote the following:
To the forester who has had the opportunity of studying this matter of the
close inter-relation of the forest with agriculture and water supplies
outside of Africa the apparent difficulty of some officers whose service
has been confined to Africa to recognise this close relation is perhaps not a
matter of surprise (Stebbing, 1937b: 32).
But, while Stebbing believed that colonial officers lacked the breadth of perspective to
understand their local environments, critics of researchers like Stebbing argued that long-
term residence in Africa was necessary in order to comprehend the variability in African
climates and ecosystems. As noted in Chapter 3, scientists such as Jones (1938) and
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Rodd (1938) believed that it was "dangerous for a visitor to come to definite conclusions
unless he has spent more than one rainy season in the desert" (Rodd, 1938). 137
With the credibility of the researcher hinging on the accuracy of his observations,
photographs helped to buttress the researcher's credibility and document his first-hand
observations. They served as a testament to his presence in the region under study.
Mapping the African Frontier
Colonial researchers used maps to show their location or trace their journey. As in the
case of Stebbing and the Anglo-French Forestry Commission, they occasionally
employed maps to illustrate observed changes in the environment. Maps produced by
Stebbing and the Commission played important roles in the desert encroachment debate.
In the 1910s and 1920s, other authors discussed the possibility of shifting desert
regions, but did not use maps to illustrate movement of desert borders. In Conquest of
the Desert (1913), one of MacDonald's two maps (see Figure 1) was titled "showing the
steady advance of settlers on the desert" (MacDonald, 1913: 197). He labeled the map's
center as the "unexplored Kalahari." In addition, he sought to illustrate not the spread of
desert outward from the desert core, but rather the movement of settlers toward the desert
center. Though the title of Bovill's 1921 article, the "Encroachment of the Sahara on the
Sudan" was strikingly similar to Stebbing's, Bovill's piece contained no illustrations.
The absence of illustrations in Bovill's article and similar studies of the time, suggested
that visual representations and geographic measurements of the spreading desert
phenomenon were not unnecessary for presenting a persuasive argument.
Twenty years later, however, maps figured prominently in some dryland debates.
Perhaps the most powerful cartographic image of desertification during the colonial
period was introduced by E. P. Stebbing in a 1935 article. In a presentation to the Royal
137 Many years later, Michael Mortimore, and well-known geographer with a wealth of experience in Africa
echoed the views of Stebbing's critics. According to Mortimore: "some influential contributions to the
desertification debate...appear to be based on quite modest field research and limited exposure to African
perceptions - including those prevailing in governmental structures or educational institutions within
Africa (and which it is unwise to ignore or dismiss)" (Mortimore, 1989: 188).
253
,SHOWING THE STEADY ADVANCE OF SETTLERS ON THE DESERT.
/Woe &a7/c/ e/9/3)
254
Geographical Society and the publication of this talk, Stebbing claimed that the Sahara
desert was moving southward. The "invasion of sand" he described had potentially dire
consequences. In 1937 he wrote:
The present-day results of investigations would appear to prove that the
Sahara is far from stationary on its southern frontiers; that blown sand and
desiccation are increasing in the colonies lying in juxtaposition to the
desert, and that the present method of agricultural livelihood of the
population living in these regions, with their unchecked action of firing the
countryside annually, and methods of pasturage-all tend to assist sand
penetration, drying up of water supplies, and desiccation (Stebbing,
1937b: 31).
Stebbing's 1935 article contained several photographs showing deciduous forests,
savannah, and various types of vegetation. 138 The publication also contained three maps,
one of which proved particularly evocative and influential (see Figure 2). Stebbing's
maps marked a departure from the use of cartographic representations in previous dryland
studies. In these maps Stebbing provided the first measurements of the so-called
advancing Sahara. He also illustrated a forest belt scheme for halting the advance. Based
on firsthand observations, and discussions with local inhabitants, Stebbing drew three
types of boundaries on the map pictured in Figure 2: one line delineated what Stebbing
believed to be the original desert boundary, another line indicated the desert boundary at
the time of Stebbing's study and a third line represented a proposed forest-belt intended
to contain the spreading desert.
This way of depicting the desert was significant, in part, because previous authors
had described the spread of desert using words rather than cartography. By displaying
his knowledge claims in a map format, Stebbing lent a new dimension desiccation and
desert encroachment studies. At one level he provided a new scientific framework for
analysis of the West African environment, by emphasizing the measure-ability and map-
ability of desiccation and desert encroachment. At the same time, the controversies his
maps provoked reflected disagreements about where the desert
138 The 1935 article published in The Geographical Journal was based on a talk Stebbing delivered on
March 4, 1935 at the Royal Geographical Society. He published the article in June of that year.
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begins and where it ends, and revealed significant uncertainties surrounding the notion of
spreading deserts. Stebbing's depiction of the moving desert border ultimately proved to
be a tenacious symbol representing not only an ecological limit, but also relationships
between the French and British, humans and nature, and Africans and colonists.
Stebbing's work put a scientific face on the claims of desiccation and desert
encroachment that had preceded his 1935 paper. Stebbing's maps, for example, relayed
his observations, but erased the individual viewer perspective so prominent in
photographs. Instead of portraying the landscape as Stebbing saw it, the maps provided a
plan view of the area in question. They depicted the Sahara region in a simplified,
abstract format.
Members of the Anglo-French Forestry Commission published papers responding
to Stebbing's claims. Collier and Dundas (1937) and Jones (1938) each included maps in
their publications. They drew these maps based on first-hand observations, general
knowledge of the region (since all were working there), and on discussions with local
people they encountered on their travels. Collier and Dundas (Figure 3) showed the
approximate northern limit of unirrigated cultivation and areas of extensive farming.
Their map also indicated the location of different types of vegetation (e.g., woodlands,
savannah) and the extent of sand dunes. Jones' map (Figure 4) depicted the route
traveled by the Commission, and the approximate limit of live dunes. Both maps
indicated the numerous towns and the international boundary separating British and
French territories. However, Collier and Dundas more prominently indicated the
international boundary separating the French Niger Colony from the British Nigerian
colony.
5.2.3 Holding Back the Desert: Mapping Causal Narratives and Policy Prescriptions
The maps of MacDonald and those of Stebbing and the Commission reflect varying
perceptions of human-environment relationships and varying attitudes of the colonists
toward the colonized. MacDonald's answer to the advancing Kalahari focused on
European settlements and permanent agriculture. Stebbing's policy prescriptions were
represented in his illustration of a forest belt traversing French and British territories.
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The Desert Boundary
MacDonald portrayed the advancing desert as part of a hostile natural world in need of
taming. Researchers such as MacDonald (1913) echoed the sentiments of colonial
administrations by calling on the British to settle the African frontier and hold back the
desert advance with agriculture and other forms of development. The desert, however,
was not portrayed as a purely natural phenomenon. Many foresters and geographers
equated desert expansion with the invasion of barbaric nomadic tribes who inhabited it.
Still others saw certain African forms of agriculture as contributing to desert
encroachment. Shifting cultivators, in particular, were blamed for deforesting the land
and promoting the spread of desert conditions.
Humans versus Nature
Stebbing believed that a sort of bi-lateral policy was necessary to "stem the invasion" and
proposed and mapped an international forest belt to contain the advancing front of desert.
Although Stebbing believed that shifting cultivators contributed to desiccation and desert
encroachment, his transnational forest belt scheme seemed most directly in response to a
naturally spreading Sahara. In this respect, Stebbing's forest belt scheme and his
cartographic depiction of it was reminiscent of MacDonald's human-versus-nature view
of the African environment.
In his map, MacDonald depicted agricultural settlement as a means to contain and
"shrink" deserts." MacDonald argued that challenges of African farming would be no
greater than those facing settlers when they first arrived in America. In response to
skeptics suggesting that South Africa was not ready for settlement, MacDonald expressed
a technological optimism. "Every farmer knows that the maladies that attack his crops
and his herds can best be checked and conquered by the wire fence, the Closer
Settlement, cleansing dip, and the poison spray (MacDonald, 1913: 196). MacDonald's
suggestions also highlighted the great importance scientists and resource managers placed
on European methods of agriculture. They believed that the "European Model" of
permanent agriculture offered the best promise for settling Africa (e.g., Collier and
Dundas, 1937; Jones, 1938).
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MacDonald also believed that drought was most prevalent in the sparsely
populated wilderness. "Plant more people on your desolate lands, and then you will
cease to fear drought" (MacDonald, 1913: 5). He paraphrased the speech by an
Australian premier speaking in London in saying "Population was merely another term
for Patriotism,.meaning thereby that everyone who had the highest interests of the
Commonwealth at heart must labour earnestly and ceaselessly to fill up her empty spaces
with a sturdy race of British emigrants. The same might be said with equal truth of South
Africa" (MacDonald, 1913: 6). MacDonald equated conservation with cultivation
because he believed that ploughing and planting would cause the soil to retain moisture.
He also called for afforestation to contain moving sand dunes (MacDonald, 1913: 6-7).
Colonists versus Africans
Unlike Stebbing, the Commissioners pointed to shifting cultivation as the only source of
degradation threatening Africa. Their maps showed live dunes located at a much more
northern location than suggested by Stebbing's maps. But while the Commission did not
see a need to subdue nature, it did advocate control of the African people. Collier and
Dundas' (1937) map, for example, indicated an "area where Deforestation for farming is
extensive." This equating of Africans with environmental degradation was a common
theme. Scientific and government departments were concerned with such issues, even
managing to agree at times. As Bovill described in 1921, "The Forestry Department are
keenly alive to the desiccation of the Sokoto region, and in agreement with the Political
Department are strongly of opinion that the greatest harm is done by the wasteful way the
farmers take up new lands" (Bovill, 1921: 259).
A French government report of 1904, described tensions between "pillaging
nomads" and sedentary agriculturists. It claimed that agriculturists were refusing to plant
in and invest in their resources until the government could provide security against the
nomadic vandals.
... man himself is a contributory factor of some importance. The
encroachment of the desert on its oases is largely due to the constant strife
between the tribes and factions of these inhospitable regions. General
insecurity has led to the reduction of the agricultural communities with the
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result that in the cultivated areas there has been less and less opposition to
the desert which has crept in and all but won the day (Bovill, 1921: 268).
Bovill also describes how when Italy entered World War I and withdrew from Fezzan, it:
threw the country open to hordes of desert tribes who live largely by
brigand and loot. Equally lacking in all sense of honour and courage, they
prey upon the broken, spiritless, agricultural communities of the oases.
When disappointed of their booty they resort to wanton destruction of
wells, palm groves, and carefully irrigated gardens. The reduction of the
cultivable areas has been enormously increased by these nomads (Bovill,
1921: 176).
This problem prompted more calls for international (or at least bi-lateral) governmental
responses. For example, Bovill called for a "strong central authority...capable of
reducing the nomads to submission" (Bovill, 1921: 176-7). He noted that the French
considerably "arrested" desert encroachment by "enforcing tranquillity on the nomads"
leading to adoption of a sedentary life and political security. He said that reclamation of
deserts indicates the success of these measures.
Fifteen years later, researchers were still debating the utility of transnational
policy approaches to degradation. Differences of opinion were evident in the maps of
Stebbing and Commission members. Stebbing's map, for example, labeled regions of the
French Niger and Nigeria. However, his tran-colony lines indicating an advancing desert
and proposed forest belt scheme were much more prominent than the line depicting the
international boundary. In contrast, maps in both the AFFC studies showed no evidence
on a transnational advancing desert front. Furthermore, lines showing the French-British
border reflected the Commission's consensus that policies implemented by the colonial
administrations should respect this border.
5.2.4 Inklings of a Global Problem
Before World War II, many of the maps and studies concerning progressive desiccation
and desert encroachment focused on French and British African colonies and the prospect
of exportation of natural resources. Colonial administrations had a stake in the problem,
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and the African environment offered an interesting site for scientific explorations on the
part of French and British foresters and geographers
In the 1930s, however, scientists began to connect dryland degradation in Africa
to similar problems elsewhere in the world. Lowdermilk (1935), for example, described
human-induced soil erosion in China and associated problems of increased runoff. In
1939, Jacks and Whyte's The Rape of the Earth: World Survey of Soil Erosion, helped
mark the beginning of a more international focus on land degradation. This new
perspective linked African desiccation with the American Dust Bowl and with similar
problems throughout China, Russia and Australia. Jacks and Whyte identified Africa as a
particularly challenging area because of the numerous political jurisdictions, challenges
of coordination and the "difficulty of countering native customs or prejudices" (Stamp,
1940: 300). But the Jacks and Whyte study encouraged colonial foresters to begin
thinking more broadly about challenges of the African landscape. As Stamp remarked in
1940:
There now seems little doubt that the problem before West Africa is not
the special one of Saharan encroachment but the universal one of man-
induced soil erosion, which necessitates remedial measures comparable
with those being adopted in other parts of the world but with special
modifications in view of the local agricultural system of bush fallowing
and burning" (Stamp, 1940: 300).
Stamp alluded to a global perception of dryland degradation and to some degree of
standardization in means for addressing it. As discussed in the next section, views like
these became increasingly prominent in the 1950s and beyond.
5.3 World Maps and International Policy
During the 1950s and 1960s problems of dryland degradation increasingly occupied the
agendas of international institutions. Maps of the world's dry climates helped to portray
aridity as a global phenomenon. When a severe drought and famine crisis struck West
Africa between 1968 and 1974, the world's attention focused on the environmental
degradation and human suffering that ensued. African countries urged the United
Nations to take on the problems of drought. They also noted drought-related problems,
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such as advancing deserts and a process called desertification. The exact relationship
between spreading deserts and desertification was unclear. Some of the UN's initial
decisions on these issues focused on drought and equated desertification with advancing
deserts. However, by the time of the United Nations Conference on Desertification in
1977, desertification had replaced drought as a focus of UN activities. Furthermore, the
Conference defined desertification not as advancing deserts in Africa, but as a worldwide
phenomenon leading to the creation of desert-like conditions.
The present section considers the role of maps in desertification's emergence as
an international issue. In particular, how and why were original concerns regarding
African drought transformed into multi-lateral cooperation on desertification? Although
the reasons for this development were varied and complex, they partly depended on the
role of maps in desertification science and policymaking. As maps became increasingly
global in their orientation they helped to legitimate desertification as a problem
impinging on many different countries. Shifts from advancing desert portrayals to maps
based on global datasets of climate, land characteristics and human and animal
populations similarly helped to frame desertification as a human-induced problem of
worldwide extent, arising from land use.
To illustrate these changes the discussion below highlights two mapping exercises
in the 1970s. The first of these exercises reflects the United Nations Environment
Programme's (UNEP's) early view of desertification as an advancing desert
phenomenon. In 1975, the agency hired Hugh Lamprey to investigate reports of Sahara
encroachment. Based on reconnaissance flights over West Africa, Lamprey whole-
heartedly endorsed these reports. The second set of mapping endeavors concerns maps
prepared for the United Nations Conference on Desertification (UNCOD) of 1977. These
maps, drawing on the work of the United Nations Educational Cultural and Scientific
Organization (UNESCO) in the 1950s and 1960s, portrayed desertification as a
worldwide, anthropogenic phenomenon. Comparison of these two mapping initiatives
provides insight into UNEP's changing vision of desertification and the role of
cartography in both legitimizing and communicating this vision.
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5.3.1 Agencies and Individuals
During the 1970s, UNEP was the primary UN agency involved with desertification
mapping. The agency conducted some of its early studies in conjunction with national
initiatives underway in Africa and Sweden (e.g. Lamprey, 1975; Rapp et al., 1976). In
1975, UNEP sent a consultant, Hugh Lamprey, to assist with desert encroachment
research in the northern Sudan. Lamprey confirmed reports of an advancing Sahara, but
UNEP left his study unpublished. His image of the advancing desert was at odds with the
assessment work UNEP was conducting in preparation for a new United Nations (UN)
Conference on Desertification. The picture of dryland degradation emanating from
UNEP and other international organizations was not confined to Africa or to deserts. Nor
were they the product of individual mapmakers. As UNEP's line of vision broadened
from West Africa to encompass the entire world, the visionaries themselves changed
from individual mapmakers to international organizations.
Lamprey in the Northern Sudan
The UN's interest in desertification grew out of concern for the major drought crisis in
West Africa and associated problems of spreading deserts. In August 1971, the first All-
African Seminar on the Human Environment convened under ECA auspices. Much of
the discussion concerned the drought and the difficulties of getting financial support to
address it. However, in addition to resolutions on drought, the seminar recommended
measures intended to "combat the spread of deserts in Africa" (UNCOD, 1978: 6). This
caught the attention of the ECA Conference of Ministers who noted the problems of
desertification in resolution 264 (XII) and urged that the ECA collaborate with the
international community in seeking solutions. On May 1, 1974 UNGA issued resolution
3202 (S-VI) recommending that the international community "undertake concrete and
speedy measures to arrest desertification and assist the economic development of affected
areas." The Economic and Social Council resolution 1878 (LVII) of July 16, 1974 asked
that relevant UN organizations take up a "broad attack on the drought problem."
Subsequently, Governing Councils of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP)
and UNEP called for studies of drought and action plans to "check the spread of desert
conditions" (UNCOD, 1978: 6).
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Early UNEP-sponsored studies of dryland degradation assumed a priori that the
Sahara was on the move. In May of 1974, the National Council for Research and the
Ministry of Agriculture, Food and Natural Resources in Sudan issued a report on desert
encroachment and sent it to UNEP as the basis for a project called "Desert Encroachment
Control." The study requested UNEP's support for a proposed reconnaissance survey to
show the status of desert encroachment and ecological degradation in northern Sudan. In
particular, it was intended to "provide evidence on the most recent changes in desert
encroachment," and to identify sites for further analysis of environmental problems and
possible methods of environmental management. The Sudanese government aimed to
present the report at a meeting of potential donors to the desert encroachment project.139
The project took place under joint sponsorship. However, its findings were
attributed to Lamprey alone. The UN and the International Union for the Conservation of
Nature funded the aerial reconnaissance, while Sudan's government provided ground
support, including vehicles and aircraft fuel. UNEP and UNESCO sent one of their
consultants to carry out the reconnaissance (Lamprey. 1975: 1). As described by his
friend Ralph Townley, Lamprey was a natural scientist and great adventurer, a
Himalayan mountain climber and "only happy when he was three hundred miles from
nowhere" (Interview with Ralph Townley).
International Agencies
Around the time of Lamprey's work, rainfall began to improve in Africa and the crisis
seemed to fade, along with the television footage that had brought pictures of emaciated
children and parched landscapes into living rooms throughout the world. With these
changes, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) began to shift its focus away
from African drought and toward desertification. UNGA emphasized the international
scope of desertification problems and called for extensive scientific assessment activities.
In Resolution 3337 (XXIX), of 1974, UNGA recognized:
139 Desert encroachment was similarly the focus of a study initiated in 1973 by the Secretariat for
International Ecology in Sweden who published the final report in conjunction with UNEP. Like the Sudan
study, this analysis (though originally intended as a global study) focused on desert encroachment in
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the urgent need to prepare a world integrated programme of development
research and application of science and technology to solve the special
problems of desertification in all its ramification and reclamation of land
lost to desertification (UNEP, 1978: 124).
In this same resolution, UNGA called for "concerted international action to combat
desertification" and requested that UNEP and other relevant and competent agencies
convene an ad hoc task force to assist the Conference Secretariat to prepare various
scientific assessments, including "preparation of a world map of areas affected and likely
to be affected by the process of desertification" (UNEP, 1978: 124). As discussed below,
the request for this map, its production, and the role it played in negotiations were
important in shifting the UN's framing of desertification from an African problem to one
affecting the entire world.
In 1975 UNEP, the Conference Secretariat, began planning for UNCOD. Mostafa
Tolba, as Deputy Executive Director of UNEP (and Chair of the conference), seized on
UNGA's requests for "studies" and placed scientific experts and their assessments of
desertification at the center of UNCOD preparations (see Chapter 3). With soil scientists
and geographers (mainly from developed countries), Tolba began to construct a new
science of desertification. In doing so, UNEP transformed drought and its perceived
effects (phenomena generally assumed to be beyond the control of people) into
desertification, something that could be "attacked" and "banished" with the use of
science and technology (e.g., see Tolba, 1987). Hence, Tolba and the UNEP assessment
process were instrumental in creating a beat-able enemy. Maps provided a "battle" plan
for these efforts.
Expert consultants to UNCOD prepared a total of four global maps of
desertification-related parameters. However, UNEP emphasized the importance of one
map over the other three. This map, The World Map ofDesertification (see Figure 5),
was prepared by Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and UNESCO in cooperation
with World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and UNEP, and with the advice of
"internationally recognized consultants to the Secretary-General of the Conference"
(A/CONF.74/2: 3). This map showed desertification hazard and areas considered
Africa. As reflected in its title, the question at the heart of the assessment was, Can Desert Encroachment
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Figure 4.1 The 1977 UNCOD desertification hazard map
vulnerable to future desertification, though not necessarily experiencing desertification at
present. The attribution of this map to a group of agencies marked a departure from the
maps of Lamprey and the colonial foresters. Not only had the pictures of desertification
become international in scope, so had the cartographers. The World Map marked a new
trend in collective mapmaking under UNEP.
UNEP described the remaining three maps as experimental. Harold Dregne, a soil
scientist from Texas Technical University produced a map entitled Status of
Desertification in the Hot Arid Regions (see Figure 6), which identified different degrees
of ecosystem degradation. Climatologists Dr. D. Henning and Professor H. Flohn of the
University of Bonn created the Climate Aridity Index Map, which portrayed the Budyko
Ratio, the ratio of radiation to precipitation. Professor V.A. Kovda, a soil scientist from
Moscow State University authored the Experimental Scheme ofAridity and Drought
Probability. Based on soil profile data he estimated climate conditions of the past and
(via extrapolation) approximated the future likelihood of drought conditions. Compared
to the World Map, however, these maps had a much lower profile during the negotiations.
Conference organizers included these maps for purposes of clarification once they
realized the many assumptions that went into preparing the World Map. They decided
that a single map could not include all relevant parameters (A/CONF.74/3 1).
5.3.2 Modern Maps and Methods
Lamprey's map and the World Map differed in terms of both technique and content.
While Lamprey relied on aerial photography and first-hand observations of the African
landscape, FAO et al. (1977) utilized global datasets of standardized measurements. In
terms of content, Lamprey's map portrayed both the path he took in traversing the
northern Sudan and an estimated shift in the desert boundary. In contrast, the World Map
did not relay information about the cartographer's methodology. Neither did it illustrate
the results of direct observation. Instead, it showed vulnerability to desertification.
Vulnerability measures reflected both climate factors and animal and population
pressures. The differences in the Lamprey and world maps indicated a shift from local to
global depictions of desertification, and trends toward less transparency and greater
aggregation in mapmaking. These characteristics were part and parcel of the emergent
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Figure 1.2. World status of desertification of arid lands
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desertification issue and UNEP's approach to framing desertification as a global
phenomenon with a singular cause and remedy.
Lamprey: In Flight and On Foot
Lamprey's study took place between October 21 and November 10, 1975. The
reconnaissance team traveled in a four-passenger light aircraft, while a truck carrying
fuel, supplies and camping equipment followed. To ascertain the position of the desert
boundary, Lamprey and his team made ten north-south flights along the routes shown in
Figure 7, observing signs of sand encroachment and the state of agricultural lands. By
land, they ventured into some desert regions in search of signs of wildlife. Lamprey and
his assistants also attended meetings with provincial governors and other administrators
with whom they discussed sociological and political problems attendant on desert
encroachment.
Based on aerial photographs and ground survey data, Lamprey claimed that the
Sahara was on the move at the rate of 5.5 kilometers per year. Lamprey's map compared
what was believed to be the current desert boundary with that delineated by Harrison and
Jackson in 1958. These authors had used vegetation classification schemes to locate the
position of the desert boundary. Based largely on the spatial distribution of Wadi Milk, a
desert plant, Harrison and Jackson concluded that the Sahara's southern boundary had
shifted south an average of 90 to 100 kilometers in the last 17 years. Lamprey examined
desert encroachment in Northern Kordofan and Northern Darfur. In these regions he took
account of four indicators of desert encroachment: shifts in ecological boundaries, sand
encroachment, mortality of gum-producing acacia in Senegal woodlands, and failing
agriculture. In assessing ecological boundaries, he primarily observed the location of
various types of vegetation. His analysis of sand encroachment described drifting sand in
relation to what Lamprey perceived as the desert edge. He also noted the southward
shifting of the acacia trees, abandoned farms and the state of other agricultural land. In
his analysis of desert encroachment in the northern Nile valley Lamprey determined that
drifting sand was encroaching on alluvial sand surrounding the river and nearby
depressions. He also reported moving sand dunes in the process of enveloping
agricultural land and villages.
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Lamprey also addressed social aspects of observed degradation. According to Lamprey,
the natural resource managers participating in the study believed land use practices
constituted the major factor responsible for desert encroachment. Based on conversations
with local officials Lamprey concluded, much like the colonial administrators, that the
lack of natural resource and land use planning policies were the most important
deficiencies. Without such policies or means to enforce them, the area lacked regulations
over range management, control of water resources, stocking rates, and general
agricultural policies. He further suggested that questionable practices on the part of
affected populations were partly to blame.
It was appreciated by the team that the need for land-use planning and
resource management could not be separated from the need to educate the
rural populations, particularly as many of the problems are due to
traditional and hitherto unquestioned practices (Lamprey, 1975: 4).
Lamprey commented specifically on the difficulties of imposing needed centralized
policies on nomads. While officials agreed with Lamprey that such policies were needed,
they deemed any attempt at controlling the nomads "unthinkable." Lamprey concluded:
Thus, there lies at the heart of the ecological problem what appears to be
an extremely difficult sociological problem. It seems unlikely that any
substantial process can be made towards solving the crisis of ecological
degradation in northern Sudan until a considerable measure of control over
land use has been achieved (Lamprey, 1975/1988: 4).
Lamprey identified lack of ecological information of the arid zone in the northern Sudan
as a major obstacle in achieving necessary management measures. He noted an "urgent
need" for natural resource surveys for the production of maps and baseline data
(Lamprey, 1975).
Yet, while Lamprey's paper emphasized the anthropogenic nature of desert
encroachment, the advancing desert image itself connoted a vision of nature at war with
humans, and of autonomous desert fronts marching forward to engulf villages. This
connotation of desert encroachment was akin to initial interpretations of West African
famine. Originally researchers and the general public perceived these disasters to be the
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result of a ruthless nature. Only several years after the 1968-1974 famine did researchers
begin to argue that famine, rather than reflecting a struggle of people against a harsh
climate, arose largely because of flawed social institutions (e.g., Garcia, 1981; Watts,
1983).
UNCOD Maps
The World Map (Figure 5) emphasized the global extent of desertification and framed it
as a first and foremost a physical problem amenable to quantitative measurement and
scientific analysis. UNGA resolution 3337 clearly called for a map showing areas
affected by desertification, as well as areas likely to be affected. However, "because of
limitations of scale and lack of comparable knowledge throughout the areas in question,
no mapping of the existing degree of desertification could be attempted at the global
scale" (Mabbutt, 1978: 48). Consequently, although the map was titled World Map of
Desertification, it depicted desertification hazard, without an estimate of regions deemed
to be affected by desertification. FAO et al. (1977) intended the map to "delineate, on a
world scale, areas of deserts and those areas, mainly on the fringes of deserts but
elsewhere as well, which are at risk of desertification" (A/CONF.74/2: 3).40 The
mapping process focused on predicting the physical manifestations of desertification in
the forms of soil deterioration and accelerated mechanical erosion.
As Jack Mabbutt (1978) later reflected, creation of the World Map required a
large degree of simplification. The basis for this map was a Soil Map of the World (FAO
and UNESCO, 1971) at a scale of 1:5,000,000. The Map's authors noted that at more
local scales, assessment of desertification hazard is only possible via historical analysis
and monitoring. Thus, in creating a global-scale rendering of desertification they were
forced to evaluate desertification hazard "subjectively" (A/CONF.74/2: 3). The World
140 Because the Plan ofAction was completed after production of the World Map, they were based on
somewhat different definitions of the problem. The definition of desertification cited in the World Map's
documentation differed from that contained in the final UNCOD report. According to the World Map,
desertification is "the intensification or extension of desert conditions; it is a process leading to reduced
biological productivity, with consequent reduction in plant biomass, in the land's carrying capacity for
livestock, in crop yields and human well-being." (A/CONF.74/2: 3). This definition implied that deserts
gave rise to desertification. However, according to the UNCOD report, "Deserts themselves are not the
sources from which desertification springs... It is generally incorrect to envision the process as an advance
of the desert frontier engulfing usable land on its perimeter." (UNCOD, 1978: 5).
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Map depicted four parameters at a scale of 1:25,000,000. The four parameters were:
degree of desertification hazards in zones likely to be affected by desertification
(characterized as very high, high or moderate); vulnerability of land to desertification
processes (surfaces subject to sand movement, surfaces subject to salinization and
alkalinization, stony or rock surfaces, and alluvial or residual surfaces); high human and
animal pressure; and bioclimatic zones depicted as hyperarid, arid, semi-arid and
subhumid.
Desertification risk in a given region was not a function of the sensitivity of the
population, in terms of social institutions, population age or stability of food supplies.
Instead, makers of the World Map measured desertification hazard based on vulnerability
of the land combined with human or animal pressure. The land's vulnerability depended
on "climate, terrain, soil and vegetation conditions." Climate was assessed using a well-
known classification scheme for determining aridity zones. According to this scheme the
ratio of precipitation to evapotranspiration was used to determine whether the climate in a
given region was hyperarid, arid, semi-arid or subhumid. Aridity categories were
associated with livelihood methods. For example, nomadism was associated with the arid
zone and rainfed agriculture with the subhumid zone. Indicators of vulnerability included
features of such as sand movement; stony/rocky surfaces, subject to soil stripping and
accelerated gully erosion; salinization and alkalinization. Human and animal pressures
were based directly on estimates of population density (A/CONF.74/2: 2-3).
Population density was the only direct measurement of a human parameter
featured in the World Map. "Population and animal densities have been used as measures
of human and animal pressure on land, which, when excessive, results in overstocking,
excessive cultivation through reduction of fallowing or through mechanization, and
eradication of trees for firewood" (A/CONF.74/2: 6). The relationship of people and land
was conceived as a one-way dynamic (i.e., the effect of people on land) and based on
numbers of people, regardless of their social structures and practices. This is not to
suggest that assessment of such parameters would have been possible or even
141 The Penman equations enable calculation of evapotranspiration based on atmospheric humidity, wind
and solar radiation. Aridity zone values In areas that fell between measurement stations were interpolated
based on maps of vegetation, soils and topography and based on unpublished information (A/CONF.74/2:
5).
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worthwhile. Rather, this observation further highlights the emphasis on physical, rather
than socio-economic parameters in the UNCOD context. Map authors assumed that, in
the arid zone, significant land use pressures occurred when population density exceeded 7
inhabitants per square kilometer or one animal unit per 5 hectares of land area, where
population density is taken to be a likely indicator of overcultivation or excessive
vegetation cutting for fuel. In the semi-arid zone these threshold figures were 20
inhabitants per square kilometer meter and one animal unit pre hectare (A/CONF.74/2).
Tolba and map authors acknowledged uncertainties in the UNCOD maps. For
example, Tolba explained that the intergovernmental institutions and individual scientists
had made "every effort" to depict desertification processes cartographically as requested
by the UNGA's in resolution 3337 (XXIX). However, he noted that they were "at best
scientific experiments" and "implied no opinion on the part of the United Nations
regarding the status of any country or territory shown on the maps." Map authors
indicated that their goals in creating the map were to synthesize available cartographic
information and "present it uniformly on a global basis" (A/CONF.74/2: 7). They hoped
that their work would indicate potential sites for monitoring and for conservation and
development programs. However, they also concluded that the World Map reflected just
a "first approximation" which should be used to encourage national bodies to make an
improved assessment of desertification. This paralleled the goals of UNGA which aimed
to motivate international action on the issue through the UNCOD and its PACD
(A/CONF.74/2).
5.3.3 Constructing an International Scientific Problem
Lamprey's project portrayed desertification as an African problem, manifest as an
advancing desert edge, but deeply intertwined with sociological and political conditions
at the local level. In contrast, the UN and associated institutions literally put
desertification "on the map" as a global concern that was first and foremost a scientific
problem. The World Map represented the role of multilateral institutions in mandating,
and thereby contributing to the production of, scientific knowledge. World Map authors
also attempted to define desertification as a challenge that science could both understand
and solve. It helped to show that desertification could be observed, measured, quantified,
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and displayed using the tools of scientific inquiry. Together, efforts to globalize and
"scientize" desertification culminated in the first attempts to standardize the issue via
measurements of physical parameters.
The World Map also helped to establish desertification as an international issue by
emphasizing its global extent and its presence beyond African borders. Some UNCOD
participants viewed the World Map as evidence that desertification was, indeed a global
problem. In his opening speech to delegates, Tolba referred to desertification as "one of
the major global environmental problems." He described the World Map of
Desertification as a "global panorama which clearly portrays the enormous dimensions of
the desertification threat" (A/CONF.74/L. 1). Similarly, an expert advisor to UNCOD
remarked: "Despite its qualitative basis and an enforced generalization due to scale, the
World Map of Desertification clearly demonstrates the global nature and seriousness of
the threat of desertification" (Mabbutt, 1978: 49).
However, not all UNCOD participants shared these views. Delegates at regional
meetings (A/CONF.74/33) and at UNCOD itself took issue with some of the maps.
Many UNCOD delegates felt that the map's title was misleading, arguing that the map's
portrayal of desertification risk may have exaggerated the geographic extent of
degradation, thus making desertification look more "global" than it really was. Some
participants called for a more democratic process of map making. It was clear from the
Working Group consultations and the statements of delegates that UNCOD participants
wanted effects of desertification in their home countries to be depicted accurately.
Within the Working Group and in plenary, country representatives called for
cartographers to consult with individual governments regarding map production. They
urged UNEP to take all views concerned into account, prior to undertaking a cartographic
exercise (A/CONF.74/36).
To discuss their concerns regarding the maps (especially the World Map of
Desertification) delegates convened a working group to examine "technical inadequacies
or inaccuracies in the map." The working group consisted of 18 country delegations, as
well as representatives from UNESCO, FAO, WMO and the Organization of African
Unity (A/CONF.74/36:109). The working group held one meeting at which several
participants raised concerns about the map . They believed that the World Map should be
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combined with a global map of soil degradation from FAO to enable inclusion of humid
areas. They also suggested that maps or an atlas at larger scales be used to show the
dynamic elements of desertification processes. Another recommendation called for the
systematic collection of data from national governments. Because of their reservations,
the Working Group recommended that the committee accept the map as a "first
approximation primarily intended to indicate the global magnitude of the problem."
Furthermore, the committee should recognize the World Map's limitations and should
encourage production of detailed maps at larger scales, and additional maps showing
phenomenona such as salinization, alkalinization, and seasonal drought
(A/CONF.74/36).
5.4 Democratizing Desertification
In the years following UNCOD, UNEP heeded the calls of conference participants who
argued for improved mapping techniques. Throughout the 1980s the agency convened
expert panels to address questions of mapping (e.g., Odingo, 1990; Rozanov, 1990), and
worked on developing new mapping techniques and new definitions of desertification
that they believed to be more "operational," and, therefore, more easily mapped. These
cartographic endeavors occurred alongside evaluations and critiques of desertification
science and policy. As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, UNEP conducted two major
assessments of PACD implementation in 1984 and 1991. Each lamented the PACD's
failure to ameliorate land degradation and its impacts. Also during this period, several
researchers published papers that were critical of the way in which desertification had
been conceptualized and addressed in policy circles (e.g., Spooner and Mann, 1982;
Warren and Agnew, 1988; Nelson, 1990). These evaluations helped to catalyze new
conceptions of the desertification problem and new ways of visualizing it.
The World Atlas of Desertification (UNEP, 1992) embodied many of these
changes. The Atlas marked the culmination of UNEP's various mapping assessment
142 Despite the concerns of negotiators, however, the World Map and Dregne's Status Map were referenced
and reproduced throughout desertification literature as symbols of the problem's global extent (e.g.,
Mabbutt; 1978; Walls, 1980; Dregne, 1983). As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, only later did these maps
resurface as targets of deconstruction (Warren and Agnew, 1988; Thomas and Middleton, 1994; Swift,
1996)
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endeavors. Like the World Map, the Atlas portrayed physical aspects of desertification at
a global scale. On the whole, however, the Atlas both symbolized and helped to establish
a new vision of desertification emergent in the early 1990s. In contrast to the World
Map's portrayal of desertification as a uniform process with a singular uniform
definition, the Atlas presented several maps of different regions of the world, with many
based on divergent interpretations of desertification and its manifestations. Global maps
produced through a standardized methodology derived, not from global estimates of
population or land types, but from the knowledge and observations of numerous "local
experts" at positions throughout the globe. The text accompanying the Atlas also
countered advancing desert notions of desertification, explicitly noted inherent
uncertainties in the maps, and acknowledged a role for climate factors in causing
desertification. As embodied in the Atlas, these themes of plurality, democracy and
uncertainty helped to usher in a new era of desertification policymaking.
5.4.1 Atlas Makers
The Atlas was created by committee. The majority of participants were physical
scientists from fields such as physical geography and soil science. Several institutions
and individuals participated in this process. They included the Desertification Control
Programme Activity Center (DC/PAC) of UNEP, UNEP's Global Environmental
Monitoring System/Global Resources Information Database (GEMS/GRID), and a large
number of individual consultants. A Technical Advisory Group of approximately 14
experts assisted these departments. The chair of this group was Professor Mohammad
Kassas, a soil scientist who had been heavily involved with UNCOD preparations (see
Chapter 3). Two geographers authored the Atlas text: Dr. Nicholas Middleton of the
School of Geography, University of Oxford, UK and Dr. David Thomas of the
Department of Geography, University of Sheffield, UK.14 3
Several data sets were used in producing the global maps and maps of the African
continent included in the Atlas. Two of the primary databases contained measurements
of climatic parameters and soil degradation. The climate data set contained monthly
"43 Thomas and Middleton later authored a book highly critical, not of the Atlas, but of the way UNEP had
portrayed desertification in the 1970s and much of the 1980s.
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mean precipitation and temperature values derived for the Climatic Research Unit (CRU)
of East Anglia, United Kingdom. The Global Assessment of Soil Degradation
(GLASOD) provided soil degradation data. The GLASOD method of data collection
involved a process labeled by Dregne as "structured informed opinion analysis." A
coordinator was assigned for each of 21 regions worldwide. These coordinators collected
published and unpublished soil degradation data. In addition, 250 experts knowledgeable
about local conditions assessed existing information and used a systematic methodology
to collect new information on the type, extent, degree and cause of degradation (e.g.,
water erosion, wind erosion, physical deterioration and chemical deterioration) (Thomas
and Middleton, 1994).
While the global and continental maps relied on a standardized methodology,
several national and regional maps did not. Independent authors not involved in the
GLASOD process contributed individual case study maps showing degradation at sub-
global scales. These authors employed an array of different mapping techniques and
relied on varying interpretations of desertification phenomena. Some, for example,
showed both soil and vegetation degradation, while others focused solely on soil
degradation. Producers also varied in regard to their treatment of climate and social
factors. They employed different metrics for gauging these parameters and different
methods of representation.
So while UNEP and natural scientists remained at the helm of this cartographic
enterprise, the process of Atlas production marked changes in participation, aggregation
and standardization. Atlas contributors encompassed a broad range of individuals
working at local, regional and global scales. While some participants gathered
information in each of the 21 regions and others developed individual regional and
national maps, UNEP and its various consultants focused mainly on tasks of coordination
and synthesis. Techniques of aggregation differed markedly from those employed in
1977. Creators of the World Map, for example, employed ready-made global measures
of climate and human and animal populations to develop their global picture of
desertification. In contrast, aggregate measures displayed in the Atlas derived from a
"bottom-up" process whereby numerous assessments and observations took place at local
and regional levels before they were aggregated. The multiplicity of maps in the Atlas
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signaled UNEP's departure from a singular, universal definition of desertification. By
including maps based on differing methodologies and divergent definitions, UNEP
acknowledged desertification's complexity and its varying manifestations worldwide.
5.4.2 The Atlas
Most maps in the Atlas portrayed human-induced soil degradation, supplemented with a
relatively small number of maps showing climatic parameters and measures of
vegetation. This 69-page document also contained several charts, graphs and substantial
text organized into three sections: "Global," "Continental Africa," and "Case Studies."
The Atlas included global maps of climatological measures, soil degradation (Figure 8)
and soil degradation and vegetation (Figure 9). It also provided maps of various forms of
soil degradation categorized according to the type of physical mechanisms responsible
for them. These mechanisms included water erosion, chemical deterioration, and
physical deterioration.. Additional global maps depicted areas of soil degradation
resulting from deforestation, overgrazing, agricultural activities, and overexploitation of
vegetation for domestic use. The continental Africa chapter contained all of the above
analyses except those for climate. Eight case studies focused primarily on Asia and
Africa.
The GLASOD maps in the Atlas are said to reflect the definition of desertification
that arose during preparation of UNEP's (1991) assessment. However, because of data
limitations, maps showing vegetation degradation were small in number. As discussed in
Chapters 3 and 4, UNEP convened a Panel of Senior Consultants in Geneva in April of
1991 to discuss a first draft of a revised PACD and to evaluate the definition of
desertification proposed by the Nairobi meeting of the Ad-Hoc Consultative Meeting on
the Assessment of desertification (Odingo, 1990). This Nairobi group defined
desertification as "Land Degradation in Arid, Semi-arid and Dry Sub-humid Areas
resulting from adverse human impact." They also decided, that "Land in this concept
includes soil and local water resources, land surface and vegetation or crops." (UNEP,
1991: 1). However, the Geneva panel decided that a revised desertification definition
should more clearly reflect the role of natural climate variation in exacerbating
desertification. Given that desertification could be climate-induced as well as human-
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induced, the Geneva group defined desertification as "land degradation in arid, semiarid
and dry subhumid areas resulting mainly from adverse human impact" (UNEP, 1991: 2)
(emphasis added).
In applying UNEP's (1991) definition of desertification to the Atlas, its creators
encountered data problems. According to this definition, desertification constituted the
degradation of both soil and vegetation. However, the paucity of data on vegetation
degradation prompted Atlas contributors to adopt a more pluralistic approach to
interpreting and mapping desertification.
The scarcity of data on desertification and the many forms it can take has
necessitated a fresh approach to assessing the problem. It is not realistic to
produce a single map of world desertification. A more viable approach is
to map the many indicators of desertification and the factors that affect
those indicators. (UNEP, 1992: viii).
Hence, many of the global maps and maps of continental Africa reflected soil degradation
rather than a combination of soil and vegetation degradation. Other maps showed
climatic indicators and a combination of soil and vegetation degradation.
The Global Assessment of Soil Degradation (GLASOD) served as the data source
for the global and continental maps. GLASOD provided information on two types of
human-induced soil degradation: degradation resulting from the displacement of soil
material (e.g., via wind or water erosion) and degradation resulting from physical and
chemical processes occurring within the soil. The Atlas pointed out the difficulties of
discerning between human and naturally-induced soil erosion. This is especially
problematic, for example, during a drought period. A category of "non-degraded" lands
included true deserts or hyperarid regions where the ratio of precipitation to potential
evapotranspiration was less than 0.05.
Atlas creators categorized the severity of human-induced soil degradation as light,
moderate, strong or extreme. These levels were determined based on comparison to
"original" conditions and were defined in terms of what types of land use the region is
capable of supporting and the requirements necessary for restoring areas to original
productivity levels. For example, a rating of "moderate" meant "the terrain is still
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suitable for use in local farming systems, but with greatly reduced agricultural
productivity." (UNEP, 1992: 11).
The global and continental maps were developed using UNEP's Global Resources
Information Database (GRID), a system that employs geographic information systems
(GIS) and remote sensing technologies for environmental assessment and monitoring
(LNEP, 1992: ix). GIS enabled the researcher to create maps overlain by several
datasets, thereby depicting the complexity of desertification processes. For example, to
highlight areas prone to water erosion, one could superimpose a map of annual rainfall on
a base map of soil degradation.
Only two of the Atlas' maps (one global and one continental) combined measures
of soil degradation and vegetation. This global map was described as an "integrated
assessment" of overall soil degradation from the GLASOD survey and vegetation
production from the GVI (Global Vegetation Index). The GVI is a satellite-derived
indicator of photosynthetic capacity and the relationship between plant canopy and
evapotranspiration rates. 4 4 The soil degradation and vegetation maps were based on a
twenty-color grade scheme that combined four measures of soil degradation severity with
five levels of the vegetation index. The map did not indicate causal relationships
between indicators and was simply meant to "highlight area within which susceptibility
to soil or vegetation degradation may exist or have been realized" (UNEP, 1992: 23).
Some aspects of the Atlas appeared to speak directly to desertification's critics.
After publications by a number of desertification skeptics during the 1980s (e.g., Spooner
and Mann, 1982; Warran and Agnew, 1988; Hellden, 1988; Ndlson, 1990), UNEP was
particularly interested in constructing the Atlas in a way that was robust and better
insulated from outside challengers. This emphasis on scientifically robust and
reproducible measures was evident in decisions regarding estimates of potential
evapotranspiration (PET). These estimates allowed researchers to calculate aridity (the
ratio of precipitation to potential evapotranspiration). There are three common ways to
determine PET: by direct measurement, using the theoretical Penman equation (1963),
144 The GVI is derived from the Normalized Different Vegetation Index (NDVI), a qualitative index of
photosynthetically active vegetation. The NDVI is derived from surface reflectance data from NOAA's
Advanced Very High Resolution Radiometer (AVHRR) satellite. The GVI is a weekly NDVI value. A
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and using the empirical Thornthwaite (1948) equation.14 5 Penman is a common method
and served as the basis for the 1977 aridity index map prepared for UNCOD. However,
Penman relies on the direct measurement of several variables including solar radiation,
wind velocity, relative humidity and temperature. Because of data scarcity in regard to
these paramters, Atlas creators employed the Thornthwaite scheme and asked the Climate
Research Unit at the University of East Anglia to derive an empirical relationship that
adjusted for the tendency of the Thomthwaite equation to overestimate PET in wet and
cold regions and underestimate it in dry environments. This approach, Atlas authors
claimed, was more "pragmatic" and reduced errors associated with primary data
collection (UNEP, 1992: 5; Interview with UNEP Advisor 3).
The authors also distinguished the advancing desert phenomenon from the
problem of soil degradation. The Atlas, for example, differentiated between areas of
human-induced soil degradation and true deserts of hyperarid regions. Atlas authors
concluded that because these regions are uninhabitable due to climate and lack of
vegetation, human populations are not likely to reside in or degrade them. Throughout its
maps, the Atlas' depiction of desertification emphasized that desertification was not
manifest in shifting desert boundaries, but instead constituted a more systemic problem.
The Atlas further explained that, because of their variability, desert boundaries elude
identification and measurement.
Dryland boundaries are neither static nor abrupt. This is not surprising
given the high interannual variability in mean rainfall and the occurrence
of drought, which may last for periods of several years at a time. Attempts
to locate boundaries on the ground or define them in terms of features
such as natural vegetation are likely to fail (UNEP, 1992: 5).
Hence, with this statement Atlas authors clearly separated their work from earlier
attempts to estimate desert encroachment by researchers such as Stebbing (1935),
Lamprey (1975) and Hellden (1988, 1991). The Atlas authors further suggested that such
efforts were neither scientifically meaningful or defensible.
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GVI value indicates the photosynthetic capacity of plants and the relationship between plant canopy and
evapotranspiration rates (JNEP, 1992: 23).
5.4.3 Problem Framing: Plurality, Complexity and Transparency
UNEP considered the Atlas to constitute part of its "fresh approach" (Cardy, 1991) to
desertification. In some ways it resembled UNEP's attempts to map desertification in the
1970s. In other ways, however, the Atlas represented important departures from previous
cartographic efforts. Like the UNCOD maps, for example, the Atlas emphasized physical
manifestations of desertification. UNEP's objective in creating the Atlas was to "locate
and quantify the nature of the problem" (UNEP, 1992: vii). UNEP believed that this was
necessary before attempting to address the socio-economic aspects of the issue (UNEP,
1992). Like the World Map, the Atlas reflected the mechanics of human-induced soil
degradation and attributed degradation to specific human processes. The Atlas' text, for
example, provided brief descriptions of areas affected by deforestation, overgrazing,
agriculture, and overexploitation of vegetation for domestic use. Also, like earlier maps,
the Atlas depicted desertification as a global problem. The Atlas' preface, authored by
Tolba, was reminiscent of his remarks in 1977. According to Tolba, the Atlas confirmed
that desertification was still a global problem.
Desertification is a global problem, demanding urgent global action. And
this action must involve more than a campaign against the processes of
desertification. It must become an essential part of the broad process of
development and the provision of basic human needs (UNEP, 1992: iv).
Tolba believed that visual representation was among the most powerful means for
communicating desertification's global dimensions. "One of the clearest ways to depict a
global problem is to show it in an atlas. If it is true that one picture tells a thousand
words, it is probably also true that one map of a global situation tells many more than a
thousand words" (UNEP, 1992: iv).
Yet, in many ways, this global picture of desertification was a revised global
picture. In particular it displayed a more pluralistic, complex and transparent
interpretation of land degradation. Instead of presenting one standardized and universal
portrayal of desertification, the Atlas incorporated global and sub-global depictions of
desertification, as well as maps based on different approaches to the study and
145 Meigs used Thornthwaite to estimate aridity in his UNESCO map of world aridity in 1953.
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interpretation of the issue. Its purpose was not simply to support a global framing or
international treaty on the issue, but to introduce methods of analysis and new
understandings about more locally-relevant facets of desertification. Atlas authors
acknowledged the shortcomings of a singularly global vision of desertification and
asserted that worthwhile action on the issue must ultimately derive from activities at the
local level. Emphasis on sub-global aspects of the issue were apparent in the sections on
Africa and in the regional case studies. Both of these sections discussed issues of more
local relevance.
The case studies reflect the diversity of interpretations and methodological
approaches to the study of desertification. These eight analyses focused on Syria; China;
Argentina (central west); Kenya (Baringo); Mali (western area); Mali (west transect);
Tunisia (central north); and former USSR (Aral Sea). The Kenyan and Mali studies were
based on the mapping assessment methodology devised from FAO and UNEP in 1984.
Authors of the Tunisian and Aral Sea studies employed a landscape methodology. Case
studies also emphasized different manifestations of desertification. While the China
analysis examined effects of wind and water erosion, the Argentinean case assessed
desertification hazard (a combination of vulnerability and human pressure).
UNEP's more complex vision of desertification was also evident in the extensive
textual content of the Atlas. This textual component of the Atlas text marked a departure
from UNEP's earlier cartographic enterprises. In keeping with the spirit of simplification
and proximate solutions, the UNCOD maps were intended to relay a simple and clear
picture of desertification. Consequently, texts accompanying those maps contained brief
notes on methodology and very little or any discussion of map interpretation. In contrast,
Middleton and Thomas authored a descriptive account of the maps, explaining the
meaning of the various representations, the methods employed, and the nature of
uncertainty inherent in the maps. The inclusion of considerable textual accompaniment
to the maps suggested that desertification was not easily captured in map format. It was a
complex process whose analysis was uncertain and open to a variety of different
interpretations.
Greater textual content also enabled a greater transparency in regard to map
making methodologies and underlying assumptions. Through the text, Atlas authors
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made explicit many simplifications and uncertainties inherent in the maps. Middleton
and Thomas, for example, pointed out difficulties of distinguishing between human and
naturally-induced soil degradation, noting that this distinction was inevitably a subjective
one. They also explained that the method of coloring the polygon's of the GLASOD
database tended to exaggerate the spatial extent of desertification. These authors further
noted that regions of aridity as represented in the maps did not indicate homogenous
climates. All of these discussions reflected a more complex vision of desertification and
greater acknowledgement of the map audience. Creators of the Atlas did not attempt to
let the maps stand on their own, as complete visual statements about desertification.
They supplemented these visual images by communicating to viewers the assumptions
and methodological choices not visible in the maps themselves.
5.4.4 Debating Desertification's Global Dimensions
The Atlas was distributed to delegates at the United Nations Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED). However, debates that ensued over the global nature of
desertification suggest that maps played a less prominent role in these negotiations than
they did in the 1970s. While Tolba believed that the Atlas persuasively reinforced a
global framing of desertification, participants in the preparatory process for the United
Nations Conference on Environment and Development disagreed as to the global or
regional nature of the desertification problem. In the end delegates agreed to an
international treaty on the issue, but only after resolving North-South disagreements
regarding the justification for such an agreement. The seemingly decreased role for maps
at UNCED seemed to signal the beginning of a lessening role of modern scientific
inquiry in the context of international desertification policymaking.
At Preparatory Committee IV for UNCED, members of Working Group I,
attempted to finalize the draft text for what later became Chapter 12 of Agenda 21
(A/CONF.151/PC/1OO/Add.17). By the end of the session, Working Group I had reached
consensus on the entire text except for two paragraphs concerning a future desertification
convention (ENB:04:01). While Africa and other developing countries favored this
treaty, many of industrialized countries opposed it, arguing that institutions to address
289
desertification already existed and that the use of resources required for a new convention
were not warranted.
When Working Group I convened in June 1992 at the Rio Summit, Tommy Koh,
Chair of Working Group I held meetings with interested parties on the possibility of
calling for a desertification convention. While some delegates preferred a.regional
convention to address desertification in Africa only, others called for a global treaty.
Informal discussions on this topic took place among delegates throughout the day, with
some reporting a compromise was close at hand (ENB:02:07). The US, which had
previously favored a regional convention for Africa, changed its position in support of an
international desertification convention. However, several developed countries continued
to call for a regional, rather than a global convention (ENB:02:08).
When the Main Committee reconvened for its last scheduled session on June 9,
1992, issues still not agreed upon included the question of an international desertification
convention (ENB:02:08). When the text for Chapter 12 reached the Main Committee on
Tuesday/Wednesday (at an overnight meeting), it contained two bracketed paragraphs
concerning the G-77's call for a binding desertification convention. The United States
did not support this proposal and Tommy Koh established consultations on the issue.
The US changed its position in the midst of these deliberations and agreed with the
proposal to prepare an international desertification convention for 1994 for countries
vulnerable to desertification and drought (ENB:02:13). Koh also made comments
indicating that the EC, too, had changed its position (ENB:02:09).
However, the question of desertification's global dimensions threatened to
muddle the fate of the compromise text that emerged from consultations. The European
Commission had not objected to a proposal for a global convention during the
consultations only 45 minutes before. However, to the surprise of other delegations,
Portugal, on behalf of the EC, rejected the text presented to the Main Committee, arguing
that "desertification is a regional problem, not necessarily warranting global action."
Several developed and developing countries opposed the EC in supporting the plan and
urged the EC to approve its position. These pleadings and a 45 minute adjournment for
several additional consultations, notably between the EC and the African Group,
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ultimately led the EC to change its position and paved the way for a request to UNGA for
an international desertification convention (ENB:02:13; ENB:02:09).
The Atlas could have supported either of the opposing positions in this debate.
On the one hand, it portrayed desertification at global scales, while on the other hand it
emphasized desertification's diversity and the importance of addressing it at local levels.
Neither side, however, used the Atlas to argue its point.
5.5 New Forms of Visualization
The Atlas met a similar fate during negotiation of an international desertification
convention. While, it served as a backdrop to the Intergovernmental Negotiating
Committee on Desertification (INCD) process in 1993-4, the Atlas did not feature
prominently in actual deliberations. Although delegates engaged in debate about the
global character of desertification, they made in frequent reference to the Atlas. Instead,
other forms of visual representation seemed to gain prominence in the new regime. The
Atlas, for example, was presented during an Information Sharing Session (Kassas, 1995),
but speakers throughout the session employed charts, graphs and photographs, as well as
their own maps.
Most of the participants stated that they thought that the information
sharing segment was a success. By the end of the week, it was clear from
the presentations, the overhead projections and the color slides, that
desertification and drought are problems faced all over the world, in both
developed and developing countries. (ENB:04: 11).
Since the start of negotiations, the Desertification Secretariat has included photographs of
desertified areas on its web page. In general, most uses of visual communication in the
current desertification regime have occurred in conjunction with public relations
activities on the part of the Secretariat Diminishing reliance on desertification maps in
the early 1990s signaled both a de-emphasis on desertification as first and foremost a
scientific problem, greater interest in the particularities of desertification at local levels,
and the mustering of support for anti-desertification activities among a wider public
audience.
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Revisiting Debates about Global Dimensions
A decreasing reliance on cartographic representations of desertification was evident in
INCD debates regarding and the global nature of desertification and regional annexes to
the treaty.
Throughout negotiations, developed countries objected to references
characterizing desertification as a "global problem." These countries believed that
labeling desertification in this way implied that desertification was linked to climate
change. Developed countries opposed references to desertification-climate change
interactions because such references might be interpreted as a basis for North-South
compensation. If, for example, desertification were seen as arising from increased
concentrations of greenhouse gases, developed countries could be held at least partly
responsible for the problem and obligated to contribute more resources to its
amelioration.14 6 In the end, the CCD described desertification as "global" in just two
places in the Preamble.
Acknowledging that desertification and drought are problems of global
dimension in that they affect all regions of the world and that joint action
of the international community is needed to combat desertification and/or
mitigate the effects of drought (CCD, 1994: Preamble).
Bearing in mind the relationship between desertification and other
environmental problems of global dimension facing the international and
national communities (CCD, 1994: Preamble).
These references represented a de-emphasis of desertification's global dimensions. They
also downplayed possible relationships linking desertification and climate.
Other major debates on desertification's global dimensions concerned the
inclusion of regional annexes to the Convention. These debates suggested that
desertification's global extent was not definitively established by way of the Atlas, but
was, instead, negotiable. Each regional annex described the particular region's
characteristics and provided guidelines for the content of national action plans, a core
component of desertification policy. Originally, INCD Chair Bo Kjellen, in accordance
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with UN General Assembly resolution 47/188, decided that the CCD would contain a
framework convention and one regional annex directed at urgent anti-desertification
activities in Africa, with other regional annexes to be negotiated subsequently. However,
at the suggestion that priority for Africa take the form of a special instrument of the
treaty, other affected regions clamored for similar treatment. Some Latin American and
Asian countries believed that their problems deserved as much attention as Africa's and
urged that negotiation of their regional annexes take place in conjunction with negotiation
of Africa's regional annex. African country representatives, on the other hand, believed
additional annexes would divert attention from their countries' needs. After many
lengthy debates Latin America and the Caribbean, Asia and the Mediterranean (in
addition to Africa) received annexes under the treaty (ENB:04: 11; Kassas, 1995).
Developed countries had reservations about the feasibility and costs associated
with negotiation of several annexes (ENB:04: 11). Following the first negotiating session,
the Chair undertook consultations with governments in hopes of working out a
compromise on the timing and focus of the annexes. At INCD-2, the G-77 agreed that
the African annex should be finalized by June 1994, with remaining annexes negotiated
during the interim period and brought into force with the Convention and the African
annex (ENB:04:22). All INCD-2 delegates agreed to ask the UN General Assembly for
permission to negotiate annexes for Latin America and Asia. However, to complicate
this matter, Latin American and Asian countries wanted their annexes completed by June
1994. Several other countries agreed, believing that without completion of these
annexes, they would not know the full extent of their obligations under the treaty. Still,
developed countries did not want the annexes to burden them with obligations to supply
various forms of assistance (ENB:04:44). By the end of the third negotiating session, the
timing of regional annexes was still unclear, as was the form that priority for Africa
would take (ENB:04:34). In February 1994, following the third negotiating session,
regional groups from Latin America and Asia took it upon themselves to negotiate their
own regional annexes. By the end of the first week of INCD-4, draft regional
implementation annexes for Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia were tabled in
146 WMO and UNEP sponsored a study of desertification and climate in the early 1990s. This project
culminated in a book by Williams and Balling (1994), drafts of which were reviewed by a panel of experts.
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Working Group II (ENB:04:34). At INCD-5, annexes for Africa, Latin America and the
Caribbean and Asia were agreed upon. A fourth annex, for the Northern Mediterranean
was also added (Kassas, 1995).
Unlike previous desertification policies, the Convention codified North/South
relationships and obligations, thereby negotiating yet another aspect of desertification's
global extent. In previous eras, maps and measures emphasizing the geographic extent of
desertification served as a primary basis for the issue's global framing. While
cooperation between developed and developing countries had always been a key feature
of international desertification initiatives, the Convention was the first multilateral
agreement to outline the responsibilities of each group. Considerable debate ensued
regarding the labeling of categories and the responsibilities assigned to each. Developed
countries were wary that their burden would get too onerous, while developing countries
sought to ensure what they saw as the needed support from industrialized countries.
In the end, the Convention's negotiating committee created two categories of
countries. These categories were labeled "affected countries," defined as "...countries
whose lands include, in whole or in part, affected areas (CCD, 1994: Article 1(I));" and
"developed country Parties" referring to "...developed country Parties and regional
economic integration organizations constituted by developed countries" (CCD, 1994:
Article 1(k)). Affected countries were required to address desertification within a
sustainable development framework, paying due attention to the role of local
participation and socio-economic factors (CCD, 1994: Article 5). Developed country
Parties were obliged to support anti-desertification efforts, provide and mobilize financial
resources and other forms of support, and facilitate access to appropriate technology and
know-how (CCD, 1994: Article 6).'14
New Forms of Visualization
While the Atlas did not feature prominently in INCD debates, other forms of visual
communication have taken hold in the CCD Context. Many of these have been employed
147 Article 4 of the treaty contained general obligations relevant to all Parties to the Convention. These
included adoption of an integrated approach to desertification addressing physical, biological, and socio-
economic aspects; integrated strategies for poverty eradication; promotion of cooperation among affected
country Parties.
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in public relations activities on the part of the Desertification Secretariat. The first of
these appeared during the Information Sharing Session as speakers used photographs,
maps, charts and graphs to communicate their points to delegates and others in the
audience. Even more than the Atlas, these presentations portrayed a broader and more
pluralistic view of desertification. They used different media of visualization, as well as
different interpretations and approaches to desertification.
More recently, visualization in the desertification context has been targeted at an
even wider audience. The Secretariat, for example, has a logo showing an orange sun in
the horizon over an arid landscape (see Figure 10), as if to symbolize the dawn of a new
desertification regime and new desertification paradigm. The Secretariat's web page
shows several photographs of desertified areas and anti-desertification projects, focusing
attention on the local nature of desertification phenomena. The Secretariat is also
bringing its message to film media, by supporting various desertification documentaries
airing on CNN, Euronews and United Nations Television (http://www.unccd.ch/lite). So
as the producers of visual representation have changed in the desertification context, so
have the intended audiences, the media, and the messages of visualization.
5.5 Viewers and Visions
Throughout the twentieth century pictures of land degradation varied according to whose
vision was deemed to matter, what was rendered visible and invisible, and through what
processes these images were displayed. These aspects of visualization helped to
delineate the bounds of participation and tools of representation in terms of institutions
and individuals, natural and social scientists and affected people and outside observers.
As the eyes of the colonial empire, foresters and other researchers photographed and
mapped the routes of their explorations and the extent of degradation they observed. In
the 1970s, UNEP, in emphasizing the scientific and international nature of the
desertification problem, relied on the visions of natural scientists to aggregate physical
measures of desertification and portray them on a world map. As critiques called for a
more complex vision of desertification, UNEP, though still creating a global vision and
emphasizing the physical processes at work, called on natural scientists working at
different scales and with different interpretations and methodologies. Finally, in the
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1990s, as political interest in maps faded, new visualization technologies and means of
communication emerged, with less emphasis on portraying the global extent of
desertification and more interest in illuminating its local characteristics.
For much of desertification's history the people experiencing desertification have
not been the people studying desertification. Consequently, visual images, whether from
colonial researchers or UNEP, have tended to objectify the affected populations rather
than incorporate their perspectives into images of the problem. Stebbing's photographs
showed African people and the Commissioners' maps identified regions of deforestation.
Similarly, the World Map indicated population pressure and regions of rainfed
agriculture. But while affected populations and their practices were made visible through
images, their own visions of desertification were not. Only more recently has an
emergent pluralistic approach to desertification invited a greater diversity of perspectives
on the problem from both those with first hand experience and those from more distant
vantage points.
Visual representations have also embedded the goals and capacities of the image
maker in the image. While Stebbing, in arguing for a transnational forest belt,
downplayed the British-French border from his map, the Commissioner's opposed to
such a policy measure, highlighted the location of this border. UNEP created a vision of
a uniform international problem arising from physical processes and amenable to a
standardized solution. With the recognition of non-governmental organizations and
indigenous knowledge as resources for addressing desertification, visual images began to
reflect perspectives of more local people and particularities of local contexts.
Boundaries demarcated the realms of the visible and invisible and in doing so
portrayed desertification as local or global and physical or social. Global maps of the
1970s erased the personal vision of researchers and the local variability of places
experiencing degradation. The Atlas portrayed a more diverse range of interpretation of
desertification and highlighted local variability in perceptions and ecological conditions,
but continued to render broader social and cultural aspects of the issue invisible. More
recent attempts to represent desertification seem to highlight the role of the audience
rather than that of the image maker. The Secretariat's development of a desertification
logo and desertification documentaries seem more focused on communicating the
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message of the new regime, rather than legitimizing it through scientifically-derived
representations.
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CHAPTER 6
Language and Lessons
This study began with two questions: how do experts, policymakers and institutions
participate in co-production? And how might a deeper understanding of these processes
inform the way we perceive and conduct science and international environmental
policymaking? Chapters 3 through 5 addressed the first question through analysis of
expert advice, quantification and visual representation as both indicators and agents of
change in international desertification policymaking. They demonstrated how practices
and artifacts of science and policymaking embody and allocate decisionmaking power,
define rules of participation, and shape problem framings in ways that conform to
institutional goals and capacities. The present chapter reviews these themes and explores
some of their implications for policymaking.
6.1 Causation Discourses
Multilateral agreements for desertification have embedded causal narratives, widely-held
ideas about sources and solutions of land degradation. These narratives took shape
through practices of expert advice, quantification and visual representation and through
the portable texts, measures and images they generated. In a sense, these practices and
artifacts comprised and gave rise to desertification discourses, formalized languages
through which participants in science and policymaking communicated. By viewing the
history of desertification in terms of changing discourses, we can synthesize much of the
analysis in previous chapters. Examining authorization as a discursive process allows us
to ask who had voice and who did not. In regard to inscription we can ask what causal
narratives were articulated and what form did this articulation take? Boundary work is
integral to both authorization and inscription because it demarcates the realms of local-
global, natural-social and lay-expert. The location and nature of boundaries with regard
to these categories have important implications for who has voice (e.g., natural or social
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scientists, lay people or experts, Africans or international officials), as well as problem
framing and notions of causation (e.g., is the problem local or global). The summary
below provides a brief survey of authorization, inscription and boundary work as
discursive processes.
6.1.1 Voices ofAuthority
In embodying and generating causal narratives, expert advice, quantification, and visual
representations reflected sources of power while at the same time allocating power.
French and British researchers and administrators, for example, were responsible for
detecting, interpreting, and articulating the characteristics of land degradation in West
Africa. Unlike indigenous peoples or even anthropologists, foresters and geographers
were the key contributors to environmental debates of the early twentieth century. Their
views of environmental degradation aligned with paternalistic attitudes toward African
people and colonial ambitions to settle the African frontier. As the voice of
environmental science and policy in colonial West Africa, researchers and administrators
blamed "indiscriminate land use practices" of the African peoples for alleged degradation.
This causal explanation portrayed Africans as both ignorant and responsible for
degradation, effectively silencing any contributions they might have made to the debate.
On the other hand, widespread communication and acceptance of this narrative bolstered
the perceived superiority of European land use methods and further legitimated colonial
scientists and natural resource managers in efforts to understand and ameliorate the
problem.
During the modernist era, UNEP proved to be the primary source of authority in
regard to desertification politics. As discussed in Chapter 3, Mostafa Tolba's interest in
establishing a sound scientific basis for LNEP's activities led the 1977 Conference
Secretariat to rely heavily on the expertise of natural and physical scientists from
developed countries. Emphasis on science as the primary source of authority is clearly
evident in the Plan's identification of "irrational systems of production" as a primary
target of international desertification policy. Just as the colonial policies pointed to the
ignorance and primitive practices of the African people, the Plan ofAction implied that
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livelihood methods of affected populations were inferior to those based on modem
science and technology. This interpretation gave substantial voice to developed country
researchers and buttressed the authority of developed country perspectives. At the same
time, it placed developing countries in the position of receivers, rather than providers of
knowledge.
During the internationalist and pluralist eras, the voices and sources of authority in
desertification politics broadened. UNEP, as a centralizing force in desertification
policymaking was fading from the scene and desertification was seen as arising from
"various factors" and "complex interactions." Though policymakers continued to
consider scientific knowledge and experience in developed countries to be an important
resource, they no longer viewed developed countries as harboring a potential panacea for
the desertification problem. In recognizing, first, the standing of other nations, and,
second, the diversity and intricacies in desertification processes, policymakers showed a
new interest in the experiences of local populations and their interpretation of and
approaches to land degradation. Interest in the local level, in particular, coincided with
the introduction of new ideas and new voices into the policy debate.
6.1.2 Institutional Inscriptions and Policy Prescriptions
Causal models of desertification imply its remedies. For example, sources of degradation
described as "irrational land use practices," or "complex interactions" implicitly prescribe
response measures. The former formulation calls for "rationality," in the form of
scientific investigation or, perhaps, capitalist, market-based behavior. The latter suggests
that a singular solution would not be sufficient, but that a systemic or holistic approach
could be effective. Often remedies for desertification reflected the priorities and
capabilities of dominant institutions. As illustrated above, desertification discourses have
provided means for both symbolizing institutional interests and capacity and inscribing
them in policy.
In the 1930s, colonial administrations were eager to infuse their territories with
European culture, commerce and modes of governance. Bilateral cooperation, however,
was not a key part of this plan. These priorities were clearly evident in
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recommendations of the Anglo-French Forestry Commission. Commissioners rejected
Stebbing's proposal for a transnational forest belt and instead endorsed adoption of
European methods of permanent cultivation along with greater balance among natural
resource departments. These prescriptions aligned with the imperial aspirations of the
French and British governments and furthered their interest in. maintaining balance in the
natural world.
Remedies presented in the 1977 Plan ofAction centered on "proximate solutions"
based on the transfer of modem science and technology from developed countries to
affected areas. This approach supported UNEP's role as a centralized agency directing
desertification initiatives and heavily reliant on scientific expertise. The Plan's policy
prescriptions reflected a simplified vision of the problem and a linear causal model in
which anthropogenic factors (namely, improper land use methods) constituted a primary
and universal causal factor. Often such simplifications are favored because they enable
expedient policy processes (Hoben, 1996). In de-emphasizing climatic factors and
highlighting a need for greater infusion of modern scientific knowledge, the Plan
portrayed desertification as a perfect focus for international policy. The causes and
manifestations of desertification were consistent worldwide, while remedies for these
causes were known, available and aligned with the goals and priorities of UNEP. Hence,
the "narrowing of vision," and careful selection of reality reflected in modernist ideas
about causation afforded control and manipulative ability to institutions in power (see
Scott, 1998). In other words, the simplification of desertification processes seemed at
first to make them manageable.
During the nationalist era UNEP was still the main agency in charge of UN-
sponsored desertification initiatives, and land use methods remained an important target
of international activities. However, UNEP assessments in 1990 and 1991 had begun to
point out the limitations of modernist policies. In calling for an integrated approach to
desertification and sustainable development, Agenda 21 recommended greater attention to
socio-economic factors and participation by local populations. Hence, international
policies were beginning to reflect the interests and concerns, not of large agencies, but of
affected populations.
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As UNEP's role in international desertification politics began to fade, the
Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Desertification developed a new response
to the problem. The "bottom-up" approach, rather than reflecting the goals and capacities
of a key agency or colonial empire, seemed to encompass the interests and concerns of
local populations. The Convention did not set forth specific methods to combat
desertification. Rather, it focused on processes for addressing desertification. A process-
centered policy was perhaps the only meaningful way to recast the vision of
desertification as non-linear, complex and arising from a diverse array of natural and
ecological interactions. In spelling out some elements of this process the treaty promoted
greater participation by women and local organizations, protection and utilization of
indigenous knowledge and practices and a flexible, trial-and-error approach to policy
design. In doing so, the Convention reflected the interests, tools and languages of local
populations rather than those of UN agencies or developed country governments.
6.1.3 Boundaries
Just as causal models of desertification allocated power to some groups and not to others,
discourses of causation and remediation helped to frame desertification as primarily a
local or global problem and to define rules of participation. As part of these processes,
causal models as expressed in policy debates and agreements at once reflected and erected
boundaries. They delineated the nature and extent of the problem, while designating who
was in and who was out of policy dialogues.
The work of Stebbing and the Commission reflected the distinct realms of
colonists and Africans and the responsibilities of France and Britain. The colonists were
the ultimate interpreters and articulators regarding the state of West Africa's environment
and threats to its viability. In holding shifting cultivation responsible for land degradation
in West Africa, colonial researchers talked about affected populations, but seldom with
them. The Stebbing-Commission debate also reflected differing views regarding national
boundaries of degradation. Stebbing as a proponent of progressive desiccation and
advancing desert theories mapped French and British colonies as a single unit and called
for transnational cooperation. The Commission, claiming to find no evidence for most of
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Stebbing's claims, clearly demarcated the boundary separating these two colonies, and
focused attention on local-national issues of agricultural practices and administrative
coordination.
The Plan ofAction portrayed desertification as a global problem. The universal
nature of scientific discourses and their use in generalizing aspects of desertification
processes were key to establishing desertification as an international policy issue.
Desertification's framing as a global problem was considered legitimate, not only because
of its physical extent, but also because of its simplified causal model. Irrational land use,
for example, appeared as a singular, universal cause amenable to the universal laws of
science and technology and the solutions they offered. However, the dialogue that gave
rise to this interpretation of desertification was not universal. While it engaged
policymakers worldwide, developed countries and developed country scientists tended to
dominate discussions about problem diagnosis and policy prescription.
With Agenda 21, international desertification policy began to reflect new visions
of desertification's global dimensions. In highlighting the "various factors" contributing
to desertification, the agreement suggested that desertification could no longer fit a
simplified causal model applicable in a number of different locations. While
desertification remained global in terms of the need for developed country financial and
technical assistance, its framing as a uniform problem worldwide was in flux and greater
attention to local variability and complexity in desertification processes helped open the
door to a wider array of participants.
In acknowledging the complexity and diversity of desertification processes, the
Convention emphasized the local, pluralistic characteristics of desertification and invited
affected populations to contribute to the policy debate and its realization in local settings.
Thus, while desertification remained a "global" problem deserving of an international
treaty, its global character changed. Modernist era policies portrayed desertification as
arising from a singular cause operating worldwide. In contrast, the Convention described
desertification as arising from complex interactions among cultural, ecological and
economic factors, which varied from location to location. Previous agreements
emphasized desertification's global extent and the uniformity in its causes and remedies.
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In contrast, the Convention called for international partnerships in addressing the
problem, but highlighted its variations across different settings. With this recognition of
desertification as a locally contingent but globally distributed phenomenon, the
boundaries that formerly excluded local perspectives from policy debates now
encompassed them. As desertification came to be perceived as a complex process
varying from location to location, it became important to learn from the experiences and
knowledges of affected populations.
6.2 Improving Advisory Processes
Chapter 1 explained how the preceding account of desertification policymaking
challenges conventional theoretical approaches to science and politics. Not surprisingly,
this account also counters a number of assumptions underlying the practice of expert
advice and international environmental policymaking. Received wisdom, for example,
suggests that scientific knowledge and the creation of political order are or should be
separate. Traditional perspectives also imply that "good" and credible knowledge
automatically provides a pathway to more effective policy. In the desertification story we
see that science and governance are unavoidably interdependent. Furthermore, decades of
analysis and expert advice have, at times, done little to make highly complex natural-
social problems tractable. When causal narratives are unclear and wide open to debate,
convergence around a narrow set of problem framings and policy prescriptions (even after
years of research and assessment) may be unlikely. In such cases, changes in prevailing
perceptions of and approaches to the problem will be highly dependent on changes in
broader governance systems and institutional contexts.
By revealing deficiencies in received wisdom about expert advice and global
environmental politics, this analysis also points to some limitations in current evaluative
methods. There are two general forms of critique regarding the creation of policy
relevant science. One school of thought focuses on peer review as the means to ensure
credible, robust knowledge. According to this approach, experts assess the soundness of
one another's knowledge claims by subjecting attendant data, methods and modes of
representation to scrutiny. If these practices adhere to logical empiricist notions of the
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scientific method (see Hiskes and Hiskes, 1986), the resulting scientific findings are
deemed credible and worthy of trust. The second mode of critique emphasizes
participation as important in influencing the reliability and acceptability of knowledge
claims. According to this approach, the soundness and credibility of knowledge depends,
in part, on who is represented during the process of knowledge creation.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, perhaps the largest and
most comprehensive of all global environmental assessments) exemplifies both of the
above-mentioned critical paradigms. Peer review, for example, is integral to the IPCC's
operation as each of the chapters and reports the IPCC publishes are reviewed by a
number of scientists. The second style of critique has significantly influenced the IPCC's
membership. Establishing the equal representation of developed and developing
countries, for example, has been an important goal and a substantial challenge for this
institution. Such equity in membership is widely viewed by scientists and policymakers
alike as important for ensuring the IPCC's credibility. So, in relying on traditional
evaluative criteria, policymakers now recognize wide geographic representation and
gender balance to be important for ensuring the legitimacy of expert advisory processes.
On the whole, however, the composition, structure and mandate of expert institutions
tend to reflect visions of scientific as unproblematic and capable of being settled by
experts. In addition expert bodies tend to portray knowledge as comprising easily
compartmentalized categories of actors whose methodologies and knowledge claims are
largely dictated by nature, have little bearing on most political concerns, and ultimately
carry societies ever closer to true knowledge and effective governance.
In questioning these assumptions we begin to see the shortcomings in
conventional means for designing expert processes and mandates. We can also begin to
move away from standardized expert forums and develop more appropriate and effective
expert advisory processes that address the particular needs and challenges facing
individual regimes. The discussion below uses examples from the desertification case
and the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to motivate several policy
recommendations. These recommendations address three general ways in which
processes for formulating international science policy could be made better: (1) by
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addressing the tendency of regime participants to label governance decisions as purely
scientific considerations and to delegate these decisions to individuals or groups who
operate outside of more democratic negotiating forums; (2) by suggesting ways in which
scientists and policymakers can more explicitly and effectively attend to the practices and
artifacts of science and their implications for participation and responsibility; (3) by
recommending ways for improving upon what has in many cases become a standardized,
default approach for designing expert advisory processes.
6.2.1 Making Governance Decisions Explicit
Prevailing approaches to science advice overlook the interdependence of scientific
knowledge and policymaking and the ways in which knowledge production and
representation both contribute to and are contingent upon problem framing, institutions
and rules of participation. This dual characteristic of knowledge is evident in comparing
desertification policymaking across different policy eras. Analysis of expert advisory
processes, quantification and visual representations reveals that realms of activity we
usually designate as "science" and "politics" are more deeply interdependent than many
scholars and practitioners seem to recognize. Many activities that are assumed to be
purely scientific in nature, have major implications for what sort of governance systems
are put in place, who participates and has authority in these systems, and who is held
responsible for causing and ameliorating environmental degradation. Similarly, the
nature and resources of political institutions can have a tremendous bearing on how
scientific knowledge is produced, disseminated and interpreted. Failure to recognize
these science-policy relationships often results in the delegation of important governance
decisions to autonomous agencies and administrative bodies. Consequently, regime
participants writ large often lack the opportunity to scrutinize critical determinations
underlying policy decisions. Such determinations concern who has authority to interpret
a problem and who is responsible for causing and ameliorating that problem. Yet, when
these issues are not aired in democratic forums they are more likely to become the focus
of deconstructive and destabilizing efforts down the road.
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Throughout the desertification story we see that decisions about knowledge are
often decisions about policy and policymaking, and vice versa. During the 1970s and
1980s, for example, methods of quantification and visual representation helped to
establish the local and global dimensions of dryland degradation and to legitimize the role
of international agencies in helping to formulate and implement desertification policy.
On the other hand, perceptions of desertification as a physical process of global extent
reinforced the assumption that knowledge about desertification should derive from the
natural sciences and should take the form of universal generalizations. During the 1980s,
these expectations led UNEP to devote considerable resources to developing standard
definitions of desertification and measuring its physical manifestations. Nelson (1990),
for example, noted the considerable public and political pressures under which UNEP
conducted its 1984 assessment. When the assessment did not meet widely-held standards
of scientific soundness, the agency and the issue suffered under public scrutiny.
Lessening reliance on scientific understandings of desertification accompanied changes in
acceptable knowledge production and assessment practices. For example, participants in
the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee on Desertification (INCD) accepted a
pluralistic (as opposed to a consensus-based) forum for sharing information and placed
less emphasis on the need for quantitative measures and scientific representations of the
desertification problem.
Yet, despite the seemingly evident interdependence of scientific knowledge and
political order, people engaged in policymaking practice continue to view science and
politics as separate activities. They also tend to assume that scientific activity does not
impinge directly on questions of participation and responsibility. During the 1970s, for
example, UNEP had considerable autonomy in constructing the nature of "expertise" and
relationships linking experts and policymakers. UNEP authorized natural scientists to
study the issue and they drew generalizations about the physical causes and
manifestations of degradation. These generalizations, in turn, buttressed UNEP's framing
of desertification as a global problem, in a way that conformed to the agency's goals and
resources. Delegates at the United Nations Conference on Desertification wanted the
Plan ofAction to include greater attention to social dynamics and socio-economic factors.
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However, UNEP's framing of the problem, was, at that point, so embedded in the Plan,
that these interventions from country representatives had little effect on the final policy.
Ultimately the credibility of UNEP's approach to desertification came under question.
Countries in a position to ameliorate land degradation did not exhibit widespread support
for anti-desertification initiatives.
In the 1990s, the Desertification Secretariat, like UNEP in previous years, made
important governance decisions by way of decisions about knowledge dissemination and
expert advice. The Secretariat, for example, promoted the participation of new types of
experts in the policy process and helped to legitimize categories of local and traditional
knowledge. These activities allowed new voices to enter policy debates. They also
helped to portray affected populations as embodying desertification solutions, rather than
desertification sources. While the International Panel of Experts (appointed by the
Secretariat) included a wider array of natural and social science disciplines than had
earlier assessment activities, this panel, as managed by the Secretariat, played a relatively
minor role in the negotiation process. In contrast, non-governmental organizations,
supported, in part, by the Secretariat, played an important role in knowledge sharing
processes. This new conception of expertise accompanied a decentralized approach to
desertification policy and increased attention to "local knowledge." Greater attention to
indigenous insights and practices suggested that the people who had for so long received
the blame for dryland degradation, now harbored its remedy.
While the Convention's bottom-up policy approach appears stable at present, the
regime may face tougher challenges as participants attempt to link local, disconnected
anti-desertification programs with an international, centralized institutional framework as
embodied by the Conference of Parties. The regime might face other difficulties in
attempting to define "local knowledge" and mobilize its use and dissemination through
international channels. Regardless of whether the Convention proves to be a success or
not, the process by which it was created was problematic. Important determinations
regarding governance and participation were framed as questions concerning science and
expertise, and were not aired in a transparent open way in democratic negotiating forums.
Consequently, these decisions are more susceptible to backlash and deconstruction
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because they were not developed through consensus-based processes involving a broader
array of regime participants.
These examples suggest that when questions about the definition of expert and
expert methodologies are addressed behind closed doors there is greater potential for
credibility crises. These crises can eventually destabilize the dominant framing of an issue
and attendant institutional frameworks aimed at translating this vision into policy action.
While destabilization of a regime may be favorable or unfavorable based on a given set of
normative convictions, repeated deconstruction and reframing of an issue and its
institutional context (without ameliorating the problem) constitutes a waste of valuable
resources and generally undermines efforts to prevent and remedy environmental
degradation.
How can environmental regimes avoid the backlash that the desertification arena
has experienced over the past several decades? A first step is to develop processes and
procedures, which make apparent some of the political implications of presumably
scientific issues and enable regime participants to recognize and act upon the reality that
expert knowledge and its relationship to policymaking will -- and should -- differ to some
extent with every environmental issue. As such, determinations regarding the meaning of
"expert," the composition and organization of expert institutions and expert interactions
with policymaking forums should be revisited anew in the context of each new regime
and periodically reassessed throughout the process of regime formation. More specific
suggestions for new processes and institutional mechanisms appear below.
6.2.2 Defining Expertise and Designing Expert Forums
Practices and Artifacts Matter
Many participants and observers concerned with international environmental politics
operate under the assumption that more science will automatically mean "better"
international agreements. As evidenced by the United Nations Conference on
Desertification, this assumption shapes the allocation of resources and the structure of
science and policymaking activities. However, calls for more science and analysis
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seldom acknowledge how means for producing and communicating knowledge impinge
on problem definitions, policy remedies and institutional design. Science, regardless of
the way it is carried out or represented, is generally equated with progress. As a brief
example, Agenda 21, Chapter 35 "Science for Sustainable Development," calls for more
specialists in a variety of disciplines worldwide (UNCED, 1992). Agenda 21 along with
an Agenda of Science for Environment and Development in the 2 1"t Century (ASCEND),
an international conference held in 1991, called for improved understanding of the
environment via comprehensive scientific assessments and monitoring (Marton-Lefevre,
1994). These documents pay little attention to the various types of knowledge about the
global environment and the different ways it can be developed and represented.
Lack of detail regarding practices and artifacts implies that decisions about how
science is conducted and represented are unproblematic and more dependent on the
ecology of the problem at hand than on the social institutions and political interactions
from which they emerge. However, analysis of desertification maps and statistics suggest
that methods of scientific analysis have had important implications for voice and agency
in processes of policy formation. Similarly, the use of general circulation models in
climate change assessments have been important in establishing emission reduction
strategies as the primary focus of climate change policy. Failure to recognize such
relationships between scientific methods and policy prescriptions obscures a number of
important decisions.
Disciplinary Knowledge Categories May Not be the Most Relevant or Useful
In the desertification case, scientists and policymakers tended to assume that decisions
about what types of knowledge and how it should be organized are self-evident. Expert
assessments of desertification since the 1970s, for example, have been organized
according to disciplinary boundaries and widely-recognized sectors. In preparation for
the 1977 Conference, UNEP asked four small expert groups to write about the
climatological, ecological, social and technological aspects of the problem. In the early
1990s, the Desertification Secretariat selected and organized the International Panel of
Experts according to similar categorizations. In both cases there was little, if any,
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discussion about whether this formulation for expert representation made sense and
would provide the most meaningful knowledge for policymaking purposes. Aside from
case studies prepared for various locations, for example, there was no attempt to
synthesize knowledge about desertification at regional levels. Because UNEP so readily
adopted a default approach to expert organization, there was no opportunity to consider
other options that might have provided more useful ways of understanding
desertification..
The organization of the IPCC also exemplifies potential shortcomings of default
organizational schemes. This massive assessment enterprise (whose membership
numbers in the thousands) consists of three working groups focused respectively on the
science of climate change, socioeconomic impacts of climate change and response
strategies, respectively. The IPCC's structure mimics prevailing notions of global
warming processes whereby emissions lead to temperature rise, which manifests itself in
various ecological, social and economic changes that require human intervention. Hence,
IPCC creators assumed that the causal narrative ascribed to climate change, in addition to
describing environmental processes, should also dictate forums and processes for expert
advice. Implicit in the IPCC's structure is the assumption that the perceived pathway
leading from the source of degradation, to impacts, to responses should provide a
framework for organizing this expert institution. Working Group I involves mainly
climatologists and other physical scientists. Working Group II includes a broader array of
experts concerned with ecological and social processes. Working Group III relies heavily
on the expertise of economists. Regime participants, however, are now sensing the
limitations of this cause-effect organization scheme for expert knowledge. While this
scheme might have made sense during the early stages of regime formation, the IPCC is
now considering reconfiguring its assessment process to reflect regional groupings.
These groupings, it is hoped, will provide knowledge more directly relevant to
policymaking.
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Knowledge is not Monolithic
The tendency to view science as a uniform activity, independent of context and purpose,
hinders efforts to develop more nuanced understandings of expert knowledge and
international environmental policymaking. Participants in the Intergovernmental
Negotiating Committee on Desertification (INCD) had a more pluralistic view of
knowledge than their predecessors. The INCD process involved a wide array of
knowledge providers, and delegates authorized a multidisciplinary roster of experts and
acknowledged alternative forms and sources of knowledge. The Convention identified
non-governmental organizations as possessing valuable expertise. It also emphasized the
importance of local and traditional categories of knowledge.
But while the treaty reflects greater awareness of different forms of knowledge,
they remain for the most part as taken-for-granted categories. Little discussion has
ensued over the various assessment methods (e.g., development of desertification
benchmarks and indicators) and their implications for problem framing and participation.
Similarly, local knowledge though widely noted to be a bedrock feature of policy
implementation has yet to be defined. Local knowledge remains even more elusive than
the black-boxed concept of science. The program of work for the Committee on Science
and Technology calls for development of an inventory of traditional and local technology,
knowledge, know how and practices (A/AC.241/66). Perhaps this will provide a more
comprehensive understanding of local knowledge. Interestingly, however, this inventory
implicitly attempts to standardize and generalize various forms of local knowledge so
they can be transported across geographic and cultural boundaries - thereby rendering
local knowledge paradoxically non-local. These potentially important implications of the
inventory, however, have not received attention during ongoing implementation
activities. Consequently, they may prove problematic as regime participants attempt to
operationalize the vaguely-defined concept of local knowledge.
Expert Forums
While it is too early to judge the efficacy of the new desertification regime, we can in
some respects compare the Plan ofAction and the Convention five years into their
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respective implementation phases.148 Such a comparison suggests that the Convention's
more democratic approach to knowledge production and dissemination may be
facilitating a more stable policy enterprise. Five years after UNCOD, anthropologist and
UNEP consultant Brian Spooner criticized the 1977 Conference for what he viewed as an
undue emphasis on the ecological aspects of desertification. He believed that this
ecological focus detracted from the issue's varied and important social dimensions
(Spooner and Mann, 1982). As discussed in Chapter 3, Spooner's commentary was just
the first of many criticisms identifying what the Plan ofAction and UNEP had omitted or
overlooked in their analyses.
In contrast, the INCD process de-emphasized modern science and did not share
UNEP's penchant for generalizing about the physical aspects of desertification. Instead,
the delegates, the Secretariat, and other participants highlighted desertification's
complexity and variability across local settings. The INCD also facilitated the
participation of alternative experts in forums to share knowledge and develop policy
proposals. While some participants lamented what they saw as a lack of scientific
support for the negotiations (e.g., Kassas, 1995), the regime seems to be progressing
without the prospect of a major credibility crises looming over the horizon. Hence, the
INCD's democratic approach to expert knowledge appears to have generated a more
stable framing of the desertification issue and more widely accepted policy prescriptions.
As regimes for biodiversity and climate change focus increasingly on implementation and
contend with ecological, social, economic and cultural variability at more local levels,
they may find that the democratic approach to knowledge under development in the
desertification arena offers valuable lessons.
Recommendations
There are a number of ways in which participants in international environmental regimes
can more directly and effectively address questions of knowledge and governance. A first
step requires that decisions regarding expertise, scientific methods and expert forums
become more transparent in negotiating forums and undergo reevaluation throughout
148 I is important to keep in mind that the PACD was a negotiated policy statement, while the Convention is
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regime development. In general, members of the regime should address questions such
as: how is science relevant to the policy questions at hand? What types of specialized
knowledge are needed? Who should provide this knowledge? And, how should this
knowledge be communicated? In addressing the first question, regime participants may
collectively determine the types of expertise that they will call upon to inform
negotiations. Specialized knowledge could be legal or climatological or could pertain to
farming practices in a particular location. The second question raises issues about the
authorization of particular knowledge providers, whether they are agency officials, non-
governmental organizations, or natural and social scientists. The question of
communication calls attention to preferred modes of representation, whether they are
numeric, pictorial or verbal. As illustrated in the preceding analysis, decisions about
what knowledge is represented and how it is represented in international policy forums
have important implications for problem framing and participation.
At present these questions are seldom made explicit in political debate. More
often administrative bodies take up these issues in carrying out their mandates, generally
with little reflection regarding the interdependence of science and politics. Hence, new
processes or institutional mechanisms may be necessary in order to introduce these
decisions into broader decisionmaking forums and to make them a more routinized facet
of international environmental policymaking. For example, in making resolutions on
expert advice the United Nations General Assembly and Conference of Parties for various
treaty regimes might begin by addressing a similar set of questions. Alternatively, the
Conference of Parties might designate some of their members to comprise a committee to
serve as a "watchdog" to flag knowledge-policy issues and ensure they receive full
consideration. Such practices should take into account not only what countries participate
in assessment activities, but also what types of experts participate and how they produce
knowledge.
In addition to revising means for authorizing expertise, participants in
international environmental regimes should rethink the design of expert advisory panels
and processes and relationships linking experts and policymakers. Institutional
a legally-binding treaty.
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mechanisms for scientific and technological advice have become an automatic,
standardized feature of international environmental regimes. People who participate in
the design of such advisory bodies tend to assume that scientific expertise constitutes the
only, or at least the most important, form of specialized knowledge. Treaties for climate
change, biodiversity loss and desertification, for example, all call for the creation of
panels and committees to handle technical issues. In considering the composition and
organization of advisory panels participants in these regimes often fall back on a default
formulation. They are primarily concerned, for example, with ensuring geographic
diversity or national representation of panel members and often organize these bodies
according to disciplinary specialties or sectors such as water resources, forestry, and
agriculture. Generally, expert panels are separated from decisionmaking bodies.
Advisory activities precede policy deliberations and written reports provide the main
form of communication between expert and non-expert realms. Despite its widespread
use, this approach to expert advice is unlikely to be advantageous for all issue areas and
policymaking settings. Yet, in adopting this standard approach, regime participants
seldom reflect critically on the meaning of "expert" and on which modes of expert-
policymaker communication are optimal for a given regime.
It follows from this dissertation's argument, there is no "right" way to structure
advisory processes. However, international regimes can incorporate procedures for
encouraging greater reflexivity in regard to the design and functioning of expert advisory
mechanisms. Instead of adopting a single standard scheme for all expert advisory
processes, regime participants should consider the nature of expert forums in light of the
particular issues the regime addresses. Questions that could guide the design of expert
advisory processes include: what forums for expert deliberations (e.g., open, conference-
like seminars or closed-door expert panels) would be most useful in addressing the policy
questions at hand; what criteria should policymakers employ in selecting experts to
participate in the regime (e.g., academic credentials, experience, familiarity with local
conditions); how should experts and policymakers interact and communicate; and how (if
at all) should expert deliberations intersect with policymaker deliberations? In answering
these questions, policymakers and administrators will be in a better position to tailor
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advice and advisory forums to meet the particular needs of regime participants. By
revisiting these questions periodically throughout regime development, regime
participants can revise expert advisory processes accordingly and ensure that they meet
the changing needs of the regime.
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APPENDIX A
Members of the International Panel of Experts on Desertification (IPED)
1) Teresa Mendizabal Aracama, Spanish Council for Scientific Research, Spain.
2) Robert Balling, Director, Office of Climatology, Arizona State University, USA.
3) Stein W. Bie, Norwegian Center for International Agricultural Development, Norway.
4) Bert Bolin, Chairman, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (WMO), Geneva.
5) Moulaye Diallo, Conseiller Techinique, Minist&e du Developpement Rural de
l'Environnement, Mali.
6) L. N. Harsh, Central Arid Zone Research Institute, India.
7) Mohammed Adel Hentati, Ministere de l'Environnement et de l'Amenagement du
Territoire, Tunisia.
8) A.M. A. Imevbore, Director, Institute of Ecology, Obaferni Awolowo University of
Nigeria.
9) Hiroshi Kadomura, Department of Geography, Tokyo Metropolitan University, Japan.
10) Nikolai G. Kharin, Desert Research Institute, Turkmenistan.
11) Wang Lixian, President, Faculty of Water and Soil Conservation, Beijing Forestry
University, China.
12) H. N. Le Houerou, Centre d'Ecologie Fonctionelle et Evolutive, Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique, France.
13) Seeiso D. Liphuko, Executive Secretary, Ministry of Local Government, Land and
Housing, Botswana.
14) Youba Sokona, Environnement et Developpement du Tiers Monde (ENDA), Senegal.
15) Brigitte Th6baud, Rural Economist, Canada.
16) Camilla Toulmin, International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED), UK.
17) Carlos Weber, Corporation Nacional Forestal, Chile.
318
APPENDIX B
Interviews
Interviews were conducted between November 1995 and January 1999. Two
interviewees requested that their names not appear in the text. These individuals are
referenced according to their position in regard to desertification negotiations and
assessment activities (e.g., IPED Member or Secretariat Staff).
Of course it was not possible to interview scientists and colonial administrators who
worked in the French and British colonies of West Africa during the 1920s and 1930s.
Fortunately many of their writings relay a strong sense of their personal convictions on a
variety of issues relevant to this research. Wherever possible I rely on excerpts from
these writings to give voice to their authors.
Each of the interviews listed below informed the thesis. Some, but not all, of the
interviews are specifically cited or quoted in the text.
Robert Balling, IPED Member, Consultant to UNEP and WMO; Professor of
Climatology, Arizona State University, USA, interviewed November 3, 1995.
Avard Bishop, Legal Advisor to the Desertification Secretariat, interviewed February 10,
1997.
Silvaifo Briceno, Desertification Secretariat, interviewed February 11, 1997.
Ann Carey, United States Delegate to the International Negotiating Committee on
Desertification; Special Assistant for Strategic and Natural Resources Issues, United
States Department of Agriculture, Natural Resources Conservation Service, interviewed
March 5, 1998.
Harold Dregne, UNEP Consultant on Desertification during the 1970s and 1980s;
Professor of Soil Science, Texas Tech University, USA, interviewed November 8, 1995
and March 8, 1998.
Michael Hulme, UNEP Consultant during the late 1980s and early 1990s; Climatic
Research Unit, University of East Anglia, UK, interviewed May 13, 1998.
IPED Member 1, interviewed May 12, 1998.
IPED Member 2, interviewed May 13, 1998.
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Douglas Johnson, UNEP Consultant for the United Nations Conference on
Desertification; Professor of Geography, Clark University, interviewed June 29, 1998.
Beaumont McClure, Delegate to the International Negotiating Committee on
Desertification; Special Assistant for International Programs, United States Bureau of
Land Management, interviewed January 7, 1997.
Michael Mortimore, Senior Research Associate, Department of Geography, University of
Cambridge University, UK, interviewed May 14, 1998.
Claude Mottier, Desertification Secretariat, interviewed February 11, 1997.
Sharon Nicolson, Professor of Climatology, Florida State University, interviewed April
17, 1998.
Robert Ryan, Special Advisor to the Desertification Secretariat, interviewed November
27, 1995 and
Per Ryden, International Union for the Conservation of Nature, interviewed May 13,
1998.
Ian Scoones, Agricultural Ecologist, Fellow of the Institute for Development Studies,
University of Sussex, UK, interviewed May 17, 1998.
Brian Spooner, UNEP Consultant on Desertification during the 1970s and 1980s;
Department of Anthropology, University of Pennsylvania, USA, interviewed March 17,
1998.
Jeremy Swift, UNEP Advisor during the 1980s; Development Economist and Fellow of
the Institute for Development Studies, University of Sussex, UK, interviewed May 17,
1998.
David Thomas, UNEP Consultant on the World Atlas of Desertification (1992);
University of Sheffield, UK, interviewed May 13, 1998.
Ralph Townley, Special Assistant to the Executive Director of the United Nations
Environment Program, interviewed January 18, 1999.
United Nations Official, interviewed January 4, 1999.
Andrew Warren, UNEP Consultant for the United Nations Conference on Desertification;
Ecology and Conservation Unit, University College London, UK, interviewed May 15,
1998.
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